

NUOVA **ANTOLOGIA**
MILITARE
RIVISTA INTERDISCIPLINARE DELLA SOCIETÀ ITALIANA DI STORIA MILITARE

N. 6
2025

Fascicolo 24. Novembre 2025
Storia Militare Contemporanea (6)



Società Italiana di Storia Militare

General Editors: Virgilio Ilari, Jeremy Black, Giovanni Brizzi.

Legal Editor (dir. responsabile Gregory Alegi **Ed. executive (comitato di redazione):** Viviana Castelli, Alessandro Carli, Emiliano Bultrini, Francesco Biasi, Francesco Pellegrini.

Special appointee for Intl cooperation: Dr Luca Domizio.

Scientific Editorial Board : Foreign members: Prof. Jeremy Armstrong, Christopher Bassford, Floribert Baudet, Stathis Birtachas, Lee L. Brice, Loretana de Libero, Fernando Echeverria Rey, John France, Francisco García Fitz, Tadeusz Grabarczyk, Gregory Hanlon, Rotem Kowner, Armando Marques Guedes, Harold E. Raugh Jr, Yannis Stouraitis: **Italian members:** Giampiero Brunelli, Aldino Bondesan, Piero Cimbolli Spagnesi, Alessandra Dattero, Immacolata Eramo, Carlo Galli, Maria Intrieri, Roberta Ivaldi, Nicola Labanca, Luigi Loreto, Luca Loschiavo, Serena Morelli, Francesco Somaini, Gioacchino Strano, Giusto Traina, Federico Valacchi.

Senior Academic Advisory Board. Prof. Massimo de Leonardis, Magdalena de Pazzis Pi Corrales, John Hattendorf, Yann Le Bohec, (†) Dennis Showalter, Livio Antonielli, Marco Bettalli, Antonello Folco Biagini, Franco Cardini, Piero del Negro, Giuseppe De Vergottini, Gian Enrico Rusconi, Carla Sodini, Donato Tamblé,

Special Consultants: Lucio Caracciolo, Flavio Carbone, Basilio Di Martino, Antulio Joseph Echevarria II, Carlo Jean, Gianfranco Linzi, Edward N. Luttwak, Matteo Paesano, Ferdinando Sanfelice di Monteforte, Simonetta Conti, Elina Gugliuzzo, Vincenzo, Angela Teja, Stefano Pisu, Giuseppe Della Torre

Nuova Antologia Militare

Rivista interdisciplinare della Società Italiana di Storia Militare

Periodico telematico open-access annuale (www.nam-sism.org)

Registrazione del Tribunale Ordinario di Roma n. 06 del 30 Gennaio 2020

Scopus List of Accepted Titles October 2022 (No. 597)

Rivista scientifica ANVUR (5/9/2023) Area 11, Area 10 (21/12/2024)



Direzione, Via Bosco degli Arvali 24, 00148 Roma

Contatti: direzione@nam-sigm.org ; virgilio.ilari@gmail.com

©Authors hold the copyright of their own articles.

For the Journal: © Società Italiana di Storia Militare

(www.societaitalianastoriamilitare@org)

Grafica: Nadir Media Srl - Via Giuseppe Veronese, 22 - 00146 Roma
info@nadirmedia.it

Gruppo Editoriale Tab Srl -Viale Manzoni 24/c - 00185 Roma

www.tabedizioni.it

ISSN: 2704-9795

ISBN Fascicolo 979-12-5669-253-8

NUOVA **ANTOLOGIA**
MILITARE
RIVISTA INTERDISCIPLINARE DELLA SOCIETÀ ITALIANA DI STORIA MILITARE

N. 6
2025

Fascicolo 24. Novembre 2025
Storia Militare Contemporanea (6)



Società Italiana di Storia Militare



Estandart Reyau d'a Cheneralísma, prencipal bandera carlista d'a primera guerra bordada por María Francisca de Braganza em 1833 Royal Standard of the General in Chief, main Carlist flag of the First War embroidered by Maria Francisca de Braganza in 1833). Wikimedia Commons

“Boot Soles of War”:

Production, distribution, consumption and value of military shoes in Czech Provinces during the Great War¹

by MARTIN JEMELKA – VOJTĚCH KESSLER

ABSTRACT: Footwear is a material constant of human existence. In addition, it is a strategic part of the military supplies. In this study, footwear is analysed as an important part of army equipment during the First World War and as an object comprising both social functions and symbolic meanings. Previous research in traditional military historiography has paid little attention to this subcomponent of military equipment. Therefore, the presented study is focused not only on the history of military shoe production, especially in the context of the First World War but also sheds light on the changes associated with the industrialization of the shoe industry during the war. The study focuses on the interweaving of military, economic and product history.

KEYWORDS. CISLEITHANIA; FIRST WORLD WAR; MILITARY SHOES; PRODUCTION; CONSUMPTION; SHOE INDUSTRY

Introduction

Wearing shoes is a material constant of human existence. In the long time since mankind learned to protect feet and legs with shoes and their accessories, footwear has acquired many practical functions, social roles and symbolic meanings.² Military footwear is no different. It is an important part of military equipment, but also a social construct that fulfils a range of functions, roles and meanings in both military and civilian life.³ German histo-

1 The study was conducted as part of the GAČR-funded project No. 21-03708S “The Shoemakers’ War: Shoemaking and the Shoe Industry in Cisleithania during the First World War”, carried out at the Masaryk Institute and the Archives of the Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic in Prague (project leader doc. PhDr. Martin Jemelka, Ph.D.).

2 Paul WEBER, *Der Schuhmacher: Ein Beruf im Wandel der Zeit*, Stuttgart, AT Verlag, 1988, pp. 6–15.

3 Anne SUDROW, *Der Schuh im Nationalsozialismus: Eine Produktgeschichte im deutsch-britisch-amerikanischen Vergleich*, Göttingen, Wallstein 2010, p. 14.

rian Anne Sudrow has discovered footwear as a suitable object of research which shows the overlap of the consumption patterns of the military and civilian sectors, the conditions of stable consumption and the elastic market.⁴ The intersection between the military and the mass production of (military) footwear is deeper than one might think at first glance. It was mass consumption of standardized footwear by modern armies on the European and North American continents that provided the decisive impetus for the emergence of the modern footwear industry. This led to the establishment of entire production regions that were geared towards the mass production of military footwear.⁵ It is therefore even more surprising how little attention Central European economic and military historiography has paid to the history of shoe production for the army and the history of the shoe as part of military equipment.

Military historians cannot complain about the lack of publications on equipment of the past armies. On the contrary. Catalogues of uniforms and equipment are a traditional genre of military historiography. However, looking for information on military footwear in these narrative and detailed publications, one is surprised at the chronic lack of interest in military footwear. Classic overview publications provide information on the structure of the army, its ranks and uniforms, but ignore military footwear.⁶ With a few exceptions, even the information-rich publications on German uniforms and equipment lack a description of footwear. The reader must make do with the exceptional references to pants⁷,

4 Ibid, p. 12.

5 Heike WITTMER – Luis WITTMER, *Pirmasens: Einst & jetzt*, Erfurt, Sutton, 2023, p. 118.

6 Adalbert MILA, *Geschichte der Bekleidung und Ausrüstung der Kgl. Preußischen Armee 1808 bis 1878*, Berlin, Mittler, 1878; Paul PIETSCH, *Die Formations- und Uniformierungs-Geschichte des preußischen Heeres 1808–1914*, Vol. I and II, Hamburg, Schulz, 1966; *Die Uniformen und Fahnen der deutschen Armee: Erste Abtheilung Uebesichtliche Farbendarstellungen der Uniformen, sowie Fahnen und Standarten der Deutschen Armee*, Leipzig, Verlag von Moritz Ruhl, 1897; Herbert KNÖTEL – Herbert SIEG, *Handbuch der Uniformkunde*, Hamburg, Helmut Gerhard Schulz, 1937; Jan K. KUBE, *Militaria der deutschen Kaiserzeit – Helme und Uniformen 1871–1914*, Munich, Keyzers, 1977; R. HABER, *Die Cavallerie des Deutschen Reiches: deren Entstehung, Entwicklung und Geschichte, nebst Rang-, Quartier-, Anciennitäts-Liste und Uniformierung*, Hannover, Biblio-Verlag, 1877; M. JUDEX, *Uniformen: Distinctions- und sonstige Abzeichen der gesammten k. k. österr.-ungar. Wehrmacht sowie Orden und Ehrenzeichen Oesterreich-Ungarn*, Troppau, Strasilla, 1884; Jürgen KRAUS, *Die feldgraue Uniformierung des deutschen Heeres 1907–1918*, Vol. I, II, Wien, Biblio-Verlag 2009.

7 Cf. *Uniformenkunde das deutsche Heer: Friedensuniformen bei Ausbruch des Weltkriegs*

gaiters⁸ and boots, but without the necessary description.⁹ Is the reader supposed to think that military uniforms end with pants or gaiters? Why is footwear and its regulations overlooked in the existing literature on uniforms and equipment? What is the role of footwear among military equipment and its regulations? What were the situation and conditions of the Austro-Hungarian footwear industry in the years of the First World War? What role did the army, and the First World War play in the late industrialization of the shoe industry? Was the army involved in the production, distribution and utilization of military footwear during the war? If so, what role did rationalization, standardization and quality control play in production, distribution and recycling?

This study, which is part of a project on the history of the shoe industry in Cisleithania up to the end of the First World War and the transformation of the hitherto predominantly artisanal shoe production into a modern industry, is dedicated to these topics at the intersection of military, economic and product history. The Bohemian lands became its centre in Central Europe in the interwar period.¹⁰

The lack of interest in historical military footwear and the history of its manufacture is determined by the sources. Army dress regulations are certainly not a sought-after source for economic or military historians. Rather than specialists in product history, historical reenactors are the ones who reach for them.¹¹ Archival research often does not yield the expected results either: The documents from the period after the First World War have largely survived the shredding of the company archives of the Cisleithanian shoe factories. The archives of the central government agencies and the military archives are also a labyrinth. One example of this is the XIII. *Abteilung: Montur* (Assembly Department) of the *k.u.k. Kriegsmministerium* (War Ministry) in the Vienna War Archives. Despite the size of the

ges, Vol. I, Hamburg, Verlag v. Diepenbroick-Grüter & Schulz, 1935; *Uniformenkunde das deutsche Heer: Friedensuniformen bei Ausbruch des Weltkrieges*, Vol. II: Cavalry, Hamburg, Verlag v. Diepenbroick-Grüter & Schulz, 1939.

8 Klaus LÜBBE, *Deutsche Uniformen und Seitengewehre 1841–1945*, Hamburg, Niemann Verlag, 1999, p. 29.

9 Ibid, p. 88. For Austrian militaries, see *ibid*, pp. 111, 113.

10 Willi SCHÄCHTER – Michael WAGNER (eds.), *Vom Zunft Handwerk zum modernen Industriebetrieb: Schuhe und Schuhherstellung in Deutschland seit dem 18. Jahrhundert*, Hauenstein, Museum für Schuhproduktion und Industriegeschichte Hauenstein, 1998, p. 84.

11 In this context, we would like to thank the members of military history societies and the manufacturers of historical reenactment equipment, namely Martin Tichý, Tomáš Kykal, Ondřej Král and others, for their selfless help.

collection itself, the disparate presentation of the source material on footwear is striking when compared, for example, with the obsessive attention paid to signs of military distinction and their regulations in the early months of the war.¹² The indistinguishability of ordinary men's footwear and its early wear and tear in battle is certainly one reason why even in the specialized collections of military footwear in army museums, shoes from the First World War period play a marginal role (see the collection of military footwear in the Bundeswehr Museum of Military History).¹³ The situation is similar in the collections of regional museums and memorial institutions, where only a few civilian shoes from the First World War period can be found.¹⁴

Economic historians neglect the history of the shoe industry during the First World War. They usually pass over the problematic by referring to the wartime boom in the shoe industry,¹⁵ or incorrectly speak of the decline of the leather industry, as they are misled by the boom in armaments and general heavy industry.¹⁶ In doing so, they have for decades overlooked the revolutionary changes that accompanied the mobilization of industry for the needs of war and its considerable potential for the study of the war economy. Our research is also influenced by contemporary historiographical trends, including military history.¹⁷ The study of historical footwear as a strategic component of equipment also corresponds with two current public debates that are preoccupying both experts and the general

12 See Österreichisches Staatsarchiv (ÖSA), Kriegsarchiv (KA), Kriegsministerium (KM), fonds XIII. Abteilung (Montur), 1914; Cf. M. JUDEX, *Orden und Ehrenzeichen Österreich-Ungarns: Nach authentischen Quellen bearbeitet*, Troppau, Strassilla 1903.

13 We would like to take this opportunity to thank the staff of the Bundeswehr Museum of Military History (Dresden) who made the collection of military footwear available to us, namely Anett Rauer (Library) and Dr. Gerhard Bauer (Senior Scientific Advisor and Acting Head of the Museum Operations Department, Scientific Director and Subject Area Manager for Uniforms and Field Insignia).

14 Shoe collections of the regional museums in Jihlava and Litomyšl.

15 Zdeněk JINDRA, *První světová válka*, Praha, SPN 1984, pp. 196–197.

16 Zdeněk JINDRA, «České země v rakousko-uherském válečném hospodářství 1914–1918», in Ivan Jakubec – Zdeněk Jindra (eds.), *Hospodářský vzestup českých zemí od poloviny 18. století do konce monarchie*, Praha, Karolinum, 2016, pp. 446–494.

17 Joanna BOURKE, «New Military History», in Matthew Hughes – William J. Philpott (eds.), *Palgrave Advances in Modern Military History*, London, Palgrave 2006, pp. 271–287; Stig FÖRSTER, «Vom Kriege: Überlegungen zu einer modernen Militärgeschichte», in Thomas Kühne – Benjamin Ziemann (eds.), *What is Military History?* Paderborn, Schöningh 2000, pp. 265–281.

public. The first debate concerns modern technology, including equipment (footwear), in contemporary warfare from the Russian-Ukrainian front to the Middle East. Complaints about the lack of basic equipment for Russian troops are proof of the reliance on the numerical superiority of human resources over high-quality equipment and weapons.¹⁸ The effects of the global COVID-19 pandemic and the subsequent war-related energy crisis in Central Europe have raised the question of the self-sufficiency of (Central) European industry and independence from Asian imports, which have threatened the existence of Central European shoe factories in recent decades. One example of this is the closure of the Botana Skuteč (Skutsch) shoe factory in the Czech Republic, which dates back to the mid-19th century and was linked to the former military shoe contracts. A pandemic, an energy crisis and problematic management shut the company's doors at the beginning of 2023.¹⁹ The history of footwear and its production is therefore a current and research-relevant topic, at least in Central Europe, which is the focus of public attention and this study.

The army as an actor in the industrialization of shoe production in Central Europe

The army was one of the first, if not the first, mass consumer of mass-produced and standardized footwear.²⁰ Long-term and extensive military contracts for military footwear were the reason for the emergence of entire production regions in Western Europe that were geared towards the manufacture of (military) footwear. For example, the foundation stone for the German shoe industry centre in Pirmasens was laid as early as 1790, when Landgrave Ludwig IX's army was disbanded after his death and demobilized soldiers found work in the shoe industry.²¹ However, seasonal shoemaking had already been the only accepted occupa-

18 Vasabjit BANERJEE – Benjamin TKACH, «Russia-Ukraine and Israel-Hamas Wars Reveal the Importance of Weapons Production», *The Diplomat*, 16. 12. 2023. (<https://thediplomat.com/2023/12/russia-ukraine-and-israel-hamas-wars-reveal-the-importance-of-weapons-production>)

19 https://chrudimsky.denik.cz/zpravy_region/botas-nepolozily-drahe-energie-ale-nescho-pny-management-tvrdi-lide-ve-skutci-202.html

20 Werner SOMBART, *Krieg und Kapitalismus*, Munich, Leipzig, Duncker & Humblot, 1913, pp. 151–173.

21 Heike WITTMER – Luis WITTMER, *Pirmasens: Einst & jetzt*, Erfurt, Sutton, 2023, p. 108.

tion for professional soldiers before then, giving rise to a cultural type of soldier (guard) shoemaker.²² In the 18th century, several supplier regions also formed in the Bohemian lands, which owed their development to irregular contracts for military footwear.

The oldest of these was probably the town of Třebíč (Trebitsch) in the Bohemian-Moravian Highlands. The Budischowsky family's tannery already benefited from the increased demand for leather during the Seven Years' War (1756–1763) and was already regularly fulfilling orders for leather used for equipment at the end of the 1840s. In the 1860s at the latest, it began producing military footwear. Orders for both warring parties in the Russo-Turkish War (1877–1878) gave the company a new lease of life: the family business exported equipment and shoes to numerous European countries and became the most important supplier of leather equipment in the entire monarchy in the 1880s.²³ It secured its privileged position among the military suppliers of leather and footwear through dominant participation in consortium companies of leather equipment suppliers.

The need for military footwear during the Seven Years' War and the construction of fortresses in Hradec Králové and Josefov near Jaroměř (1780) also drew the attention of the era to the East Bohemian towns of Pardubice²⁴ and Skuteč with its shoemakers' guild (1534).²⁵ After 1848, the shoemakers of Skuteč became manufacturers of so-called commission shoes (*komiska*). Their production reached its peak around 1860 when they delivered shoes worth 500,000 guilders to the state every year. The decline of the Skuteč shoemakers came before the economic crisis of 1873 when the production of military shoes was monopolized by consortia of contractors. With the Balkan Wars and the outbreak of the First World War, the production of military footwear in Skuteč was reestablished again.²⁶

22 Emanuel ŠKORPIL, «O litomyšlských ševcích», *Od Trstenické stezky*, 5, (1927), pp. 72–75.

23 Jens BUDISCHOWSKY, «Das Lederunternehmen Carl Budischowsky & Söhne», *Adler: Zeitschrift für Genealogie und Heraldik*, 26, (2012), pp. 279–304; Jaroslav MEJZLÍK, *Dějiny Závodů Gustava Klimenta Třebíč-Borovina*, Třebíč, Závody G. Klimenta, 1972, pp. 13–14, 17–20, 30–31, 80–84.

24 Johann Gottfried SOMMER, *Das Königreich Böhmen*, V. Band: Chrudimer Kreis, Prag, J.G. Calve'schen Buchhandlung, 1837, p. 76.

25 Jana ZEMANOVÁ, «Obuvnictví na Skutečsku», in *Obuv v historii: Sborník materiálů z III. mezinárodní konference 25–27. září 2000*, Zlín, Muzeum jihovýchodní Moravy, 2001, pp. 67–74.

26 Václav JETMAR, «Skutečské obuvnictví», in *Sborník Vysokomýtsko*, Vysoké Mýto,

Before the First World War, the manufacture of leather equipment was only entrusted to two manufacturing consortia (Lederindustriengesellschaft für Heeresausrüstung von Budischowsky, Fleisch et Consorten and Leder-Industrie Gesellschaft für Heeresausrüstung Bergmann et Consorten), in which Budischowsky dominated. Companies that did not belong to the consortium were essentially denied access to state contracts. This was the case when they tried to offer army shoes made from other materials than leather, as in the case of the Bat'a company from Zlín, which repeatedly failed with offers of canvas shoes for army facilities.²⁷ The monopoly position of the manufacturing consortia was only shaken in the first weeks of the First World War when it became clear that the pre-war contracts could not meet the army's demand for military footwear. While the 1910 census counted 390,000 active soldiers, the number increased almost tenfold after mobilization (3,350,000), and the pressure on the production of military footwear increased accordingly.²⁸ The increase in the consumption of military shoes did not anticipate the continuous growth of the pre-war quota of military shoe supplies: while the number of conscripted soldiers rose from 135,570 to 243,800 between 1912 and 1914, the Conscription Act of October 1913 only increased the annual quota of shoes for the joint army and the other two branches of the armed forces by 31,000 pairs.²⁹ The fluctuating orders for military shoes therefore called upon a whole army of new manufacturers who had no experience in the production of military shoes or at least full leather shoes. Under the conditions of a controlled war economy³⁰, these players struggled to catch up with the technological lead of the consortium companies, especially in the horizontal concentration of production (own tanneries, machine departments, etc.).³¹

Vlastivědná komise školního okresu vysokomýtského, 1931, pp. 393–395.

27 Zemský archiv v Opavě (Regional Archives in Opava, ZAO), pracoviště Olomouc, Obchodní a živnostenská komora Olomouc, svazek 3 – spisy III. manipulace / Akten III. Manipulation (1878–1922), zvláštní výbory a komise, 1905, Dodávky armádě, námořnictvu a četnictvu všeobecně, dossier. 756, inv. no. 6957, sign. V.

28 Michael PAMMER, «Die Vorbereitung von Industrie und Staatsfinanzen auf den Krieg», in Wolfgang Reiter – Herbert Matis – Juliane Mikoletzky (eds.), *Wirtschaft, Technik und das Militär 1914–1918: Österreich-Ungarn im Ersten Weltkrieg*, Berlin, Vienna 2014, p. 61.

29 «Rozmnožování armády v Rakousko-Uhersku», *Obuvník*, 3. 5. 1914, no. 9, p. 6.

30 Max-Stephan SCHULZE, «Austria-Hungary's economy in World War I», in Stephen Broadberry – Mark Harrison (eds.), *The Economics of World War I*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2005, pp. 77–111.

31 PAMMER, p. 54.

Already in the first weeks of the war, the state declared leather to be a strategic war commodity and began to regulate the market for materials and raw materials needed for the production of military and civilian shoes. The production of military footwear largely displaced civilian production, so that businesses without access to the centrally controlled leather market and without labour contracts often either disappeared or struggled to survive. The army militarized production itself through the presence of military supervision. It appointed its representatives to the supervisory boards of the newly created war economy companies (War Central Bureau and trade associations). Above all, however, the emphasis on standards and the quality of the shoes produced during the war favoured some companies that managed to meet the required standards, whether because they were predestined to do so through pre-war production for the army (Budischowsky),³² or because they managed to change their production program and thus obtained contracts for military shoes and gained the status of a company protected by the *Kriegsleistungsgesetzes* (*War Performance Act*, Bat'a, etc.). The army and the war were the driving force behind the rationalization of production, from the handling of raw materials to the division of labour and the recycling of used military footwear. The footwear industry can thus serve as an ideal example of the industrialization of war and the transformation of army staff into war economy management.³³

The rationalization and standardization of production, forced by the centrally controlled war economy for the needs of total war,³⁴ became the driving force behind the late but accelerated industrialization of the shoe industry. Before the war, the basis of the shoe industry was small-scale production and the predominance of manual labour, even in the factories. During the war, the focus of production shifted to factory production. In view of the dwindling stocks of machines of foreign origin and the shortage of raw materials and skilled workers, "Taylorism out of necessity" prevailed in the factories. The prerequisite for rationalization and

32 Jana BEČKOVÁ, *Historie a současnost podnikání na Třebíčsku*, Žehušice, Městské knihy, 2003, pp. 81–82.

33 Herbert MATIS, «Wirtschaft, Technik und Rüstung als kriegsentscheidende Faktoren», in Wolfgang Reiter – Herbert Matis – Juliane Mikoletzky (eds.), *Wirtschaft, Technik und das Militär 1914–1918: Österreich-Ungarn im Ersten Weltkrieg*, Berlin, Wien, LIT Verlag, 2014, pp. 15–16.

34 Dieter LANGEWIESCHE, *Der gewaltsame Lehrer: Europas Kriege in der Moderne*, Munich, C. H. Beck, 2019, *passim*.

standardization were the military regulations, which developed very dynamically during the course of the war depending on the situation of the raw materials base and the workforce. The rational management of the workforce brought completely new categories of workers into the production process, including soldiers and prisoners of war. In exceptional cases, the army itself took over the manufacture or reprocessing of military footwear. Rationalization and discipline also permeated the distribution process and manifested themselves in various areas, not least in increased quality control. Last but not least, the value of footwear changed, and the army participated by acquiring the right to the best materials and machinery. The civilian sector had to make do with inferior materials and production and therefore began to rethink its relationship with footwear as a durable consumer good.³⁵ We will see this in the following sections. First, however, we should examine the role of footwear as part of the uniform and military equipment.

Footwear as a piece of equipment

In the course of the 18th century, uniforms varied in colour and form to clarify the structure and hierarchy of the army. Certain details of form, colours and accessories were distinguishing features outside and within armies (rank, arms type and specialization, regimental affiliation, etc.). The development of uniforms in the Austrian lands can be linked to the reign of Maria Theresa (1740–1780). Until the Silesian Wars (1740–1748, 1756–1763), when her regiments were equipped not only with matching uniforms but also with uniformed footwear, perhaps even with asymmetrical wooden soles, which was by no means common at the time.³⁶ Despite the complete professionalization, the regiments of the era were still in the hands of private commanders who decided on the appearance of the uniforms, including the footwear. Even after the introduction of a centralizing institution in the form of the *uniform commissions* (1767), the regiments themselves were responsible for the purchase of equipment.³⁷

35 Margarete GRANDNER, *Kooperative Gewerkschaftspolitik in der Kriegswirtschaft: Die freien Gewerkschaften Österreichs im Ersten Weltkrieg*, Wien, Köln, Weimar, Böhlau, 1992, pp. 93–96.

36 For example, symmetrical soles were still common for civilian shoes in Central Europe at the end of the 19th century (see Miroslava ŠTÝBROVÁ, *Boty, botky, botičky*, Praha, NLN, 2009, p. 124).

37 See, for example *Militär-Ökonomie System der kaiserlichen-königlichen österreichischen*

In the 19th century, the uniform became both a practical item of clothing and a symbolic unit. Wearing a uniform was associated with overt symbolism and shaped the mentality of those in uniform. The uniform was a sign of belonging to a particular group. It also helped to form an organized and hierarchically controlled group. Uniform clothing and sometimes even a prescribed appearance (white wig, braid, moustache, hair length, etc.) were external signs of the social unification (uniforming) of the group, which was reinforced by an organizational framework (hierarchy of official functions and responsibilities) and common rules (equipment and armament regulations). Uniforms are therefore not just a distinguishing feature vis-à-vis the enemy. Distinctions as symbols of order and hierarchy are an integral part of them. They are a symbol of subordination as the basis of military discipline. One of the states that were literally “uniformed” in the 19th century and in which the “sacralization of the uniform”³⁸ took place was the Habsburg Empire. Just think of the self-stylization of Emperor Francis I (1804–1835) or Francis Joseph I (1848–1916).³⁹ Their positive attitude towards the army was also reflected in their attitude towards the uniform. Historians agree that the uniformed army was one of the supporting pillars of the multinational empire until the end of the Habsburg Monarchy.⁴⁰ Those who wore the imperial uniform belonged to a select society.⁴¹

Footwear was an important part of the equipment in all eras of war. After all, as Napoleon’s brother-in-law Joachim Murat (1767–1815), the “king of moment”, explained, wars are not only won by weapons but also by the feet and boots of the soldiers. Even ancient cultures recognized the acoustic and psychological effect

Armee, vol. 1st–17th, Wien, J. Geistinger’schen Buchhandlung, 1820–1823.

38 Matthias ROGG, «Im Rock des Königs – soldatische Lebenswirklichkeit», Thorsten Loch – Lars Zacharias (eds.), *Wie die Siegestsäule nach Berlin kam. Eine kleine Geschichte der Reichseinigungskriege 1864 bis 1871*, Freiburg, Berlin, Wien, Rombach Druck- und Verlagshaus, 2011, pp. 42.

39 For the self-portrayal of Emperor Francis Joseph as the first soldier of the empire, see, for example: Laurence COLE, «Vom Glanz der Montur: Zum dynastischen Kult der Habsburger und einer Vermittlung durch militärische Vorbilder im 19. Jahrhundert», *Österreichische Militärische Zeitschrift*, 7, (1996), p. 582.

40 Gunther E. ROTHENBERG, «The Habsburg Army and the Nationality Problem in the Nineteenth Century 1815–1914», *Austrian History Yearbook*, 3, (1967), p. 70.

41 Ernst BRUCKMÜLLER, «Was there a “Habsburg society” in Austria-Hungary», *Austrian History Yearbook*, 37, (2006), p. 9.

of a large number of marching feet, often to the beat of drums.⁴² In contrast to other items of equipment, however, footwear carried no signs of distinction (with the exception of officers' boots).⁴³ One reason is that, of all items of equipment, it is the first to wear out, become worn and dirty. For infantry, both during combat operations and especially during the everyday phase of military life in the trenches, the boot does not become an object of visual interest. It is not, so to speak, "in the field of vision," unlike the situation in cavalry.

While the officer's or cavalryman's boot was a social artifact and symbol, the same cannot be said of the heavy, unsightly but practical boot of the common infantryman.⁴⁴ Throughout the Great War, there were discussions about the excessive weight of regular soldiers' boots and the unnecessary physical strain they placed on soldiers. An investigation by the trade journal *American Shoemaking* (1915) revealed that the British navy had the lightest footwear (800 g), followed by the US infantry (1060 g). The British infantryman's shoe weighed 1638 g, followed by the French regular infantryman's shoe (1800 g). The German and Austro-Hungarian infantry boots were the heaviest, weighing around 1850g.⁴⁵ However, the massiveness of the boots was also an advantage. In the trenches, when marching through rough terrain, in the rain and in winter, soldiers valued high-quality footwear above all else. Back then, weight was a sign of quality. Heavy footwear was an advantage in situations in which the soldier found himself relatively frequently and which involved the use of kinetic energy – the boot became a weapon and part of the armament. With the boot, the soldier could strike or stomp the enemy and crush a smaller obstacle. It is no coincidence that during our research in the Ego documents, which are kept in the possession of the Military History Archive in Prague, the boot emerged as the most frequently reflected upon and mentioned part of the equipment and uniform. The problem is the fragmentary nature of these mentions and their lack of context. Probably because military footwear was seen as something so commonplace that it did not

42 Cf. William McNEIL, *Keeping Together in Time: Dance and Drill in Human History*, Boston, Harvard University Press, 1995.

43 Jörg NIMMERGUT – Jörg M. HORMANN, *Deutsche Militaria 1808–1945*, München, Nickel Verl., 1982, p. 191.

44 Alexander HÖNEL, *Österreichische Militärgeschichte: die Adjustierung des k. (u.) k.. Army 1868–1914*, vol. 2: Cavalry, Wien, ARES Verlag, 1999, *passim*.

45 «Odborná kronika: Kolik váží vojenské boty?», *Obuvník*, 24. 1. 1915, no. 2, p. 3.

need to be addressed. The only exception was the packing of shoes during conscription, when they were a material symbol of this military initiation ritual along with other items of equipment.⁴⁶

Leaving aside the multitude of equipment components and concentrating solely on footwear, it can be stated that according to the regulations in force before the outbreak of the First World War, every soldier in the field was equipped with two pairs of boots. One pair of standard boots made of brown, unpainted natural leather and one pair of so-called light boots.⁴⁷ During the entire war, 8,000,000 soldiers joined the joint army and both the Landwehr and the Honvédség. From this figure, it is possible to calculate the consumption of at least 16,000,000 pairs of boots. However, the actual number of military boots supplied is closer to 32,000,000 pairs of military boots, which is more than a hundred times the total pre-war production of military boots in the Monarchy.⁴⁸ While the Italian army ordered 5,000,000 pairs of military shoes from the cradle of the modern shoe industry, the USA, in the autumn of 1914,⁴⁹ the armed forces of the Danube Monarchy relied on contractual supplies of military shoes, which were concluded with a few suppliers, but were gradually supplemented by medium-sized and larger factories, production cooperatives and, in exceptional cases, small manufacturers. Military footwear became a strategic part of the equipment and leather a valued raw material, the production, distribution and consumption of which was regulated by the state long after the war. In the words of Otto Strakosch, chairman of the *Verband der österreichischen Schuhfabrikanten* (Association of Austrian Shoe Manufacturers), “there was no piece of leather in the monarchy that the army did not reach for”.⁵⁰

46 Jiří HUTEČKA, *Men under Fire: Motivation, Morality and Masculinity among Czech Soldiers in the Great War, 1914–1918*, New York, Oxford, Berghahn, 2020, pp. 29–61.

47 These light boots, also known as Komode shoes, were soon replaced by a second pair of leather boots, as they were practically useless. Cf. Isabelle BRANDAUER, *Soldatenalltag in den Dolomiten im Ersten Weltkrieg 1915–1917*, Innsbruck, Golf Verlag, 2005, p. 156.

48 «Rozmnožování armády v Rakousko-Uhersku», *Obuvník*, 3. 5. 1914, no. 9, p. 6.

49 «Odborná kronika: Pět milionů párů obuvi», *Obuvník*, 15. 11. 1914, no. 23, p. 3.

50 «Die Ledernot und das Schuhgeschäft», *Der Schuh. Fachblatt für Schuh-Interessenten*, 10. 1. 1915, no. 1, pp. 10–13.

Regulations for shoe adjustment

The military historian encounters a wide variety of regulations – be it on training, tactics or leadership. Central European historians in particular know that an unwritten rule applied to the Habsburg army: “When a regulation is written down, the reality is often in stark contrast to it.” This also applies to the uniform dress regulations, an essential source for understanding how the Austro-Hungarian armed forces secured and organized the production and distribution of equipment. Uniform dress regulations were not issued constantly, but usually only in connection with a significant change in equipment regulations. As a rule, this was not a change related to the internal needs of the army, but to external circumstances. In the years 1861–1862, for example, the regulations were the result of an initiative by an officer named Kövess, who collected the existing regulations and compiled them in a printed document.

Significant changes in the equipment regulations of the Austro-Hungarian army took place in the period from 1866 to 1875, when the most important reforms in the area of equipment procurement were carried out, which must be seen in the context of the time.⁵¹ First of all, the existing *commissions for military equipment* were abolished after the defeat of 1866. The main reason for this was economic and social development, which did not suit the conservative and inflexible structures of the commissions. This move was part of a trend to place the production and distribution of equipment in private hands. The aim was to free the already overburdened state from administrative and financial burdens. In 1878, the uniform dress regulations were redesigned with the introduction of the metric system. The last general regulation was published in 1910–1911 under the code name A–28, both for the joint army,⁵² and for Landwehr and Honvédség.⁵³ With the equipment specified in this regulation, the c. and k. regiments entered the First World War.

Some of the regulations were amended on an ongoing basis and published in

51 Egbert APFELKNAB, *Waffenrock und Schnürschuh. Die Monturbeschaffung der österreichischen Armee in 18. und 19. Jahrhundert*, Wien, Österreichischer Bundesverlag, 1984, p. 9.

52 *Adjustierungsvorschrift für das k.u.k. Heer 1910/11*, Wien, K. K. Hof- und Staatsdruckerei, 1911.

53 *Adjustierungsvorschrift für die k. k. Landwehr. II. Teil. Fußtruppen*, Wien, K. K. Hof- und Staatsdruckerei, 1911.

the *Verordnungsblättern für das Kaiserlich-Königliche Heer*.⁵⁴ The catch with this system of adjustment regulations and partial adjustments was the fact that the existing regulations applied as long as an equipment component is not changed. Often the regulations described the component only superficially, and if a manufacturer wanted detailed information about the product, he had to study the regulations via leaflets and circulars. For example, although the ingredient can often be seen in surviving photographs from the 1880s, it is not mentioned for the first time until the regulations of 1910.⁵⁵

As far as the boot uniform dress regulations were concerned, it was by no means the case that footwear remained unregulated.⁵⁶ The last major change in the regulation of Austro-Hungarian military boots took place at the end of the 19th century. The change was systematized in the uniform dress regulations of 1910–1911. It prescribed uniform footwear for men made of natural leather and above the ankle with eight holes for lacing, a stamped heel and a sole with 40 studs (the way they were attached to the sole was left to the decision of the depot commanders or individual units).⁵⁷ Black cream was used for waterproofing. The soldiers of some special units wore uniform footwear without studded soles. These included, for example, members of the fortress artillery, the illumination troops, one-year volunteers, members of the field artillery and all cavalry units. The ordinances specified the sizes of all boot parts; there were a total of eight size types. The so-called light footwear, which was intended as a replacement shoe, was part of the rucksacks' equipment. They had a shaft made of cotton fabric (full cotton canvas) and an unglazed sole. It also reached over the ankles and was fastened with a six-hole lace fastener. The lightweight shoe was not blackened by a shoe-cream. They were worn as standard by hospitalized soldiers, barracks personnel, railwaymen, etc. Another type was the mountain boot, which was made of the same leather as the uniform boot, but the sole was reinforced and the sole

54 <https://alex.onb.ac.at/cgi-content/alex-day?apm=0&aid=kkh>

55 *Adjustierungsvorschrift für das k.u.k. Heer 1910/11*, Wien, K. K. Hof- und Staatsdruckerei, 1911.

56 Stefan REST – Christian ORTNER – Thomas ILMING, *Des Kaisers Rock im 1. Weltkrieg: Uniformierung und Ausrüstung der österreichisch-ungarischen Armee von 1914 bis 1918*, Wien, Militaria, 2002, p. 396.

57 *Adjustierungsvorschrift für das k.u.k. Heer 1910/11*, Teil 1, Wien, K. K. Hof- und Staatsdruckerei, 1911, pp. 69–73.

and heel were heavily nailed. The regulations also defined the shape of low shoes, chischmen and boots, each with a designation for individual dressings. This secondary footwear was mainly made for members of cavalry units.

The footwear and clothing of officers and military officials in the officer ranks were excluded from the supply system. Officers had to have their uniforms made by a tailor as “clothing for their own use”. The officers’ pay included a clearly defined clothing allowance. The tailor’s products were naturally made of better fabrics and of better quality. There were therefore (un)intended deviations from the regulations, with which the officers wanted to express their taste and fashion preferences.⁵⁸ The same applied to the officers’ footwear, for which the regulations were only recommendations. As far as the equipment components were concerned, the army regulations were largely adopted by the Landwehr. For example, the same regulations were issued in the *ordonnanz*, only under a different number and with a delay of about a month.

In the second half of the war, the army’s regulations for military footwear began to be adopted by civilian footwear production, as technical debates were held between designers and manufacturers about standardized, so-called war footwear for the civilian population. Although military circles were indirectly involved in these debates, the participants drew on their experience in the manufacture of military footwear, which they tried to apply to civilian production.⁵⁹ This was not easy, however, as army regulations changed rapidly during the war. However, since the last uniform dress regulations were issued in 1911, as already mentioned, and no new, amended publications were made during the war, all changes, in which the experiences and feedback from wartime practice were written down, were presented in the partial bulletins and circulars already mentioned. It is therefore very difficult to reconstruct the entire change process. The only thing that did not change was the maxim: military shoe production always took precedence over civilian production.⁶⁰

58 Jürgen KRAUS, *Die deutsche Armee im Ersten Weltkrieg. Uniformierung und Ausrüstung – 1914 bis 1918*, Wien, Verlag Militaria, 2004, p. 26.

59 « Holzbesohlte Kriegsschuhe », *Der Schuh. Fachblatt für Schuh-Interessenten*, 10. 3. 1916, no. 5, p. 177.

60 Vojtěch KESSLER, « Děti v konzumu, racionaci a propagandě válečné obuvi ». *Český lid*, 109, (2022), pp. 403–425.

Manufacture of military footwear

During the war, the production of military footwear and leather parts for equipment was affected by the limits of economic potential of the Habsburg state's. Both the state and the army attempted to mobilize manpower, rationalize production, provide replacement production or to use external resources.⁶¹ However, the high war demands placed on uniforms, including footwear, could not be maintained in the long term. This was certainly not just a problem for the Austro-Hungarian army. All belligerent states had to contend with difficulties.⁶² The Austro-Hungarian army tried to slow down and reverse this scarcity trend by intervening in the production process. However, not (as we will show) by retreating from the regulatory standards of the pre-war period, but by actively participating in production. With the *Kriegsgesetz* (War Act) of December 1912, which supplemented the secret mobilization by introducing emergency measures in the civil and military administration, it had a legitimizing instrument at its disposal. The law prepared the conditions for the utilisation of large companies and their workforce in the event of a special emergency – the war. It ordered the maximum mobilization of human resources in the army, administration, production and transport, with the army having absolute priority at the expense of other producers.⁶³

Austria-Hungary did not concentrate war production to the same extent as the neighbouring German Empire. There, in addition to civilian factories, special military offices (*Kriegsbekleidungsamt*) were also set up here.⁶⁴ This was an elaborate network of workplaces which employed mobilized soldiers, who had mostly worked in the shoe industry before the war. For this reason, German military boots had a very good reputation and objectively high quality throughout the war. France, on the other hand, relied exclusively on the production of civilian factories and the efforts of non-state actors to profit from the war. In England, civilian factories were supplied via the state-controlled leather market.⁶⁵ The Russian

61 PAMMER, p. 55

62 KRAUS, p. 26.

63 GRANDNER, pp. 38–44.

64 Jürgen KRAUS, *Die feldgraue Uniformierung des deutschen Heeres 1907–1918: Band 2*, OSnabrück, Biblio, 2009, pp. 937–938.

65 «Odborná kronika: Malá kronika», *Obuvník*, 28. 10. 1917, no. 22, pp. 3–4.

Empire focused on domestic production and foreign contracts (USA), and Italy, after entering the war, began to set up state-owned shoe factories employing invalids, prisoners of war or mobilized workers. The last major player, the Ottoman Empire, copied the German system, but could not match the quality of German products.⁶⁶ How did the Danube Monarchy fare in comparison and what strategy did it pursue? Most of the production of military footwear during the war rested on the shoulders of non-state suppliers, mostly medium-sized and large factories. However, in order to maintain social peace, the state relied on the involvement of producers' cooperatives and associations or competent small producers. As the war progressed, however, the army found more and more opportunities to become directly involved in shoe production.

The shoe industry was concentrated in the hinterland (Vienna, Graz, Bohemia),⁶⁷ taking the advantage of continuous production, despite being far away from the front. It also found its place on the battlefields. Shoes were repaired directly in the field, for example in patented shoe workshops equipped with German Moenus shoe machines and housed in converted railroad carriages.⁶⁸ In addition to the necessary shoe repairs, the battlefields were also a place of collection of shoe materials, especially hides, from skins or hides from animals killed or slaughtered in the field. In 1915, their collection and distribution was the responsibility of one of the three wartime organizations for hides and shoes (Etappenhäutezentrale), which, despite its short existence (1915), demonstrated the state's systematic and rationalized interest in all strategic raw materials.⁶⁹ On the battlefields and in the occupied territories, leather and footwear naturally became valuable booty.⁷⁰ Not to be forgotten is the role of the battlefield as an experimental laboratory where the properties and durability of military footwear were

66 «O způsobu výroby vojenské obuvi v různých státech», *Obuvník*, 25. 7. 1915, no. 15, p. 1.

67 Martin MOLL, «Mobilisierung für den totalen Krieg: „Heimatfront“ Österreich-Ungarn im Ersten Weltkrieg am Beispiel der Steiermark», in Wolfram Dornik – Johannes Giessauf – Walter M. Iber (eds.), *Krieg und Wirtschaft: Von der Antike bis ins 21. Jahrhundert*, Innsbruck, Wien, Bolzano, Studien Verlag, 2010, pp. 449.

68 ÖSA, KA, KM, fonds XIII. Abteilung (Montur), 1916, Sign 62/22/6.

69 Wiener Stadt- und Landesarchiv (WSL), fonds Handelsgericht, Etappen-Häute-Zentrale, A45-C-Registerakten: C 19/16.

70 Anton HOLZER, *Das Lächeln der Henker: Der unbekannte Krieg gegen die Zivilbevölkerung 1914–1918*. With numerous previously unpublished photographs, Darmstadt, Primus in Herder, 2008, p. 208.

tested. Nevertheless, most military footwear was manufactured and repaired in the rear areas, where the army commissioned people who had no experience in the manufacture of footwear to produce it.

For example, there were war invalids and convalescents,⁷¹ whose inclusion in production offered the opportunity to use them even after the end of the war. In cooperation with the *k.u.k. Kriegsministerium* (War Ministry), *k.k. Ministerium für Landesverteidigung* (Ministry of National Defense) und dem *k.k. Ministerium für öffentliche Arbeiten* (Ministry of Public Works), as well as with convalescent homes and institutions for the care of disabled or otherwise impaired soldiers, the invalids were put to work in production. Special shoemaking courses were also organized. In 1916, for example, a ten-week course on vocational training in shoemaking, bookkeeping and calculation, trade law and chemistry was held in the Bohemian Department of the *Landesamtes für die Verbesserung des Gewerbes* (Provincial Office for the Improvement of Trade), and a number of practical shoemaking courses were held.⁷² In the Jedlička Institution for disabled in Prague, almost 3,000 pairs of regular military shoes were made by the inmates in the same year.⁷³

Prisoners of war were also involved in the manufacture of military and civilian shoes. For example, several shoe workshops were set up in the large POW camp in Sigmundsherberg (Lower Austria). They were supervised by professional, non-soldier craftsmen. In addition to the obligatory military boots and their parts, the prisoners also produced special straw boots and slippers. In both cases, these were activities without the need for higher qualifications.⁷⁴ The situation was similar, for example, with the production of clogs. These were mainly produced by Russian prisoners of war, for example in the large epidemic hospital in Novosady near Olomouc,⁷⁵ where all the raw materials required for production were supplied by the state. From 1915 at the latest, prisoners of war were also employed in militarized shoe factories under military supervision. One example of this was the Bat'a company in Zlín, where Russian prisoners of war were

71 V. GLASER, «Průmysl obuvnický a váleční invalidé», *Obuvník*, 1. 9. 1918, no. 18, p. 1.

72 «Odborná kronika: Druhý kurz pro invalidy», *Obuvník*, 4. 2. 1917, no. 3, p. 3.

73 «Firmě T. A Bat'a», *Obuvník*, 12. 5. 1918, no. 10, p. 10.

74 Rudolf KOCH, *Schicksal Kriegsgefangenschaft: Kriegsgefangenenlager Sigmundsherberg*, Wien, Berger & Söhne, Ferdinand, 2015, p. 39.

75 «Odborná kronika: Malá kronika», *Obuvník*, 2. 4. 1916, no. 7, p. 3.

employed until the end of the war. In the spring of the last year of the war, they dared to rebel against the treatment by the factory administration and military supervision.⁷⁶

Special workshops in military collection or supply depots for war material (Bergungsgüter-Sammelstelle, abbreviated to Bergstelle), which had been set up since 1915 for the collection, repair and distribution of material suitable for military purposes, were also used for the manufacture and, above all, the repair of military footwear under the direction of the army. Uniforms, shoes and other items of equipment were among the main products of these recycling centres of the Austro-Hungarian army.⁷⁷

The Ministry of Public Works also became the army's partner in mobilizing manpower for production. For example, in the first year of the war, the shoemakers' association in Prague, the capital of the Bohemian kingdom, was ordered by the ministry to delegate all its members, regardless of their age, to military contracts. Those who did not report or refused to make military shoes had to reckon with consequences. On the other hand, there may also have been an incentive in the form of exemption from military service.⁷⁸ But even such campaigns and incentives were not enough. The army finally tried its hand at production itself by setting up its own, rather unique factory in Sezemice near Pardubice.

Among the dozens of militarized factories, the Glasner, Stein and Konsorten company in Sezemice near Pardubice was an exception. It was founded in 1881 and was one of the largest in the Bohemian lands before the war with 400 employees and an output of 150 horsepower.⁷⁹ Shortly before the war, the founder Glasner left the management of the company. When the company with its extensive factory premises was threatened with liquidation, his partner Stein decided to offer the factory to the army, which was to operate it on its own with the existing employees and machinery. At the beginning of August 1916, a contract was signed between Glasner, Stein und co. and the *Kriegsfürsorgeamt* (War Welfare Office) of the Ministry of War, the main purpose of which was to collect funds

76 Bohumil LEHÁR, *Dějiny Baťova koncernu (1894–1945)*, Praha, SNPL, 1960, pp. 54–55.

77 Vojenský historický archiv (Military History Archive Prague, VHA), Bestand 9. Korpskommando/I., Sign. 63, 1918, dossier. 423; *Normal-Verordnungsblatt für das k. und k. Heer: Beiblatt*, vol. 22, Wien, K. K. Hof- und Staatsdruckerei, 1915, p. 135

78 «V Praze musí vojenskou obuv vyráběti každý mistr», *Obuvník*, 10. 1. 1915, no. 1, p. 4.

79 *Compass*, vol. 52, 1919, no. 2, Wien, Compassverlag 1918, p. 415.

from industrial entrepreneurs for the so-called Kaiser Karl Fund. In Bohemia, the War Welfare Office set up branches in Brno, Prostějov, Rakovník, Ústí (nad Labem) and Hradec Králové, which were responsible for the Sezemice company. However, even leasing the factory to the army could not save the company from existential problems, and so the factory was sold to the newly founded joint-stock company Leona (“Leona” Schuhfabriks-A.-G., formerly Glasner, Stein und Co.) at the end of 1917.⁸⁰

When the authorities of the new Czechoslovak state took an interest in the army-owned factory after the collapse of the Danube monarchy, the army administrator declared to the republican administration that “the factory was not a private enterprise, but a military facility.” At the end of the war, the military shoe factory in Sezemice, headed by Lieutenant Jaroslav Veselský, a professor at the Industrial School in Pardubice, employed 216 workers: 106 women (103 female workers and 3 administrative staff) and 110 men, most of whom were soldiers (80) and not civilians (30). The sources are silent on the composition and nature of the workforce, but it is likely that invalids and soldiers unsuitable for front-line service were stationed in Sezemice rather than soldiers fit for combat. Their task was twofold. On the one hand, they were supposed to repair military shoes for reuse at the front, and on the other, they were supposed to re-sole shoes unsuitable for military use into cheap emergency shoes, namely full leather shoes for children and adults. At the end of the war, the War Welfare Office in Hradec Králové was in possession of 166,000 pairs of shoes, mainly shoes and sandals with wooden soles. In Sezemice alone, there were 10,000 pairs of various types of emergency shoes in stock, and three wagons of torn military shoes were waiting to be converted into emergency shoes for children after the proclamation of the Czechoslovak Republic.⁸¹ The Sezemice army factory was unique among the other military shoe factories. However, with its production and recycling program, it successfully demonstrated the importance of recycling and reusing of military footwear in the wartime consumer economy.

80 VHA, fond 8. sborové velitelství (fonds 8. Korpskommando), Likvidace odbočky Úřadu pro válečnou péči v Hradci Králové (Liquidation of the branch office of the Office of War Welfare in Hradec Králové), Dossier. 1687, Sign. 63-3/3-8.

81 Ibid.

Distribution, quality, control

So far, we have dealt with military footwear primarily from the perspective of production. Distribution played just as important a role in the (war-related) consumer chain as production. But in contrast to production with its numerous actors (factories, production cooperatives and companies, military institutions, military hospitals, etc.), it was completely controlled by the military. Whereas before the war only a few manufacturers were responsible for the production of military footwear, during the conflict, as the number and type of manufacturers increased, there was a proportional increase of importance of quality control and monitoring of the distribution of footwear to the target customers, the military units and individual soldiers. Quality and its control had several stages during the war. Direct supervision of manufacturers and production on site was carried out by military supervisors in militarized factories with corporate status, which were protected by the *Kriegsleistungsgesetz* (War Performance Act). Entrepreneurs and factory administrations sought the favour of the controlling officers, so the distribution chain was accompanied by various forms of corruption.

The shoes produced were taken from factories to *Monturdepots* (Assembly Depots), which had several functions in the distribution chain. Potential buyers of military contracts were able to pick up samples of military footwear,⁸² which served as a template for production. However, the primary function of the *Monturdepots* was to properly inspect the footwear. Inspection was a dreaded aspect of quality control, which was carried out more and more professionally and with increasingly sophisticated methods as the war progressed. While at the beginning of the war mainly officer cadets carried out the inspections, as the war progressed the officers, who had no previous knowledge of shoemaking, were replaced by enlisted soldiers who were military or civilian shoemakers or had sufficient knowledge of shoemaking. They at least checked that each pair was stamped with the manufacturer's stamp.⁸³ Inspection by senior officers in the military depots was no exception. For example, in 1915 an unnamed general ordered during an inspection

82 *Monturdepot* (Assembly Depot) no. 1 in Brno, *Monturdepot* no. 2 in Budapest, *Monturdepot* no. 3 in Göstling, *Monturdepot* no. 4 in Kaiser-Ebersdorf, *Monturdepot* No. 5 (from 1917) in Brunn am Gebirge, k. k. *Landwehrmonturdepot* in Vienna, k.u. *Landwehr-Zentralmonturdepot* in Budapest.

83 «Upozornění dodavatelům vojenské obuvi», *Obuvník*, 5. 3. 1916, no. 5, p. 3.

of the *k. k. Bekleidungslager* (clothing depot) in Brno that the rear leather straps or bands on the shoes should be sewn with a stronger double seam.⁸⁴

The monopoly distribution of raw materials, the increasingly strict controls and the confrontation with military supervision were a stressful experience for the manufacturers. In the early years of the war, representatives of the production cooperatives and companies preferred to put up with faulty deliveries of military footwear rather than risk penalties in the form of fines or military punishments for poorly manufactured and confiscated military footwear.⁸⁵ This is indirectly confirmed by a unique archive document kept in the collections of the Baťa-Busi (Budischowsky) company. It is an inventory of the shoes delivered to the military depot in Brno in the second half of the war. The inventory proves both the increasingly important role of the Baťa company from Zlín among the suppliers of the Brno military depot and the relatively small proportion of inferior shoes that were rejected by the military administration and returned to the manufacturers for repair.⁸⁶

In the early months of the war, the quality inspectors at the military clothing depots functioned between the rock and the hard place. On the one side were the manufacturers, who gradually adapted to the conditions of the war economy and tried to meet the quality requirements for military footwear, and on the other side were the inspectors for shipped footwear, who strictly adhered to the regulations during the first year of the war and were only gradually accepting the declining quality of the shoes shipped.⁸⁷ This was exploited by the numerous traders who tried to take advantage of the war situation and supply the state with all kinds of shoes, often of dubious quality. In mid-1915, for example, all the Cisleithanian newspapers reported on a trial that shed light on the case of fraudulent military shoe suppliers from Vienna, Hranice and Litomyšl who had supplied the state with work boots from the Litomyšl firm Lederer & Adler, presented as durable military footwear. 5000 pairs of military shoes fell apart after one day of marching because they were made of inferior leather and had paper soles. The military

84 «Odborná kronika: O šití svršků u vojenské obuvi», *Obuvník*, 19. 3. 1916, no. 6, p. 3.

85 ZAO, pracoviště Olomouc, Obchodní a živnostenská komora Olomouc, svazek 3 – spisy III. manipulace / Akten III. Manipulation (1878–1922), zvláštní výbory a komise, 1915, Dodávky armádě, námořnictvu a četnictvu všeobecně, dossier 764.

86 Moravský zemská archiv (Moravian Provincial Archives Brno, MZA), fonds Busi, a. s., Třebíč, Buch Nro. 11, K.u.k. Monturdepot Nro. 1 in Brünn, Fussbekleidungsübernahme, fol. 1–89.

87 «Situační poměry při tovární výrobě obuvi», *Obuvník*, 9. 1. 1916, no. 1, pp. 1–2.

court in Moravská Ostrava imposed exemplary punishments in the form of fines (manufacturers) and prison sentences (traders-suppliers), which were intended as a warning to the others.⁸⁸ A similar case was repeated in the Bohemian lands when Jewish shoe manufacturer Löwith from Pardubice was sentenced to ten years in prison.⁸⁹ The Jewish origin of the convicted merchants and manufacturers only fed the anti-Semitic fantasies of the war-weary lower classes, who were also disturbed by the high proportion of Jewish conscripts among the employees of the *Kriegszentralen* (War Centrals).⁹⁰

The military camps were also a place where discussions about production technologies and processes, footwear standards and possible solutions or innovations were held at regular meetings between manufacturers, suppliers and customers. Although the discussion about the quality, production, distribution, consumption or recycling of civilian and military footwear was conducted throughout society, the military camps functioned as focal points, distribution centres and laboratories, from which situation reports on military footwear were addressed to the Vienna army circles and, from where the detailed instructions or designs were issued to the manufacturers.

Shoes and the change in their value

Army circles were aware of the role and value of quality footwear in the mechanisms of total, trench and attrition warfare. A clear hierarchy of production, distribution and consumption was therefore introduced, with the army playing the main role in controlling the sale of hides destined for the manufacture of military footwear. In 1916, for example, a large-scale raid was carried out in Vienna on shoe production cooperatives applying for military supplies. The aim of the inspection was to uncover illegal production for the civilian sector from entrusted state-owned hides. One of the companies guilty of this offense was the *Tschechische Schuhmacherproduktionsgenossenschaft in Wien* (Czech Shoemaker Production Cooperative in Vienna): of the 110 people employed in production, only two worked on military orders. The rest produced shoes for

88 «Podvodní dodavatelé obuvi před soudem», *Obuvník*, 9. 9. 1915, no. 19, p. 1.

89 Alois ŽIPEK, *Domov za války (svědectví účastníků)*: vol. 1 (1914), Praha, Pokrok 1929, p. 82.

90 «Gegen die Zentralen», *Reichspost*, 8. 3. 1918, no. 101, p. 4.

the civilian sector. The result? The management of the cooperative was arrested without hesitation.⁹¹ In the same year, six Austrian shoe companies and the Czech company Štěpánek from Zlín were punished with the withdrawal of their orders because they had “misused” the leather intended for the production of military shoes for the production of civilian ones.⁹² However, there are also known cases of persecution of civilians who were caught wearing military boots.⁹³ Most of those caught got off with small fines or prison sentences of a few dozen hours in the local court detention.⁹⁴

Despite all the monitoring, control and repression, other types of leather such as calfskin or pigskin were increasingly used during the war instead of the prescribed heavy cowhides. In the fall of 1917, the chronic shortage of high-quality upper parts led to the order to make the straps of mountain boots from waste uppers. The use of double seams when sewing shoes was also intended to compensate for the lack of high-quality materials. The War Ministry had already approved the hand sewing of shoes and the flocking of soles with wooden pegs at the beginning of the war in order to give small manufactories and production cooperatives or companies without sufficient technical equipment, including quilting machines, the opportunity to participate in the supply of military footwear.⁹⁵ With the exception of mountain boots, which were to continue to be sewn consistently, this regulation remained in force until the end of the war. The thinning out of leather stocks was particularly noticeable in the processing of soles. While it was initially still permitted to produce inferior soles (tanner soles) from two soles sewn together, boots with wooden soles were increasingly to be found on the feet of Austrian soldiers from 1916 onwards. One of the first deliveries of wood-

91 «Odborná kronika: Zatčení, že používali státní kůže pro civilní obuv», *Obuvník*, 17. 9. 1916, no. 19, p. 3.

92 «Bestrafung für die Verwendung der Häute für zivile Schuhe », *Obuvník*, 12. 11. 1916, no. 23, p. 2.

93 «Kupovati a nositi vojenskou obuv je trestné», *Obuvník*, 16. 9. 1917, no. 19, p. 3–4; «Soudní síň: Následky z koupě vojenské obuvi, soudní síň», *Obuvník*, 1. 4. 1917, no. 7, p. 3.

94 For example, the obligation to report stocks of hides and materials required for the leather industry was laid down by the decree of the Ministry of Trade in agreement with the Ministries of the Interior, Public Works and National Defense of March 4, 1915 No. 53 of the decree of March 4, 1915. No. 274 of October 10, 1914.

95 Svatopluk HERC, «Obuvnická družstva a společenstva v Čechách za první světové války. Hospodářské dějiny, 38, (2023), pp. 1–20.

en soles for the army was made in mid-1916 by the military command in Lviv (based in Ostrava, Moravia): Sample soles were available in the clothing sample department of the *Monturdepot* in Brunn am Gebirge. Offers were to be sent to the headquarters in Lviv via the respective chambers of commerce and trade.⁹⁶

Wooden soles and later all-wooden shoes were the most significant expression of the search for and use of substitute materials. In addition to wood, there were also treated textiles, jute and leather remnants. Wood was initially only used as sole protection, then directly as a substitute. Experiments were carried out with the manufacture and use of shoes made of straw.⁹⁷ Pupils at municipal and middle-class schools throughout the monarchy were encouraged to make soles from glued paper. They began to make wire from hemp, which was not only an Austrian specialty but a worldwide phenomenon.⁹⁸ Shoe uppers made of paper were a much-discussed topic. Despite all the concessions made, paper shoes were still perceived as a downgrading of the shoemaker's craft, but also of the wearer's social status.⁹⁹ Some companies turned to making shoes from artificial leather fabrics.¹⁰⁰ Shoes made of sheet metal were something of a curiosity.¹⁰¹ All substitute materials had to be approved by the *k.k. Handelsministerium* (Ministry of Trade) and the *k.u.k. Finanzministerium* (Ministry of Finance). The Ministry of Finance then issued an updated list of not only the permitted materials, but also the companies that were allowed to use them.¹⁰²

Logically, the market prices for footwear also rose.¹⁰³ First of all, the price of quality leather rose enormously. In the half century before the war, the price of leather on the world markets had already quadrupled.¹⁰⁴ During the war years,

96 «Změny ve výrobě a nové názvy vojenských pohorek», *Obuvník*, 19. 2. 1917, No. 4, pp. 2–3.

97 «Odborná kronika: Výrobu slaměné obuvi», *Obuvník*, 1. 10. 1916, no. 20, p. 3.

98 «Odborná kronika: Význam konopí», *Obuvník*, 28. 11. 1915, no. 24, p. 3.

99 «Svršky z papíru», *Obuvnické listy*, 18, 15. 9. 1918, no. 18, p. 6.

100 «Nové, za přípustné uznané náhražky koží», *Obuvník*, 2. 9. 1917, no. 18, pp. 2–3.

101 «Budeme chodit v brnění. 1918», *Obuvnické listy*, 1. 9. 1918, no. 16–17, p. 7.

102 «Dovolené náhražky pro obuv», *Obuvnické listy*, 1. 9. 1918, no. 16–17, p. 5.

103 For example, the War Ministry paid 24% higher purchase prices for military shoes in 1918 than in 1917.

104 Wilhelm H. SCHRÖDER, *Arbeitergeschichte und Arbeiterbewegung: Industriearbeit und Organisationsverhalten im 19. und frühen 20. Jahrhundert*, Frankfurt am Main, New York, Campus, 1978, p. 168.

prices rose by several dozen percent every year.¹⁰⁵ Production costs were increased by the rise in labour costs. This prompted manufacturers to exert pressure on the government or the Ministry of Public Works to increase the purchase prices for military footwear.¹⁰⁶ In addition, the Habsburg monarchy was cut off from the world markets, which necessitated a series of measures to curb the inflationary spiral, including the fixing of purchase prices for leather and shoes, which fatally restricted the hitherto liberal market environment.¹⁰⁷

These were all impulses aimed at the production sector. Of course, the military also had the other end of the product life cycle in mind, i.e. it tried to influence (restrict) consumption through its regulations. For example, right at the beginning of 1915, it issued a decree stating that the shoes of fallen soldiers should be reused.¹⁰⁸ These measures represented an ethically problematized version of a broader effort to redistribute scarce products and raw materials from those who – for whatever reason – did not need them to those who did. Similarly, in the civilian sector, there were the traditional clothing donations that had previously been successfully carried out to support the needy sections of the population. During the war, however, these clothing or shoe donations were redesigned, generalized and directed towards the entire population.

For the same reason, military circles emphasized the symbolic value of shoes in the eyes of the public. The poster for the VII. *Kriegsanleihe* (War Bond), for example, showed a soldier lying in a trench and his shoes dominated the image.¹⁰⁹ The soldiers in the field were then specifically informed about care for their shoes. Educational articles appeared on various primitive forms of self-repair, on replacing missing grease, but also with bizarre-looking advice on how to put on shoes ideally.¹¹⁰ It should be noted, however, that few creatures are as resourceful as the soldier in the field, and much advice, however well-intentioned, was a mere shadow of the practice of using and caring for boots at the front.¹¹¹

105 GRANDNER, pp. 81–87.

106 «Odborná kronika», *Obuvník*, 18. 8. 1918, no. 17, p. 3.

107 J. H. van STUIJENBERG, *Economische geschiedenis van Nederland*, Groningen, Wolters-Noordhoff, 1977, pp. 271–278

108 BRANDAUER, p. 157.

109 PAMMER, p. 63.

110 «Jak jsou ve válce obouvány mokré boty», *Obuvník*, 7. 3. 1915, no. 5, p. 4.

111 Vojtěch Kessler – Josef Šrámek, *Tváře války: Velká válka 1914–1918 očima českých účastníků*, Praha, Historický ústav Akademie věd ČR, 2020, pp. 46–47.

For example, soldiers could dry their boots by quickly extinguishing burning newspaper thrown into wet shoes.¹¹²

Despite the army's efforts to supply the troops with reliable military footwear, complaints about the declining quality of the footwear supplied, as well as delays in delivery and supply shortages, became more frequent from the spring of 1915 onwards.¹¹³ Especially in the trenches, in the cold and rain, the poor quality of the footwear had fatal consequences. The officers attributed the high number of casualties to this fact.¹¹⁴ The relatively heavy weight of military footwear was considered by some officers to be one of the causes of the early physical exhaustion of the men on the marches. Particularly in the early stages of the war, when campaigns took place in the warm summer and early autumn months, soldiers did not consider sturdy footwear to be advantageous and often sold it, exchanged it for lighter civilian models or even threw the shoes away.

With the onset of the first war winter the relationship with boots was reassessed. Soldiers took care of their boots and saw them as having a symbolic value that would save their lives in many cases. Masculine notions of heroic military service were fundamentally shaken by the military mechanics of the Great War. The cold, damp, parasites and their associated diseases became the enemy rather than a rivals in the uniform of the opposing side and their weapons. The dry, warm boot was literally a lifesaver in this sense. There is surviving evidence of the intimate relationship that a soldier could develop with his boots. In one of the war diaries, a soldier confesses to a dream in which he experienced physical, romantic moments with his lover. When he woke up, he realized that in real life he had been stroking one of his boots.¹¹⁵

Conclusion

In 1916, the trade journal *Leather Trades Review* published the following estimate: according to the editors' calculations, there were up to 50,000,000 soldiers on the European battlefields in 1916, with each soldier in the field using an average of four pairs of shoes per year. According to the editors, behind the

112 «Jak jsou ve válce obouvány mokré boty», *Obuvník*, 7. 3. 1915, no. 5, p. 4.

113 BRANDAUER, p. 157.

114 Ibid, p. 158.

115 Václav ŘÍPA, «Sen vojína», In: *Vzpomínky Václava Řípy* (manuscript), p. 32.

200,000,000 pairs of military shoes were 44,600,000 pieces of leather needed to make them. 6,600,000 additional hides were needed for the soles and out-soles, and a further 12,800,000 hides were used for equipment. In 1916 alone, 64,000,000 hides and skins were used to make military footwear for the warring parties, in a war that claimed millions of lives and tens of millions of slaughtered animals killed solely for the production of leather equipment.¹¹⁶

Although the strategic importance of military footwear for military equipment and the indispensability of civilian footwear for people's daily lives is recognized, footwear is only one of many important components of military equipment and civilian clothing. The production of military footwear during the First World War is also inconceivable without the involvement of a number of related manufacturing industries. One example of this is the war-related boom in cleat production, which was on the brink of collapse before the war. A billion cleats ordered by the Habsburg state a year before the end of the war from the *Verband der Hersteller von Stollen für Militärstiefel* (Association of Manufacturers of Cleats for Military Boots) kept an entire segment of mainly domestic small-scale production alive, and with it several rural production regions such as Podbrdsko (Brdy) and Rožmitálsko (Rozmital) in the Bohemian lands.¹¹⁷

The leather processing industry, without which the manufacture of military footwear would have been inconceivable, generated profits many times greater than the small-scale production of cleats. In the last months of the war, the Austrian press was full of sensational reports about the fabulous wealth of a few leather manufacturers who hurriedly bought villas, country estates and castles.¹¹⁸ Their stereotypical portrait was immortalized after the war by the German-Bohemian writer of Jewish origin Ludwig Winder in the aptly titled novel *Die Reitpeitsche* (*The Vampire*), whose title character is the amoral war profiteer and leather merchant Dupić.¹¹⁹ While Winder gave free rein to his literary imagination, the Austrian post-war economic statistics spoke a clear language without literary license:

116 «O zjištění spotřeby kůže ve válce», *Obuvník*, 1. 10. 1916, no. 20, p. 3.

117 «Odborná kronika: Miliarda cvočků», *Obuvník*, 2. 4. 1916, no. 7, p. 3. For more details, see Jindřich JIRÁSEK, *Cvokaři: o zaniklém řemesle z rožmitálského údolí*, Hostivice, Petr Prášil, 2012.

118 «Kdo vydělává ve válce?» *Obuvník*, 11. 7. 1915, no. 14, p. 2; «Zisky kožařských firem», *Obuvník*, 5. 3. 1916, no. 5, p. 3.

119 Ludwig WINDER, *Die Reitpeitsche*: Roman, Berlin, Ullstein Verlag, 1928.

three of the seven companies that profited most from the war in the Danube Monarchy belonged to the leather and shoe industry.¹²⁰

Finally, the question must be asked whether the Habsburg state was in a position to supply its armed forces with the necessary footwear under the conditions of a controlled war economy, with fewer and fewer suitable hides and without access to the international market for foreign raw materials (especially chemicals).¹²¹ Despite the corruption scandals and cases of dubious footwear quality that accompanied the early years of the war in particular, and despite the deteriorating quality of military, let alone scarce civilian, footwear, there is no evidence that the state failed in this segment of the equipment procurement. The centrally controlled distribution of monopolized raw materials, systematically improved quality control, the use of new or alternative materials, and a new hierarchy of consumption that made the civilian sector a much smaller side of the playing field made it possible to supply troops with adequate footwear until the end of the war.¹²² After the end of the war, the shoe factories' warehouses were filled with unworn shoes, which the manufacturers tried to take to the successor states of the defunct monarchy or offer to the hungry civilian shoe market, which was done immediately after the war by the Zlín company Baťa, which offered heavy military boots to Slovak customers.¹²³ The civilian sector thus gradually reviewed its relationship to footwear as a long-term quality commodity, which had been dictated by availability, practicality and affordability during the war.¹²⁴

The Great War and the contracts for military footwear completely redrew the map of Central European shoes production, as after the war it was led by companies that had profited significantly from the production of military footwear during the conflict. These companies were able to find ways to resume the production of civilian footwear and were able to adapt flexibly to both wartime and

120 Martin JEMELKA, «The Army, the Great War and the Belated Industrialisation of Shoemaking in the Czech Lands», *War in History* (2024), pp. 1–24.

121 Already in the first months of the war, there were discussions about readiness for war. Austrian diplomats and the General Staff pointed out the lack of readiness. See PAMMER, p. 51.

122 Ibid, p. 49.

123 Martin JEMELKA, «Státoprávní představy Tomáše Bati», in Karel Schelle and Jaromír Tauchen (eds.), *Encyklopedie právních dějin XVI*, Praha, Aleš Čermák, 2019, pp. 2421–2423.

124 GRANDNER, pp. 93–96.

post-war conditions and to cope with the changing legal frameworks. Shoe factory production underwent major structural changes during the war, starting with the chaos of the first weeks of the war, which was reflected in the dismissal of apprentices and the closure of entire factories. With the first orders for military shoes in the first year of the war, the production of civilian shoes was completely neglected. After a year, civilian production was resumed and the factories largely specialized purely in the manufacture of military shoes or, in minority, simple civilian shoes. Finally, the specialization of production and the rationalization of the management of raw materials and machinery contributed significantly to the concentration of military footwear production in a few large factories, which took advantage of the exceptional wartime conditions and restrictive legislation to impose the basic principles of Fordism and Taylorism.¹²⁵

The army and its contracts for military shoes became the driving force behind the completion of the belated industrialization of the shoe industry in Central Europe: the rationalization and the standardization of the production portfolio also found their way into the mass production of civilian shoes after the war. Military circles also took part in the technical debates on standardization during the war and the search for alternative sources of raw materials and supplies. Finally, the successor states also learned from the war. The Czechoslovak Republic, for example, was so distrustful of shoe companies that “collaborated” with the Habsburg state that it turned to medium-sized and smaller companies for shoe orders for the Czechoslovak army instead of established companies with wartime know-how.¹²⁶

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Moravský zemský archiv (Moravian Provincial Archives Brno, MZA), fonds Busi
Österreichisches Staatsarchiv (ÖSA), Kriegsarchiv (KA), Kriegsministerium (KM),
fonds XIII. Abteilung (Montur)
Vojenský historický archiv (Military History Archive Prague, VHA), fonds 9. Korpskommando; 8. Korpskommando

¹²⁵ «Situční poměry při tovární výrobě obuvi», *Obuvník*, 9. 1. 1916, no. 1, pp. 1–2.

¹²⁶ František MOKRÝ, *Ševci a boty ve Žďáře, Žďár nad Sázavou*, Knihovna Matěje Josefa Sychry, 2012, p. 112.

Wiener Stadt- und Landesarchiv (WSL), fonds Handelsgericht, Etappen-Häute-Zentrale
Zemský archiv v Opavě (Regional Archives in Opava, ZAO), pracoviště Olomouc, fonds
Obchodní a živnostenská komora Olomouc

Adjustierungsvorschrift für das k.u.k. Heer 1910/11, Teil 1, Wien, K. K. Hof- und Staatsdruckerei, 1911.

Adjustierungsvorschrift für die k. k. Landwehr. II. Teil. Fußtruppen, Wien, K. K. Hof- und Staatsdruckerei, 1911.

APFELKNAB Egbert, *Waffenrock und Schnürschuh. Die Monturbeschaffung der österreichischen Armee in 18. und 19. Jahrhundert*, Wien, Österreichischer Bundesverlag, 1984.

BANERJEE Vasabjit –TKACH Benjamin, «Russia-Ukraine and Israel-Hamas Wars Reveal the Importance of Weapons Production», *The Diplomat*, 16. 12. 2023 (on-line).

BEČKOVÁ Jana, *Historie a současnost podnikání na Třebíčsku*, Žehušice, Městské knihy, 2003.

BOURKE Joanna, «New Military History», in Matthew Hughes – William J. Philpott (eds.), *Palgrave Advances in Modern Military History*, London, Palgravem 2006, pp. 271–287.

BRANDAUER Isabelle, *Soldatenalltag in den Dolomiten im Ersten Weltkrieg 1915–1917*, Innsbruck, Golf Verlag, 2005.

BRUCKMÜLLER Ernst, «Was there a “Habsburg society” in Austria-Hungary», *Austrian History Yearbook*, 37, (2006), p. 1–16.

BUDISCHOWSKY Jens, «Das Lederunternehmen Carl Budischowsky & Söhne», *Adler: Zeitschrift für Genealogie und Heraldik*, 26, (2012), pp. 279–304.

Compass, vol. 52, 1919, no. 2, Wien, Compassverlag 1918.

Der Schuh. Fachblatt für Schuh-Interessenten (periodical)

Die Uniformen und Fahnen der deutschen Armee: Erste Abtheilung Uebesichtliche Farbendarstellungen der Uniformen, sowie Fahnen und Standarten der Deutschen Armee, Leipzig, Verlag von Moritz Ruhl, 1897.

FÖRSTER Stig, «Vom Kriege: Überlegungen zu einer modernen Militärgeschichte». in Thomas Kühne – Benjamin Ziemann (eds.), *What is Military History?* Paderborn, Schöningh 2000, pp. 265–281.

GRANDNER Margarete, *Kooperative Gewerkschaftspolitik in der Kriegswirtschaft: Die freien Gewerkschaften Österreichs im Ersten Weltkrieg*, Wien, Köln, Weimar, Böhlau, 1992, pp. 93–96.

HABER R., *Die Cavallerie des Deutschen Reiches: deren Entstehung, Entwicklung und Geschichte, nebst Rang-, Quartier-, Anciennitäts-Liste und Uniformierung*, Hannover, Biblio-Verlag, 1877.

HERC Svatopluk, «Obuvnická družstva a společenstva v Čechách za první světové války. *Hospodářské dějiny*, 38, (2023), pp. 1–20.

HOLZER Anton, *Das Lächeln der Henker: Der unbekannte Krieg gegen die Zivilbevölke-*

- rung 1914–1918*. With numerous previously unpublished photographs, Darmstadt, Primus in Herder, 2008.
- HÖNEL Alexander, *Österreichische Militärgeschichte: die Adjustierung des k. (u.) k. Army 1868–1914*, vol. 2: Cavalry, Wien, ARES Verlag, 1999.
- HUTEČKA Jiří, *Men under Fire: Motivation, Morality and Masculinity among Czech Soldiers in the Great War, 1914–1918*, New York, Oxford, Berghan, 2020.
- JEMELKA Martin, «Státoprávní představy Tomáše Bati», in Karel Schelle and Jaromír Tauchen (eds.), *Encyklopedie právních dějin XVI*, Praha, Aleš Čermák, 2019, pp. 2421–2423.
- JEMELKA Martin, «The Army, the Great War and the Belated Industrialisation of Shoemaking in the Czech Lands», *War in History* (2024), pp. 1–24.
- JETMAR Václav, «Skutečské obuvnictví», in *Sborník Vysokomýtsko*, Vysoké Mýto, Vlastivědná komise školního okresu vysokomýtského, 1931, pp. 393–395.
- JINDRA Zdeněk, «České země v rakousko-uherském válečném hospodářství 1914–1918», in Ivan Jakubec – Zdeněk Jindra (eds.), *Hospodářský vzestup českých zemí od poloviny 18. století do konce monarchie*, Praha, Karolinum, 2016, pp. 446–494.
- JINDRA Zdeněk, *První světová válka*, Praha, SPN 1984.
- JIRÁSEK Jindřich, *Cvokaři: o zaniklém řemesle z rožmitálského údolí*, Hostivice, Petr Prášil, 2012.
- Jörg NIMMERGUT – Jörg M. HORMANN, *Deutsche Militaria 1808–1945*, München, Nickel Verl., 1982.
- JUDEX M., *Orden und Ehrenzeichen Österreich-Ungarns: Nach authentischen Quellen bearbeitet*, Troppau, Strassilla 1903.
- JUDEX M., *Uniformen: Distinctions- und sonstige Abzeichen der gesamten k. k. österr.-ungar. Wehrmacht sowie Orden und Ehrenzeichen Oesterreich-Ungarn*, Troppau, Straffilla, 1884.
- KESSLER Vojtěch – ŠRÁMEK Josef, *Tváře války: Velká válka 1914–1918 očima českých účastníků*, Praha, Historický ústav Akademie věd ČR, 2020-
- KESSLER Vojtěch, «Děti v konzumu, rationaci a propagandě válečné obuvi». *Český lid*, 109, (2022), pp. 403–425.
- KNÖTEL Herbert – SIEG Herbert, *Handbuch der Uniformkunde*, Hamburg, Helmut Gerhard Schulz, 1937.
- KOCH Rudolf, *Schicksal Kriegsgefangenschaft: Kriegsgefangenenlager Sigmundsherg*, Wien, Berger & Söhne, Ferdinand, 2015.
- KRAUS Jürgen, *Die deutsche Armee im Ersten Weltkrieg. Uniformierung und Ausrüstung – 1914 bis 1918*, Wien, Verlag Militaria, 2004.
- KRAUS Jürgen, *Die feldgraue Uniformierung des deutschen Heeres 1907–1918*, Vol. I, II, Wien, Biblio-Verlag 2009.
- KUBE Jan K., *Militaria der deutschen Kaiserzeit – Helme und Uniformen 1871–1914*,

- Munich, Keyzers, 1977.
- LANGEWIESCHE Dieter, *Der gewaltsame Lehrer: Europas Kriege in der Moderne*, Munich, C. H. Beck, 2019, passim.
- Laurence COLE, «Vom Glanz der Montur: Zum dynastischen Kult der Habsburger und einer Vermittlung durch militärische Vorbilder im 19. Jahrhundert», *Österreichische Militärische Zeitschrift*, 7, (1996), pp. 577–591.
- LEHÁR Bohumil, *Dějiny Baťova koncernu (1894–1945)*, Praha, SNPL, 1960
- LÜBBE Klaus, *Deutsche Uniformen und Seitengewehre 1841–1945*, Hamburg, Niemann Verlag, 1999.
- MATIS Herbert, «Wirtschaft, Technik und Rüstung als kriegsentscheidende Faktoren», in Wolfgang Reiter – Herbert Matis – Juliane Mikoletzky (eds.), *Wirtschaft, Technik und das Militär 1914–1918: Österreich-Ungarn im Ersten Weltkrieg*, Berlin, Wien, LIT Verlag, 2014, pp. 15–16.
- MEJZLÍK Jaroslav, *Dějiny Závodů Gustava Klimenta Třebíč-Borovina*, Třebíč, Závody G. Klimenta, 1972.
- MILA Adalbert, *Geschichte der Bekleidung und Ausrüstung der Kgl. Preußischen Armee 1808 bis 1878*, Berlin, Mittler, 1878.
- Militär-Ökonomie System der kaiserlichen-königlichen österreichischen Armee*, vol. 1st–17th, Wien, J. Geistinger'schen Buchhandlung, 1820–1823.
- MOKRÝ František, *Ševci a boty ve Žďáře, Žďár nad Sázavou*, Knihovna Matěje Josefa Sychry, 2012.
- MOLL Martin, «Mobilisierung für den totalen Krieg: „Heimatfront“ Österreich-Ungarn im Ersten Weltkrieg am Beispiel der Steiermark », in Wolfram Dornik – Johannes Giessauf – Walter M. Iber (eds.), *Krieg und Wirtschaft: Von der Antike bis ins 21. Jahrhundert*, Innsbruck, Wien, Bolzano, Studien Verlag, 2010, pp. 443–460.
- Normal-Verordnungsblatt für das k. und k. Heer: Beiblatt*, vol. 22, Wien, K. K. Hof- und Staatsdruckerei, 1915.
- Obuvnické listy* (periodical)
- Obuvník* (periodical)
- PAMMER Michael, «Die Vorbereitung von Industrie und Staatsfinanzen auf den Krieg», in Wolfgang Reiter – Herbert Matis – Juliane Mikoletzky (eds.), *Wirtschaft, Technik und das Militär 1914–1918: Österreich-Ungarn im Ersten Weltkrieg*, Berlin, Vienna 2014, p. 61.
- PIETSCH Paul, *Die Formations- und Uniformierungs-Geschichte des preußischen Heeres 1808–1914*, Vol. I and II, Hamburg, Schulz, 1966.
- Reichspost* (periodical)
- REST Stefan – ORTNER Christian – ILMING Thomas, *Des Kaisers Rock im 1. Weltkrieg: Uniformierung und Ausrüstung der österreichisch-ungarischen Armee von 1914 bis 1918*, Wien, Militaria, 2002.

- ŘÍPA Václav, «Sen vojína», In: *Vzpomínky Václava Řípy* (manuscript), p. 32.
- ROGG Matthias, «Im Rock des Königs – soldatische Lebenswirklichkeit», Thorsten Loch – Lars Zacharias (eds.), *Wie die Siegessäule nach Berlin kam. Eine kleine Geschichte der Reichseinigungskriege 1864 bis 1871*, Freiburg, Berlin, Wien, Rombach Druck- und Verlagshaus, 2011, pp. 42–46.
- ROTHENBERG E. Gunther, «The Habsburg Army and the Nationality Problem in the Nineteenth Century 1815–1914», *Austrian History Yearbook*, 3, (1967), p. 70–87.
- SCHÄCHTER Willi – WAGNER Michael (eds.), *Vom Zunft Handwerk zum modernen Industriebetrieb: Schuhe und Schuhherstellung in Deutschland seit dem 18. Jahrhundert*, Hauenstein, Museum für Schuhproduktion und Industriegeschichte Hauenstein, 1998.
- SCHRÖDER H. Wilhelm, *Arbeitergeschichte und Arbeiterbewegung: Industriearbeit und Organisationsverhalten im 19. und frühen 20. Jahrhundert*, Frankfurt am Main, New York, Campus, 1978.
- SCHULZE Max-Stephan, «Austria-Hungary's economy in World War I», in Stephen Broadberry – Mark Harrison (eds.), *The Economics of World War I*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2005, pp. 77–111.
- ŠKORPIL Emanuel, «O litomyšlských ševcích», *Od Trstenické stezky*, 5, (1927), pp. 72–75.
- SOMBART Werner, *Krieg und Kapitalismus*, Munich, Leipzig, Duncker & Humblot, 1913, pp. 151–173.
- SOMMER Johann Gottfried, *Das Königreich Böhmen*, V. Band: Chrudimer Kreis, Prag, J.G. Calve'schen Buchhandlung, 1837, p. 76.
- STUIJENBERG J. H. van, *Economische geschiedenis van Nederland*, Groningen, Wolters-Noordhoff, 1977.
- ŠTÝBROVÁ Miroslava, *Boty, botky, botičky*, Praha, NLN, 2009, p. 124).
- SUDROW Anne, *Der Schuh im Nationalsozialismus: Eine Produktgeschichte im deutsch-britisch-amerikanischen Vergleich*, Göttingen, Wallstein 2010.
- Uniformenkunde das deutsche Heer: Friedensuniformen bei Ausbruch des Weltkrieges*, Vol. I, Hamburg, Verlag v. Diepenbroick-Grüter & Schulz, 1935.
- Uniformenkunde das deutsche Heer: Friedensuniformen bei Ausbruch des Weltkrieges*, Vol. II: Cavalry, Hamburg, Verlag v. Diepenbroick-Grüter & Schulz, 1939.
- WEBER Paul, *Der Schuhmacher: Ein Beruf im Wandel der Zeit*, Stuttgart, AT Verlag, 1988.
- William McNEIL, *Keeping Together in Time: Dance and Drill in Human History*, Boston, Harvard University Press, 1995.
- WINDER Ludwig, *Die Reitpeitsche: Roman*, Berlin, Ullstein Verlag, 1928.
- WITTMER Heike – WITTMER Luis, *Pirmasens: Einst & jetzt*, Erfurt, Sutton, 2023.
- ZEMANOVÁ Jana, «Obuvnictví na Skutečsku», in *Obuv v historii: Sborník materiálů z III. mezinárodní konference 25–27. září 2000*, Zlín, Muzeum jihovýchodní Moravy, 2001, pp. 67–74.
- ŽÍPEK Alois, *Domov za války (svědectví účastníků)*: vol. 1 (1914), Praha, Pokrok 1929.



William Balfour Ker (1877-1918), *Knights of Columbus*, 1917 / Poster showing a priest looking heavenward and raising a crucifix, blessing kneeling soldiers. Library of Congress, Prints and Photographs Division Washington, D.C. 20540 USA. Reproduction Number: LC-USZC4-10131
Rights Advisory: No known restrictions on publication. <https://www.loc.gov/pictures/item/2002711996/>

Articoli / Articles - Military History

- *Interests over Affinities: U.S. Geopolitics and the Italian Revolutions of 1848–49*,
di LUCA CONIGLIO
- *Technology, operations, and strategy in the Crimean War, 1853–1856*,
by VLADIMIR SHIROGOROV
- *Milyutin's response to the Central Asia question. The geo-strategy of the Russian War Minister for annexing Turkistan*,
by GIORGIO SCOTONI
- *"The human heart is the starting point for all matters." Charles Ardant du Picq as a pioneer of combat psychology*, by MICHAŁ N. FASZCZA
- *Il ruolo dell'INA nella distribuzione del Prestito Nazionale durante la Prima guerra mondiale*,
di PIETRO VARGIU
- *"Boot Soles of War": Production, distribution, consumption and value of military shoes in Czech Provinces during the Great War*,
by MARTIN JEMELKA & VOJTECH KESSLER
- *Prigionieri di guerra austro-ungarici e lavoro in Italia durante la Prima guerra mondiale*,
by SONIA RESIDORI
- *I prigionieri di guerra austro-ungarici e la sicurezza in Italia*,
by JUHÁSZ BALÁZS
- *The Purported Resupply of German Submarines in Spain Notes on a failed WW1-Project*, by GERHARD LANG-VALCHS
- *Le trasvolate dall'Europa al Sud America durante gli anni Venti*,
by ANTONIO HORTA FERNANDES
- *Dal raid Lisbona-Rio de Janeiro al primo volo senza scalo Montecelio-Touros*,
di PIER PAOLO ALFEI
- *Catturate la Enigma! Come, grazie alla collaborazione tra Bletchley Park e la Royal Navy, fu possibile violare la macchina cifrante della Kriegsmarine*,
di CLAUDIO RIZZA e PLATON ALEXIADES
- *Giuseppe Izzo maestro di tattica*,
di CARMELO BURGIO
- *The Fighting Experience of the Jewish Brigade Group and Its Influence on the Creation of the IDF*, by SAMUELE ROCCA
- *Onde rosse. Gli esuli italiani in Cecoslovacchia e le trasmissioni radio da Praga verso l'Italia durante la guerra fredda (1948-1976)*,
di SIMONE NEPI

Strategic History

- *Science of War, Strategy in Doubt: The Ambiguity of Military Theory in the Age of Reason* by MAURIZIO R. ECORDATI-KOEN
- *Failed states: The need for a paradigm shift in peace-driven state-building*,
by JAIME A. TEIXEIRA DA SILVA
- *Strategic Military Leadership in Modern Greece: An Interdisciplinary Study of International Relations and Military Pedagogy*,
by MARIOS KYRIAKIDIS
- *Strategy, Operational Strategy and Operations. Comments from the Portuguese Strategic School*, by ANTONIO HORTA FERNANDES
- *Learnable versus Teachable. Reflections on Inculcating Strategic Sense*,
by LUKAS MILEVSKI
- *The Regia Aeronautica in September 1942. The disillusioned assessment of the Italian Air Force Chief of Staff at the crucial moment of the war*, by BASILIO DI MARTINO
- *Italy within the International Commission of Military History, the Past and the Path Ahead* di DAVIDE BORSANI
- *The Simla War Game of 1903*
di LUIGI LORETO
- *La R. Marina e lo sbarco alleato in Sicilia, luglio-settembre 1943*,
di FERDINANDO SANFELICE DI MONTEFORTE
- *Sviluppo e situazione della difesa costiera della Sicilia nel luglio 1943*, di SARA ISGRÒ
- *Le Medaglie d'Oro del Congresso concesse ai combattenti americani della Campagna d'Italia*, di CARMELA ZANGARA
- *Il Gruppo storico 157° Reggimento di fanteria Brigata Liguria*,
di SERGIO DALL'ALBA

DOCUMENTS AND INSIGHTS

Notes

Recensioni / Reviews

- Phillips Payson O'Brien, *War and Power. Who Wins War and Why*, (by JEREMY BLACK)
- Frederick W. Kagan Robin Higham (eds), *The Military History of Tsarist Russia*,
(by VLADIMIR SHIROGOROV)
- Carola Dietze, *The Invention of Terrorism in Europe Russia and the United States*, (by COMESTOR)
- Mirela Altic, *Kosovo History in Maps*,
(by MATTEO MAZZIOTTI DI CELSO)
- Paul W. Schroeder, *America's Fatal Leap 1991-2016*, (di GIANCARLO FINIZIO)
- Stefano Marcuzzi, *Britain and Italy in the Era of the Great War. Defending and Forging Empires*,
(by JOHN GOOCH)
- Giancarlo Finizio, *L'Intelligence italiana nell'anno di Caporetto*,
(di PAOLO POZZATO e MARTIN SAMUELS)
- Aude-Marie Lalanne Berdoutic, *Des hommes pour la guerre. La sélection médicale des soldats*, (di ALESSIO FORNASIN)
- Pum Khan Pau, *Unconventional Warfare Small Wars and Insurgencies in the India-Myanmar Borderland 1914-1945* (by SOHINI MITRA)
- Christian Carnevale, *La guerra d'Etiopia come crisi globale*, (di DAVIDE BORSANI)
- Fabio De Nino, *Mancò la fortuna non il valore*, (di MAURO DIFRANCESCO)
- James J. Sadkovich, *Fascist Italy at War. Men and Materiel*, (di GIANCARLO FINIZIO)
- Giancarlo Poidomani, *Al centro del Mediterraneo. I bombardamenti alleati sulla Sicilia (1940-1943)*,
(di ANTONINO TERAMO)
- Timothy A. Wray, *Tenere le posizioni. La dottrina difensiva tedesca sul fronte russo 1941-1943*, (di PAOLO POZZATO)
- Gastone Breccia, *L'ultimo inverno di guerra. Vita e morte sul fronte dimenticato*, (di PAOLO POZZATO)
- Alberto Li Gobbi, *Guerra Partigiana*, a cura di Antonio Li Gobbi (di GIOVANNI CECINI)
- Tommaso Piffer, *Gli Alleati, la resistenza europea e le origini della guerra fredda*, (di GIANCARLO FINIZIO)
- Sarah Lias Ceide, *L'Organisation Gehlen in Italia, 1946-1956*, (di Gianfranco Linzi)
- Alessandro Giorgi, *Cronologia della guerra del Vietnam*, (di COMESTOR)
- Thomas Mahnken, *Arms Competition, Arms Control, and Strategies of Peacetime*,
(by EMANUELE FARRUGIA)
- Serhii Plocky, *Chernobyl Roulette - War in a Nuclear Disaster Zone*, (by MARIA TESSAROLI)
- Giuseppe De Ruvo (ed.), *Storia e filosofia della geopolitica. Un'antologia*, (by GIACOMO MARIA ARRIGO)
- Briefing. *A Global Fight for a New World Order*,
(by GIUSEPPE GAGLIANO)
- *Geopolitica XIV N. 1 Confine e Frontiera*,
(di MARIKA BALZANO)
- Bernd Mütter, *Die Entstehung der Geschichtsdidaktik als Wissenschaftsdisziplin in der Epoche der Weltkriege*, (di GIOVANNI PUNZO)
- Esther-Julia Howell, *Von den Besiegten lernen? Die kriegsgeschichtliche Kooperation der U.S. Armee und der ehemaligen Wehrmachtselite 1945-1951*, (di GIOVANNI PUNZO)
- Luca Addante, *Le Colonne della Democrazia. Giacobinismo e società segrete alle radici del Risorgimento*, (di GIOVANNI PUNZO)
- Claudio Gotti, *Jean Landrieux. L'artiglio del gatto (Memorie 1796-1797)*,
(di GIOVANNI PUNZO)
- Maurizio Lo Re, *Storie imperfette oltre il confine*,
(di KRISTIAN KNEZ)
- Wolfgang Muchtisch (ed.), *Does War Belong in Museums?*
- *The Representation of Violence in Exhibitions*
(di FRANCESCA M. LO FARO)