


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Società Italiana di Storia Militare



Borgognotta “a coda d’aragosta” (“zischägge”, “cappellina”, “capeline”) per corazzieri, raitri e archibugieri a cavallo, di derivazione ottomana (szyszak, çiçak). Esemplare olandese, ca. 1630/50, donato nel 1964 dal Dr. Douglas G. Carroll, Jr. al Walters Art Museum di Mount Vernon-Belvedere, Baltimore (MD), kindly licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike 3.0 Unported license (wikipedia).

Veterans of the War of Cyprus (1570-71)

Captivity, Liberation and Restitution through their Recruitment into the Venetian Armed Forces. A First Approach

by STATHIS BIRTACHAS and CHRYSOVALANTIS PAPADAMOU

ABSTRACT. The War of Cyprus (1570–71) took place within the framework of the Fourth Ottoman–Venetian War, which was concluded with the naval Battle of Lepanto and the peace treaty signed by the two contenders in 1573. This essay deals with the consequences of the War of Cyprus, focusing on a category of veterans that comprised native Cypriot non-professional combatants and militiamen who had fought alongside the Venetian overlords, as well as subjects of the *Serenissima* originating from former territories (such as the Morea) in the Venetian Maritime State (*stato da mar*), who served as professional military personnel in the army of Cyprus (*stradioti*). The principal issues explored in this essay are: firstly, their captivity in the hands of the Ottomans and the procedures for their liberation; and secondly, their subsequent claims to restitution through their recruitment into the Venetian armed forces. The sources on which the study is based are the veterans' unpublished petitions to the Venetian authorities, in combination with other types of documents (notarial documents, court cases, deliberations by various Councils and magistracies etc.) from the Archivio di Stato di Venezia.

KEYWORDS: Republic of Venice; *stato da mar*; Ottoman Empire; War of Cyprus (1570–71); veterans; captivity; recruitment; Venetian armed forces.

1. About the War of Cyprus (1570–71)

Throughout the Venetian rule in Cyprus (1489–1571), the danger of an Ottoman attack was present, while ever since the Ottomans abolished the Mamluk Sultanate in Egypt (1517) the island became a tributary to the Sublime Porte.¹ At that time, the Ottoman Empire conquered Rhodes

¹ George HILL, *A History of Cyprus*, Vol. 3, Cambridge, At the University Press, 1972, pp. 711-712, 735, 745, 821-837; Aikaterini ARISTEIDOU, «Η καταβολή φόρου υποτέλειας της Κύπρου στο Μαμελούκο και αργότερα στον Τούρκο σουλτάνο», *Επετηρίδα του Κέντρου*

(1522) and Chios (1566), abolishing the Western rules of the Knights of Saint John and the Genoese respectively. These moves aimed at eliminating the rival Christian forces in the Eastern Mediterranean and securing the Ottoman supremacy in the Middle East. This purpose was also served by the subsequent Ottoman conquest of Cyprus. Irrespective of the speculation regarding the aspirations and influence of Joseph Nasi, a Jew, in the Sublime Porte and his competition with the *Serenissima* in the Mediterranean trade, the additional incentives for waging war against the Venetian overlords of the island were the prospect of new revenues to the Empire, the need to secure the unimpeded transfer of Muslim pilgrims to Mecca and, most of all, the safety of trade routes; according to Ottoman claims, Christian pirate ships based on the island stormed against the Ottoman merchant vessels which transported supplies from Syria and Egypt to Constantinople.²

Consequently, after his ascension to the throne as Sultan, adopting the bellicose policy of his predecessors, Selim II (1566–74) finalised the project of the conquest of Cyprus. In early July of 1570 the Ottomans started the invasion from the Saline (Larnaca) and on 26 July the Ottoman army under General Lala Mustafa Pasha appeared before the walls of Nicosia. According to Ottoman sources, it comprised about 60,000 to 100,000 men, while the

Επιστημονικών Ερευνών, 24 (1998), pp. 153-160; Stathis BIRTACHAS, *Society, Culture and Government in the Venetian Maritime State: The case of Cyprus* [Κοινωνία, πολιτισμός και διακυβέρνηση στο βενετικό Κράτος της Θάλασσας: *Το παράδειγμα της Κύπρου*], Thessaloniki, Vaniias Publishers, 2011, pp. 49, 52-53, 54-55, 146-147; Nicholas COUREAS, «The tribute paid to the Mamluk Sultanate, 1426-1517: The perspective from Lusignan and Venetian Cyprus», in U. VERMEULEN, K. D'HULSTER and J. VAN STEENBERGEN (EDS.), *Egypt and Syria in the Fatimid, Ayyubid and Mamluk eras*, Vol. 7, Leuven, Peeters Publishers, 2013, pp. 363-380; Nicholas COUREAS, «Latin Cyprus and its relations with the Mamluk sultanate, 1250–1517», in Adrian J. BOAS (Ed.), *Latin Cyprus and its Relations with the Mamluk Sultanate, 1250–1517*, London and New York, Routledge, 2016, pp. 391-418.

2 Archimandrite ΚΥΡΙΑΝΟΣ, *Ιστορία χρονολογική της νήσου Κύπρου*, Venice, N. Glykis Printing Press, 1788, p. 275; İdris BOSTAN, «Kıbrıs Seferi Günlüğü ve Osmanlı Donanmasının Sefer Güzergâhi», *Düden Bugüne Kıbrıs Meselesi*, Istanbul, Tarih ve Tabiat Vakfı, 2001, pp. 11-13; Andreas ORPHANIDES and Nicholas COUREAS, «Piracy in Cyprus and the Eastern Mediterranean during the Later Lusignan and Venetian Periods (15th-16th Centuries)», *Επετηρίδα του Κέντρου Επιστημονικών Ερευνών*, 33 (2007), pp. 121-162, esp. 148-149; BIRTACHAS, *Society, Culture and Government* cit., pp. 144, 147; Gilles GRIVAUD, «Η κατάκτηση της Κύπρου από τους Οθωμανούς», in Theodoros ΠΑΠΑΔΟΠΟΥΛΛΟΣ (Ed.), *Ιστορία της Κύπρου*, Vol. 6, Τουρκοκρατία, Nicosia, Archbishop Makarios III Foundation / Office for Cyprus History, 2013, pp. 145-146.

defenders of the Cypriot capital within the walls numbered around 12,000. Two men without military and leadership skills were in charge of the city's defence, ill-equipped to face the Ottoman attack effectively: Venetian *luogotenente* Nicolò Dandolo and Cypriot nobleman Eugenio Singlitico, Count of Rocha (or Roucha). The fate of the city was sealed, due to lack of time for the completion of the fortifications, wrong manoeuvres by the two commanders during the siege, as well as lack of external military assistance. The battle lasted for 45 days, and on 9 September the Ottomans entered Nicosia. Plunder and slaughter raged for more than three days. According to some sources, the casualties during the first day were more than 20,000, and a similar number of captives ended up in the slave markets of the Levant. Dandolo was killed in the palace of the Venetian administration along with others who had found shelter there. Several lightly armed cavalrymen, the so-called *stradioti*,³ managed to escape to the mountains, most of them heading to Famagusta, the most significant fortress on the island, in order to reinforce its defence.⁴

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- 3 About the light cavalry of *stradioti* (of Greek, Albanian or even Slavic descent), see the following studies by Stathis BIRTACHAS, encompassing the earlier literature: «La memoria degli stradioti nella letteratura italiana del tardo Rinascimento», in Zosi ZOGRAFIDOU (Ed.), *Tempo, spazio e memoria nella letteratura italiana. Omaggio ad Antonio Tabucchi*, Thessaloniki, University Studio Press, 2012, pp. 124-142; «*Stradioti, capelletti, compagnie or milizie Greche*: 'Greek' Mounted and Foot Mercenary Companies in the Venetian State (Fifteenth to Eighteenth Centuries)», in George THEOTOKIS and Aysel YILDIZ (Eds.), *A Military History of the Mediterranean Sea. Aspects of War and Military Elites*, Leiden-Boston, Brill, 2018, pp. 325-346. Cf. the later study by Katerina KORRÈ, *Μισθοφόροι stradioti της Βενετίας. Πολεμική και κοινωνική λειτουργία (15ος-16ος αιώνας)*, Phd diss., Corfu, Ionian University, 2018. Regarding their presence in Cyprus, see also Gilles GRIVAUD, «Formes et mythe de la strateia à Chypre», *Études Balkaniques*, 5 (1998), pp. 33-54; Nasa ΠΑΤΑΡΙΟΥ, «Η κάθοδος των Ελληνοαλβανών stradioti στην Κύπρο (ΙΣΤ' αι.)», *Επετηρίδα Κέντρου Επιστημονικών Ερευνών*, 24 (1998), pp. 161-209; Αικατερίνη ΑΡΙΣΤΕΙΔΟΥ, «Ενίσχυση των οχυρώσεων και η εγκατάσταση ελληνοαλβανών στρατιωτών στην Κύπρο (1514-1516)», *Επετηρίδα Κέντρου Επιστημονικών Ερευνών*, 26 (2000), pp. 195-203; Nasa ΠΑΤΑΡΙΟΥ, «Υπερασπιστές της Αμμοχώστου το 1570-1571 από τη Μεθώνη: οικογένεια Μεθωναίου (Da Modon) και οικογένεια Λυκούρεση», *Επετηρίδα Κέντρου Επιστημονικών Ερευνών*, 34 (2008), pp. 167-188; Stathis BIRTACHAS, *Venetian Cyprus: The Reports by the Dominion's Supreme Administrative Officials*, Thessaloniki, Epikentro Publishers, 2019, *passim*.
- 4 BIRTACHAS, *Society, Culture and Government* cit., pp. 147-156; GRIVAUD, «Η κατάκτηση της Κύπρου» cit., pp. 151-154. About the importance of the Famagusta fortress for the defence of Cyprus, and the fact that many Venetian supreme administrative officials considered it as strong and impregnable, see their final reports in BIRTACHAS, *Venetian Cyprus*:

The beginning of the end of Venetian rule in Cyprus was signalled by the resumption of conflict in the above-mentioned fortress. The Ottoman army arrived outside the walls of Famagusta on 17 September 1570. They had grown to 200,000–250,000 men, supported by 74 artillery cannons. On the opposite camp, under Marcantonio Bragadin, *capitano* of Famagusta, stood 3,000–4,000 experienced Italian infantrymen, 200–300 *stradioti* of the light cavalry and around 4,000 native militiamen. Conditions in Famagusta were much better than in Nicosia, since the fortifications had been completed, the mercenaries were fed and paid regularly, there was an organised hospital for the wounded, and overall the morale of the armed forces and the civilian population was quite high. In contrast to the situation in Nicosia – where the population expressed discontent against the *luogotenente* Dandolo and a disinclination to counter the Ottoman attack – the people of Famagusta were ready to participate actively in the protection of the city. In parallel, they fully supported the Venetian commanders Marcantonio Bragadin, Astore Baglioni and Lorenzo Tiepolo, who exuded confidence and decisiveness in the fight against the common enemy⁵.

The surrender of Famagusta was finally signed by Lala Mustafa Pasha and Marcantonio Bragadin (5 August 1571) after a siege of eleven months. Notwithstanding, the Ottoman commander violated the agreement, arrested all the military officers accompanying Bragadin and executed them outside his tent. Then, he ordered his men to skin the Venetian *capitano* alive. On 22 August, with thousands of captives aboard Ottoman ships, Mustafa Pasha departed for Constantinople.⁶

The Reports cit., *passim*, esp. pp. 72, 96, 109, 161, 220-221, 230, 275, 432, 446, 450, 459, 470, 472, 479. The sources reveal the names of several *stradioti* who escaped from Nicosia to Famagusta. See, e.g., Guido A. QUARTI, *La guerra contro il Turco a Cipro e a Lepanto, MDLXX-MDLXXI. Storia documentata*, Venezia, G. Bellini, 1935, pp. 503-504; Gigi MONELLO, *Accadde a Famagosta. L'assedio turco ad una fortezza veneziana el il suo sconvolte finale*, Cagliari, Scepsi & Mattana, 2006, p. 3.

- 5 George HILL, cit., pp. 988-998; Aikaterini ARISTEIDOU, «Μεχμέτ πασά Σοκόλοβιτς και κυπριακός πόλεμος», *Κυπριακά Σπουδαί*, 51 (1987), pp. 73-74; Iain FENLON, *The Ceremonial City: History, Memory and Myth in Renaissance Venice*, New Haven, Yale University Press, 2007, pp. 162-163; GRIVAUD, «Η κατάκτηση της Κύπρου» cit., pp. 155-157; Federico MORO, *Venezia in guerra. Quattordici secoli di storia politica e battaglie*, Venezia, La Tolletta, 2011, pp. 181-183; BIRTACHAS, *Society, Culture and Government* cit., pp. 157-159.
- 6 HILL, cit., pp. 1028-1035; Giorgio DISSERA BRAGADIN, *Venezia da Mar. Città diffusa su cin-*

The War of Cyprus took place within the framework of the Fourth Ottoman–Venetian War, which was concluded with the naval Battle of Lepanto and the peace treaty signed by the two contenders in 1573.⁷ The loss of the island had disastrous geopolitical, political and economic consequences for the Republic of Venice. Beyond the casualties, as already mentioned, a large part of the population (both Venetians and others in the service of the Republic) was captured and transferred to the slave markets of the Levant, which essentially robbed the Republic of valuable human resources. Captivity was also the fate of the island’s defenders: a) Venetians; b) Italian mercenaries and officers of the Venetian army; c) native non-professional combatants and militiamen who fought in the conflicts; and d) subjects of the *Serenissima* originating from former territories in the Venetian Maritime State (*stato da mar*), who served as professional military personnel in the army of Cyprus (*stradioti*). This essay focuses exclusively on the last two categories. Although it is impossible to draw firm conclusions regarding the exact number of captives, mainly in Nicosia and Famagusta, given the disparities in the sources, undeniably several thousand souls were lost.⁸

que mari, Venezia, Libri da Mar, 2004, pp. 247-248; GRIVAUD, «Η κατάκτηση της Κύπρου» cit., pp. 117-119; BIRTACHAS, *Society, Culture and Government* cit., p. 160.

7 From the rich historiographical production about the conflict, see the following works encompassing the relevant sources: Samuele ROMANIN, *Storia documentata di Venezia*, Vol. 6, Venice, Pietro Naratovich, 1857, pp. 259-340; Paul HERRE, *Europäische Politik im Cyprischen Krieg 1570-1573. I. Vorgeschichte und Vorverhandlungen*, Leipzig, Dieterich (T. Weicher), 1902; QUARTI, *La guerra contro il Turco* cit.; HILL, cit., pp. 878-1040; Michel LESURE, *Lépante, la crise de l’Empire ottoman*, Paris, Julliard, 1972; Gino BENZONI (Ed.), *Il Mediterraneo nella seconda metà del Cinquecento alla luce di Lepanto*, Florence, Leo S. Olschki, 1974; Fernand BRAUDEL, *La Méditerranée et le monde méditerranéen à l’époque de Philippe II*, Vol. 2, Paris, A. Colin, 1979 [4th ed.], pp. 330-430; Kenneth K. M. SETTON, *The Papacy and the Levant (1204-1571)*, Vol. 4, *The Sixteenth Century from Julius III to Pius V*, Philadelphia, The American Philosophical Society, 1984, pp. 922-1104; Romano CANOSA, *Lepanto. Storia della «Lega Santa» contro i Turchi*, Rome, Sapere 2000, 2000; GRIVAUD, «Η κατάκτηση της Κύπρου».

8 See, e.g., BOSTAN, «Κίβρις Seferi» cit., p. 100; GRIVAUD, «Η κατάκτηση της Κύπρου» cit., p. 84. Indicatively, it is stated here that one of the captives in Constantinople, Ettore Podocataro, noted in a letter to the Venetian *bailo* there, Marcantonio Barbaro, that 40,000 people had been killed in the cities and 15,000 people transferred to the Ottoman capital under the commands of Admiral Piali Pasha. About the coded letter by Ettore Podocataro, see A.S.V., Senato, Dispacci degli ambasciatori e residenti a Costantinopoli, filza 5, fols. 282r-286r, 15 November 1570. Cf. GRIVAUD, «Η κατάκτηση της Κύπρου» cit., p. 171; Vera COSTANTINI, «Famagusta in Early Ottoman Sources», in Michael J. K. WALSH (Ed.), *City*

2. *Captivity and Liberation of the Veterans*

Through the combination of the various sources available, new evidence regarding the consequences of the War of Cyprus comes to light, along with the personal and familial stories of the captives.⁹ Information can be drawn initially from various lists of captives, military men or civilians, which circulated in Constantinople after the War, mainly in the circles of the Venetian *bailo* there, with the aim of ensuring the release of as many people as possible, but especially aristocrats and experienced war professionals.¹⁰ The first list of names was drawn up on 18 April 1571, regarding people from Nicosia («...»)¹¹.

Similarly, chronicles of the War drawn up as reports or journals by witnesses and, mostly, captives who were liberated, also provide information. The following examples are indicative:

Soldier Angelo Gatto from Orvieto, who had fought in Famagusta and had been sent as a prisoner of war to Constantinople, cites a list of dead, rescued

of Empires: Ottoman and British Famagusta, Cambridge, Cambridge Scholar Publishing, 2015, pp. 5-7.

- 9 Information regarding the topic can be drawn only as fragments from documents in the Archivio di Stato di Venezia (mainly in the following series: Senato, Terra; Senato, Mar; Collegio, Supplice di dentro; Collegio, Supplice di fuori; Bailo a Costantinopoli; Senato, Dispacci degli ambasciatori e residenti a Costantinopoli) or in other archives (e.g., Archivio Segreto Vaticano, Archivo General de Simancas etc.) regarding the individual petitions for liberation by the captives themselves or their relatives. See Wipertus H. RUDT DE COLLENBERG, «Les *litterae hortatoriae* accordées par les papes en faveur de la rédemption des Chypriotes captifs des Turcs (1570-1597) d'après les fonds de l'Archivio Segreto Vaticano», *Επετηρίδα Κέντρου Επιστημονικών Ερευνών*, 11 (1981-1982), pp. 13-167; Ioannis HASSIOTIS (Ed.), Πηγές της κυπριακής ιστορίας από το ισπανικό αρχείο *Simancas*. Από τη μικροϊστορία της κυπριακής διασποράς κατά τον ΙΣΤ΄ και ΙΖ΄ αιώνα, Nicosia, Cyprus Research Centre, 2000. About a detailed list of the *stradioti* who fought in Cyprus and were taken captives, see KORRÈ, *Μισθοφόροι* cit., pp. 229-278.
- 10 Vera COSTANTINI, «Old Players and New in the Transition of Cyprus to Ottoman Rule», in Vera COSTANTINI and Markus KOLLER (Eds.), *Living in the Ottoman Ecumenical Community. Essays in honour of Suraiya Faroqhi*, Leiden and Boston, Brill, 2008, pp. 374-376.
- 11 ARCHIVIO DI STATO DI VENEZIA (hereafter: A.S.V.), Collegio, Relazioni di ambasciatori, rettori e altre cariche, busta 84, unnumbered fols., 18 April 1571. This list also comprises the names of dead people and has been published by Chryssa MALTEZOU, «Η περιπέτεια ενός ελληνόφωνου Βενετού της Κύπρου (1571)», in Theodoros PAPADOPOULLOS and Venediktos EGGLEZAKIS (Eds.), *Πεπραγμένα Β΄ Διεθνούς Κυπριολογικού Συνεδρίου*, Vol. 2, Nicosia, Society of Cypriot Studies, 1986, pp. 236-239.

and imprisoned individuals in Famagusta, as well as a list of the captured, who were then imprisoned in the Tower of the Black Sea.¹² Count Nestore Martinengo, a military officer, cites a list of casualties alongside 32 *capitani*, who were captured in Famagusta.¹³ Giovanni Sozomeno, who was in charge of an army corps of engineers in Nicosia and was liberated after having paid a ransom of 1,000 ducats, concluded his own account of the War with a list of the dead and captives in the town, as well as those who escaped to Famagusta.¹⁴ Dominican friar Angelo Calepio also gives the names of dead and captives in Nicosia and Famagusta.¹⁵

Other sources of greater interest are the following: a) the 1,017 letters of appeal (*litterae hortatoriae*) to the Pope regarding the collection of funds for the liberation of Cypriot prisoners of war;¹⁶ b) the *Atti* of the *bailo* in Constantinople, recording the ransoming of captives;¹⁷ and c) the list of 13,719 people in the *Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivleri* (The Prime Minister's Ottoman

12 Angelo GATTO, *Narratione del terribile assedio e della resa di Famagosta nell'anno 1571 da un manoscritto del capitano Angelo Gatto da Orvieto*, ed. Policarpo CATIZZANI, Orvieto 1895 [new edition by Maria Perla DE FAZI, *Narratione del Capitano Angelo Gatto da Orvieto del successo dell'assedio di Famagosta*, San Benedetto del Tronto, Istituto di Ricerca delle Fonti per la Storia della Civiltà Marinara Picena, 2005, fols. 170v-186v, 198v-201r].

13 Nestore MARTINENGO, *L'assedio et presa di Famagosta, dove s'intende minutissimamente tutte le scaramucchie, & batterie, Mine & assalti dati ad essa fortezza. Et quanto valore habbiano dimostrato quei Signori, Capitani, Soldati, popolo, & infino le donne; Li nomi de i Capitani, & numero delle genti morte, cosi de Christiani, come de Turchi; & medesimamente di quelli che sono restati prigionieri*, Stampata in Brescia, & ristampata in Verona per Bastian dale Donne, & Gioianni fratelli, 1572 [new edition by Gigi MONELLO, *Accade a Famagosta. Appendice: La relazione di Nestore Martinengo*, Cagliari, Scepi e Mattana, 2007]. Despite its inaccuracies, the work of Martinengo was widely used by historians studying the War of Cyprus and was translated into various European languages. GRIVAUD, «Η κατάκτηση της Κύπρου» cit., pp. 16 and notes 45-46.

14 Giovanni SOZOMENO, *Narratione della guerra di Nicosia, fatta nel Regno di Cipro da' Turchi l'anno MDLXX*, Bologna, per Biagio Bignami, 1571.

15 Angelo CALEPIO, *Vera et fidelissima narratione del successo dell'espugnatione, & defensione del Regno de Cipro*, in Stefano LUSIGNANO, *Chorographia, et breue historia universale dell'isola de Cipro principiando al tempo de Noè per in fino al 1572*, Bologna, per Alessandro Benaccio, 1573, fols. 92v-112r: 110r-112r; Angelo CALEPIO, *Vera et fidelissima narratione dell'espugnatione, & defensione de Famagosta*, in LUSIGNANO, *Chorographia*, pp. 112v-123v: 120r-121v.

16 COLLENBERG, «Les *litterae hortatoriae*» cit. In his study, Rudt de Collenberg cites a list of 291 names.

17 A.S.V., *Bailo a Costantinopoli, Atti-Protocolli*, buste 263-267.

Archives) in Istanbul. This significant list comprises the names (though not the surnames) of captives from Nicosia, as well as their redemption price.¹⁸

Finally, significant information regarding this topic can be drawn from the individual petitions for liberation by the captives initially to the *bailo* in Constantinople and subsequently (after liberation) to the Venetian authorities in the metropolis, regarding restitution through their recruitment into the armed forces, financial aid or land concessions. The misadventures of the captives, as revealed by these sources, are indicative of the blow that part of the Cypriot population, who had sided with the Venetian overlords, had suffered from the Ottoman conquest of the island. Nonetheless, let it be noted here that another part of the Cypriot population, mostly among the peasants, who – despite the opportunistic measure adopted by the Council of Ten, i.e. the liberation of feudal serfs (*parici*) shortly before the beginning of the War (22 February 1570) – being discontent with the oppressive social policy of the Venetian rulers and their exploitation by feudal lords and landowners, were swayed by the Ottoman promises of a policy of tolerance and fairer taxation. Consequently, they expressed disobedience and disinclination to resist the invasion¹⁹. The severe grain crisis of the last decade of Venetian rule on the island and the subsequent frustration of Nicosia's *popolo*, expressed through popular riots in 1566, should also be taken into account²⁰.

Irrespective of the above, the descriptions given by the liberated captives

18 Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi, Mâliyeden Müdevver, reg. 5471. Cf. Vera COSTANTINI, «Destini di guerra. L'inventario ottomano dei prigionieri di Nicosia (settembre 1570)», *Studi Veneziani*, n.s. 45 (2003), pp. 229-241, with a description of the list.

19 BIRTACHAS, *Society, Culture and Government* cit., pp. 108-109, 152-153, 154-155. Cf. Gilles GRIVAUD, «Un société en guerre: Chypre face à la conquête ottomane», in Angel NICOLAOU-KONNARI (Ed.), *Η Γαληνοτάτη και η Ευγενεστάτη: Η Βενετία στην Κύπρο και η Κύπρος στη Βενετία / La Serenissima and La Nobilissima: Venice in Cyprus and Cyprus in Venice*, Bank of Cyprus Cultural Foundation, Nicosia 2009, pp. 194-203; GRIVAUD, «Η κατάκτηση της Κύπρου» cit., pp. 162-170, 174-177.

20 Benjamin ARBEL, «Η Κύπρος υπό ενετική κυριαρχία», in Theodoros PAPADOPOULLOS (Ed.), *Ιστορία της Κύπρου*, Vol. 4, *Μεσαιωνικόν βασίλειον – Ενετοκρατία*, Nicosia, Archbishop Makarios III Foundation / Office for Cyprus History, 1995, p. 528 and note 332; BIRTACHAS, *Society, Culture and Government* cit., pp. 115-127, esp. 120-124; Gilles GRIVAUD, *Venice and the Defence of the Regno di Cipro. Giulio Savorgnan's unpublished Cyprus correspondence*, translated by G. Cunningham, Nicosia, The Bank of Cyprus Cultural Foundation, 2016, pp. 260-262.

provide important information regarding the following: a) their origins and former social standing; b) the military services they had provided to the Venetian forces prior to and during the War; c) their exploits (real or exaggerated) on the battlefield; d) their place and conditions of imprisonment; e) their fellow prisoners; f) at times, their masters; g) the time span of their captivity; and h) other facts and evidence related to their lives. The short and succinct biographical notes provided by petitioners to the Venetian authorities served mostly to emphasise their obedience and loyalty to the *Serenissima*, given the significant services that they had provided in the critical hour of the War. The ultimate goal was to ensure the approval of their requests as war veterans. Upon liberation, successful petitions – for limited or extended financial aid, land concessions or recruitment into the Venetian armed forces – would represent a springboard for their future survival and advancement.²¹

Regarding the captives' ransoming, the role of the Venetian *bailo* in Constantinople was instrumental, since he was involved in all necessary procedures. With the funds he received from the Venetian metropolis he tried to liberate as many people as possible, but – as already stated – he was particular to aristocrats and experienced war professionals. The process was set in motion with the captives or their representative, sending a letter to the *bailo* asking for help. Then, the *bailo* would investigate in order to verify the petitioners' claims, i.e. that they had fought in Cyprus, and would call for witnesses to testify. If their assertions were proven true, he would deposit the ransom. In order to leave Constantinople, the former captive would receive a certificate of liberation either from the *bailo* himself or from the Ottoman authorities. In general, there were various magistracies and officials certifying the liberation of a prisoner of war according to his placement during captivity. For instance, if he had been serving as a rower in a galley, he would receive an attestation from the clerk of the ship. Petitioning by captives began right after the end of the War and increased after the mid-1570s. Some were lucky enough to be freed a short while after they were captured, but most remained in captivity for years.²²

21 Hundreds of petitions can be found in the A.S.V., mainly in the following archival series: Senato, Mar; Senato, Terra; Collegio, Supplice di dentro; Collegio, Supplice di fuori; Cinque Savi alla Mercanzia.

22 COSTANTINI, «Old Players» cit., pp. 374-376; KORRÈ, Μισθοφόροι cit., pp. 252-254.

Besides the instrumental role of the *bailo*, it is important to note the contribution of the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople and other people, both well-known and unknown, who tried to assist captives in their own ways. Typical cases include Patriarch Jeremias II (1572–79) and the *stradioto* Zorzi Livadi. The latter had fought as a *stradioto* in Nicosia, had been captured and brought to Constantinople. After his ransoming, Livadi developed a powerful network in cooperation with the Venetian *bailo* and Patriarch Jeremias II, who provided him with financial aid; thus, within a short time period he managed to liberate several heads (*capi*) of *stradioti* before the Ottomans had realised their significance and asked for more ransom. The *stradioti* were lightly armed mercenary cavalry forces, recruited in large numbers by the Venetians in order to reinforce their overseas possessions, and the military operations against the Ottomans in the Levant or against other enemies on the Italian peninsula. They were famous for their nimbleness, speed, bravery and ferocity on the battlefield, as well as their unorthodox tactics.²³ The long list of those who were freed thanks to Livadi includes three significant figures of the War of Cyprus: the *stradioti* Andrea Rontac(c)hi, Nicolò Vlami and Zuan Licuressi.²⁴

As for the combatants who were captured in Nicosia and Famagusta, most were transferred to Constantinople as captives of the Sultan or other Ottoman officials. Beyond the Ottoman capital, some were sent to the coasts of Asia Minor and the slave markets of Barbary. Those who were sent to Constantinople also became slaves and were divided into two categories: private or domestic slaves, and public ones, depending on their masters. The private or domestic slaves were owned mostly by Janissaries. They sold them off to speculators, who in turn tried to profiteer by reselling them. As for the public slaves, they belonged to the Sultan and to Lala Mustafa Pasha, and were held in prisons, for example the so-called baths – because of their former use – at the Arsenal of Constantinople, with the intension of their subsequent assignment to Ottoman galleys, public works and cultivations. The above-

23 The *stradioti* participated in the wars of the Republic of Saint Mark with foreign powers in the Italian Peninsula from the late 1470s until the War of Gradisca. BIRTACHAS, «La memoria degli stradioti» cit.; BIRTACHAS, «*Stradioti, cappelletti, compagnie*» cit.

24 About the activities of Livadi, see KORRÈ, Μισθοφόροι cit., pp. 257-259. All the veterans' names cited in the essay follow the spelling of the archival documents.

mentioned baths were an enclosure with high walls, restored by the Ottoman administration in order to be used as a detention centre for prisoners of war. In the sixteenth century, several other spaces in the Ottoman capital had been adapted to similar uses in order to house the numerous slaves. A typical detailed description of such a place, where people captured in the War of Cyprus were held, is given by the aforesaid Angelo Gatto.²⁵

3. *Veterans' Restitution through their Reintegration into the Venetian Armed Forces*

As mentioned above, after the liberation of the veterans of the War of Cyprus, and upon receiving their petitions the Venetian administration proceeded to recruit them into the armed forces or to provide some form of allowance or land concession. By assigning the skilled and able-bodied to new

25 See above, note 12. Cf. Marco LENCI, *Corsari. Guerra, schiavi, rinnegati nel Mediterraneo*, Roma, Carocci, 2006, p. 121. About the slavery in the Ottoman Empire during the 16th century, see mainly: Alan W. FISHER, «The sale of Slaves in the Ottoman Empire: Markets and State Taxes on Slave Sales, some Preliminary Considerations», *Boğaziçi Üniversitesi Dergisi, Beşeri Bilimler*, 6 (1978), pp. 149-174; Alan W. FISHER, «Chattel slavery in the Ottoman empire», *Slavery and Abolition*, 1, 1 (1980), pp. 25-45; Alan W. FISHER, «Studies in Ottoman Slavery and Slave Trade, II: Manumission», *Journal of Turkish Studies*, 4 (1980), pp. 49-56; Halil SAHILLIOĞLU, «Slaves in the social and economic life of Bursa in the late 15th and early 16th centuries», *Turcica*, 17 (1985), pp. 43-112; Ronald Jennings, «Slaves and Slavery», in Id., *Christians and Muslims in Ottoman Cyprus and the Mediterranean World, 1571-1640*, New York and London, New York University Press, 1993, pp. 240-247; Ehud R. TOLEDANO, *Slavery and Abolition in the Ottoman Middle East*, Seattle, University of Washington Press, 1998; Mehmet AKİF ERDOĞRU, «Chattel Slavery in Ottoman Cyprus (1580-1680)», *Archiv Orientalní*, 66, Supplementa VIII (1998), pp. 121-128; Nicolas VATIN, «Une affaire interne: Le sort et la libération des personnes de condition libre illégalement retenues en esclavage sur le territoire ottoman (XVIe siècle)», *Turcica*, 33 (2001), pp. 149-190; Robert C. DAVIS, «Slave Redemption in Venice, 1585–1797», in John MARTIN and Dennis ROMANO (Eds.), *Venice reconsidered. The History and Civilization of an Italian City-State, 1297–1797*, Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2002, pp. 454-487; Madeline C. ZILFI, «Servants, Slaves and the Domestic Order in the Ottoman Middle East», *Hawwa*, 2, 1 (2004), pp. 1-33; Madeline C. ZILFI, «Slavery», in Gábor Ágoston and Bruce Masters (Eds.), *Encyclopedia of the Ottoman Empire*, New York, Facts on File, 2009, pp. 530-533; Ehud R. TOLEDANO, «Enslavement in the Ottoman Empire in the Early Modern Period», in David ELTIS and Stanley L. ENGERMAN (Eds.), *The Cambridge World History of Slavery*, Vol. 3, AD 1420–AD 1804, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2011, pp. 25-46.

military offices or minor positions, Venice aimed to reinforce the army and the navy with experienced warriors and, at the same time, to supply them with financial restitution. In some cases, the incentive behind this was to defuse a crisis situation at their host territories. For instance, this was the case in Crete, following the arrival of a wave of Cypriot refugees. The local Venetian officials (Giacomo Foscarini and Luca Michiel, *provveditori generali* and *inquisitori* of Candia), in cooperation with the metropolitan authorities, placed a few hundred of able-bodied men in the infantry as soldiers and junior officers, and in the galleys patrolling the island's coastline, as non-commissioned officers, sailors and unchained rowers (*scapoli*). In this case, the recruits secured food and work, while the Venetians manned their armed forces with fresh, battle-ready, and experienced personnel.²⁶ An operational front that benefited from the veterans' reintegration into the Venetian armed forces was Dalmatia, where the Ottomans and their Morlach subjects had been initiating intense acts of aggression after the War of Cyprus.²⁷

Due to the complex and time-consuming Venetian bureaucratic processes, the military reintegration of veterans, who had been liberated from captivity, was neither immediate nor certain. As in the case of their ransoming, their restitution pre-required a process of certifying their former activities and loyalty to the *Serenissima* and, evidently, depended largely on their connections to networks and people of political power who had access to the mechanisms of decision-making, as well as on their former social identities, as will be clarified later on. Although this essay is limited to the examination of the cases of those who petitioned the Venetian State, it should be noted that the above protracted processes and dire financial circumstances led some of

26 Kostas ΤΣΙΚΝΑΚΙΣ, «Κύπριοι πρόσφυγες στην Κρήτη στα τέλη του 16ου αιώνα. Προβλήματα εγκατάστασης», in Chryssa ΜΑΛΤΕΖΟΥ (Ed.), *Κύπρος – Βενετία: κοινές ιστορικές τύχες. Πρακτικά του Διεθνούς Συμποσίου (Αθήνα, 1-3 Μαρτίου 2001)*, Venice, Hellenic Institute for Byzantine and Post-Byzantine Studies in Venice – Embassy of the Republic of Cyprus in Athens / The “House of Cyprus” – Gennadius Library, 2002, pp. 175-207, esp. 185-196.

27 See, e.g., A.S.V., Senato, Deliberazioni, Parti Secrete, reg. 80, fol. 79r, 11 November 1575. Cf. Tea ΜΑΥΗΕW, *Dalmatia between Ottoman and Venetian Rule: Contado di Zara 1645-1718*, Rome, Viella, 2008, pp. 25-29; Katerina ΚΟΡΡÈ, «L’ ‘intollerabile liquidità’ della frontiera dalmata e gli *stradioti* della Serenissima», in Ester CΑΡUZZO and Bruno CREVATO-SELVAGGI (Eds.), *Atti del VI convegno internazionale Venezia e il suo Stato da mar / Venice and its Stato da Mar (Venezia / Venice, 22-24 febbraio / February 2018)*, Rome, Società Dalmata di Storia Patria, 2019, pp. 55-70.

the released captives to submit similar requests for recruitment to the Spanish King.²⁸

Others had been forced to serve as rowers in Ottoman warships during captivity and even to participate in the naval Battle of Lepanto. A typical case is that of a group of captives, who belonged to the category of public slaves. During the Battle, they managed to escape and board the galley of *capitano* Julio Rosa Zarrettino. Following the victory of the Christian forces, they remained in the galley, performing various tasks. More than three years later, they were still on the ship that was docked in Zara. From there, they informed the Venetian authorities about the improper payment of their wages and their consequent destitution, also requesting an intervention in order to survive. The letter was signed by nine Cypriots: Francesco de Janni, Zegno, Thodori de Luchi, Giacomo de Giulio Martinengo, Filippo de Piero, Zorzi de Perin, Marco di Lario, Manoel di Alexi and Francesco. Their case was examined twenty days later (24 May 1574) by the *provveditore all'armar*, who was in charge of wage payments to crews of military vessels and would provide satisfaction for their claims.²⁹

Nevertheless, most veterans of the War of Cyprus, who were liberated, asked to be placed in the Venetian armed forces. The following cases include veterans from various social strata, who were either native Cypriots or subjects of the *Serenissima* originating from former territories (such as the Morea) in the Venetian *stato da mar*, and who had served in the army of Cyprus during the War (*stradioti*). In this context, we first examine the cases of scions of noble Cypriot families, such as Alessandro Podocataro, son of Filippo. Their petitions were almost always accepted due to their noble descent, as well as in recognition of the services that their families had provided to the Venetian authorities on Cyprus during the War and earlier, in the form of considerable

28 Chrysovalantis PAPADAMOU, *Cypriot refugees in Venice after the War of Cyprus (1570-71). Reconstruction of everyday life, social and cultural integration (1570-1650)* [Κύπριοι πρόσφυγες στη Βενετία μετά τον Πόλεμο της Κύπρου (1570-71). Ανασυγκρότηση του βίου, κοινωνική και πολιτισμική ένταξη (1570-1650)], Phd diss., Nicosia, University of Cyprus, 2019, pp. 113-114 and note 212. Cf. HASSIOTIS (Ed.), Πηγές της κυπριακής ιστορίας από το ισπανικό αρχείο *Simancas* cit., pp. 27-42, 66-77, 85-87, 100-101, 122-124; Ioannis HASSIOTIS (Ed.), *Ισπανικά έγγραφα της κυπριακής ιστορίας (ιστ' -ιζ' αι.)*, Nicosia, Cyprus Research Centre, 2003 [2nd ed.], pp. 1-2, 19-20.

29 A.S.V., Collegio, Supplice di dentro, filza 5, fol. 263r.

loans, grain supplies and labour force for the fortifications in Nicosia.³⁰ Regarding Alessandro, despite the traditionally problematic and competitive relations between administrations and the established Communities of the two most important cities on Cyprus,³¹ he, his brother Tuzio and their father were the only noblemen who agreed, prior to the start of the War, to leave Nicosia for Famagusta in order to serve in the military there and reinforce the city's defence, not only in person but also by recruiting combatants whom they paid with their own funds. During the siege of Famagusta, Alessandro served as commander of a company of Cypriot militiamen and was captured when the city surrendered, while his brother Tuzio was killed.³² Alessandro remained a prisoner of war for 37 days and was liberated after the French consul in Tripoli, Syria intervened and paid a ransom of 325 sequins. Then, via Tripoli and the island of Milos, he ended up in Venice (24 December 1571).³³ There, he wrote a report on the War at the urging of Venetian patrician Melchior Michiel, who had probably served as *capitano* of Famagusta in the past (1541–43).³⁴ In his report, Alessandro wrote about the war preparations, the fortifications, the battles he had fought and his family's military engagement, the positions of the Ottoman armed forces outside the city, the military capacity of the two sides etc. Despite the fact that this report presents wrong dates and several inaccuracies, its value is obvious: it provides a clear picture of the atmosphere of the war and describes the emotional state of the defenders of Famagusta during its long-lasting siege.³⁵

30 BIRTACHAS, *Society, Culture and Government* cit., pp. 61-62. Cf. GRIVAUD, *Venice and the Defence* cit., *passim*.

31 See, e.g., BIRTACHAS, *Society, Culture and Government* cit., pp. 32-33, 101, 134; BIRTACHAS, *Venetian Cyprus: The Reports* cit., *passim*, esp. p. 411.

32 Significant information regarding Alessandro's contribution to the defence of Famagusta can be drawn from his petition to the Venetian authorities. A.S.V., Senato, Mar, filza 50, unnumbered fols., 16 February 1572 (1571 m.v. [= *more veneto*: date based on the Venetian calendar year]). Cf. GRIVAUD, «Η κατάκτηση της Κύπρου» cit., p. 18.

33 Alessandro PODOCATARO, *Relatione di Alessandro Podocataro de' successi di Famagosta dell'Anno 1571 ora per la prima volta pubblicata*, ed. Andrea TESSIER, Venezia, Giovanni Cecchini, 1876 [new edition by Paschalis M. KITROMILIDES, in *Κυπριακές πηγές για την άλωση της Αμμοχώστου*, Athens, National Hellenic Research Foundation, 2011, pp. 37-87: 76-83].

34 If it is Marchio (Melchior) Michiel after all. BIRTACHAS, *Venetian Cyprus: The Reports* cit., p. 392 and note 29. Cf. GRIVAUD, «Η κατάκτηση της Κύπρου» cit., p. 18 and note 53.

35 Gilles GRIVAUD, «Ο πνευματικός βίος και η γραμματολογία κατά την περίοδο της Φρα-

In Venice, Alessandro appealed to the authorities for financial aid and, most certainly, his assignment to some military office. In his petition, beyond his own and his family's contribution to the defence of Famagusta, he noted that, although he had managed to escape, one of his sisters, his nephew and another relative still remained in captivity. On 16 February 1572, the Venetian Senate provided him with the sum of 100 ducats for essential expenses and a letter of recommendation so that he may address the *capitano generale da mar*, Giacomo Foscarini. Consequently, Alessandro served for ten months in the galley of Foscarini.³⁶

Subsequently, Alessandro appealed to the authorities once again, this time requesting a land concession in Crete. Acknowledging his noble descent, his loyalty to the *Serenissima* and the services provided by him and his family in general, also taking into account the loss of his property and his precarious economic situation, the Senate decided to grant his request. On 8 August 1573, he was accorded the title of nobleman of Crete and he became administrator of the *castellania* of Pediada for ten years.³⁷

From notarial acts drawn up in the Venetian metropolis, we can gather information regarding Alessandro's efforts to liberate his fellow countrymen who were still in captivity. In particular, a notarial act dated 23 March 1581 reveals that Alessandro was involved in two such cases. The first regarded his nephew Jacomo Corner, with 200 sequins paid as ransom for his liberation, and the second involved Zuan Renier, with 300 sequins expended. The funds were to be paid within six days.³⁸

Finally, in addition to the administration of the *castellania* of Pediada in Crete, some years later (1590) Alessandro took up military office as *capitano* in San Felice of Verona, following his request for a rise in his monthly payment

γκοκρατίας», in Theodoros ΠΑΠΑΔΟΠΟΥΛΛΟΣ (Ed.), *Ιστορία της Κύπρου*, Vol. 5, Μεσαιωνικών βασιλείων – Ενετοκρατία, Nicosia, Archbishop Makarios III Foundation / Office for Cyprus History, 1996, pp. 1173-1174; Paschalis M. ΚΙΤΡΟΜΙΛΙΔΗΣ, *Κυπριακή Λογιοσύνη 1571-1878: Προσωπογραφική θεώρηση*, Nicosia, Cyprus Research Centre, 2002, pp. 225-226; ΠΟΔΟΚΑΤΑΡΟ, *Relatione* cit. [Ed. ΚΙΤΡΟΜΙΛΙΔΗΣ], pp. 22-29.

36 A.S.V., Senato, Mar, reg. 40, fols. 190r-v (*olim* 156r-v); A.S.V., Senato, Mar, filza 50, unnumbered fols., 16 February 1572 (1571 m.v.). Cf. ΤΣΙΚΝΑΚΙΣ, «Κύπριοι πρόσφυγες στην Κρήτη» cit., pp. 175-176.

37 ΤΣΙΚΝΑΚΙΣ, «Κύπριοι πρόσφυγες στην Κρήτη» cit., pp. 176-177.

38 A.S.V., Notarile, Atti, busta 4859, fols. 97v-98v.

from 20 to 25 ducats.³⁹

Another Cypriot nobleman, feudal lord Giacomo Strambali, was captured, sent to Constantinople and, after he was freed through the processes described above, he ended up in Venice, where he asked to be recruited into the armed forces. Evidently for the same reasons as Alessandro Podocataro mentioned previously, his request was granted: he was assigned as *capitano* of infantrymen in Bergamo in 1573. In 1581, Giacomo petitioned again for approval of his land lease in the area of Zara in Dalmatia (in «scoglio nominato selva nel territorio di Zara»), emphasising the services that he had provided during the War of Cyprus and the financial devastation that had ensued for him and his entire family.⁴⁰ Two years later, the Senate approved a raise of his monthly payment from 15 to 18 ducats, as Giacomo was now serving as *capitano* of infantrymen in Verona.⁴¹

Another Cypriot serviceman from Nicosia, T(h)omaso Selumi, son of Francesco, also settled in another area of the Venetian hinterland (*terraferma*). He first went to Venice and then to Padua. Having received excellent recommendations about him, Andrea Foscarini, the *capitano* of Padua, suggested to the metropolitan authorities that Selumi should undertake the guarding of a city gate («ufficio alla porta sarasinesca»), replacing the deceased Alessio di Beni. Consequently, the Cypriot veteran was hired to this position in 1584.⁴²

Focusing our interest on the Venetian *stato da mar*, three *stradioti* originating from Modon in the Morea, who had served in the army of Cyprus and had fought during the siege of Famagusta, laid claims for re-employment by Venice in 1574. To this end, Angelo Podocataro,⁴³ a *stradioto* of noble

39 A.S.V., Senato, Terra, reg. 59, fol. 200v (*olim* 170v), 27 January 1590 (1589 m.v.).

40 A.S.V., Collegio, Suppliche di fuori, filza 335, unnumbered fols., 7 May 1581. Cf. George PLOUMIDES, *Αιτήματα και πραγματικότητες των Ελλήνων της βενετοκρατίας (1554-1600)*, Ioannina, University of Ioannina, 1985, p. 65, with incorrect archival indication.

41 A.S.V., Senato, Terra, reg. 54, fol. 145r (*olim* 104r); A.S.V., Senato, Terra, filza 87, unnumbered fols., 31 March 1583.

42 A.S.V., Senato, Terra, reg. 54, fols. 234r-v (*olim* 193r-v); A.S.V., Senato, Terra, filza 89, unnumbered fols., 7 January 1584 (1583 m.v.).

43 Angelo Podocataro had been imprisoned in Rhodes together with his family. After sending a petition to the Pope (22 July 1573), he paid his ransom and was freed. He ended up in Venice. Katerina KORRÈ (Ed.), *Τα πρακτικά των συνελεύσεων της ελληνικής Αδελφότητας*

descent, presented himself to the authorities (11 October 1574) to certify that the three brothers signing the petition, Belissario, Marco and Vico, were indeed *stradioti*, had fought under commanders Astore Baglioni and Andrea Rontac(c)hi in Famagusta and had been taken prisoners along with their families after the city had surrendered. Until the ransom of 360 sequins had been paid, the wife and children of one of them, Belissario, had remained in captivity. In support of their assertions, twelve people presented themselves to the authorities.⁴⁴ The three brothers were placed in military posts in Cephalonia, where they met a wealthy Cypriot woman, Marchesina, daughter of Christofori Nestora, with whom they had been in close friendship from the time they served on the island of Cyprus. She helped them with a low-interest loan for their new beginning.⁴⁵

The life of Pietro Antonio Brachimi, another defender of Famagusta, appears to have been more adventurous and eventful. During the War, he served in various positions: as head of a civil militia corps (*cernide, ordinanze*), then under the command of Costanzo Cauriol and Count Nestore Martinengo.⁴⁶ Due to his military experience, his request to the Venetian authorities was approved and he was hired as *capitano* of infantrymen in Corfu and, in particular, at the newly completed New Fortress (*Fortezza Nuova*) in the city. Yet, Giovanni Moro, the *bailo* in Constantinople (1588–90), informed the administration of the island and the metropolitan authorities that, according to confidential information he had received, a *capitano* at the New Fortress was involved in secret preparations for the capture of the island by the Ottomans.⁴⁷ More specifically, during the imminent arrival of the

Βενετίας: Εκλογές και Αποφάσεις. Βιβλίο Α' (1558-1601), Athens-Venice, Hellenic Institute for Byzantine and Post-Byzantine Studies in Venice, 2012, pp. 166-167.

44 A.S.V., Senato, Mar, filza 61, unnumbered fols., 18 November 1574, with testimonies attached.

45 A.S.V., Notarile, Atti, busta 4854, unnumbered fols., 5 May 1579.

46 Martinengo served in Famagusta from March or April 1570 until the fall of the city in August 1571. He was imprisoned but freed forty two days later thanks to the help of the French consul in Tripoli, Syria. Then, through Tripoli and Crete (with an in-between stop at the Cypriot Cape of Gata [*Capo delle Gatte*]), he went to Venice. On 7 December 1571 he presented before the Venetian *Collegio* his account of the Ottoman siege and the fall of Famagusta. Based on this presentation he wrote the work that was published the following year. See above, note 13. Cf. GRIVAUD, «Η κατάκτηση της Κύπρου» cit., pp. 15-16.

47 A.S.V., Consiglio di Dieci, Deliberazioni, Parti Segrete, filza 24, unnumbered fols., 24

Ottoman fleet, this officer would undertake subversive action in the Fortress and would commit sabotage in order to facilitate the potential conquest. On 19 December 1588, Brachimi was arrested as a prime suspect. His two sons, also serving at the New Fortress, were arrested as well. The local authorities did not carry out interrogations, but sent the three Cypriots to Venice, with letters and documents found in their residence as evidence. The Heads of the Council of Ten (*capi del Consiglio dei Dieci*) examined their case, but after thorough interrogation of the suspects and examination of the documentation, which lasted for four months, they informed the *bailo* in Constantinople about the lack of incriminating evidence against the Cypriots. Despite that, they would be held imprisoned until the submission of new evidence from the *bailo* or the *provveditore* and *capitano* of Corfu, or even other sources.⁴⁸

Eventually, the fact that Pietro Antonio Brachimi was not involved in the crime of lese-majesty against the Venetian State can be safely assumed by the fact that not only was he not put to death, but he also returned to his office. Proven loyal to the *Serenissima*, he served again in Corfu as *capitano* in the Valley of San Zorzi from 1592 to 1599. This information is drawn from a case file in which he was accused of power abuse by some of the peasants in the area.⁴⁹

The last case of a veteran of the War of Cyprus presented here is of particular interest due to his high recommendations and military career. It is the case of the Cypriot Hieronimo Emanuel, who requested his restitution through recruitment into the Venetian armed forces in 1591. His exceptional virtue and service, his honesty and his loyalty to the *Serenissima* throughout his military career were certified by prominent individuals: in 1576, by the previously mentioned Cypriot nobleman Giacomo Strambali, *capitano* of infantrymen (Hieronimo Emanuel had served under him in Bergamo); and in

May 1589; A.S.V., Senato, Dispacci degli ambasciatori e residenti a Costantinopoli, filza 28, n. 42, fols. 301r-302r.

48 A.S.V., Consiglio di Dieci, Deliberazioni, Parti Secrete, filza 24, unnumbered fols., 24 May 1589.

49 A.S.V., Avogaria di Comun, Penale, busta 4041, n. 18. Cf. Chrysovalantis PAPADAMOU, «A Secret War: Espionage in Venetian Corfu during the Construction of the San Marco Fortress», in George THEOTOKIS and Aysel YILDIZ (Eds.), *A Military History of the Mediterranean Sea. Aspects of War and Military Elites*, Leiden-Boston, Brill, 2018, pp. 362-364.

1579, by the also mentioned Luca Michiel, the Venetian *provveditore generale* and *inquisitore* of *Candia* (he verified that Hieronimo Emanuel had served in Crete under two *capitani*: Bernardino Ergati and Bernardin Cecchati, both of Verona). It seems that Hieronimo left the Venetian army in 1583 and settled in the Principate of Massa and the Marquisate of Carrara, where he served as Colonel of the entire State Militia, on foot or on horseback, while in 1588 he served in the palace guard of the ruler, Alberico I Cybo-Malaspina (1553–1623). As mentioned above, in 1591, he returned – for unknown reasons – and asked to be employed again in the Venetian army.⁵⁰ Although the outcome of his request could not be documented, his re-employment should be considered as a strong possibility, given his extensive experience and high recommendations.

Conclusions

The War of Cyprus created a new political and social order on the island. Firstly, the War brought about large-scale upheaval in local society and, along with an ensuing plague epidemic,⁵¹ caused a grave demographic decline within two years, which amounted to about a third of the island population. Infrastructure was seriously damaged in both Nicosia and Famagusta, while the ecological and economic systems of the island were also considerably impaired.⁵² The consequences of the War include the wounded and the invalid, as well as the numerous rescued subjects of the *Serenissima*, mainly originating from the local aristocracy and the urban population, who fled as refugees to the Venetian metropolis, the rest of the Venetian state, Italy and the West in general. This topic has only recently been studied in a systematic way.⁵³ The procedures for the restitution and integration of these Cypriot subjects

50 A.S.V., Capi del Consiglio di Dieci, Notatorio, busta 12 bis, unnumbered fols., 1 February 1591 (1590 m.v.).

51 Pietro VALDERIO, *La guerra di Cipro*, edited by Gilles GRIVAULD and Nasa PATAPIOU, Nicosia, Cyprus Research Centre, 1996, pp. 91, 137 note 459, 265, 283 notes 131-132.

52 GRIVAULD, «Η κατάκτηση της Κύπρου» cit., pp. 171-172; COSTANTINI, «Old Players» cit., p. 374.

53 PAPADAMOU, *Cypriot refugees* cit.

of Venice proved to be arduous and time-consuming, despite the relevant positive measures proclaimed in the immediate aftermath by the Venetian Republic (e.g. the deliberations of *Maggior Consiglio* [5 July 1573]; *Cinque Savi alla mercanzia* [1 December 1575]; Senate [20 December 1578]).⁵⁴

This essay has explored the trajectories of a number of survivors of the War, most of whom were captured and enslaved by the Ottomans (their number cannot be precisely determined on the basis of current research data). Venetian institutions, the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople, Western rulers and consular authorities, the Pope, the Apostolic Nuncio in Venice, as well as fellow countrymen, relatives and friends acted to facilitate their ransoming. Their liberation – aristocrats and experienced war professionals were given priority – brought to light a category of military men who had provided various services during Venice's conflicts with the Ottoman army: on the one hand were native Cypriots, who were non-professional combatants, obliged, due to the circumstances, to fight either as militiamen or as replacements for deceased professional soldiers, or even in command positions, forming and funding at the same time the military corps; on the other hand were subjects of the *Serenissima* originating from former areas (such as the Morea) in the Venetian *stato da mar*, who had served in Cyprus as members of professional companies of light cavalry (*stradioti*). In return for their loyalty to the Republic and the extraordinary services that they had rendered, as well as due to their dire financial and social circumstances following captivity, these veterans of the War of Cyprus claimed remedy in large numbers, requesting to be recruited again into the Venetian armed forces.

This paper has highlighted the following: firstly, based on various published and unpublished sources, the procedures and mechanisms for the liberation of veterans; and secondly, based on significant unpublished archival documents (i.e. the petitions submitted to the metropolitan Venetian authorities in combination with other material [notarial documents, court cases, deliberations by various Councils and magistracies etc.] from the

54 A.S.V., Cinque Savi alla Mercanzia, Prima Serie, busta 136, fols. 66v-67r; A.S.V., Senato, Mar, reg. 44, fols. 97r-100r (*olim* 67r-70r); Chryssa A. MALTEZOU (Ed.), *ire debeas in retto-rem Caneae: Η εντολή του δόγη Βενετίας προς τον ρέκτορα Χανίων 1589*, Venice, Hellenic Institute for Byzantine and Post-Byzantine Studies in Venice, 2002, pp. 234-236. Cf. PΑ-ΡΑΔΑΜΟΥ, *Cypriot refugees* cit., pp. 169-170 and notes 345-348.

Archivio di Stato di Venezia), a collection of representative case studies. These case studies were selected based on the following criteria: the veterans' previous social identities, their military skills and the type of military services they had provided during the War, their potential military employment by foreign powers, their connections and personal recommendations, as well as their spatial dispersion in military units and posts in the Venetian territories, in the hinterland or in the overseas possessions. The conclusion that is drawn from the examination of these cases is that the restitution of the veterans of the War of Cyprus in the Venetian armed forces was often an alternative for livelihood, which is not to say that many would not go on to enjoy successful military careers as common soldiers or junior officers. As for the professional *stradioti*, after their Cyprus experience, they continued to offer their services in other Venetian frontier areas. Nonetheless, as evidenced by its title, this essay is no more than a first attempt to approach the topic, which certainly deserves further investigation. Sound quantitative and qualitative conclusions require the systematic indexing of the hundreds of petitions submitted to the Venetian *Signoria* by the veterans – or even by the widows of fallen fighters, seeking the recruitment of their sons in the place of their fathers – that were found by the authors in the Archivio di Stato di Venezia. These important primary sources can be combined with notarial documents, which also offer a wealth of information, together serving to promote the study of prosopography.



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