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EDITED BY STATHIS BIRTACHAS



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
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On the cover: lantern of an Ottoman galley captured at Lepanto.
Venice, Armory rooms of the Council of Ten at the Doge's Palace.
Topwar.ru website of Vjačeslav Špakovsky.



Venice and the Ottoman Empire as warriors. Source: [Roger PALMER, Earl of Castlemaine], *Das von den Türcken auff's äusserst bedrangte, aber: Durch die christliche Waffen der heroischen Republic Venedig auff's tapferst beschützte Candia [...]*, Frankfurt, Wilhelm Serlin, 1669.



“Oltremarini” (Overseas) Regiments in Venetian service, nicknamed ‘Schiavoni’
(Vinkhuijzen Collection, NYPL)

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Destined to lead nowhere?

Venice, the Ottoman Empire and the Geography and Technology of War in the Early Modern Mediterranean, c. 1530–1715*

by PHILLIP WILLIAMS**

ABSTRACT: It was, or would have been, extremely difficult for Venice or Constantinople to instigate a “military revolution” in the early modern Mediterranean. Fortresses, harbours and ships-of-the-line faced numerous logistical, geographical and manpower limitations, while many garrisons lacked the resolve to defend their redoubts and keeps. Operational concerns (moving supplies, or finding water and horses) shaped campaign outcomes. The great powers were unable to fight in more than one theatre of action and depended upon the constant circulation of resources. Galleys were decisive. The mixed-vessel taskforce emerged as a polyvalent form of campaigning. On a strategic level, offensives in the Levant cannot be separated from events in central Europe. The Mediterranean remained in the limelight after 1580, in spite of the huge wastage involved in fighting. Conflicts were shaped by political, not military, priorities.

KEYWORDS: GALLEYS, MILITARY REVOLUTION, FORTRESSES, CRUSADE, GAZA, OPERATIONAL WARFARE.

Many historians have been drawn to the idea of a “military revolution”, a transformation in fighting capabilities and organisation as a result of the advent of gunpowder weaponry at the end of the Renaissance. In regard to naval affairs, it is argued that improvements in cannon, sails and bureaucratic abilities led to the emergence of powerful fleets of galleons, dread-

* This paper is dedicated to don Hugo O'Donnell y Duque de Estrada in gratitude and admiration.

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noughts, or men-o'-war: these were ships-of-the-line, high-sided, sail-driven and designed primarily for the challenges of warfare in the Atlantic and North Sea.¹ A new type of battlement was another manifestation of the advance in tactics, organisation and technology in the sixteenth-century. An innovative design of fortresses with thick, low, angular walls was pioneered in Italy (the *trace italienne* style), and its widespread adoption meant that the reduction of major positions now became the key objective of warfare. The need to overcome modern *trace italienne* fortresses, built to control key strategic anchorages, helped to end «the Mediterranean system of warfare at sea».²

Like many grand historical interpretations, the military revolution thesis perhaps overlooks some details, what is sometimes called the “strategic geography” of warfare. Sailing was not quite as simple a process as has been assumed, many harbours being difficult to enter. As Hugo O'Donnell has pointed out, maritime regulations issued by the Madrid government in the early seventeenth-century were designed to address the difficulties posed by the sands and ridges that lay at many harbour mouths in the Atlantic. To this end, no ship was to be built that exceeded 550 tons «in contemplation of the banks at the entrances».³

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- 1 John H. PRYOR, *Geography, technology, and war: studies in the maritime history of the Mediterranean, 649–1571*, Cambridge, Past and Present, 1988; Carlo M. CIPOLLA, *Guns, Sails and Empires. Technological Innovation and the Early Phases of European Expansion, 1400–1700*, Manhattan (Kansas), Sunflower University Press, 1985; Jan GLETE, *Warfare at Sea, 1500–1650. Maritime Conflicts and the Transformation of Europe*, London and New York, Routledge, 2000; Clifford J. ROGERS (Ed.), *The Military Revolution Debate: Readings on the Military Transformation of Early Modern Europe*, Boulder, CO, Westview Press, 1995; Geoffrey PARKER, *The Military Revolution: Military Innovation and the Rise of the West, 1500–1800*, 2nd edition Cambridge, CUP, 1996 (1st edition 1988); Geoffrey Parker, *The Grand Strategy of Philip II*, New Haven and London, Yale University Press, 1998.
 - 2 John Francis GUILMARTIN, Jr., *Gunpowder and Galleys. Changing Technology and Mediterranean Warfare at Sea in the 16th Century*, 2nd edition, London, Conway Maritime Press, 2003; see also PRYOR, *Geography, technology and war*, cit., chapter VII «The Turks», (quotation p. 177). On fortresses, see Christopher DUFFY, *The Fortress in the Age of Vauban and Frederick the Great, 1660–1789. Siege Warfare Volume II*, London etc., Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1985, chapter VIII.
 - 3 «[...] en contemplación por las entradas de las barras». Hugo O'DONNELL Y DUQUE DE ESTRADA, «Función militar en las flotas de Indias», in IDEM (Ed.), *Historia Militar de España. III Edad Moderna. I. Ultramar y la Marina*, Madrid, CEHM & RAH, 2012, pp. 81–119, esp. 99. Professor Patrick Williams has kindly pointed out to me that the new *ordenanzas* regarding hulls came in response to the loss of the treasure ships in 1607.

In the Mediterranean a slightly different set of circumstances and problems prevailed. Many ports offered anchorages that were vulnerable to fireships and bombardment.⁴ In August 1639 it was thought likely that Venice's *stato da mar* would be attacked by an Ottoman force. The government of Philip IV of Spain (1621–1665) gave orders that his Atlantic galleons – all of which were of at least 600 tonnes, the existing instructions (above) to build smaller ships having apparently had little or no effect – were to sail with 20 reinforced galleys to assist the Doge and Senate. But it specified that the king's flotillas could not remain «in the Levant» in winter on account of the «narrowness» of these seas and the fact that they offered few deep-water harbours.⁵ Feeding and protecting an armada when it was in port was another challenge. Fleets anchored in Palermo (June 1676) and Toulon (1707) suffered major damage as the result of attacks: in the latter case, the loss of Louis XIV's men-o'-war facilitated the Austrian conquest of Naples.⁶

There were relatively few defendable forward positions offering a sheltered anchorage, cellars, cisterns, reliable modern fortifications and a productive hinterland. One of the signal characteristics of the campaigns of the early 1570s was precisely the difficulty faced by Christian commanders in identifying a viable target in the Levant. Once Cyprus had fallen to the Ottomans (Famagusta's garrison surrendered on 1 August 1571), it was difficult, if not impossible, to see how the ambitions of the Holy League could be squared with the conditions on

4 The arguments presented here are set out at greater length in Phillip WILLIAMS, *Empire and Holy War in the Mediterranean. The Galley and Maritime Conflict between the Habsburgs and Ottomans*, London, I.B. Tauris, 2014 (in regards to fortresses, chapter IX). See also Phillip WILLIAMS, «Mare Nostrum? Reform, Recruitment and the Business of Crusade in the Fleets of the Seventeenth Century Mediterranean», *Storia Economica*, XIX, 1 (2016), pp. 77-102 (Special issue edited by Mario RIZZO, *À la guerre comme à la guerre. Attori, risorsi e dinamiche della competizione strategica in Europa e nel Mediterraneo fra XV e XVIII secolo*). For French bombardments of Algiers and Tunis, see Nabil MATAR, *Britain and Barbary, 1589–1689*, Gainsville, University Press of Florida, 2005, pp. 129-130, 141-144.

5 ARCHIVO GENERAL DE SIMANCAS (hereafter: AGS), Secretaría de Estado (Est.), legajo (leg.) 3582, f. 190, Philip IV to count de la Roca ('Por consulta de 6 de agosto de 1639'), Madrid 8 August 1639.

6 Luis A. RIBOT GARCÍA, *La Monarquía de España y la Guerra de Mesina*, Madrid, Actas, 2002, pp. 93-95; Ciro PAOLETTI, «Prince Eugene of Savoy, the Toulon Expedition of 1707, and the English Historians: A Dissenting View», *The Journal of Military History*, 70, 4 (2006), pp. 939-962.

the ground.⁷ Santa Maura (Levkas or Lefkada), for instance, appears to have been a trap – at least, this was the warning issued by an expert engineer, Felipe Lascari Paleologo, who was, by any standard, an extraordinary figure.⁸

To effect any sort of campaign in the Morea would have required a siege train with a large number of pack animals and carts, which the armada did not have with it. The 1572 expedition (“the Navarino campaign”), was an attempt to seize the position commanding the road to Modon, where the Ottoman fleet had taken shelter. The hope was that by cutting supply lines on both land and sea, the sultan’s high admiral or Kapudan Paşa (sometimes “Kaptanpaşa”), Uluç Ali, would be forced to venture out from the anchorage, which he had intelligently fortified.⁹ His armada could then be engaged and destroyed, preparing the ground for future offensive and ventures.¹⁰

In these cases – in 1571 and 1572 – the basic requirement of any plausible offensive campaign in Rhodes, Cyprus or the Morea was that the fleet of the Holy League should have an extended amphibian capability, allowing it to disembark companies of light cavalry that could roam perhaps 10 to 15 miles from the harbour or bridgehead.¹¹ Horse units clearly played a major role in the Ottoman campaigns on Cyprus and in 1572 don John of Austria, the overall commander, reported, doubtless with a degree of exaggeration, that the beylerbey of Greece arrived to save Navarino with 20,000 horses.¹² Aside from their direct military

7 On the abortive attack on Santa Maura, see David GARCÍA HERNÁN and Enrique GARCÍA HERNÁN, *Lepanto: el día después*, Madrid, Actas, 1999. Venice made an attempt against the small island early in the following year. Kenneth M. SETTON, *The Papacy and the Levant (1204–1571)*, Vol. 4, Philadelphia, American Philosophical Society, 1976, 1978, 1984, p. 1075.


8 He was a renegade Turk, having turned Christian at Malta after an apparition of Our Lady and St John in his dreams. AGS, Secretarías Provinciales, leg. 4, sf «Phelipe Lascari Paleologo capitán que fue del gran Turco».

9 Luciano SERRANO, *La Liga de Lepanto entre España, Venecia y la Santa Sede (1570–1572). Ensayo histórico a base de documentos diplomáticos*, Vol. 2, Madrid 1918, pp. 108, 116-117, 125, 128, 131.

10 The expeditionary force was on land from 2 to 5 October. Fernand BRAUDEL, *The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II*, translated by Siân Reynolds, Vol. 2, London, Collins, 1972, pp. 1121-1123; SETTON, *Papacy and the Levant*, cit., Vol. 4, p. 1084 ff.

11 In 1572 don John of Austria sought to take a sizeable corpus of cavalry aboard the fleet: in fact, only 200 horses went. BRAUDEL, *Mediterranean*, cit., Vol. 2, p. 1121.

12 AGS, Est., leg. 1401, f. 149, «De Corfu» 13 June 1571; f. 159, «Avisos» 24 June; f. 242



Title: Naval Combat.

Artist: Jacques Callot (France, 1592–1635).

Date: early 17th century.

Medium: Etching.

Accession Number: 40.52.8.

Courtesy of the Metropolitan Museum of Art, New York.

Comment: Callot's depiction of a naval battle was perhaps based on operations in 1613. Note that Callot portrays the galleys as having relatively round hulls, with high seaboard. This was increasingly the case in the seventeenth-century, as they came to be sailed into October, November and December.

functions and purposes (scouting; communication; guarding supply lines and exposed terrain; raiding enemy camps and stores; and leading charges in battles and skirmishes) horses were needed to pull heavy weapons, water, supplies and

«Avisos» August; don John's colourful account of 1572, in SETTON, *Papacy and the Levant*, cit., Vol. 4, p. 1085.

equipment to and within bastions and forward camps.¹³ In 1669 Venice sent a large number of horses to the Levant, «*per montar molti cavalieri*».¹⁴ So important were cavalry units in the campaigns of Francesco Morosini (d. 1694) in the 1680s that they appear to have been given priority on board ships ahead of refugees and even troops.¹⁵ The Venetian garrison left to defend Chios in February 1695 consisted of 500 cavalry, according to Ottoman sources.¹⁶

But the use of animals came with two costs and restrictions. The first was that there were not, in fact, that many mounts and mules available in Spain, France or Greece.¹⁷ The second major limitation was operational: even when horses and pack animals could be found, their deployment meant that officials had to secure large quantities of water and fodder. This was far from easy. During the brief Venetian occupation of Athens (September 1687 to April 1688) surveys indicated that, factoring in a garrison of 400 men (300 soldiers and 100 valets and servants) and the animals needed to run the Acropolis fort, the fort's cisterns could store water for no more than 50 days.¹⁸

13 The stradiots or *stradioti* were light cavalry units deployed by Venice in defense and police forces. These companies proved operationally effective, while the financial aspects of their story reinforce the arguments that horses were relatively expensive to maintain. They evolved into the *cappelletti a cavallo* in the seventeenth-century. See Stathis BIRTACHAS, «*Stradioti, Cappelletti, Compagnie or Milizie Greche: ‘Greek’ Mounted and Foot Mercenary Companies in the Venetian State (Fifteenth to Eighteenth Centuries)*», in Georgios THEOTOKIS and Aysel YILDIZ (Eds.), *A Military History of the Mediterranean Sea. Aspects of War, Diplomacy, and Military Elites*, Leiden & Boston, Brill, 2018, pp. 325-346.

14 Kenneth M. SETTON, *Venice, Austria and the Turks in the Seventeenth Century*, Philadelphia, American Philosophical Society, 1991, p. 220.

15 *Ibid.*, pp. 293, 302-303, 339, 342.

16 Svat SOUCEK, «The Straits of Chios and the Kaptanpaşa’s Navy», reproduced in *Studies in Ottoman Naval History and Maritime Geography*, Istanbul, Isis Press, 2011, pp. 147-170, esp. 159.

17 Robert A. STRADLING, «Spain’s Military Failure and the Supply of Horses, 1600-1660», in *History*, 69, 226 (1984), pp. 208-221; David PARROTT, *Richelieu’s Army: War, Government and Society in France, 1624–1642*, Cambridge, New York & Port Melbourne, CUP, 2001, pp. 61-62, 99, 68-70, 212, 244, 386, 388. Cf. Siriol DAVIES, «Administration and Settlement in Venetian Navarino», *Hesperia*, 73, 1 (2004), pp. 59-120.

18 That is, 50 days even after supplies of wine and biscuit had been provided to the garrison. SETTON, *Venice, Austria*, cit., chapters X and XI, esp. pp. 335-336; William MILLER, «The Venetian Revival in Greece, 1684–1718», *The English Historical Review*, 35, 139 (1920), pp. 343-366. The threat posed by Ottoman cavalry units based in Thebes, together with enemy control of the Megara pass, was also decisive in forming the assessment that Athens could not be held.

Geographical and climatological features shaped warfare in many other ways. Without doubt, this was a brutal, draining theatre of action. Those troops inured to the fevers and “contagions” of the campaign zone and experienced enough to know how recover from dehydration and exhaustion were consequently much more effective – and far more highly valued – than those soldiers without direct experience of the “trabajos” of the fighting season. It was better, observed an exasperated Spanish official in the 1640s, to have 10 veterans than 50 new recruits.¹⁹ A number of permanent or quasi-permanent marine regiments also acquired a superb array of skills: the *oltremarini* serving Venice and the *tercios de armada* employed by Madrid could both fight and sail and so proved highly effective aboard their flotillas.²⁰

What emerged, therefore, was a form of warfare that prioritised mobility and skilled veteran forces, with major, defendable positions being very much the exception to the rule (Rhodes and perhaps Malta and Candia; Monemvasia and Canea under the Ottomans but not, paradoxically, under the Venetians). Indeed, a case could be made that the determination of garrison troops to fight (in 1522, 1539, 1565, 1666–1669 and 1688) was, or came close to being, the decisive consideration, while the inability or unwillingness of so many other guard regiments to do so shaped events in other years.²¹ From the beginning, galleys were taken to be decisive: their preservation was certainly the priority for both the Emperor Charles V (1519–1556) and Philip II (1556–1598) of Spain.²² The surrender of Candia in 1669 was justified by the fact that the terms allowed Morosini to leave the harbour with the fleet, upon which, his defenders pointed

19 Raquel CAMARERO PASCUAL, *La Guerra de Recuperación de Cataluña 1640–1652*, Madrid, Actas, 2015, pp. 439–440, 467.

20 Guido CANDIANI, «Un corpo di polizia marittima: le galeotte veneziane della Dalmazia (1670–1684)», in Livio ANTONIELLI (Ed.), *Extra moenia. Il controllo del territorio nelle campagne e nei piccoli centri*, Rubbettino, Soveria Mannelli, 2013, pp. 39–63; O'DONNELL Y DUQUE DE ESTRADA, Hugo, «Función militar», cit.; Phillip WILLIAMS, «Captains of Both Professions. Seafaring capacities in the Armada of Charles II of Spain, 1665–1700», in Davide MAFFI and Enrique GARCÍA HERNÁN (Eds.), *Estudios sobre Guerra y Sociedad*, Madrid, Albatros, 2017, pp. 225–248.

21 An interpretation along these lines has been presented for the great Italian forts by David PARROTT, «The utility of fortifications in early modern Europe: Italian princes and their citadelles, 1540–1640», *War in History*, 7 (2000), pp. 127–153.

22 WILLIAMS, *Empire and Holy War*, cit., pp. 16–17, 43–47, 52, 63–64, 68, 156.

out, the freedom of the Republic of St Mark depended.²³

The major amphibian campaigns in the Mediterranean began in 1522, when sultan Süleymân I (1520–1566) claimed Rhodes from the Order of Knights of the Hospital of St John of Jerusalem (the Hospitallers).²⁴ Ten years later, in September 1532, Doria took 30 or so Christian galleys into the Levant; Patras and Castelnuovo di Cattaro were put to the torch and a garrison installed in Koron.²⁵ This campaign may have played some role in diverting Süleymân away from a second attack upon Vienna, which he had unsuccessfully besieged three years previously, although other reasons for his abortive move against the Austrian capital appear more convincing.²⁶ For his part, the sultan certainly expressed his desire to advance the ambitions of Francis I of France (1515–1547) in Italy.²⁷

Everything indicates that the sultan took the Christian offensive seriously, as in 1533 he invited Barbarossa Hayreddin (1478? – 1546), a privateer based in Algiers, to serve as his first high admiral or Kapudan Paşa.²⁸ The Sublime Porte also began to invest dramatically larger sums in its navy.²⁹ Koron was abandoned by the Christians in the following year, in large part because of the considerable

23 SETTON, *Venice, Austria*, cit., p. 240.

24 In addition to the superb works of Setton and Braudel, already cited, general studies include Géraud POUMARÈDE, *Pour en finir avec la Croisade. Mythes et réalités de la lutte contre les Turcs au XVIe et XVIIe siècles*, Paris, PUF, 2004; Ekkehard EICKHOFF, *Venezia, Vienna e i Turchi. Bufera nel sud-est europeo*, Stuttgart, Rusconi, 1991; Salvatore BONO, *Corsari nel Mediterraneo: Cristiani e musulmani fra guerra, schiavitù e commercio*, Milan, Mondadori, 1993; Caroline FINKEL, *Osman's Dream. The History of the Ottoman Empire 1300–1923*, Cambridge (MA), Basic Books, 2005.

25 María José RODRÍGUEZ-SALGADO, «‘Carolus Africanus?: el Emperador y el turco», in José MARTÍNEZ MILLÁN and Ignacio J. EZQUERRA REVILLA (Eds.), *Carlos V y la quiebra del humanismo político en Europa (1530-1558)*, Vol. 1, Madrid, SECCCF, 2001, pp. 487-531, esp. 495-499.

26 WILLIAMS, *Empire and Holy War*, cit., pp. 31-33; SETTON, *Papacy and the Levant*, cit., Vol. 3, pp. 355-367.

27 Gülru NECİPOĞLU, «Süleyman the Magnificent and the Representation of Power in the Context of Ottoman-Habsburg-Papal Rivalry», in Halil INALCIK and Cemal KAFADAR (Eds.), *Süleymân the Second and His Time*, Istanbul, Isis Press, 1993, pp. 163-191.

28 On the position of high admiral, see the essays in Elizabeth ZACHARIADOU (Ed.), *The Kapudan Pasha, his office and his domain*, Rethymnon, Crete University Press, 2002.

29 Rhoads MURPHIEY, «A Comparative Look at Ottoman and Habsburg Resources and Readiness for War circa 1520 to circa 1570», in Enrique GARCÍA HERNÁN and Davide MAFFI (Eds.), *Guerra y Sociedad en la Monarquía Hispánica. Política, estrategia y cultura en la Europa moderna (1500-1700)*, Vol. 1, Madrid, Laberinto, 2006, pp. 75-102, esp. 78.

risks involved in sailing Charles V's galleys to it through an Ottoman maritime blockade.³⁰ There followed campaigns against Tunis in 1534 and 1535.³¹ In 1537 Barbarossa returned with the "armada del Turco" to the coastlines of Italy, his intention being to help a prospective rebellion by grandes sympathetic to the French cause in Naples.³² The campaign against Calabria was a failure, and on his return to the Levant he attacked Corfu, resulting in a brief siege (25 August – 6 September). The defences of the island were up to the task – something of a surprise, given the chaotic nature of the preparations – and the "Turks" were repulsed. The decisive intervention was Süleymân's, who ordered his forces to withdraw: «I would not exchange the life of one of my Janissaries for a thousand such fortresses».³³ The sultan had not, therefore, apparently noticed that an incipient military revolution based upon fortified harbour positions was underway.

If the Christian offensive in 1532 had shocked statesmen in Constantinople, so the scale of the attack in 1537 focused minds in Rome, Madrid and Venice. In February 1538 a Holy League was proclaimed by Pope Paul III Farnese (1534–1549). It effectively ended in the *bataille manquée* of Preveza, although this abortive confrontation, like Doria's intervention in 1532, remains open to interpretation and contextualisation.³⁴ In 1539 Barbarossa led a huge force to recover Castelnuovo (Herçeg Novi), which Christian forces under Doria had seized at the end of the previous year. Four years later he returned to the "Ponant" (the western Mediterranean) and overwintered his armada in Toulon in 1543–1544. But, as in previous years, the final effects or consequences of this campaign were far from obvious and in 1545 Charles V and Süleymân settled upon a peace

30 Francisco LÓPEZ DE GÓMARA, "Guerras de mar" del emperador Carlos V, version edited by Migeul Ángel DE BUNES IBARRA and Nora Edith JIMÉNEZ, Madrid, SECCCF, 2000, pp. 143-144.

31 Svatopluk SOUCEK, «Naval Aspects of the Ottoman Conquest of Rhodes, Cyprus and Crete», *Studia Islamica*, 98–99 (2004), pp. 219-261, esp. 227-229.

32 LÓPEZ DE GÓMARA, "Guerras de mar", cit., pp. 184-186.

33 Ottoman chronicles refer, somewhat implausibly, to plans to conquer Italy. SOUCEK, «Naval Aspects», cit., p. 230.

34 On the holy leagues of the 1530s and 1570s, see POUMARÈDE, *Pour en finir*, cit., pp. 222-245. On 1538, see the essays of Simon MERCIERA, «The Battle of Preveza 1538: the Knights of Malta's Perspective», and Emmanuelle PUJEAU, «Preveza in 1538: The background of a very complex situation», in *Preveza B. Proceedings of the Second International Symposium for the History and Culture of Preveza*, Preveza, University of Ioannina, 2010, pp. 107-120 and 121-138, respectively.

of sorts. Martin Luther, incidentally, took this accord to be evidence that the Second Coming was imminent.³⁵

Venice remained steadfastly neutral in the campaigns of the mid-century, perhaps because of its relative military strength and high degree of preparedness, perhaps because of a realisation that peace in 1540 had come at a great price, having been compelled to surrender Monemvasia and Nauplia, two of the most impressive bastions in the eastern Mediterranean.³⁶ In 1551 Tripoli was seized by “la armada del Turco” in retaliation for the capture of Mahdia (“Africa” in contemporary sources).³⁷ Unsuccessful campaigns were then launched by the Ottoman Empire against the outpost of Oran in 1556 and 1563: in the former case the sultan once again ordered his forces to withdraw.³⁸

The collapse of royal authority in France after 1559 ushered in a new phase in the “mare nostrum”, characterised by a more overt and direct form of Christian–Muslim confrontation, as was clear at the Ottoman siege of Malta (1565), the expeditions under Selim II (1566–1574) to capture Cyprus (1570–1571) and Tunis (1574). Much has been written about these episodes. Essentially, a much smaller Christian armada (of reinforced galleys, with superior rowing crews) confronted a huge Ottoman fleet. For its part Venice chose to arm as many warships as possible, meaning that the Republic of St Mark’s squadrons, like the huge flotillas serving the sultan, were in “poor order”, with very high levels of mortality and relatively low levels of oarsmanship.³⁹ The fighting refused to die


35 SETTON, *Papacy and the Levant*, cit., Vol. 3, p. 482.

36 On the impressive size of Venetian forces in the mid-century, see Luciano PEZZOLO, «Stato, guerra e finanza nella Repubblica di Venezia fra medioevo e prima età moderna», in Rossella CINCILA (Ed.), *Mediterranea in armi (sec. XV–XVIII)*, Vol. 1, Palermo, Quaderni di Mediterranea, 2007, pp. 67–112, esp. 92. On the peace of 1540, see SETTON, *Papacy and the Levant*, cit., Vol. 3, p. 451; Mia Pia PEDANI, *The Ottoman–Venetian Border (15th–18th Centuries)*, translated by Mariateresa Sala, Venice, Ca’ Foscari, 2017, p. 57.

37 The blame for ending the truce is placed on the Barbary corsairs by Beatriz ALONSO ACERO, «El norte de África en el ocaso del emperador (1549–1558)», in MARTÍNEZ MILLÁN and EZQUERRA REVILLA (Eds.), *Carlos V y la quiebra*, cit., Vol. 1, pp. 387–414, esp. 393 ff.

38 María José RODRÍGUEZ-SALGADO, «“El león animoso entre las balas”: los dos cercos de Orán a mediados del siglo XVI», in Miguel Ángel DE BUNES IBARRA and Beatriz ALONSO ACERO (Eds.), *Orán. Historia de la Corte Chica*, Madrid, Polifemo, 2011, pp. 13–54.

39 WILLIAMS, *Empire and Holy War*, cit., chapters 2 and 7. Much recent thinking and scholarship is presented in Àlex CLARAMUNT SOTO (Ed.), *Lepanto. El mar rojo de sangre*, Madrid, Desperta Ferro, 2021.



Title: L'Abordage du “Bertone” (The boarding of the *bertone*).

Series/Portfolio: Les Combats de Quatre Galères (The Battles of Four Galleys).

Artist: Jacques Callot (France, 1592–1635).

Date: early 17th century.

Accession Number: 40.52.21.

Courtesy of the Metropolitan Museum of Art, New York.

Comment: This print portrays the *bertone* or high-sided ship in an unusual light. The *bertoni* have often been described as advanced sailing ships, but this one certainly appears a rather unwieldy vessel, with relatively little armament – easy prey to the pack of galleys.

down and re-emerged in the 1590s, in large part in response to the «Long Turkish War» in Hungary and the Balkans of 1593–1606.⁴⁰

The traditional historiographic approach to the campaigns after 1580 is to emphasise that they were of little consequence, the inland sea being most firmly «out of the limelight», to use Fernand Braudel's famous phrase.⁴¹ But comparison with the Atlantic operations of the day is instructive. In 1671 the Buccaneer Henry Morgan stormed Maracaibo, Portobello and Panama, key links in the Spanish imperial system in the Americas. He commanded some 600 men – a tiny force by Mediterranean standards.⁴² Spain was hardly committed to Atlantic warfare. In the 1660s the Madrid government was unable to arrange for a naval blockade of Lisbon: the failure to do so had profound consequences, as it went a very long way towards ensuring the success of the Portuguese rebellion in the War of Restoration (1640–1668).⁴³

Ottoman, Venetian, French and “Spanish” forces in the years after 1580 remained substantial. During its patrols of 1606 and 1607 Ahmed I's fleet perhaps had some 7,000 troops aboard it. At around this time there were some 71 galleys operating in Italy (not counting those of Venice and Castile or, as they are often known, Spain).⁴⁴ In 1608 Venice ran 33 light galleys, 3 galleasses and one galleon.⁴⁵ After 1645 Constantinople regularly mobilised some 150 vessels, including 40 galleys and 40 ships-of-the-line, to supply the expeditionary force in Crete.⁴⁶ Such a force would have employed well over 16,000 men.⁴⁷ In 1651 Alvise Mocenigo (commanding 24 galleys, 6 galleasses and 34 galleons) faced Husseinbeyse Ali, with 70 galleys, 40 large ships: so we have over 170

40 Jan Paul NIEDERKORN, *Die europäischen Mächte und der “Lange Türkenkrieg” Kaiser Rudolf II, 1593–1606*, Vienna, Archiv für österreichische Geschichte, 1993.

41 BRAUDEL, *Mediterranean*, cit., Vol. 2, pp. 1186–1188.

42 Esteban MIRA CABALLOS, «Defensa Terrestre de los reinos de Indias», in O'DONNELL Y DUQUE DE ESTRADA (Ed.), *Historia Militar de España*, cit., pp. 143–194, esp. 149.

43 Rafael VALLADARES RAMÍREZ, «La dimensión marítima de la empresa de Portugal: limitación de recursos y estrategia naval en el declive de la monarquía hispánica», *Revista de Historia Naval*, 13, 51 (1995), pp. 19–32.

44 WILLIAMS, *Empire and Holy War*, cit., pp. 235–236.

45 PEZZOLO, «Stato, guerra», cit., p. 73 fn. 9.

46 Rhoads MURPHEY, «The Ottoman Resurgence in the Seventeenth-Century Mediterranean: the Gamble and its Results», *Mediterranean Historical Review*, 8, 2 (1993), pp. 186–200, esp. 188–189, 192–193.

47 Rhoads MURPHEY, *Ottoman Warfare 1500–1700*, London, UCL Press, 1999, p. 23.

warships, a fairly clear indication that the inland sea was still «in the limelight». And in 1654 well over 200 *navires de guerre* were mobilised.⁴⁸ In 1669 Louis XIV sent 6,000 troops, 15 ships of the line and a dozen galleys to try to save Candia: this was as many as had been sent to relieve Malta in the Great Siege of 1565.⁴⁹ In the 1690s the Sun King had over 12,000 rowers serving aboard his oared warships: this was around as many as Philip II had on his squadrons at the Battle of Lepanto in 1571.⁵⁰

True, it would be difficult to claim that these formidable fleets and amphibian forces were going anywhere, that they were deployed to advance some grand strategy or design. Perhaps the opposite was the case. The outbreak of the War for Crete (1645–1669) might well be seen as a strategic defeat for all of its participants. Essentially, Venice paid the price for a brutal Hospitaller attack in the Levant.⁵¹ In 1644 an Ottoman fleet ventured to coastline the kingdom of Naples, with the apparent intention of diverting “Spanish” forces from the campaign front in Lombardy.⁵² It achieved very little. As it made its way back home, a Hospitaller squadron undertook a lightening raid in the Levant, seizing a large ship carrying pilgrims to Alexandria. In the lead up to the sieges of Rhodes in 1522, Malta in 1565 and Cyprus in 1570, Christian corsair expeditions clearly provoked the Ottomans, in large part because they challenged the Ottoman claim to be the defender the Holy Sites of Islam, a cornerstone of the dynasty’s authority.⁵³ In

48 EICKHOFF, *Venezia, Vienna*, cit., pp. 66-67; SETTON, *Venice, Austria*, cit., pp. 177-178.

49 PORMARÈDE, *Pour en finir*, cit., p. 289.

50 In 1571 the king mobilised 78 galleys, nearly all with rowing crews of 164. Ernle BAMFORD, «The Procurement of Oarsmen for French Galleys, 1660–1748», *American Historical Review*, 65, 1 (1959), pp. 31-48, esp. 46; additional context in André ZYSBERG, *Les galériens. Vies et destins de 60 000 forçats sur les galères de France 1680–1748*, Paris, Seuil, 1987.

51 SOUCEK, «Naval Aspects», cit., pp. 249-253; BONO, *Corsari nel Mediterraneo*, cit., pp. 51-52. On the many frontiers, see PEDANI, *The Ottoman-Venetian Border*, cit.

52 On fighting in Italy, see Davide MAFFI, *Il Baluardo della Corona. Guerra, esercito, finanze e società nella Lombardia seicentesca (1630–1660)*, Florence, Le Monnier Università, 2007.

53 Andrew C. HESS, «The Evolution of the Ottoman Seaborne Empire in the Age of the Oceanic Discoveries, 1453–1525», *The American Historical Review*, 75, 7 (1970), pp. 1892-1919. See also Nicolas VATIN, *L’Ordre de Saint-Jean-de-Jérusalem, l’Empire ottoman et la Méditerranée orientale entre les deux sièges de Rhodes (1480–1522)*, Paris, Collection Turcica, 1994; Maria Pia PEDANI, «Some Remarks upon the Ottoman Geo-Political Vision of the Mediterranean in the Period of the Cyprus War (1570–1573)», in Colin IMBER,

1644 history repeated itself, not as farce but as terror, with grim tales of drownings and pilgrims in chains and dungeons.⁵⁴ The subsequent conflict (1645–1669) was a fateful one for many of those who had championed it: sultan Ibrahim I (1640–1648) himself was deposed and done to death in August 1648. It is perhaps not difficult to understand why this conflict caused so much ill ease and resentment, having begun under very inauspicious circumstances. The Ottoman attack upon Crete was deemed illegal by a prominent Islamic judge, the Mufti Aziz Efendi, who pointed out that the Venetians had neither attacked the peoples of Islam (in 1644) nor been asked to surrender (in 1645). These conditions meant that the war taxes were levied illegally.⁵⁵

Most of Crete was quickly overrun in 1645 but Candia (Chandax, modern Heraklion) was not finally overcome until 1669. This was most certainly a major war and its concluding operations represented a singular success for Mehmed IV and his empire. «Never before», wrote one witness, «had anyone seen such a tremendous battle and use of treasure and never will anyone see it again». Turkish sources stated that 30,000 Janissaries died in the final months of the siege of Candia; another account had it that a total of 75,000 soldiers perished in 1668 and 1669.⁵⁶ A third file listed 260,000 casualties for the years 1667–1669.⁵⁷

The next Mediterranean war (the first War of the Morea, 1684–1699) was also clearly historically significant, as much of coastal Greece was won by the Republic of St Mark, which fought as part of the Holy League of pope Innocence XI Odescalchi (1676–1689). Morosini's expeditions of 1684 to 1688 were superb demonstrations of the potential of a new type of integrated amphibian campaigning. A disciplined and skilled vanguard force (some 8,000 troops

K. KIYOTAKI and Rhoads MURPHEY (Eds.), *Frontiers of Ottoman Studies: State, Province, and the West*, Vol. 2, London & New York, I.B. Tauris, 2005, pp. 23–36; Suraiya FAROQHI, *Pilgrims and Sultans. The Hajj under the Ottomans 1517–1683*, London & New York, I.B. Tauris, 1994. A different emphasis, stressing political considerations, is provided by SOUCEK, «Naval Aspects», cit., pp. 220–221, 237.

54 For the background, see Victor MALLIA MILANES, *Venice and Hospitaller Malta 1530–1798: Aspects of a relationship*, Marsa, PEG, 1993.

55 SOUCEK, «Naval Aspects», cit., p. 257.

56 SETTON, *Venice, Austria*, cit., pp. 158, 208, 224; Marc David BAER, *Honoured by the Glory of Islam. Conversion and Conquest in Ottoman Europe*, Oxford, New York, etc. OUP, 2008, pp. 155, 157–159.

57 MURPHEY, «The Ottoman Resurgence», cit., pp. 188–189, 192–193. Note DUFFY's (*The Fortress*, cit., p. 221) comments on the historical importance of the siege of Candia.

in 1684; 9,500 in 1685; 10,000 in 1686) was transported aboard a taskforce consisting of galleys, ships-of-the-line, galleasses, freighters and lighter craft. In July 1688 some 15,000 men were landed at Chalcis, which had a garrison of some 6,000 Turks.⁵⁸ In early November, as the Venetian taskforce was heading back to its bases, William of Orange (later King William III, 1688–1702) landed an army of just over 14,000 veteran troops in Devon: at this point James II (1685–1688) abandoned London and his kingdoms. Direct comparison of the two campaigns is, of course, problematic. Still, it would seem that if the events of the “Glorious Revolution” were historically significant, then those at Lepanto, Athens and Chalcis must also deserve a place in the grand narrative of battlefield events and naval expeditions.

The strategic aims behind Mediterranean fighting remain open to debate. What did planners in Constantinople and Venice hope to achieve in their campaigns in the “mare nostrum”? Was the Ottoman Empire a warrior state, seeking to win new territories – indeed, needing to acquire new lands, revenues and peoples in order to palliate its inherent domestic instability? And, if so, was this a conquest state constructed according to Islamic precept, a latter-day caliphate?⁵⁹ But, if this is the case, did Süleymân and his successors really view the King of France as a vassal monarch who had “capitulated” to the Threshold of the Nest of Felicity?⁶⁰ Many sultans – Selim II, Murad III (1574–1595), Osman II (1603–1617), Mehmed IV (1648–1687) and even the brilliant and fearsome Murad IV (1623–1640) – needed a major campaign success to buttress their political capital at key moments.⁶¹ Süleymân, for example, appears to have been conscious of the political capital to be won from battlefield triumphs in the first years of his sultanate.⁶²

58 Guido CANDIANI, *Dalla galea alla nave di linea. Le trasformazioni della marina veneziana (1572–1699)*, Novi Ligure, Città del Silenzio, 2012, pp. 145–146, 148–149.

59 On this theme, see Hakan T. KARATEKE and Maurus REINKOWSKI (Eds.), *Legitimizing the Order: The Ottoman Rhetoric of State Power*, Leiden & Boston, Brill, 2005.

60 As suggested by Bernard LEWIS, *The Muslim Discovery of Europe*, New York & London, W.W. Norton & Company, 1982, pp. 44–45, 163. See also Christine ISOM-VERHAAREN, *Allies with the Infidel. The Ottoman and French Alliance in the Sixteenth Century*, London & New York, I.B. Tauris, 2011.

61 Baki TEZCAN, *The Second Ottoman Empire: Political and Social Transformation in the Early Modern World*, Cambridge, New York etc., CUP, 2010.

62 Belgrade was captured in 1521 and Rhodes in 1522. SOUCEK, «Naval Aspects», cit., p. 225; Colin IMBER, «Frozen Legitimacy», in KARATEKE and REINKOWSKI (Eds.), *Legitimizing the Order*, cit., pp. 99–107.

It has often been argued that Venice was a victim of aggression in 1537, 1570 and 1644, and engaged in the fighting only with great reluctance: certainly, many contemporaries framed their analysis in these terms.⁶³ The Republic of St Mark, remarked an official in the early seventeenth-century, was not for war, «Venezia non è da guerra».⁶⁴ This perspective undoubtedly contains a great deal of truth. As we have seen, in 1539 and 1540 the Republic wasted no time in abandoning Paul III's Holy League and accepting humiliating conditions. But more perhaps lay behind this decision than losses during Levant trade during the war against Süleymân and the threat to its dominion of the Adriatic posed by Doria's incursion in 1538. Supporting a battle fleet posed a huge challenge to it. As Luca Lo Basso has noted, from 1542 or so the *Serenissima* sought to overhaul its naval administration and recruit and deploy a different sort of rowing crew, a tacit admission that the demands of Paul III's Holy League had proven a steep challenge for its armada of free oarsmen («galeotti di libertà»).⁶⁵ In 1545 the first Venetian galley crewed by criminal oarsmen was armed.⁶⁶ Certainly, this was a break from its long and proud maritime traditions and a step towards the grim system used to equip the flotillas of Naples, Sicily, Leghorn and Malta, which was dependent upon criminals and slaves. But galleys of this sort were much more reliable and effective. In this context, it is noticeable that no action was undertaken by the Veneto–Papal squadrons in the summer of 1538 before the arrival of the galleys under Doria in Corfu in early September.

If the War for Crete began under a dark cloud for the Ottoman Empire, it also started in opportune circumstances for Venice, where many statesmen professed grave misgivings. From 1648 a group of senators and officials sought to negotiate a peace settlement.⁶⁷ True, the course of events took a radical new direction in 1684, when the Republic was keen to expand its territories and readily joined Innocence XI's Holy League. By this stage the evidence of Ottoman decline

63 In 1537 Doria predicted that Venice would quickly seek peace with Constantinople. POU-MARÈDE, *Pour en finir*, cit., p. 223; PRYOR, *Geography, technology and war*, cit., p. 182 (citing J.R. Hale).

64 PEZZOLO, «Stato, guerra», cit., p. 110.

65 Luca Lo Basso, *Uomini da remo. Galee e galeotti del Mediterraneo in età moderna*, Milan, Selene, 2003, pp. 35–39 (Parte 1.1).

66 PEZZOLO, «Stato, guerra», cit., p. 81.

67 Guido CANDIANI, «Conflitti d'intenti e di ragioni politiche, di ambizioni e di interessi nel patriziato veneto durante la Guerra di Candia», in *Studi Veneziani*, n.s., 36 (1998), p. 163.



Title: Galley under construction.

Artist: Attributed to Pietro Ciafferi (Italy, died c. 1650).

Medium: Etching.

Accession number: 1985.1.26.

Courtesy of the National Gallery of Art, Washington (Julius S. Held Collection).

Comment: Relatively little is known about construction techniques, but this fascinating print suggests the skills, manpower and resources needed to build a galley.

was too clear to be ignored by the canny patricians of the Rialto, although this perspective – that Mehmed IV’s empire was on a clear downward trajectory – would be questioned by many scholars today, who tend to frame it as an «empire of difference», of adaption, toleration and logistical foresight.⁶⁸ It is also worth

⁶⁸ See, for instance, Karen BARKEY, *Empire of Difference. The Ottomans in Comparative Perspective*, Cambridge & New York, CUP, 2008. For an extremely stimulating comparative study, see Rudi MATTHEE, «The Decline of Safavid Persia in Comparative Perspective», *Journal of Persianate Studies*, 8 (2015), pp. 276-308. Turkish logistical expertise is stressed in MURPHEY, *Ottoman Warfare*, cit., pp. 9-11, 52-53, 100-102.

noting that many historians have also interpreted Venetian bellicosity after 1684 as a symptom of its decadence and ossification, with the lagoon republic riven by bitter divisions which gave rise to notions that it was better «to fight a war that conserves us than a peace which destroys us».⁶⁹

Any calculation or assessment of strategy is complicated by the imperfect tools and methods of warfare. Koron was judged to be too much of a risk in 1534, and five years later Castelnuovo could not be defended. Two large modern bastions, Nicosia and Famagusta, were surrendered in 1570 and 1571: some well-informed Castilian statesmen at the time suspected that more should have been done to prepare and defend both positions.^{⁷⁰} Nearly all of the defences of Crete were overcome in a couple of months in 1645. The Venetians quickly won Tenedos and Limnos in 1656, but then surrendered both islands (the former without a siege or any sort of fighting) following the reverse in the Fourth Battle of the Dardanelles (17–19 July 1657), in which Lazzaro Mocenigo, the famed, fearless commander, was killed.

Gunpowder fortifications in the Morea proved remarkably vulnerable in 1685, 1686 and 1687. This having been said, determined resistance was clearly put up at Chalcis (Negropont, Euboea) in 1688 and Crete in 1692, when the Republic of St Mark's forces were rebuffed after desperate bouts of fighting at the walls of Canea. Indeed, the siege of Chalcis lasted three months (from mid-July to mid-October).^{⁷¹} The 1692 registers suggest that the best fortifications at Canea were those which the Republic of St Mark herself had erected before the attack launched under Ibrahim I: this detail perhaps poses the question of why the officers and soldiers of the Republic of St Mark had not managed to put up stiffer resistance in 1645.^{⁷²}

Accounts of the campaigns of 1538, 1571, 1657, 1669 and 1695 tend to focus

⁶⁹ Mario INFELISE and Anastasia STOURAITI, «L'ultima crociata», in IDEM (Eds.), *Venezia e la guerra di Morea. Guerra, politica e cultura alla fine del '600*, Milan, Franco Angeli, 2005, pp. 1-15.

⁷⁰ WILLIAMS, *Empire and Holy War*, cit., pp. 217-218.

⁷¹ In 1688 contemporaries were convinced that Morosini made a decisive error in allowing the Ottomans to retain the small hilltop position at Karà Baba, which commanded a bridge into the principal bulwark. SETTON, *Venice, Austria*, cit., pp. 349, 354, 361.

⁷² Guido CANDIANI, *I vascelli della Serenissima. Guerra, politica e costruzioni navali a Venezia in età moderna, 1650-1720*, Venice, Istituto Veneto di Scienze, Lettere ed Arti, 2009, p. 257.

on claims of heroism and betrayal, martial skills and incompetence.⁷³ Behind the sometimes operatic terms of registers, narratives and trials there perhaps lies the very real sense that Athens, Chios, Navarino, Modon and Koron were not only imperfectly fortified positions but that they could not be fortified and made “inexpungable”, with cavernous cellars and cisterns, thick angular walls, a safe anchorage and a productive hinterland – at least not in the timeframe available to the Venetian forces.⁷⁴ Monemvasia, on the other hand, presents a very different type of military failure: the massive fort took no less than seventeen months to win, finally succumbing to forces under Girolamo Corner in August 1690; it was surrendered by Ferigo Badoer in 1715, before a shot had been fired but after several rounds of (frantic) negotiation. The obvious theme in this episode was, once again, the absence of fighting spirit amongst the officers and garrison; but this failing can be closely tied to tactical and operational concerns – the strict orders issued to keep the Republic’s fleet well away from the Ottoman armada; the fact that the fortress appears not to have offered an anchorage to larger ships and was only reachable by smaller vessels.⁷⁵

Venice, notes Christopher Duffy, constructed a «remarkable series of five detached forts on the summit of the Palamidi Mountain» overlooking Nauplia (Napoli di Romania), 700 feet above sea level.⁷⁶ This position was stormed after an encirclement of just eight days. The key strongpoints in Greece (the lower bastion at Nauplia, built during the Byzantine period; Monemvasia; the Acrocorinth and the “castello” on the acropolis at Athens) may well have been of the “old design”, with long, thin walls (perhaps 40cm thick, as Haris A. Kalligas states), but they harnessed formidable geographical qualities. On the other hand, their shortcomings may have been far from unique, as the great bastions of Casale

⁷³ MERCIECA, «Battle of Preveza», cit.; PUJEAU, «Preveza in 1538»; CANDIANI, «Conflitti d’intenti», cit.; IDEM, *Dalla galea*, cit., pp. 161-163.

⁷⁴ On the many difficulties in using Koron and Modon during the Middle Ages, see Ruthy GERTWAGEN, «Harbours and facilities along the eastern Mediterranean Sea lanes to Outremer», in John H. PRYOR (Ed.), *Logistics of Warfare in the Age of the Crusades*, London & New York, Routledge, 2006, pp. 95-118, esp. 108-111. Note also Pryor’s (*Geography, technology, and war*, cit., p. 291) concluding comments on Monemvasia, Koron and Modon («just roadsteads») and water provision.

⁷⁵ The Venetian attack began in 1687, although a close blockade was maintained only for the final 17 months. Haris A. KALLIGAS, *Monemvasia. A Byzantine city state*, London & New York, Routledge, 2010, chapters IX, X, XII; on its shallow anchorage, pp. 107-109.

⁷⁶ DUFFY, *The Fortress*, cit., pp. 223-224.

Monferrato in Mantua and Pinerolo were lost by Louis XIV during the Nine Years War (1688–1697). Even France, then, with its vast resources and army, found it very difficult to retain strategic forward positions, although the Sun King was certainly guilty of a series of serious misjudgements in this conflict.⁷⁷ It was not until the conclusion of the fighting on the other fronts that Paris was able to dispatch a formidable expeditionary force to claim Barcelona. This having been said, by 1697 the French were pushing against an empty door: as Antonio Espino has shown, the fall of the “City of the Count” was largely due to the disorder and demoralised state of its defenders.⁷⁸

While scholars have emphasised the impact of the lateen sail, which allowed crews to clip into the wind and therefore to sail much more efficiently and quickly, it is very clear that governments invariably failed to recruit enough seamen.⁷⁹ This leaves open the possibility, seldom (if ever) entertained by scholars but implicit in much correspondence, that admirals were simply unable to make use of this new technology because of manpower deficiencies. As Arturo Pacini has underlined, officers found that sailing ships and galleys together posed a serious challenge in the sixteenth-century.⁸⁰ A great deal of evidence suggests that ships, freighters, merchantmen, long boats and skiffs were (very) expensive to hire and few in number.⁸¹

Many seventeenth-century expeditions underlined the vitality of oared warcraft, their ability to sail with ships-of-the-line. This was especially so when the rowing crews were experienced, as the history of Venice’s Adriatic flotilla in the 1640s and 1650s tends to underline.⁸² In 1660 Antonio Priuli, captain of

77 Guy ROWLANDS, «Louis XIV, Vittorio Amedeo II and French Military Failure in Italy, 1689–96», *The English Historical Review*, 115, 462 (2000), pp. 534–569.

78 Antonio ESPINO LÓPEZ, *Las guerras de Cataluña. El teatro de Marte, 1652–1714*, Madrid etc., EDAF, 2014.

79 CANDIANI, *I vascelli*, cit., pp. 39, 43–44, 172–173, 424–426; MURPHEY, «Ottoman Resurgence», pp. 190–191; Geoffrey SYMCOX, *The Crisis of French Sea Power 1688–1697. From the guerre de escadre to the guerre de course*, The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff, 1974, p. 12 *ff.*

80 Arturo PACINI, «*Desde Rosas a Gaeta*. La costruzione della rotta spagnola nel Mediterraneo occidentale nel secolo XVI», Milan, FrancoAngeli, 2013, pp. 157–169, 188–190.

81 CANDIANI, *I vascelli*, cit., pp. 169–176, 240; DAVIES, «Administration and Settlement», p. 85.

82 Domagoj MADUNIĆ, «The Adriatic Naval Squadron, 1645–1669: Defence of the Adriatic during the War for Crete», *Povijesni prilozi*, 45 (2013), pp. 199–235, esp. 213–217.



Title: The entry of Marcantonio Colonna and the Christian army in Rome after victory
at the battle of Lepanto, December 11, 1571.

Artist: Francesco Tramezzino (Italy, died 1576).

Year: c. 1571.

Medium: Etching.

Courtesy of the Metropolitan Museum of Art, New York.

Comment: Mediterranean holy war can be seen as an extension of political interests by other means. An idea of the pageantry and ceremonial dimensions of the crusade is conveyed by this print.

the Venetian ships of the line (*Capitano delle Navi*) despaired of his inability to intercept Ottoman galley convoys when the elements were favourable to the enemy: «to pretend that the ships can catch galleys is to want to believe that tortoise can arrest the hares, and that with carts it is possible to capture foxes». Nightfall was also an advantage to the oared squadrons.⁸³

Battles and skirmishes might in fact be mined for compelling – if overlooked –

83 CANDIANI, *I vascelli*, cit., p. 58.

evidence of the tactical shortcomings of sailing fleets. The heavy Ottoman losses at the Third Battle of the Dardanelles (1656), for example, were almost entirely the result of Mehmed IV's ships (both galleons and galleys) being caught on a lee shore. In this supremely disadvantageous position, they were both bombarded and set alight. Fireships were clearly determinative in this episode, as in many others. As with Lepanto in 1571, the reverse of 1656 can be largely explained by the "poor order" of the Ottoman galleys. Their crews consisted of a majority of inexperienced oarsmen, who proved highly susceptible to diseases and exerted little strength in the oar stroke as a consequence of their physical weakness and poor technique, resulting in an irregular – and therefore inefficient – rhythm.⁸⁴ Many officials and soldiers, moreover, appear to have taken flight at the first opportunity, to the chagrin of the recently-appointed Grand Vizier, Köprüllü Mehmed Paşa (governed 1656–1661).⁸⁵ Again, the determination and resilience of the combatants – or singular lack of it – appeared to be a decisive factor: put another way, gunpowder weaponry only functioned if there were soldiers brave enough to use it.

The development of the mixed-vessel taskforce constituted a fascinating, if neglected, theme in the naval history of the century. Philip IV's offer in 1639 (above) to assist Venice explicitly depended upon the joint deployment of both oared and sail-driven warships, his *galeras reforzadas* and *galeones*. The large scale confrontations at the mouth of the Dardanelles in the mid-1650s, like numerous skirmishes and chases in this period, also underlined the circumstances in which galleys could be deployed with galleons for maximum effect.⁸⁶ As Guido Candiani has argued, the technical and administrative successes of the Republic of St Mark in the War of Crete were considerable.⁸⁷ French operations against

84 WILLIAMS, «Mare Nostrum», cit., pp. 94-97. The vast majority of oarsmen aboard the "armada del Turco" were employed for one year as a form of tax service, resulting in sickly, ineffective crews. Colin IMBER, «The Navy of Süleyman the Magnificent», *Archivum Ottomanicum*, 6 (1980), pp. 211-282; Emilia THEMPOULOU, «Les kürekçi de la flotte ottomane au XVIIe siècle», in ZACHARIADOU (Ed.), *The Kapudan Pasha*, cit., pp. 165-179.

85 He ruthlessly hunted down and executed deserters, of whom there were many. EICKHOFF, *Venezia, Vienna*, cit., pp. 161, 162, 165.

86 Mocenigo used galleys to resupply the ships-of-the-line and hunt down stranded or abandoned enemy vessels. EICKHOFF, *Venezia, Vienna*, cit., pp. 156-165. Numerous examples of the navigational qualities of galleys in the 1640s and 1650s can be found in SETTON, *Venice, Austria*, cit., chapters V, VI, VII.

87 Guido CANDIANI, «Stratégie et diplomatie Vénitiennes: navires anglo-hollandais et blocus

Palermo in 1676 and Barcelona in 1697, like the heavy bombardments of Algiers and Genoa in the 1680s, were also undertaken by taskforces consisting of galleys and sail-driven, high-sided ships.⁸⁸ In many other campaigns of the second half of the century galleys towed the men-of-war into position: this was the case, for example, on 25 July 1669, when the oared warships pulled the French flotilla of high-sided gunships into range of the Ottoman siege works around Candia. But, like so many other manifestations of the “military revolution”, this bombardment proved largely ineffective and had little bearing on the course of events.⁸⁹

This is not to deny that things could very quickly go wrong, as the career of Antonio Zen demonstrated in the mid-1690s. On 16 September 1694 he failed to engage an Ottoman navy in seas to the north of Chios. True, this episode underlined that oared warships could be highly effective in positioning high-sided gunships for attack; but, like so many other offensives of its kind, it ended in inaction and (bitter) recrimination. Zen appears to have lost his nerve at the moment of truth and then failed to capitalise upon a later opportunity to destroy the enemy ships in harbour, after they had been abandoned by their galley escort. These were fateful mistakes, as a resurgent Ottoman navy inflicted heavy damage on the Venetian fleet near Chios (9 February 1695), in a confrontation in which three *nave* caught fire; the new Kaptanpaşa, Amcazade Hüseyin, did not adopt the line-ahead formation, but concentrated his fire on the enemy ships of the line.⁹⁰

Conclusions

Mediterranean campaigns of the sixteenth- and seventeenth-centuries do not, therefore, fit in with the prevailing interpretations about a “military revolution” and the sea’s abandonment. Paradoxically, nearly all campaigns presented a direct and inescapable contradiction between the grand intentions of the protagonists and the realities on the ground. Finances were another matter: none of these

des Dardanelles, 1646–1659», *Revue d’Histoire Maritime*, 9, (2008), pp. 251-282.

88 Guy ROWLANDS, «The King’s Two Arms: French Amphibian Warfare in the Mediterranean under Louis XIV, 1664–1697», in Mark C. FISSEL and David TRIM (Eds.), *Amphibian Warfare 1000–1700. Commerce, State Formation and European Expansion*, Leiden & Boston, Brill, 2006, pp. 263-314.

89 Some 12,000 to 15,000 shots were discharged. SETTON, *Venice, Austria*, cit., pp. 224-227.

90 SOUCEK, « The Straits of Chios», cit., p. 151 *ff*; SETTON, *Venice, Austria*, cit., pp. 395-396; CANDIANI, *Dalla galea*, cit., pp. 160-162.

politics could really afford war.⁹¹ The Venetian experience in Greece after 1685, like the history of the Spanish outposts at Algiers (lost in 1529), Bona or Bône (abandoned in 1541), Tripoli (surrendered, with barely a fight, by the Hospitallers in 1551), Mahdia (destroyed and abandoned in 1554), Bougie (lost in 1555), La Goletta (lost in 1574), La Mamora (lost in 1681), Larache (lost in 1687) and Oran (lost in 1708), demonstrated how difficult it was to construct, equip and maintain frontier fortresses. Ceuta was, apparently, the exception to the rule, able to withstand a siege that stretched over decades. But the British wasted little time in abandoning Tangiers in 1684.⁹²

Some decisive “harbour positions” were not really harbours at all: La Goletta, Monemvasia and Santa Maura in fact commanded lagoons. In this context Philip IV’s reservations about an extended Levant venture in 1639 are clearly understandable. The idea that wars were fought for the control of a chain of “strongly fortified strategic positions” represents a theoretical formulation, an assessment of what would have occurred had geography, economics and technology conspired to adorn campaigns with a general direction, purpose or rationale. The reality, in the Mediterranean and, perhaps, in the Greater Caribbean, was a chaotic series of offensives based upon the peculiarities of navigation in both deep and shallow waters; the “narrowness” of the seas; the need to support forward positions that were tenable only if their garrisons were convinced that help was coming; and the drive for political ascendancy in court cultures that prioritised confessional warfare and exhibited a marked tendency towards volatility.

In a famous, brilliant aside, Voltaire observed that the Battle of Lepanto in 1571 led nowhere: it had no consequence other than to save Crete and Corfu from Ottoman attack. His assessment remains open to debate – no less an authority than Fernand Braudel disagreed with it – but he was clearly correct in direct,

91 On the ruinously destructive financial cost of seventeenth-century fighting for Iran, Madrid, Naples, Constantinople, France and other states, see the attempt at synthesis WILLIAMS, «Mare Nostrum», cit., pp. 79-81. Pezzolo suggests that war spending was manageable for seventeenth-century Venice, largely because of growing incomes. PEZZOLO, «Stato, guerra», cit., esp. pp. 101-103.

92 DAVIES, «Administration and Settlement», *passim*; Antonio SÁNCHEZ-GIJÓN, «La Goleta, Bona, Bugía y los presidios del reino de Túnez en la política mediterránea del Emperador», in Carlos José HERNANDO SÁNCHEZ (Ed.), *Las Fortificaciones de Carlos V*, Madrid, Ministerio de Defensa, 2000, pp. 625-651; MATAR, *Britain and Barbary*, cit., p. 142; Anne BROGINI and María GHAZALI, «Un enjeu espagnol en Méditerranée: les présides de Tripoli et de La Goulette au XVIIe siècle», *Cahiers de la Méditerranée* (On line), 70 (2005), pp. 9-43.



Title: Galley with deck covered by sails.

Year: probably c. 1654/1655.

Artist: Stefano Della Bella (Florence, 1610–1664).

Medium: Etching.

Accession number: 1972.66.6.

Series Title: Views of Livorno [Vesme 844–849].

Courtesy of the National Gallery of Art, Washington (Alisa Mellon Bruce Fund).

Comment: Here a crew apparently takes shelter under the sails, a fascinating episode in social history of the oared warships, about which relatively little is known.

geographical terms: Mediterranean conflict between the Ottomans and Venice did in fact go nowhere.⁹³ Venice occupied much of the Morea in the war of 1463–1479 and lost it to sultan Beyazit II (1481–1512) in 1499–1502. Monemvasia and

93 BRAUDEL, *Mediterranean*, cit., Vol. 2, pp. 1103–1106.

Nauplia followed suit in 1540.⁹⁴ The coastal towns and harbours then exchanged hands a further two times, often without a shot being fired in anger, during the two wars of the Morea (1684–1699; 1714–1718).⁹⁵

On the other hand, many contemporaries most certainly *did* have a clear idea of what purpose the fighting served – to divert forces from other theatres of action. Commanders and statesmen were profoundly aware of the symbiotic relationship between events in Hungary and Greece: whether-or-not Doria's intervention in 1532 served to divert Süleymân from Vienna, Charles V's “grand strategy” was caught on a constant dilemma between his interests and commitments in central Europe and campaigns of direct value to the subjects of his Mediterranean kingdoms.⁹⁶ In 1541 the Emperor chose to sail to try to capture Algiers, rather than to attempt to save Buda and Pest from Süleymân.⁹⁷ In 1570 the Morisco rebellion in Granada provided the essential context and background to Selim II's attack upon Cyprus. In turn, the Mediterranean operations of 1570–1571 prevented Philip II from undertaking a more thorough repression in the Netherlands, as the leading rebel, William of Orange, well appreciated.⁹⁸ But then, in 1572, concerns about the situation in Zeeland delayed the expedition into the Levant, which concluded in the frustrating efforts at Navarino.⁹⁹ In these years many statesmen – the pope foremost among them – hoped for a campaign in Hungary to coincide with the Christian advance in the Morea; during the Long Turkish War (1593–1606) the other side of the equation came to the fore, as statesmen in Vienna and Rome sought to engineer naval expeditions into the Ionian and Aegean seas to divert Ottoman attention and resources away from

94 PRYOR, *Geography, technology and war*, cit., pp. 181-182.

95 For a detailed and up-to-date presentation of these two wars, see Eric PINZELLI, *Venise et l'Empire Ottoman: les guerres de Morée (1684–1718)*, Athens, 2020.

96 Aurelio ESPINOSA, «The Grand Strategy of Charles V (1500–1558): Castile, War and Dynastic Priority in the Mediterranean», *Journal of Early Modern History*, 9, 3–4 (2005), pp. 239–283, esp. 267.

97 James D. TRACY, *Charles V, Impresario of War: Campaign Strategy, International Finance and Domestic Politics*, Cambridge etc., CUP, 2002, pp. 170–172.

98 John ELLIOTT, «Ottoman–Habsburg Rivalry: The European Perspective», in INALCIK and KAFADAR (Eds.), *Süleymân the Second*, cit., pp. 159–163, esp. 161 (citing Geoffrey Parker). Charles V had hoped that his brother, Ferdinand, would lead a campaign in Hungary in 1538. POUMARÈDE, *Pour en finir*, cit., pp. 228–229.

99 SETTON, *Papacy and the Levant*, cit., Vol. 4, pp. 1078–1081.

Hungary and the Balkans.¹⁰⁰ In 1609 Philip III decided to expel the Moriscos, because he feared a rebellion in Valencia timed to coincide with the arrival of an Ottoman fleet and simultaneous offensives by “bad Christians”.¹⁰¹ The reverse under Kara Mustafa Paşa at Vienna in 1683 and subsequent chaos opened the door to the Venetian conquest of the Peloponnese in 1685, 1686 and 1687, and the unsuccessful ventures at the Negropont, Crete and Chios; in 1717 Austrian intervention, and the skills of Count Johann Mathias von der Schulenburg, saved Corfu for Venice but came too late to prevent the loss of the Morea.

A similar pattern might be discerned between campaigns in the inland sea and offensives in Italy and central Europe: Süleymân repeatedly deployed his armada and land forces (1532, 1537, 1543–1544, 1556 and 1558) to try to assist Bourbon advances in Milan and Naples, while fighting in Italy in 1522 and 1645 made it impossible to form a Christian alliance to save Rhodes and Crete respectively. After 1686 Louis XIV was motivated by the need to prevent the total collapse of the Ottoman position in the Balkans, which appeared a distinct possibility following the loss of Buda.¹⁰² Finally, the destruction of the French fleet in Toulon in 1707 opened the door to the Austrian conquest of Naples. “Il regno” was, in fact, central to the entire story, both as the principal naval base of the Spanish Monarchy and as the object of French ambitions and machinations.

The underlying assumption of contemporaries over many generations, from the time of Andrea Doria and Süleymân the Magnificent to that of Francesco Morosini and Mehmed IV, was that the leading powers were incapable of fighting in more than one theatre of action; they seem also to have acted on the understanding that military deployments in Hungary and the Danube theatre, in Greece, Milan, Catalonia, Portugal and North Africa, and even, to a large degree, in northern Europe or Iran, depended upon the transfer of resources across the Mediterranean. At the same time, crusade and *gaza* were the cornerstone of political culture and vital to projections of royal majesty. If galley campaigns went nowhere, then they were not entirely without consequence and meaning. Mediterranean warfare was a means to an end somewhere else.

¹⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 1061, 1064, 1066–1067; NIEDERKORN, *Die europäischen Mächte*, *passim*.

¹⁰¹ WILLIAMS, *Empire and Holy War*, cit., pp. 161–170.

¹⁰² ROWLANDS, «Louis XIV, Vittorio Amedeo II», cit., pp. 535–536, 566–567. See also David QUILES ALBERO, «La guerra de Candia (1645–1669): ¿Causa común en una Europa dividida?», *Tiempos Modernos*, 38, 1 (2019), pp. 176–195.

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Typology of the War at Sea in the Ionian Sea

(late fifteenth–early nineteenth century)

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ABSTRACT: In the geographical and chronological limits defined by the title of this study, which is a first approach to a complex issue, we will attempt to formulate and classify the main types of warfare that took place in the Ionian Sea and affected local communities to a greater or lesser extent. We will also seek an analysis of the means offered by traditional and modern literature for the examination of war, with a clear emphasis on the area under consideration.

KEYWORDS: IONIAN ISLANDS, EARLY MODERN PERIOD, VENETIAN–OTTOMAN WARS.

In the Early Modern Period, the Ionian Sea, a border zone in terms of historiography due to its special position at the intersection of local and international roads,¹ was claimed by the great powers of the time: the Spaniards dominated the western part, occupying Southern Italy, and the Venetians (settled on the islands and in coastal places) and Ottomans (positioned for the most part on the mainland side) being forced to coexist in the eastern part of the Ionian region.

Some of the conflicts between these three powers stood out for their intensity and left a strong mark on the collective memory for the pain they caused. Thus, they functioned as points of reference and inspiration for works that exploited the war on a symbolic level. Let us remember here the examples of the Ottoman

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1 Alberto TENENTI, «Le isole ionie: un area di frontiera», in Massimo COSTANTINI (Ed.), *Il Mediterraneo Centro-orientale tra vecchie e nuove egemonie*, Rome, Bulzoni editore, 1998, pp. 11-20; Ilias KOLOVOS, «Εισαγωγή», in IDEM (Ed.), Οθωμανικές πηγές για τη νεώτερη ιστορία της Λευκάδας, Irakleion, Crete University Press, 2013, pp. 11-16.

attack on Otranto in 1480,² the seven Venetian-Ottoman wars, which were not all of the same weight nor did they affect the entire Ionian Sea, the Battle of Lepanto, the Ottoman siege of Corfu in 1716 and the siege of French-occupied Corfu in 1799, the latter leading to the expulsion of the French from the islands and the establishment of Russian-Turkish rule, etc.³

In the geographical and chronological limits defined by the title of this study, which is a first approach to a complex issue, we will attempt to formulate and classify the main types of warfare that took place in the Ionian Sea and affected local communities to a greater or lesser extent. We will also seek an analysis of the means offered by traditional and modern literature for the examination of the war, with a clear emphasis on the area under consideration.

It is clear that most of the conflicts in the period studied here either took place at sea or utilized the maritime routes with the aim, on the one hand, of attacking the enemy fleet and, on the other hand, of conducting raids against island positions, fortified or otherwise. So the criteria for a categorization of wars could be found in some other fields. A first distinction could be that between conventional and unconventional forms of warfare, which included another distinction, one between wars involving – albeit on the one hand, the Christian – a multitude of forces, which we usually call “international”, and by another to “interstate” wars occurring between two states, which we could also call “bi-imperial”, given the tendency of historians to associate Venice with the status of an empire.

A second distinction concerns the connection of these forms of warfare with their consequences on human societies and the environment, both natural and urban.

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- 2 Cosimo Damiano FONSECA (Ed.), *Otranto 1480. Atti del Convegno internazionale di studio promosso in occasione del V centenario della caduta di Otranto ad opera dei Turchi (Otranto, 19–23 maggio 1980)*, 2 vols., Lecce, Galatina Congedo Editore, 1986.
- 3 A brief reference to all these battles is made in Roger Charles ANDERSON, *Naval Wars in the Levant. From the Battle of Lepanto to the Introduction of Steam (1559–1853)*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1952. Cf. Frederic C. LANE, *Βενετία η θαλασσοκράτειρα: Ναυτιλία-Εμπόριο-Οικονομία*, translated by Kostas Kouremenos, edited by Gerassimos D. Pagratis, Athens, Alexandria Publishers, 2007, *passim*; Dionysios HATZOPoulos, *Ο τελευταίος βενετο-οθωμανικός πόλεμος (1714–1718)*, Athens, Papadimas Publishers, 2002; Fotini B. PERRA, *Ο Λέων εναντίον της Ημισελήνου. Ο πρώτος βενετο-οθωμανικός πόλεμος και η κατάληψη του ελλαδικού χώρου (1463–1479)*, Athens, Papazisis Publishers, 2009; Guido CANDIANI, *I vascelli della Serenissima: guerra, politica e costruzioni navali a Venezia in età moderna, 1650–1720*, Venice, Istituto Veneto di Scienze, Lettere ed Arti, 2009.



1 Hayreddin Barbarossa defeats the united Christian fleets of the so-called “Holy Coalition”, led by Admiral Andrea Doria of Genoa, at the Battle of Preveza (1538); by Osman Nuri Pasha and Hovhannes Umed Behzad, 1866. Turkish Naval Museum, Istanbul. Source: Wikimedia Commons.

I. The category of the so-called “international wars” can include three main sets of events: the conflicts related to the conquest of the Peloponnese by Charles V between 1532 and 1534, and the naval battles of Preveza in 1538 and Lepanto in 1571.

I.1. The military campaign of Emperor Charles V in Western Peloponnese, based on his need to reduce the pressure he was under in Central Europe, was made possible thanks to the formation of a coalition led by the Genoese admiral Andrea Doria. The coalition consisted of Genoese, Spanish, Papal and Maltese ships (of the Order of the Knights of St. John) and soldiers of various origins (Italians, Spaniards, Germans, Greeks, and Albanians).

Charles V’s entire effort lasted for two years and included numerous battles at sea and on land, as well as territorial sovereignty. The strengthening of Ottoman armies forced the Emperor to abandon the Morea and pushed several thousand

Peloponnesians, who had supported him, to relocate to Southern Italy.⁴ The following year (1535) Suleiman the Magnificent signed the famous “unholy alliance” with the King of France, while in the Ottoman fleet the star of Hayreddin Barbarossa began to rise.⁵

I.2. The naval Battle of Preveza, part of the Third Ottoman–Venetian War, took place on 27 September 1538 (Fig. 1). The Ottoman fleet, under the command of Hayreddin Barbarossa, faced the united Christian fleets of the so-called “Holy Coalition”, led by Admiral Andrea Doria of Genoa. Despite the clear naval superiority of the Christian forces (302 ships against 122 Ottoman ones), the Ottomans achieved a great victory, thanks to the bold offensive moves of Barbarossa, who faced a divided Christian camp headed by the rather timid Andrea Doria. From now on, and for several decades, the European camp would be terrified of what the Ottomans were capable of achieving at sea.⁶

I.3 The naval battle that took place on 7 October 1571, and has come to be known as the Battle of Lepanto (Fig. 2), put a brake on the successes of the Ottomans. As Miguel Cervantes, author of *Don Quixote*, notes: «On that day, the belief that the Turks were invincible at sea was shattered throughout the world». Debunking the “invincible Turk” myth contributed to an increase in the conspiratorial and revolutionary movements among the conquered peoples of the Balkans against the Sublime Porte.⁷

This significant event, regardless of its subsequent utilization, stands out for a number of reasons, to which I will refer briefly. First of all, for the number of

4 Ioannis HASSIOTIS, «Οι Έλληνες, το πρόβλημα της ανεξαρτησίας και τα πολεμικά γεγονότα στον ελληνικό χώρο», in *Ιστορία του Ελληνικού Εθνους*, Vol. 10, Athens, Ekdotike Athenon, 1974, pp. 294-297.

5 On Barbarossa see Virginia H. AKSAN and Daniel GOFFMAN (Eds.), *The early modern Ottomans: Remapping the Empire*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2007.

6 HASSIOTIS, «Οι Έλληνες, το πρόβλημα της ανεξαρτησίας», cit., pp. 301-302.

7 Androniki DIALETI, «Νοηματοδοτήσεις της “χριστιανικής νίκης” στις αφηγήσεις για τη ναυμαχία της Ναυπάκτου (1571) στην πρώμη νεότερη Ιταλία», in Gerassimos D. PAGRATIS (Ed.), *Πόλεμος, Κράτος και Κοινωνία στο Ιόνιο Πέλαγος (τέλη 14ου-αρχές 19ου αιώνα)*, Athens, Ionian Society for Historian Studies – Erodotos Publishers, 2018, pp. 291-317. For revolutionary movements in Southeastern Europe, see Kostas G. TSIKNAKIS, «Η ναυμαχία της Ναυπάκτου και οι επαναστατικές κινήσεις στον ελληνικό χώρο», in IDEM (Ed.), *Η απίγχηση της Ναυμαχίας της Ναυπάκτου στον ευρωπαϊκό χώρο. Πρακτικά της επιστημονικής συνάντησης (Ναύπακτος, 13 Οκτωβρίου 2012)*, Athens and Venice, Hellenic Institute of Byzantine and Post-Byzantine Studies in Venice – Demetrios and Aegli Botsaris Foundation, 2013, pp. 53-89.

powers involved in it (Ottoman Empire, Spain, Venice, Genoa, Savoy, Naples and Sicily, and the Papal States), for the large number of ships and crews that took part, for the changes that this naval battle brought about with regard to naval tactics and shipbuilding techniques (cementing the use of sails as the main means of propulsion at the expense of galleys), and finally for the souls that were lost in the waters of the Gulf of Patras and the Ionian Sea (Fig. 3), which seem to have exceeded 30,000 in a battle that lasted only a few hours.⁸

I.4. About a century and a half after the Battle of Lepanto, the united Christian forces would face the Ottomans again in the Ionian waters during the siege of Corfu, in the summer of 1716, a conflict that is part of the last of the seven main Ottoman-Venetian wars. The Ottomans attempted to occupy Venetian Corfu, driven not only by the expected geopolitical benefits, but also by the fear that not claiming the island would be perceived as a weakness in terms of impressions and psychology. In the forty-eight days that remained on the island (July 5 to August 22) – half of which were war events – they attempted bombardments against the walled area, combined with land and sea battles. About 1,700 men were killed in these operations, not counting civilians (Figs. 8-12).⁹

I.5. In 1799, two years after the overthrow of the Most Serene Republic, the last siege for the period studied here is recorded in the Ionian area. In an alteration of roles, the French who succeeded the Venetians on the islands, initially hailed

8 The literature on the Battle of Lepanto is enormous. See DIALETI, «Νοηματοδοτήσεις της “χριστιανικής νίκης”», cit.; TSIKNAKIS (Ed.), «Η ναυμαχία της Ναυπάκτου», cit., *passim*.

9 CANDIANI, *I vascelli della Serenissima*, cit., pp. 511-554; Ioanna-Varvara LEVENTI, «Οθωμανικές πολιορκίες στην Κέρκυρα την περίοδο της Βενετοκρατίας», in *Πρακτικά Ι' Διεθνούς Πανιονίου Συνεδρίου* (Κέρκυρα, 30 Απριλίου – 4 Μαΐου 2014), Vol. I, Corfu, Society for Corfiot Studies, 2015, pp. 587-594; EADEM, «1716, η Κέρκυρα υπό οθωμανική πολιορκία», in *1716. Η πολιορκία της Κέρκυρας*, Corfu, Friends of the Albert Cohen Memorial Foundation, 2016, pp. 18-27. On the Seventh Venetian-Ottoman War, see HATZOPoulos, *Ο τελευταίος βενετο-οθωμανικός πόλεμος*, cit.; Anastasia STOURAITI, «Η πολιτισμική ιστορία του πολέμου και η Βενετική αυτοκρατορία: η περίπτωση της πολιορκίας της Κέρκυρας (1716)», in PAGRATIS (Ed.), *Πόλεμος, Κράτος και Κοινωνία*, cit., pp. 321-345. See also in various studies of the volumes: Nikos E. KARAPIDAKIS and Aliki D. NIKIFOROU (Eds.), *Αναμνηστικό Τεύχος 1716–2016. 300 χρόνια από την Πολιορκία της Κέρκυρας / Commemorative Volume 1716–2016. 300 Years since the Siege of Corfu*, Corfu, Municipality of Corfu – Regional Union of Municipalities of Ionian Islands, 2016; EIDEM (Ed.), *Οθωμανική Αυτοκρατορία και Βενετία: Η πολιορκία της Κέρκυρας από τους Οθωμανούς το 1716. Πρακτικά επιστημονικού συνεδρίου*, Κέρκυρα, 21–23 Οκτωβρίου 2016, Corfu, Municipality of Corfu – Regional Union of Municipalities of Ionian Islands, 2019. For the main fortresses and castles of Corfu, see Fig. 7.

by the local population as liberators, found themselves in the position of defender. They faced not only the united Russian-Turkish fleet, in an unusual alliance of the two forces, but also the hostility of a large part of the local population. The fortified city of Corfu was closely besieged for four months by sea and land, until the final surrender of the French in early March 1799.¹⁰

II. The second category, the so-called “international wars”, involves conflicts between two powers, in this case Venice and the Ottoman Empire. From 1396 to 1718, Venetians and Ottomans found themselves in rival camps 11 times in total.¹¹

II.1. Mainly guided by the damage caused by these wars to societies and the urban environment, the eastern Ionian coast suffered the worst during the Ottoman invasion of Corfu in 1537.

In their attempt to occupy the castle of the island, in the 15 days they remained there (August 25 to September 11) the Ottomans caused the almost total destruction of the suburbs. Using mainly siege pieces and naval artillery, they scored direct hits on the Old Fortress (Fig. 6), without coming into direct confrontation with their opponents. According to various testimonies – which show small and/or large differences between them – the death toll from this brief siege is estimated at around 18,000 and the number of prisoners from 15,000 to 22,000.¹² The consequences of the siege include the capture of most of the inhabitants of Paxos.¹³

It took decades for the wounds of this war to heal and for the surviving captives to return from the slave markets. The rhythms of these “repatriations” have left their mark on the archival material, especially notary documents, which record loans with real estate used as collateral, as well as other transactions aimed at raising money to pay for ransoming the prisoners.


A typical case is that of a father from the south of Corfu who in 1542, five

10 See Theodosis NIKOLAIDIS, «Η λατρεία του αγίου Σπυρίδωνα στην Κέρκυρα», *Historica*, 29, 57 (December 2012), pp. 329 and so on.

11 Benjamin ARBEL, «Venice’s Maritime Empire in the Early Modern Period», in Eric DURSTTELER (Ed.), *A Companion to Venetian History, 1400–1797*, Leiden, Brill, 2013, p. 199.

12 LEVENTI, «Οθωμανικές πολιορκίες στην Κέρκυρα», cit. Small variations in numbers (from 7,000 to 24,000) are given by ARBEL, «Venice’s Maritime Empire», cit., p. 200.

13 *Ibid.*, p. 201.



2 Engraving of the naval Battle of Lepanto. Johann Christoph Wagner, «Delineation Provinciarum Pannoniae et Imperii Turcici in Oriente Eine Grundrichtige Beschreibund deb ganzen Aufgangs Gedruckt bei Jacob Koppmayer», Augsburg, 1684. Courtesy of the Spyros Gaoutsis Collection, Corfu.

years after the Ottoman siege, dictates his will to the notary, making his children his heirs «if they come from slavery», without ignoring the opposite case «and if no one comes from slavery and my brother's children come, to have them for my soul salvation». ¹⁴

For a long time after the siege, the people of Corfu would protest in Venice for the cruelty shown to the civilians by the local Venetian authorities, who prevented civilians from entering the castle, with the exception of those who, according

14 Georgios E. RODOLAKIS and Lydia PAPARRIGA-ARTEMIADI, «Οι πράξεις του νοταρίου Αγίου Ματθαίου Κερκύρας Πέτρου Βαραγκά (1541–1545)», *Επετηρίδα των Κέντρων Ερεύνης της Ιστορίας του Ελληνικού Δικαίου της Ακαδημίας Αθηνών*, 31 (1996), p. 227.

to Nikandros Noukios, managed to pay their taxes; they also protested against the refusal of the Most Serene Republic to expand the city wall, thus enhancing the protection of the local population.¹⁵ Their appeals finally came to fruition about four decades after the siege, when the Venetians proceeded with an urban redesign, building the New Fortress and extending a wall that included both the fortresses and the settlements that had meanwhile developed in the intermediate space (Fig. 6).¹⁶

II.2. In 1571, another siege took place on Corfu. In the seven days that they remained on the island (August 30 to September 6), the Ottomans used little or no artillery and clashed directly with the defenders only once. The consequences of this war were also limited: 12 dead, about 70 wounded, and one prisoner.¹⁷


III. From the above-mentioned case study, with the exception of the two-year presence of the forces of Emperor Charles V in the western part of the Peloponnese, some conclusions can be drawn: the wars, conventional or otherwise, that directly impacted the eastern Ionian coasts were brief and combined the traditional with the modern means (firearms and artillery). At the same time, however, there was an extensive war of attrition with raids, the capture of civilians and the looting of buildings in the suburbs and the countryside.

In particular, the first two sieges (of 1537 and 1571) do not seem to have been the product of any particular planning, but emerged as a kind of opportunity for

15 Theodosis NIKOLAIDIS, «Η λατρεία του αγίου Σπυρίδωνα στην Κέρκυρα», *Historica*, 29, 56 (June 2012), pp. 109-111.

16 Afroditi AGOROPOULOU-BIRBILI, *H αρχιτεκτονική της πόλεως της Κέρκυρας κατά την περίοδο της Ενετοκρατίας*, PhD diss., National Technical University of Athens, 1976; Elli YOTOPOULOU-SISSLIANOU, «Οι Τούρκοι στην Κέρκυρα», in Ennio CONCINA and Aliki NIKIFOROU-TESTONE (Eds.), *Κέρκυρα: Ιστορία, Αστική ζωή και Αρχιτεκτονική 14ος-19ος αι.*, Corfu, Cultural Association “Korkyra”, 1994, pp. 49-55; EADEM, «Οχυρωματικά έργα και αστικός πληθυσμός (16ος αι.)», in Aliki NIKIFOROU (Ed.), *Κέρκυρα, μια μεσογειακή σύνθεση: νησιωτισμός, διασυνδέσεις, ανθρώπινα περιβάλλοντα, 16ος-19ος αι.*, Corfu, Cultural Association “Korkyra”, 1998, pp. 229-240; Nikos SKOUTELIS, *O πόλεμος χωροτάκτης. Το δίκτυο των πόλεων-οχυρών στο κατά θάλασσαν κράτος της Βενετίας, 16ος-17ος αιώνας*, Athens, Piraeus Bank Group Cultural Foundation, 2013, *passim*; IDEM, «Ο σχεδιασμός του χώρου ως θεάτρου πολέμου στις βενετικές κτήσεις (16ος-17ος αι.)», in PAGRATIS (Ed.), *Πόλεμος, Κράτος και Κοινωνία*, cit., pp. 115-142.

17 YOTOPOULOU-SISSLIANOU, «Οι Τούρκοι στην Κέρκυρα», cit.; EADEM, «Οχυρωματικά έργα», cit.




3 Map of the Gulfs of Patras and Corinth (indicated as Gulf of Lepanto). The naval Battle of Lepanto took place on October 7, 1571, near Echinades (Curzolari in Italian), a group of islands in the Ionian Sea, off the coast of Acarnania. Source: Giovanni Francesco CAMOCIO, *Isole famose, porti, fortezze, e terre maritime sottoposte alla Ser.ma Sig.ria di Venetia, ad altri Principi Christiani, et al Sig.or Turco, novamente poste in luce*, Venice, Alla libraria del segno di S. Marco, [c. 1574].

attack, presented during the established movements of the Ottoman fleet in the Eastern Mediterranean. On the contrary, that of 1716, despite the international interest it aroused, seems to have been a choice almost forced upon the Ottomans.¹⁸

The two most important sieges (1537 and 1716) – that of 1571 was brief and limited in its effects – summarize the most negative images created by the Ionians

18 LEVENTI, «Οθωμανικές πολιορκίες στην Κέρκυρα», cit.




4 View of the Venetian sea-borne Siege of the Ottoman-held Castle of Lefkada (Santa Maura), 23 July–7 August 1684, resulting in a Venetian victory; by Giovanni Giacomo Rossi. Royal Collection Trust / © Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth II 2022; free for non-commercial use. Source: <https://militarymaps.rct.uk/ottoman-habsburg-wars-1521-1791/lefkada-and-st-maura-1684-sitvazione-e-prospetto>.

about the wars that struck their islands during the four centuries of Venetian rule.


Over the years these events, and especially those of 1537, would increasingly serve as a constant reminder and threat of what the Ottomans could achieve on the battlefield, emotions which reinforced situations that were regularly repeated.

The most well-established of these situations was the annual appearance of the Ottoman fleet in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Adriatic. The fear created by the movements of the Ottoman ships in their passage through the straits



between the Venetian-held Ionian islands and the Ottoman mainland, was maintained by rumors that circulated long before its departure from the Aegean. These referred to the number of ships comprising the Sultan's armada, their firepower, the number of sailors and other warriors they carried etc. However, they were multiplied by the unpredictable, though frequent, attacks that some of these ships made against the island coasts.


IV. The year 2016 marked the commemoration of the 300th anniversary of the Ottoman–Venetian War of 1716 (Fig. 13), the last of its kind; its central event was, as mentioned above, the siege of Corfu. Due to the Ottoman threat, a large number of Christian forces gathered around the northern Ionian island and once again (as in 1571 and 1669) rushed to defend a place that, in the eyes of part of



5 View of the Old Fortress of Corfu from the north. Source: Vincenzo CORONELLI, *Repubblica di Venezia p. IV. Citta, Fortezze, ed altri Luoghi principali dell'Albania, Epiro e Livadia, e particolarmente i posseduti da Veneti descritti e delineati dal p. Coronelli*, Venice, 1688.

contemporary public opinion, symbolized the last bastion of Christianity, possible predominance over which would increase the pressure on European territories.

Apart from commemorative references to war events, in this case to the siege of 1716, I think there is a lot to be done to study more comprehensively the fac-



tors that shaped the feeling of insecurity in the Ionian societies during the Early Modern Period.

Answers to questions such as the above presuppose the utilization of a series of research “ways”, which deal with the traditional and modern historiography of war. Summarizing them will allow us, on the one hand, to measure the weight given to research in each of these fields and, on the other, to identify untapped sources and research tools that will allow us to extract new data.

The first and foremost of these “ways” is that of classical military history, which focuses on the study of the reality of war in Clausewitzian terms, that is, as an uncertain confrontation of forces, on the basis of which exist violent passions, luck and logical calculations, a reality that, as regards its examination, leads to research into the conditions of the battles on land and sea, to an analysis of tactics and strategy and so on.¹⁹ It is obvious that the main weight of historiography has been given here.

A second “way” focuses on the “great men” of the war, with the aim of compiling biographies of people who exceeded the average in terms of their heroism and/or strategic intelligence. The social history of war is constantly gaining ground, focusing on the effects of different types of war on public finances and family budgets, as well as on societies, at the level of human resources (victims, prisoners), effects which various States took care to mitigate with measures such as the organization of hospital care and the support of those affected by compensation or tax exemptions etc.

A privileged field of the social history of war is the study of the subjects of this activity, with emphasis placed on those groups that were characterized by a so-called “anonymity”, survived the war and at the same time lived and developed relations within the Ionian societies, seeking, among other things, to redeem successes at the front with economic and/or socio-political benefits.

The relatively recent historiography of war points us to another path. This is a trend that has developed in recent decades and has decisively influenced the relevant historiography, which now converses creatively with narrative sources and iconographic testimonies or other works of art, aiming to examine the cultural and social implications of war. The nature of the sources predisposes one for the emphasis placed on themes related to emotions, symbolisms or political uses of war.²⁰

19 See Karl Von KLAUSEWITZ, *Περί των Πολέμων*, translated by Natasa Xepoulia, Thessaloniki, Vanias Publishers, 1999, as utilized by Georgios MARGARITIS, *Πόλεμος και Πολιτική*, Athens, Hellenic Academic Libraries Link, 2015, pp. 190-192. Accessed November 10, 2021. <https://repository.kallipos.gr/handle/11419/4305>

20 See DIALETI, «Νοηματοδοτήσεις της “χριστιανικής νίκης”», cit.; STOURAITI, «Η πολιτισμική ιστορία των πολέμων», cit. Cf. EADEM, «Η γυναίκα του Χάνδακα: τερατογονία, φύλο και έντυπες ειδήσεις στον απόρχο του Κρητικού Πολέμου», in Stefanos KAKLAMANIS (Ed.), *O Κρητικός Πόλεμος (1645–1669). Όψεις των πολέμων στον χώρο και τον χρόνο / The Cretan War (1645–1669). Aspects of war in space and time [=Κρητικά Χρονικά / Cre-*



6 Map of the city of Corfu with the Venetian fortifications (the Old and the New Fortresses). Source: Olfert DAPPER, *Naukeurige Beschryving der Eilanden in de Archipel der Middelantsche Zee [...]*, Amsterdam, Wolfgangh, 1688.

In the discussion about fertile research fields, we need to focus more on the stage of preparation for war through military training, methods of raising armies, their financing, but also the rearrangement of urban space, in order to achieve a more effective defense on the part of the besieged, a process that involves both spatial and technical changes (in their fortifications) and is inevitably linked to general changes in the way war is conducted. There are numerous examples concerning the Ionian Sea. Perhaps the most important of these refers to the urban

tica Chronica 39 (2019)], Heraklion, Society of Cretan Historical Studies, 2019, pp. 381-407.

reorganization of the Ionian cities from the second half of the sixteenth century, shortly before and shortly after the Battle of Lepanto, with the aim of strengthening the defense of the islands in times of intense Ottoman threat.²¹

In the same direction, but rather “in parallel”, that is without meeting with the “professionals” of war, the large mass of the urban and rural population that suffered the consequences either as an imminent threat or as reality. In the first case, it was the people of the rural areas who paid the annual cost of the risk of imminent threat, through compulsory services to the public, the *angarie* associated with the defense, such as service in the galleys,²² militia duty and castle repair work. The same population groups and part of the inhabitants of the urban centers were charged, in addition to taxation, with the cost of feeding and/or billeting the soldiers who lived inside and outside the walls for as long as a state of emergency lasted.²³

There was certainly an honorary service associated with the war: funding by local communities for the construction and manning of galleys. These ships, as well as other, smaller commercial vessels that were relatively easily converted into warships, increased the power of the Venetian fleet. The compensation of the citizens (*cittadini*) for these services to the Most Serene Republic, which proved their loyalty and devotion to it, was remarkable, as they translated into social and economic benefits (tax collection rights, privileges etc.).²⁴

Issues concerning the subjects of war have troubled human societies even in

21 SKOUTELIS, *O πόλεμος χωροτάκτης*, cit.

22 On the rowers in the Venetian galleys of Crete during the Fourth Venetian-Ottoman War, see Aristea GRATSEA, «Galeotti και Andiscari στις βενετικές γαλέρες: κοινωνικές και οικονομικές προεκτάσεις στη βενετοκρατούμενη Κρήτη», *Historica*, 37, 71 (April–October 2020), pp. 87-112.

23 Elli YOTOPOULOU-SISSLIANOU, *O αντίκτυπος του Δ' Βενετοτουρκικού πολέμου στην Κέρκυρα: από ανέκδοτες πηγές*, Athens, 1982, pp. 81, 238-242. On the personal and the economic *angarie* in Morea during the second venetian dominion, see Eirini VRETTOU, *Ο θεσμός της προσωπικής και οικονομικής αγγαρείας (angarie personali e reali) στις κτήσεις των Βενετών στον ελληνόφωνο χώρο: η περίπτωση της Πελοποννήσου κατά τη Β' Βενετοκρατία (1685-1715)*, PhD diss., Aristotle University of Thessaloniki, 2021. On the role of the rural social strata in the Cyprus War (1570-1571), see Gilles GRIVAUD, «Un société en guerre: Chypre face à la conquête ottomane», in Angel NICOLAOU-KONNARI (Ed.), *H Γαληνοτάτη και η Ευγενεστάτη: Η Βενετία στην Κύπρο και η Κύπρος στη Βενετία / La Serenissima and La Nobilissima: Venice in Cyprus and Cyprus in Venice*, Nicosia, Bank of Cyprus Cultural Foundation, 2009, pp. 194-203.


24 YOTOPOULOU-SISSLIANOU, *O αντίκτυπος του Δ' Βενετοτουρκικού πολέμου*, cit., pp. 59-73, 229-232.



7 Map of Corfu framed by views and floor plans of the island's main fortresses and castles. Vincenzo M. Coronelli, «Isola di Corfù posseduta dalla Serenissima Repubblica di Venetia, descritta, e dedicata dal P. Cosmografo Coronelli all'Ill.mo [...],» Venice, 1690. Courtesy of the Spyros Gaoutsis Collection, Corfu.

times of peace. For instance, we know – more as a literary motif (*Periplous*, of D. Romas) and, with exceptions,²⁵ less as a research result – the meager pay of soldiers and alternative means of livelihood. By providing services such as, e.g., the transfer of water from springs to the homes of the natives, but also the protection of wealthy people, the mercenaries of the Most Serene Republic on the one hand secured additional resources, valuable when their salaries were late in arriving

25 Romina TSAKIRI, «Παράνομοι στην υπηρεσία ατόμων και οικογενειών στην Κρήτη (16ος–17ος αι.): περιπτώσεις (αυτο)κατάλυσης του βενετικού κρατικού μηχανισμού. Μια πρώτη προσέγγιση», *Historica*, 31, 60 (June 2014), pp. 23-52.



8 Floor plan of the fortified city of Corfu during its Siege by the Ottomans (1716). Johann Baptist Homann, «Plan de la place de Corfu avec ses environs, assiégée par les infidèles, tranchée ouverte le 25me de Juillet jusqu' au 22me d'Août [...]», Nuremberg, 1720. Courtesy of the Spyros Gaoutsis Collection, Corfu.

from Venice or the local currencies in which they were paid were devaluated. On the other hand, they were involved in local disputes and conflicts, degrading the nature and role of their work.

Contributing to the creation of conditions of insecurity was a marginal kind of warfare: raiding, another constant that gained special intensity before and during the main events of the war, aiming to cause material and psychological damage to civilians. The participation of the corsairs of Barbary was a special case. In



9 Map of the Ottoman Siege of Corfu by sea and land (1716). Johann Baptist Homann,
 «Plan du Siege de Corfu par Terre et par Mer avec la situation de deux Flottes
 Venitienne et Ottomanne depuis le jour de l'entrée de celle des Ottomans dans le canal»,
 Nuremberg, 1720. Courtesy of the Spyros Gaoutsis Collection, Corfu.

theory, they were driven by religious motives and spread terror on the western and eastern shores of the Ionian Sea,²⁶ from where they grabbed men, women and children for the slave markets of the Mediterranean. In times of great war turmoil, such as the Napoleonic Wars, this reality became even more complicated, with people and ships becoming targets of pirates either expected (serving enemy forc-

26 Peter EARLE, *Corsairs of Malta and Barbary*, London, Sidgwick & Jackson, 1970.

es) or unexpected (coming from theoretically friendly States).²⁷

The consequences of piracy were similar in terms of maintaining fear and insecurity. And this despite the different starting points of the perpetrators and the apparent emphasis on the part of the pirates on robbery in peacetime, a differentiation that is not always confirmed by the relevant case studies. In the Ionian, pirates came from Lefkada, until its incorporation to the Venetian state (1685) [Fig. 4],²⁸ as well as from Himara,²⁹ a constant source of danger. Both of these groups were active on almost all of the eastern shores of the Ionian Sea.

Despite the attraction of raiding and piracy in modern societies, their study with regard to how they were conducted in the Ionian area lacks the basic works that will make known the various dimensions of this phenomenon.³⁰

27 Salvatore BONO, *I corsari barbareschi*, Turin, ERI-Edizioni RAI Radiotelevisione Italiana, 1964; Louis SICKING, «Islands, pirates, privateers and the Ottoman Empire in the Early Modern Mediterranean», in Dejanirah COUTO, Feza GÜNERGUN and Maria Pia PEDANI (Eds.), *Seapower, Technology and trade. Studies in Turkish Maritime History*, Istanbul, Piri Reis University Publications – Denizler Kitabevi, 2014, pp. 239-252. See also ARBEL, 2013, pp. 202-203; Giorgos KOUTZAKIOTIS, «Κούρσος και επιχειρηματική δραστηριότητα στις Κυκλαδες κατά τον βενετο-οθωμανικό πόλεμο των ετών 1684-1699», in *Νέοι οι ερευνητές: Ιστορικοί (4 Νοεμβρίου 2010). Θεωρητικοί της Ψυχανάλυσης (1 Νοεμβρίου 2012)*, Athens, Moraitis Foundation, 2013, pp. 9-21; Gerassimos D. PAGRATIS, «War at sea and trade routes in the Mediterranean during the Napoleonic period through the reports of Septinsular Republic's diplomatic representatives», *Mediterranean Chronicle*, 8 (2018), pp. 67-81.

28 Marinos SARIYANNIS, «Οθωμανοί κουρσάροι στη Λευκάδα: Με αφορμή ένα χωρίο του Εβλιγά Τσελεμπή», in *Δρόμοι και παράδρομοι της τοπικής ιστορίας, Πρακτικά ΙΕ' Συμποσίου, Πνευματικό Κέντρο Δήμου Λευκάδας, Γιορτές Λόγου και Τέχνης (Λευκάδα 18-20 Αυγούστου 2010)*, Lefkada, Society for Leucadian Studies, 2011, pp. 49-65; Sophia LAIOU, «The Levends of the Sea in the Second Half of the 16th Century: Some Considerations», *Archivum Ottomanicum*, 23 (2005/6), pp. 233-247; KOLOVOS (Ed.), 2013, *passim*.

29 Gerassimos D. PAGRATIS, *Κοινωνία και Οικονομία στο βενετικό Κράτος της Θάλασσας: οι Ναυτιλιακές Επιχειρήσεις στην Κέρκυρα (1496-1538)*, Athens, Pedio Publishers, 2013, p. 362. See also YOTOPOULOU-SISSILIANOU, *Ο αντίκτυπος του Δ' Βενετοτουρκικού πολέμου*, cit., p. 189.

30 Among the exceptions are the studies of Alexandra KRANTONELLI, *Ιστορία της Πειρατείας στους πρώτους χρόνους της Τουρκοκρατίας (1390-1538)*, Athens, Hestia Publishers, 1985; EADEM, *Ιστορία της Πειρατείας στους μέσους χρόνους της Τουρκοκρατίας (1538-1699)*, Athens, Hestia Publishers, 1991; EADEM, *Ελληνική Πειρατεία και κούρσος των 18ο αιώνα και μέχρι την Ελληνική Επανάσταση*, Athens, Hestia Publishers, 1998; EADEM, «Η δράση των πειρατών στο Ιόνιο Πέλαγος», in *To Ιόνιο Πέλαγος. Χαρτογραφία και Ιστορία, 16ος-18ος αιώνας*, Athens, National Bank of Greece Cultural Foundation / Cartography Archive, 2002, pp. 217-223. See also in PAGRATIS (Ed.), *Πόλεμος, Κράτος και Κοινωνία*, cit.,



10 Ottoman vessels bombing Corfu during its Siege (1716). German painted engraving (1720). Courtesy of the Spyros Gaoutsis Collection, Corfu.

Even less attention seems to have been paid to another activity related to the war and the preparations around it: the mechanism by which information was gathered on behalf of the most important powers in the region (Venetians, Ottomans, Spaniards) and other interested players (English, Dutch, Russians). Indigenous or passing merchants and the military, consuls, but also ecclesiastics of all ranks, not to mention cases in which the above qualities are combined, have somehow joined the information-gathering networks, contributing to another feature of the islands, that of a place of residence, or temporary residence, for spies.³¹

2018, pp. 67-81.

31 See Ioannis HASSIOTIS, *Σχέσεις Ελλήνων και Ισπανών στα χρόνια της Τουρκοκρατίας*, Athens, 1969; IDEM, *Oι Έλληνες στις παραμονές της ναυμαχίας της Ναυπάκτου*. Εκκλή-

Last, but definitely not least, an observation on the wide period of time covered by the present study and the changes in warfighting methods that occurred during this long period. The outer limits of this period include two historical events with various connotations. On the one hand, the fall of Constantinople, resulting from a long siege during which old and new methods of warfare were tried, assuring it a key place in military history; but it was also a development of global importance, as it dramatically changed the political and economic geography of the Eastern Mediterranean, further frustrating one of the possible choices of the Ionians, the slightest expectation of their ever reconnecting with the Byzantine Empire.

The other end of the period in question is dominated by another milestone in military history: the Napoleonic Wars. In addition to his military intelligence, the historical figure of Bonaparte was associated with a new relationship between war and society. A relationship that was forged on the principles of the French Revolution and the various transitions that it confirmed at the social and political level, but also on the way war was conducted, which now usually concerned conflicts between Nations.³²

σεις, επαναστατικές κινήσεις και εξεγέρσεις στην ελληνική χερσόνησο από τις παραμονές ως το τέλος των Κυπριακού πολέμου (1568–1571), Thessaloniki, Society for Macedonian Studies, 1970; IDEM, «Venezia e i domini veneziani tramite di informazioni sui Turchi per gli Spagnoli nel sec. XVI», in Hans-Georg BECK, Manoussos MANOUSSACAS and Agostino PERTUSI (Eds.), *Venezia, centro di mediazione tra Oriente e Occidente (secoli XV–XVI). Aspetti e problemi*, Vol. 1, Florence, L. S. Olschki, 1977, pp. 117-136. For the case of the Venetian state, see Paolo PRETO, «La Guerra segreta: spionaggio, sabotaggi, attentati», in Stefania Maddalena REDOLFI (Ed.), *Venezia e la difesa del Levante. Da Lepanto a Candia 1570–1670*, Varese, Arsenale Editrice, 1986, pp. 79-85; IDEM, *I servizi segreti di Venezia. Spionaggio e controspionaggio ai tempi della Serenissima*, Milan, il Saggiatore, 2010. See also Emrah Safa GÜRKAN, *Espionage in the 16th century Mediterranean: Secret Diplomacy, Mediterranean go-betweens and the Ottoman-Habsburg Rivalry*, PhD diss., Georgetown University, 2012; IDEM, «L’Idra del Sultano. Lo spionaggio ottomano nel Cinquecento», *Mediterranea. Ricerche storiche*, 38 (2016), pp. 447-476; Chrysoulantis PAPADAMOU, «A Secret War: Espionage in Venetian Corfu during the Construction of the San Marco Fortress», in George THEOTOKIS and Aysel YILDIZ (Eds.), *A Military History of the Mediterranean Sea. Aspects of War and Military Elites*, Leiden-Boston, Brill, 2018, pp. 347-370; Ioanna IORDANOU, *Venice’s Secret Service. Organizing Intelligence in the Renaissance*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2019 [it. translation: *I servizi segreti di Venezia. Organizzazione dei servizi d’informazione nel Rinascimento*, translated by Giorgio Maini, Gorizia, LEG, 2021].

32 MARGARITIS, *Πόλεμος και Πολιτική*, cit., pp. 189-190; Gunther ROTTENBERG, *The Art of Warfare in the Age of Napoleon*, Indiana U.P., Bloomington Ind., 1980; IDEM, *The Napole-*



11 Allegory of Venice's victory over the Ottomans in Corfu (1716), with the portraits of Doge Giovanni II Corner and Field Marshall Johann Mathias von der Schulenburg, commander of the Venetian armed forces. Engraving, Dillingen 1718.
Courtesy of the Spyros Gaoutsis Collection, Corfu.

However, the aforementioned time limits also include the discussion of the so-called “military revolution”, the transition from a typically medieval or post-medieval mode of warfare to a set of different methods and practices that included the upgrade of the infantry as the main arm of attack against cavalry, the mass use of gunpowder artillery and musketry, the spatial reform of cities, the fortification updates based on new technological advances etc.³³

All these developments were already visible to modern observers, such as Niccolò Machiavelli, in his works *The Art of War* (1521) and *The Prince* (1532), despite the criticism he has received for some of his views. In the new tendencies in the conduct of the war and in the relative backwardness of the Italian states, Machiavelli attributed the difficult position of the latter to the French, who had dominated a large part of the Peninsula.

Contrary to Italian history, the literature on the Ionian Sea is characterized by several “silences”, without degrading the key contribution of the main general synthesis. Based on our acquired knowledge, we will try to draw, in lieu of conclusions, some rough lines around the nature and character of the war in the Ionian Sea.³⁴

The wars that mainly affected the Ionian societies were defensive in nature and manifested themselves mainly in the form of sieges against the northernmost of the islands, Corfu. During these periods, the civilians were burdened not only with compulsory recruitment, but also with the obligation to billet the soldiers, with all the consequences this entailed.

Equally painful, however, were other situations associated with periods of peace that, in various ways, perpetuated the Ionians’ fears of the Ottomans. These

onic Wars, New York, Harper Perennial, 2006.

33 See the classic essays of Michael ROBERTS, *The Military Revolution, 1560–1660: An Inaugural Lecture Delivered Before the Queen's University of Belfast*, Belfast, M. Boyd, 1956, and Geoffrey PARKER, «The “Military Revolution”, 1560–1660—a Myth?», *The Journal of Modern History*, 48, 2 (1976), pp. 195–214, reprinted repeatedly; IDEM, *The Military Revolution: Military Innovation and the Rise of the West, 1500–1800*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1988 [revised edition, 1996]. See more analytically in Ágoston GÁBOR, «Firearms and Military Adaptation: The Ottomans and the European Military Revolution, 1450–1800», *Journal of World History*, 25, 1 (2014), pp. 85–124.

34 This was the starting point behind the composition of the collective work under the supervision of the current author, entitled *Πόλεμος, Κράτος και Κοινωνία στο Ιόνιο Πέλαγος (τέλη 14ου–αρχές 19ου αιώνα)* [PAGRATIS (Ed.), *Πόλεμος, Κράτος και Κοινωνία*, cit.].



12 The Miracle of Saint Spyridon in the Siege of Corfu (1716). Detail from an icon, mid-18th century, in the Chapel of Aixoni, Glyfada, Athens.

Source: Ioanna ΒΙΤΗΑ, «Παραπήσεις στους εικονογραφικούς κύκλους του αγίου Σπυρίδωνα», *Δελτίον της Χριστιανικής Αρχαιολογικής Εταιρείας*, IV, 19 (1996–1997), p. 266.

included the sporadic (but essentially regular) attacks of Ottoman ships against insular and coastal settlements up and down the Ionian Sea, as well as the spring and summer raids of corsairs and pirates, mainly from Barbary, Himara or the Ottoman Empire, which resulted in the capture of slaves, as already mentioned.

Situations such as the above, which are basically short in duration but constantly repetitive, although their description may imply a certain stagnancy, have been able to change the form of States, borders and societies, sometimes slowly, sometimes speedily, but always decisively.



13 Hellenic Post, Commemorative Stamp Set “1716-2016, 300 years since the Siege of Corfu”. Source: <https://enimerosi.com/article/5851/I-poliorkia-tis-Kerkuras-to-1716-se-grammatosimo-ton-ELTA>

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The Greeks and the Secret War among Venice, Spain and the Ottoman Empire: the Plans for the Occupation of Nafplio on the Eve of the Fourth Venetian–Ottoman War (1570–1573)*

by KOSTAS G. TSIKNAKIS**

ABSTRACT: The occupation of Nafplio by the Ottomans during the Third Venetian–Ottoman War (1537–1540), intercepted a long period of Venetian rule over the city. In the next few years, the reconquest of the city remained among the prime goals of the Venetian policy. Discussions were intensified on the eve of the Fourth Venetian–Ottoman War (1570–1573). Secret agents from both the Venetian and Spanish sides, who toured the Ottoman-occupied Greek territory, collected detailed information about the state of the fortress so as to seek ways for its siege and occupation. Such a possibility, as planned, would trigger general developments and would result in the release of the entire Peloponnese. During the War, however, the forces of the Christian fleet undertook no serious attack against Nafplio. This negative development was due to disputes arisen in the meantime between Venice and Spain concerning their presence in the East.

KEYWORDS: VENETIAN *STATO DA MAR*, NAFPLIO, PELOPONNESE, OTTOMAN–VENETIAN WARS, SPAIN, SECRET AGENTS, 16TH CENTURY.

In the first decades of the 16th century, the Peloponnese became an area of conflict among the three potent political forces of the city. The gradual Ottoman penetration in the Peloponnesian peninsula had severely restricted the movements of the Venetians, who had lost most of their footholds in the area.

* For more on this, see my article, «Το Ναύπλιο και τα σχέδια κατάληψής του στις παραμονές του Τέταρτου Βενετοουρκικού Πολέμου (1570–1573)», *Ναυπλιακά Ανάλεκτα 9* (2017): Eftychia D. LIATA (Ed.), *Της Βενετιάς τ' Ανάπλι. 300 χρόνια από το τέλος μιας εποχής 1715–2015. Επιστημονικό Συμπόσιο. Ναύπλιο, 9–11 Οκτωβρίου 2015. Πρακτικά*, Nafplio, Municipality of Nafplion – Cultural Foundation “Ioannis Kapodistrias”, 2017, pp. 155–175, 390 Figs. 1-2. My heartfelt thanks to Sandy Kouretzi for editing the English text.

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Now the two rivals were joined by Spain, which, since establishing a consulate in Corfu in 1515,¹ had started showing interest in the Greek territory, particularly discussing the possibility of campaigning against the Peloponnese. Charles V of Spain's late interest in the peninsula, as it later emerged, served other ends. His main goal was to create a diversion intended to split up the Ottoman forces attacking Vienna, to disrupt the maritime connection between Constantinople and Algiers, and establish permanent bases in the eastern Mediterranean.²

The conflict among the three forces reached a peak during the Third Venetian–Ottoman War (1537–1540).³ In the summer of 1540, when the continuation of combat operations seemed impossible, the Venetians made contact with the Ottomans and accepted to sign peace. In this context, the Venetian authorities of Nafplio were ordered to inform the local population of the upcoming surrender of their besieged city to the Ottomans. Being opposed to such a prospect, the locals notified Charles V to send forces so that they would surrender the city to him. Viewing this development positively, the Spanish side moved swiftly. Andrea Doria, in command of the fleet, headed for the Ionian Sea, so as to follow the developments closely and be ready to take action. In the meantime, the Spanish army officer Petros Sekoulas was sent to Nafplio by the Viceroy of Sicily, Ferrante Gonzaga. Petros Sekoulas, who originated from Nafplio, was or-

1 Gerassimos D. PAGRATIS, «Οι απαρχές της παρουσίας των Ισπανών στην Ανατολική Μεσόγειο μετά τις γεωγραφικές ανακαλύψεις: το προξενείο “του αυθέντη ρηγός της Ισπανίας” στη βενετοκρατούμενη Κέρκυρα (1515)», *Κερκυραϊκά Χρονικά*, 6 (2012): Λορέντζος Μαβίλης. Εκατό χρόνια από τον θάνατο του. *Πρακτικά Επιστημονικής Διημερίδας*. 28–29 Απριλίου 2012, pp. 235–245.

2 See the relevant essay of Ioannis K. HASSIOTIS, «Η Πελοπόννησος στο πλαίσιο της μεσογειακής πολιτικής του Καρόλου Ε'», *Πελοποννησιακά*, 15 (1982–1984), pp. 187–240. The article was also translated in Spanish: «El Peloponeso en el marco de la política mediterránea de Carlos V», *Erytheia*, 19 (1998), pp. 79–115 (without the publication of the documents of the first edition). It is also included in the following book: Ioánnis HASSIOTIS, *Tendiendo puentes en el Mediterráneo. Estudios sobre las relaciones Hispano-Griegas (ss. XV–XIX)* (Miscelánea de Estudios Bizantinos y Neogriegos 1), Editado por: Encarnación MOTOS GUIRAO, Coordinación de traducciones al español: Panayota Papadopoulou, Granada, Centro de Estudios Bizantinos, Neogriegos y Chipriotas, 2008, pp. 221–269. Therein-after reference will be made to the Greek language article.

3 The developments of the Third Venetian–Ottoman War, which led to the fall of Nafplio and Monemvasia, are commented on in detail by Athanasios N. KONDYLIS, *To Ναύπλιο (1389–1540). Μια ευρωπαϊκή πόλη στην Ελληνο-βενετική Ανατολή*, Unpublished doctoral thesis, Athens, National and Kapodistrian University of Athens, Department of History and Archaeology, 2006, pp. 43–52.

dered to make contact with his compatriots so that they would jointly define an action plan. Venice became aware of all the above and acted methodically. After complaining to Charles V about the Spanish actions in the Ionian Sea, it took care to send its own fleet to the area to control the situation. With the help of Venetian officers sent to Nafplio, Venice managed to convince the locals of the need to surrender the city to the Ottomans. Finally, they alerted the latter of the imminent arrival of Petros Sekoulas and, once arrived in the Greek territory, he and his men were all arrested. They were taken to Constantinople where, after being subjected to torture, they were beheaded.⁴

With the surrender of Nafplio and Monemvasia, on 21 and 23 November 1540, all the Peloponnese came under the Ottoman rule. Any hopes of Venice or Spain taking control of the area were dashed. The future of the peninsula was no more a pending challenge. The two new possessions were gradually incorporated in the existing administrative system of the new rulers and life there soon returned to normal.⁵

A few months after the occupation, the people in Nafplio sent an embassy to Ecumenical Patriarch Jeremiah I, asking for the reestablishment of the Metropolis. Their request was positively considered. In 1541, Dorotheos⁶ was appointed as Metropolitan of Argos and Nafplio, with seat at Nafplio. In 1576, as Theodosios Zygomas notes in his *Oδοιπορικόν*, the Metropolitan of Nafplio had 150 priests and 4,000 houses (*ιερείς 150 και οσπίτια χιλιάδας τέσσαρας*).⁷

4 See the relevant study of Ioannis K. HASSIOTIS, *Σχέσεις Ελλήνων και Ισπανών στα χρόνια της Τουρκοκρατίας*, Thessaloniki, 1969, pp. 37-38. More detailed information is provided by the relevant archive material, in HASSIOTIS, «Η Πελοπόννησος στο πλαίσιο της μεσογειακής πολιτικής του Καρόλου Ε'», cit., pp. 211-216, 233-239 docs. E'-H'. Cf. KONDYLIS, *To Ναύπλιο*, cit., pp. 48-49.

5 On the surrender of Nafplio from the Venetian general proveditor of the Sea (*provveditore generale da Mar*), Alessandro Contarini, to Kasim Pasha, governor of the Peloponnese, on 21 November 1540, see Apostolos VAKALOPOULOS, *Ιστορία του Νέου Ελληνισμού*, Vol. 3: *Τουρκοκρατία 1453-1669. Οι αγώνες για την πίστη και την ελευθερία*, Thessaloniki, 1968, pp. 160-161. Cf. KONDYLIS, *To Ναύπλιο*, cit., p. 49.

6 Periklis G. ZERLENTIS, «Ανασύστασις της μητροπόλεως Άργους και Ναυπλίας κατά το 1541», *Αθηνά*, 27 (1915), pp. 202-207. Cf. Dimosthenis STRATIGOPoulos, *Ο Νικόλαος Μαλαζός, πρωτοπαπάς Ναυπλίου, και το συγγραφικό του έργο* (Βυζαντινά κείμενα και μελέται 47), Thessaloniki, Aristotle University of Thessaloniki, Centre for Byzantine Research, 2008, p. 93.

7 Émile LEGRAND, *Notice biographique sur Jean et Théodore Zygomas* (Recueil de textes et de traductions publié par les professeurs de l'École des Langues Orientales Vivantes,

In the years to come, due to its strategic importance, the Peloponnese continued to remain a key concern for Venice. In the context of general rearrangements, which were to take place in the wider region, reconquering the peninsula was one of Venice's tacit priorities.⁸

Furthermore, the international situation made Spain, which during the reign of Phillip II appeared to have withdrawn interest from the eastern Mediterranean, change its stance. Phillip II was worried by the continuous expansion of the Ottomans in northern Africa and the revolt of the Crypto-Muslims (*moriscos*) in Andalusia in 1568. Such developments were deemed to have the potential to challenge his position in the future and, for this reason, had to be met with prompt and forceful response. Under these circumstances, he started to seek ways to penetrate the eastern Mediterranean again. His ultimate goal was to create a climate of tension in the region, which would compel the Ottomans to enter into negotiations about the future of the Mediterranean as a whole.⁹

Spain's renewed interest in the Greek territory preoccupied Venice. Another strong adversary had been added, claiming a region in which Venice had traditionally had great influence, and thus changing the existing balance of power.¹⁰

à l'occasion du VII^e Congrès International des Orientalistes tenu à Stockholm en 1889, Tome second), Paris, Imprimerie Nationale, 1889, p. 192. Cf. STRATIGOPOULOS, *O Νικόλαος Μαλαζός*, cit., p. 93.

- 8 The information about the peninsula, published by Maria Pia PEDANI FABRIS (Ed.), *I "Documenti Turchi" dell'Archivio di Stato di Venezia*, Inventario della miscellanea con l'edizione dei regesti di Alessio BOMBACI† (Pubblicazioni degli Archivi di Stato, Strumenti CXII), Venice, Ministero per i beni culturali e ambientali, Ufficio centrale per i beni archivistici, 1994, *passim*, are of great importance.
- 9 For Spain's interest in the region in the following years, see José Manuel FLORISTÁN, «Felipe II y la empresa de Grecia tras Lepanto (1571–78)», *Erytheia*, 15 (1994), pp. 155–190. Also, Pedro BÁDENAS, «Η διστακτική πολιτική της ισπανικής μοναρχίας στην Ανατολή. Διπλωματία και κατασκοπεία στο ΙΣΤ' και ΙΖ' αι.», in Lenos MAVROMMATHIS and Katerina NIKOLAOU (Eds.), *Βαλκανία και Ανατολική Μεσόγειος 12ος–17ος αιώνες. Πρακτικά του Διεθνούς Συμποσίου στη Μνήμη Δ. Α. Ζακνθηνού. Αθήνα, 14–15 Ιανουαρίου 1994* (Το Βυζάντιο σήμερα 2), Athens, National Hellenic Research Foundation, Institute for Byzantine Research, 1998, pp. 11–28.
- 10 To better understand the developments of that period, see Ioannis K. HASSIOTIS, *Oι Ελλήνες στις παραμονές της ναυμαχίας της Ναυπάκτου. Εκκλήσεις, επαναστατικές κινήσεις και εξεγέρσεις στην ελληνική χερσόνησο από τις παραμονές ώς το τέλος του Κυπριακού πολέμου (1568–1571)*, Thessaloniki, Society for Macedonian Studies, Institute for Balkan Studies, 1970. Cf. Manoussos MANOUSSACAS, «Lepanto e i Greci», in Gino BENZONI (Ed.), *Il Mediterraneo nella seconda metà del '500 alla luce di Lepanto*, Florence, Leo S. Olschki, 1974, pp. 215–241.

The competition between the two powerful political forces of the west assumed great dimensions on the eve of the Fourth Venetian–Ottoman War (1570–1573). During this time secret agents from both sides are touring the Greek peninsula. The movements of all these people are very similar. Moving cautiously, they collect information about the defense capability of the Peloponnesian fortresses, detect flaws and seek to include strong local actors in the conspiracy plans they are elaborating. In order to win their support, they do not hesitate to promise them future restoration of their authority.¹¹

The focus of almost all the initiatives taken by both the Venetians and the Spaniards was on the Peloponnese. As a first step, both sides were considering organizing the necessary movements aiming to liberate the peninsula from the Ottomans. In the context of a general revolt, occupying Nafplio, which was the center of the Peloponnese, was of great importance.

Among the plans regarding the Peloponnese presented to the Spanish authorities at the time, three stand out. The first was submitted in the early spring of 1569 by the commander of the *stradioti* or *estradiotes* (mercenary light cavalry corps) of the Spanish army of Flanders Petros Menagias.¹² The second plan was submitted in 1569, with Ioannis Varelis and Ioannis Akkidas arguing about its

11 As to the Spanish network of spies acting in the Greek territory, see Giovanni K. HASSIOTIS, «Venezia e i domini veneziani tramite di informazioni sui Turchi per gli Spagnoli nel sec. XVI», in Hans-Georg BECK, Manoussos MANOUSSACAS and Agostino PERTUSI (Eds.), *Venezia. Centro di mediazione tra Oriente e Occidente (secoli XV–XVI). Aspetti e problemi*, Vol. 1, Florence, Leo S. Olschki, 1977, pp. 117–136, esp. 131–133. Cf. Katerina F. ZARIDI, *O Μέγας Πρωτοπαπάς Κερκύρας Αλέξιος Ρωπούρος. Λόγιος των 16ου αι. (1504–1574)*, Corfu, Ionian University, 1995, pp. 84–85. For details, see Paolo PRETO, *I servizi segreti di Venezia. Spionaggio e controspionaggio ai tempi della Serenissima*, Milan, Gruppo editoriale il Saggiatore S.p.A., 2004, pp. 117–123.

12 For more details about Menagias' plan, see HASSIOTIS, *Oι Έλληνες στις παραμονές της ναυμαχίας της Ναυπάκτου*, cit., pp. 37–48, 236–237 doc. B'. Cf. MANOUSSACAS, «Lepanto e i Greci», cit., pp. 219–220; Kostas G. TSIKNAKIS, «Επαναστατικές κινήσεις στη βορειοδυτική Πελοπόννησο στα τέλη του 16ου αιώνα», in Helen G. SARADI (Ed.), *Πρακτικά Συνεδρίου: Δύμη: Φραγκοκρατία – Βενετοκρατία – Α' Τουρκοκρατία. 1–2 Οκτωβρίου 2005*, Patras, Municipality of Dymi – Region of Western Greece – 6th Ephorate of Byzantine Antiquities, Patras – Ethnological Society of Peloponnese, 2012, pp. 218–219. On the corps of the *stradioti*, see Stathis BIRTACHAS, «*Stradioti, Cappelletti, Compagnie or Milizie Greche: ‘Greek’ Mounted and Foot Troops in the Venetian State (Fifteenth to Eighteenth Centuries)*», in Georgios THEOTOKIS and Aysel YILDIZ (Eds.), *A Military History of the Mediterranean Sea: Aspects of War, Diplomacy and Military Elites*, Leiden & Boston, Brill, 2018, pp. 325–346.

paternity, both descending from families of coders and Greek manuscript dealers, and having common interests.¹³ The third conspiracy plan was submitted in June 1570. Its author was Georgios Mizoteros from Tripolitsa, who had served in military groups of both Venice and Spain as a commander of the Greek *stradioti* for many years.¹⁴

It is worth mentioning that in one of those plans, that of Petros Menagias, there was a rough sketch of the Peloponnese, on which the Ottoman military headquarters in the peninsula were marked (Fig. 1).¹⁵

All three submitted plans provided for the liberation of the Peloponnese. They differed, however, depending on the author, as to the region where the revolutionary movements would take place. In the plan of Petros Menagias, coming from Pyrgia of Kyparissia, the center of action was placed in the area of Messinia, while in that of Ioannis Varelis and Ioannis Akkidas, in the northern Peloponnese, and, finally, in that of Georgios Mizoteros, who came from Tripolitsa, in the central Peloponnese.


According to Ioannis Varelis and Ioannis Akkidas' plan, Nafplio was one of the cities that had to be occupied.¹⁶ On the basis of evidence collected by Petros

13 For Varelis–Akkidas' plan, see HASSIOTIS, *Oι Έλληνες στις παραμονές της ναυμαχίας της Ναυπάκτου*, cit., pp. 48-76, 244-245 doc. H'. Cf. MANOUSSACAS, «Lepanto e i Greci», cit., pp. 221-222; Kostas G. TSIKNAKIS, «Η Μονή Ταξιαρχών του Αιγίου στα τέλη του 16ου αι.», *Πελοποννησιακά*, 21 (1995), pp. 57-59; TSIKNAKIS, «Επαναστατικές κινήσεις στη βορειοδυτική Πελοπόννησο», cit., pp. 219-221.

14 For Mizoteros' plan, see HASSIOTIS, *Oι Έλληνες στις παραμονές της ναυμαχίας της Ναυπάκτου*, cit., pp. 76-85. Cf. MANOUSSACAS, «Lepanto e i Greci», cit., p. 220; TSIKNAKIS, «Επαναστατικές κινήσεις στη βορειοδυτική Πελοπόννησο», cit., p. 221. His action in Madrid at the end of 1570 and the beginning of 1571 is described by the Venetian ambassador at the Spanish court at the time, Leonardo Donà: Mario BRUNETTI and Eligio VITALE (Eds.), *La Corrispondenza da Madrid dell'ambasciatore Leonardo Donà (1570–1573)*, Vol. I (Città Veneziana – Fonti e Testi V), Venice & Rome, Istituto per la Collaborazione Culturale, 1963, pp. XVI-XVII, 132 (October 26, 1570), 185-186 (January 19, 1571) and 292 (May 28, 1571).

15 This sketch, today kept in ARCHIVO GENERAL DE SIMANCAS (AGS), Mappas, planos y dibujos (MPD), 06, 036, has been published at least three times so far: in HASSIOTIS, *Oι Έλληνες στις παραμονές της ναυμαχίας της Ναυπάκτου*, cit., p. 41; José M. FLORISTÁN IMÍZCOZ, *Fuentes para la política oriental de los Austrias. La Documentación del Archivo de Simancas (1571–1621)*, Vol. 1, León, Universidad de León, Servicio de Publicaciones, Con la Colaboración de la Caja de Ahorros y Monte de Piedad de León, 1988, between pp. 260 and 261; TSIKNAKIS, «Το Ναύπλιο και τα σχέδια κατάληψής του», cit., p. 390 fig. 1.

16 HASSIOTIS, *Oι Έλληνες στις παραμονές της ναυμαχίας της Ναυπάκτου*, cit., p. 61. Cf. FLORISTÁN, «Felipe II y la empresa de Grecia tras Lepanto (1571–78)», cit., p. 162.



1 Map of the Morea peninsula and adjacent coasts and islands [Mapa de la península de Morea y de las costas e islas adyacentes]; by Petros Menagias, 1568? ARCHIVO GENERAL DE SIMANCAS (AGS), Mappas, planos y dibujos (MPD), 06, 036. Courtesy of: Spain. Ministry of Education, Culture and Sport [España. Ministerio de Educación, Cultura y Deporte], Archivo General de Simancas.

Source: <http://www.mcu.es/ccbae/es/consulta/registro.do?id=176769>

Menagias, 600 men were protecting its mighty fortress.¹⁷ There is no information, however, about conspiracy movements being organized in the city. For the success of the plans, the participation of groups of *stratioti* serving in the military units of Flanders and Italy in the operations was deemed indispensable. In fact, according to all evidence, the pressure put on these groups to take action proved to be of crucial importance.

In an effort to lure the Spanish side and make it adopt their plans, the secret agents stressed the importance of the Peloponnese in the East. In the beginning, their proposals aroused the interest of the Spanish side but later on, with the exception of Ioannis Varelis–Ioannis Akkidas' plan, which seemed more feasible, interest was lost. This was due to the great extent of the military operations and

¹⁷ HASSIOTIS, *Oι Έλληνες στις παραμονές της ναυμαχίας της Ναυπάκτου*, cit., p. 43.

the huge costs required for a positive result.

Venice was aware of all the above movements, calmly watching the developments and examining ways of responding to Spain's penetration in the Greek territory,¹⁸ even though it was in an extremely difficult position, as it had to take action in great secrecy so as not to cause problems in its diplomatic relations with the Ottomans. The opportunity it had hoped for more vigorous action was soon to be given.

With the outbreak of the Fourth Venetian–Ottoman War, in spring 1570, the scene was set for change. In response to the Ottoman attack on Cyprus, apart from taking military action, it was considered necessary to organize revolutionary movements within the Greek territory. These would confuse the enemy, who would find it difficult to focus on the main target. Many secret agents were mobilized in this direction, with impressive results. Any information about the military capacity of the Ottomans would be valuable.

At the critical time, the contribution of the Greek community in Venice proved crucial. Once the Venetian intention to take military action in the Greek territory became apparent, the mobilization within the Greek Brotherhood of Venice was intense.¹⁹

Particular interest was shown by the members of the Brotherhood coming from Nafplio.²⁰ With memories still fresh of their hometown, they thought there was now hope for its reoccupation. One of them was the scholar Grigorios Malaxos, who suggested fomenting a revolutionary movement in the Greek territory, which would be supported by the Ecumenical Patriarch Metrophanes III.²¹

18 For the reactions to the Spanish plans, see *Ibid.*, pp. 85-90. Cf. MANOUSSACAS, «*Lepanto e i Greci*», cit., pp. 222-223; TSIKNAKIS, «*Επαναστατικές κινήσεις στη βορειοδυτική Πελοπόννησο*», cit., p. 222.

19 On the mobilization that took place, see HASSIOTIS, *Oι Έλληνες στις παραμονές της ναυμαχίας της Ναυπάκτου*, cit., pp. 105-106.

20 For the strong Nafplian presence in the Greek Brotherhood of Venice at the time, see Fani MAVROIDI, *Συμβολή στην ιστορία της Ελληνικής Αδελφότητας Βενετίας στο ΙΣΤ' αιώνα. Έκδοση του Β' Μητρώου εγγραφών (1533-1562)*, Athens, Notis Karavias' Bookstore, 1976, p. 65; Sotiris KOUTMANIS, «*Ναυπλιώτες στη Βενετία (16ος – 18ος αιώνας)*». Η κοινότητα της διασποράς ως τοπική ιστορία», *Ναυπλιακά Ανάλεκτα*, 9 (2017); Eftychia D. LIATA (Ed.), *Της Βενετίας τ' Ανάπλι. 300 χρόνια από το τέλος μιας εποχής 1715-2015. Επιστημονικό Συμπόσιο. Ναύπλιο, 9-11 Οκτωβρίου 2015. Πρακτικά*, Nafplio, Municipality of Nafplio – Cultural Foundation “Ioannis Kapodistrias”, 2017, pp. 211-219.

21 On his proposals, see HASSIOTIS, *Oι Έλληνες στις παραμονές της ναυμαχίας της Ναυπάκτου*, cit., pp. 23, 60 and 124-133.

Among those who expressed concerns at the time was a person who knew the Greek territory very well; that person was the Nafplian scholar Andreas Londanos. He was a graduate of the University of Padua and a knight of the Tuscany order of San Stefano.²² He was married to Izabeta Kouvli, daughter of the rich merchant and shipowner Andronikos, son of Kanakis Kouvlis,²³ also Nafplian and a man of high status in the Venetian circles.

In the spring of 1570, he started examining the direction in which the Venetian military operations had to move, and soon enough his proposals were made concrete. On June 7, 1570, he appeared before the Heads of the Council of Ten (*Capi del Consiglio dei Dieci*) and submitted two proposals concerning military operations in Greece, in which local populations would be keen to participate, according to written assurances which he had received by residents of Albania, Himara and Mani.²⁴

In accordance with his first proposal, which was to be implemented promptly, a large Venetian military force would sail from Corfu to Parga, to then head for Moscholouri, where it would steal all goods gathered in town on the occasion of the trade fair that was to be held. In this context, a revolt of the people of Thessaly

22 For him, see *Ibid.*, pp. 108-109, fn. 2. Also, Elli GIOTOPOULOY-SISILIANOU, *Αντόνιος ο Επαρχος. Ένας Κερκυραίος ουμανιστής του ΙΣΤ' αιώνα*, Athens, 1978, pp. 181 fn. 2, 257-258. More recent bibliography in Michela DAL BORGO's article, «La descrizione del Peloponneso di Andrea Londano alla Repubblica di Venezia (1570)», *Mediterranean World*, 20 (2010), pp. 133-150.

23 For Izabeta Kouvli and her marriage to Andreas Londanos, see MAVROIDI, *Συμβολή στην ιστορία της Ελληνικής Αδελφότητας Βενετίας*, cit., p. 141 fn. 4; Despina Er. VLASSI, «Δύο διαθήκες των αρχών του 17ου αιώνα από το Παλαιό Αρχείο του Ελληνικού Ινστιτούτου Βενετίας», *Θησαυρίσματα*, 31 (2001), pp. 183-190, 198-203 no 1; Despina Er. VLASSI, «Le ricchezze delle donne. Pratica testamentaria in seno alle famiglie greche di Venezia (XVI-XVIII sec.)», in Chyssa MALTEZOU and Gogo VARZELIOTI (Eds.), *Oltre la morte. Testamenti di Greci e Veneziani redatti a Venezia o in territorio greco-veneziano nei sec. XIV-XVIII. Atti dell'incontro scientifico. Venezia, 22-23 gennaio 2007 (Convegni – 11)*, Venice, Istituto Ellenico di Studi Bizantini e Postbizantini di Venezia, 2008, pp. 87, fn. 13, 93 and fn. 34, 94 fn. 37, 98 fn. 57, 100; DAL BORGO, «La descrizione del Peloponneso di Andrea Londano», cit., pp. 133-134.

24 As to his movements and plan, see HASSIOTIS, *Oι Έλληνες στις παραμονές της ναυμαχίας της Ναυπάκτου*, cit., pp. 107-117, 238-239, doc. Δ'. Cf. MANOUSSACAS, «Lepanto e i Greci», cit., p. 223; TSIKNAKIS, «Επαναστατικές κινήσεις στη βορειοδυτική Πελοπόννησο», cit., p. 222; Kostas G. TSIKNAKIS, «Το φρούριο του Πόρτο Κάγιο στη Μάνη και η καταστροφή του από τους Βενετούς το 1570», *Λακωνικά Σπουδαί*, 20 (2012): *Τιμητική προσφορά εις Ελένην Μπελιά-Βαγιακάκου. Ανθών. Πάσιν ἀνθεσι πεποικιλμένος Πλάτ. Πολ. 55c*, pp. 449-450.

against the Ottomans was bound to break out.²⁵ The Venetian authorities appeared uninterested in this plan due to it being impossible for them to mobilize military forces as quickly as suggested for the success of the operation.²⁶

The second proposal provided for a concrete plan of action in the Peloponnese centered on the Isthmus of Corinth. It was based on a similar earlier successful operation, carried out between 1537 and 1540 by the Nafplian Georgios Saras, an Arvanite *stradioto* in the service of Venice, together with some companions. According to planning, a Venetian military force of 500–1000 men would disembark in the region of Isthmus of Corinth, cutting off communication between Central Greece and the Peloponnese. Immediately thereafter, they would start capturing the major Ottoman military centers in the peninsula.²⁷

Londanos provided information about every fortress of the Peloponnese, its defense state, the number of soldiers stationed in it, and the population composition of the wider area. In his descriptions, he often incorporated historical background, coming from books of ancient authors.²⁸

Finally, in order for the military expedition to be successful, he proposed certain improvements concerning its siege system, and therefore designed two new weapons which he considered to be more effective. These were *geranium* and *triena ferrea*. He also proposed the type of galley he considered to be the best for their operations.²⁹

This proposal immediately aroused the interest of the Council of Ten (*Consiglio dei Dieci*), which took care to write it down in a separate twelve-page

25 HASSIOTIS, *Oι Έλληνες στις παραμονές της ναυμαχίας της Ναυπάκτου*, cit., pp. 109-110, 238-239, doc. Δ'.

26 *Ibid.*, pp. 109-110.

27 *Ibid.*, pp. 110-116, 238-239, doc. Δ'. Cf. MANOUSSACAS, «Lepanto e i Greci», cit., p. 223; GIOTOPOULOY-SISILIANOU, *Αντώνιος ο Επαρχος*, cit., pp. 257-258; TSIKNAKIS, «Επαναστατικές κινήσεις στη βορειοδυτική Πελοπόννησο», cit., p. 222; TSIKNAKIS, «Το φρούριο του Πόρτο Κάγιο στη Μάνη», cit., pp. 449-450; Chryssa MALTEZOU, «Il riuso di testi militari bizantini nel XVI secolo», in Giorgio VESPIGNANI (Ed.), *Polidoro. Studi offerti ad Antonio Carile*, Spalato, Fondazione Centro Italiano di Studi sull'Alto Medioevo, 2013, pp. 529-530.

28 HASSIOTIS, *Oι Έλληνες στις παραμονές της ναυμαχίας της Ναυπάκτου*, cit., pp. 111-112 and fn. 1, 238-239 doc. Δ'. See also DAL BORGO, «La descrizione del Peloponneso di Andrea Londano», cit., pp. 142-145, 150; MALTEZOU, «Il riuso di testi militari bizantini nel XVI secolo», cit., p. 529.

29 HASSIOTIS, *Oι Έλληνες στις παραμονές της ναυμαχίας της Ναυπάκτου*, cit., p. 112 and fn. 2.

booklet (measuring 32×22cm).³⁰ This way, it would be easier for it to be read.³¹

The Heads of the Council of Ten, who at the time were busy following the developments concerning the Ottoman attack against Cyprus, avoided taking a position on the submitted proposal suggesting undertaking military operations in the Peloponnese, postponing the discussion until later. They asked Londanos, however, to hand over all the copies of his plan and not show them to anyone. On being informed by Londanos himself that he had already delivered a copy to the captain of the galleys (*capitano delle galee grosse*), they were obliged to intervene. By sending him a confidential letter on June 29, 1570, they asked him to return the copy as well as any other copies which he had possibly made.³²

For obvious reasons, Londanos was analytical in his plan concerning the region he came from, particularly focusing on the state of its fortifications. Two depictions of Nafplio of approximately the same period constitute valuable sources for understanding his descriptions. The first is a 16×25,5 cm copper engraving, which is included in the Venetian cartographer Giovanni Francesco Camocio's *Isole famose, porti, fortezze, e terre maritime*, printed in Venice, probably in 1574 (Fig. 2).³³ The second is a 15×26,5 cm two-page miniature, included in the Cretan painter Georgios Klontzas' illuminated manuscript, which was completed between 1590 and 1592 (Fig. 3).³⁴

According to Londanos, Nafplio was stretching out to the sea like a turtle. It could not be hit by artillery if it were not from the north. But there was Bourtsi

30 *Ibid.*, p. 110 and fn. 4; DAL BORGO, «La descrizione del Peloponneso di Andrea Londano», cit., p. 133 fn. 1.

31 ARCHIVIO DI STATO DI VENEZIA (hereafter: ASVE), *Consiglio dei Dieci, Miscellanea Codici*, register (hereafter: reg.) 110, fols. 3r-12r. Text edited by DAL BORGO, «La descrizione del Peloponneso di Andrea Londano», cit., pp. 141-150. Cf. HASSIOTIS, *Oι Έλληνες στις παραμονές της ναυμαχίας της Ναυπάκτου*, cit., pp. 112-116, where the Greek translation of the text.

32 DAL BORGO, «La descrizione del Peloponneso di Andrea Londano», cit., p. 135 and fn. 15.

33 Giovanni Francesco CAMOCIO, *Isole famose, porti, fortezze, e terre maritime sottoposte alla Ser.ma Sig.ria di Venetia, ad altri Principi Christiani, et al Sig.or Turco, novamente poste in luce*, Venice, Alla libraria del segno di S. Marco, [c. 1574], p. 70. Cf. HASSIOTIS, *Oι Έλληνες στις παραμονές της ναυμαχίας της Ναυπάκτου*, cit., pp. 112-113 fn. 7 (publication of the plan on p. 113).

34 BIBLIOTECA NAZIONALE MARCIANA DI VENEZIA (BNMV), Cl. VII, 22 (=1466), ff. 125v-126r. Cf. Athanasios D. PALIOURAS, *Ο ςωγράφος Γεώργιος Κλόντζας (1540 ci. – 1608) και οι μικρογραφίαι του κώδικος αυτού*, Athens, Grigorios Publishers, 1977, pp. 132, 231 and plan 270.



2 Map of Nafplio [«Napoli [di Romania] Citta nella Provincia della Morea»]. Source: Giovanni Francesco CAMOCIO, *Isole famose, porti, fortezze, e terre maritime sottoposte alla Ser.ma Sig.ria di Venetia, ad altri Principi Christiani, et al Sig.or Turco, novamente poste in luce*, Venice, Alla libraria del segno di S. Marco, [c. 1574].

(*Castel Scoglio*), which was surrounded by artificial, not natural, inner breakwaters (*porporelle*), and it would be highly dangerous for an armada to enter; it provided great security and rendered this side of the city impregnable (*inespugnabile*). On the side of Palamidi hill (*monte Palamedo*) though, carrying out an attack would be much easier. No artillery was deployed on that side by the Ottomans, as they felt sovereign over land, which also explained why the moat (*fossa*), once being deep and filled with water, was now filled with soil. Its



3 Nafplio [«To Aváπλι», 1590–1592. BIBLIOTECA NAZIONALE MARCIANA DI VENEZIA (BNMV), Gr. VII, 22 (=1466), ff. 125v-126r. Courtesy of: Italy. Ministry of Culture – Biblioteca Nazionale Marciana. Reproduction forbidden [Su concessione del Ministero della Cultura – Biblioteca Nazionale Marciana. Divieto di riproduzione].

counterscarp (*contrascarpa*) was now covered with crops almost up to the hill, and the part of the wall between the bastions (*cortina*) had been damaged; as a consequence, it was easy for someone to cross the city by night and get to the Land Gate (*Porta di terra ferma*).

On the other side of the city, namely on the side of the gulf, there was a not quite big cave (*grotta*) and a narrow passage starting from that point and leading up to the Castle of the Greeks (*Castel dei Greci*). Many could climb up to the

Castle through this passage, although, because of its narrowness, no more than one at a time. During the last war, someone having reached that point, ordered that a hundred more soldiers be sent, and they all stayed there to protect the Castle of the Greeks. This had happened a number of times in the past. Now the Castle of the Greeks had no garrison or walls, but only a few artillery pieces (*pochi pezzi d'artigliaria*). The above entrance to the Castle of the Greeks was secret. On that side of the city, where the Albanian houses were, the walls were low (*puocco alta di terra*) and vulnerable to attacks. A man of those living there offered, together with a few other men, to secretly enter the Castle from that point, as he had already examined this possibility many times. In the night hours, there were eight garrisons around the city walls and four on the Castle of Torri (*Castel Torron*), the Castle of the Franks (*Castel di Franchi*) and that of the Greeks.

The city garrison consisted of 300 mercenaries. In the Castle of the Greeks there was an agha (*aga*), in the same grade as the castellan (*castellano*). It was his responsibility to keep the keys of the above Castles and resided in the city's episcopal residence, which was in the Castle of the Greeks. In the Castle of Torri, there was another agha with 150 Ottomans. His responsibility was to take care of the supplies, which amounted to approximately 20.000 *stara*.

Christians were forbidden to live in the Castles. They were well equipped with artillery, mostly on the side of the Argolic Gulf, to fight enemy armadas. In the city, there were also 400 Ottomans and 150 Janissaries (*gianiceri*). Among the 400 Ottomans, many were useless for military service, as, for the most part, they were families and children.

For the aforementioned reasons, on the side of the sea there were many pieces of artillery, while on the side of the land only a few. On Bourtzi there were 60 Ottomans and enough artillery. They collected rain water in two tanks (*cisterne*). The city used water, which was conveyed from outside sources through conduits.

Colonel (*colonello*) Agostino Cluson, military commander of the city in the previous war, claimed one could enter from the side of the moat (*banda del fosso*), where the old gate that used to remain closed, had now been walled up by the Ottomans. In Londanos view, choosing this particular side to enter the city from, would be the least easy way to do so, compared to the other options.

Londanos' description of the city concludes by saying that there were 400 Christian men living in Nafplio, all devoted to the Venetian Republic, as well as

Arvanites living in many villages.

He also added that 60 miles away of Nafplio, at *Capo Schilo*, there was the Castle of Thermisi (*Castel Termissi*), which was of strategic importance as it was in control of a region with large and efficient salt lakes. Its garrison comprised 80 Ottoman soldiers. All the residents of the local villages were Christians, dissatisfied with the Ottoman administration and willing to leave their land for good, even if they had to abandon their homes and possessions.³⁵

We can see that Londanos' proposal provided a complete picture of the state of Nafplio at the time.³⁶ He had managed to gather all this information about his hometown from his compatriots who lived in or travelled to Venice.

In the meanwhile, developments were proceeding quickly. In the summer of 1570, the Ottomans managed to occupy the biggest part of Cyprus with relative ease and were now besieging Famagusta. Acting without a proper planning, the Venetian fleet failed to stop them.³⁷

During this eventful period, Londanos saw his plan remain unimplemented. In parallel, he had also delivered a treatise, entitled *le battaglie navali con molta*

35 DAL BORGO, «La descrizione del Peloponneso di Andrea Londano», cit., pp. 146-147 (on p. 139 sort reference to the relevant passage). Also, see HASSIOTIS, *Oι Έλληνες στις παραμονές της ναυμαχίας της Ναυπάκτου*, cit., pp. 112-114 (translation of the passage of «Descrizione»).

36 On the fortifications of the city, see Giuseppe GEROLA, «Le fortificazioni di Napoli di Romania», *Annuario della Regia Scuola Archeologica di Atene e delle Missioni Italiane in Oriente*, 13-14 (1930-1931, ed. 1934), pp. 347-410. Cf. Iordanis E. DIMITAKOPOULOS, «Η πύλη της ξηράς των ενετικών οχυρώσεων του Ναυπλίου», in *Πρακτικά του Δ' Διεθνούς Συνεδρίου Πελοποννησιακών Σπουδών*. Κόρινθος, 9-16 Σεπτεμβρίου 1990, Vol. 2: *Αρχαιότης και Βυζάντιον* (Πελοποννησιακά. Παράρτημα 19), Athens, Society for Peloponnesian Studies, 1992-1993, pp. 297-323, esp. 298-300 [= *Scripta Minora. Ερευνες στην αρχιτεκτονική και έργα για τη συντήρηση των μνημείων* (Δημοσιεύματα του Αρχαιολογικού Δελτίου αρ. 88), Athens, Hellenic Republic, Ministry of Culture, 2005, pp. 329-346, esp. 330-332]; Ioanna Th. STERIOTOU, «Συμπληρωματικά αμυντικά έργα στις οχυρώσεις της Πελοποννήσου (1684-1715). Δύο σχέδια του τείχους της πόλης του Ναυπλίου (18ος αι.) από το αρχείο της Βενετίας», in Charis KALLIGA (Ed.), *Η εκπρατεία των Morosini και το "Regno di Morea". Μονεμβασιώτικος Όμιλος. Γ' Συμπόσιο Ιστορίας και Τέχνης 20-22 Ιουλίου 1999*, Athens, “Hestia” Publishers, 1998, pp. 135-154, esp. 140-143.

37 Kostas G. TSIKNAKIS, «Η Κύπρος στη δίνη του ανταγωνισμού των ευρωπαϊκών δυνάμεων (15ος-16ος αι.)», in Nikos G. MOSCHONAS (Ed.), *Κύπρος. Σταυροδόροι της Μεσογείου* («Επιστήμης Κοινωνία». Ειδικές Μορφωτικές Εκδηλώσεις), Athens, National Hellenic Research Foundation – Embassy of the Republic of Cyprus in Athens, “House of Cyprus”, 2001, pp. 97-101.

prudentia et esperienza trattate in lingua greca elegantissimamente da Leone Sapiente imperator di Constantinopoli, to the Heads of the Council of Ten.³⁸ When exactly he delivered this text remains unknown. In his letter including his proposals for military operations in the Greek territory, submitted to the Council of Ten on June 7, 1570, he made some allusions: «Fui anco studioso in mostrare istoriate sopra la carta le varie foglie et maniere de ordinanze maritime, secondo che mi hano ricordato gli antichi autori et moderni greci, con diversi stratagemmi et instrumenti che contra gli inimici se potrebon usare nelle galere et navi approvati dall'esperienza».³⁹

In the months to come, Londanos would keep pressuring the Council of Ten to undertake a military operation in the Peloponnese, while receiving the services of the experienced Georgios Saras. The Heads of the Council of Ten asked Londanos to provide them with more information about him. At the same time, they ordered him to go to the Senate's member Agostino Barbarigos' house and give him the aforementioned *battaglie navali* to read. That is what happened. After studying the text carefully, the Venetian official asked Londanos to translate it in Italian, which the latter promised to do.⁴⁰

Londanos described all the above moves in a letter to the Heads of the Council of Ten, which most probably, although not dated, was drawn up on January 26, 1571. In this letter he repeated his ideas about undertaking military operations, already expressed in writing a few months before. He underlined the fact that Georgios Saras, who was then serving in Dalmatia, could offer them valuable services. He came from Nafplio, was knowledgeable about the Peloponnesian peninsula, spoke Turkish, Greek and Albanian and could therefore easily rouse the local population and persuade them to take the side of Venice.⁴¹

On January 26, 1571, in another handwritten letter to the Heads of the Council

38 DAL BORGO, «La descrizione del Peloponneso di Andrea Londano», cit., p. 136 and fn. 18, 137 and fn. 25. Cf. MALTEZOU, «Il riuso di testi militari bizantini nel XVI secolo», cit., p. 529.

39 HASSIOTIS, *Oι Έλληνες στις παραμονές της ναυμαχίας της Ναυπάκτου*, cit., pp. 238-239 doc. Δ'. Cf. MALTEZOU, «Il riuso di testi militari bizantini nel XVI secolo», cit., p. 529.

40 DAL BORGO, «La descrizione del Peloponneso di Andrea Londano», cit., pp. 135-136 and fn. 18, 137 and fn. 25. Cf. MALTEZOU, «Il riuso di testi militari bizantini nel XVI secolo», cit., p. 529.

41 DAL BORGO, «La descrizione del Peloponneso di Andrea Londano», cit., p. 136 and fn. 18. Cf. MALTEZOU, «Il riuso di testi militari bizantini nel XVI secolo», cit., p. 529.

of Ten, he pointed out that Georgios Saras was known to Fabio da Canal, cavalry proveditor in Dalmatia (*provveditor ai cavalli in Dalmatia*) as well as to all the cavalry men of the region. He would very willingly offer his services to the Venetian State.⁴²

In view of these developments, the Venetian authorities started reconsidering the plan to recapture the Peloponnese, submitted by Londanos a few months earlier. Along with this, they had another similar operation plan in their hands, also submitted to the Heads of the Council of Ten. The author of this plan, which included suggestions for naval operations in Greece, was the Corfiot scholar Antonios Eparchos, who in the spring of 1570 was in Venice as head of a delegation of his compatriots.⁴³

On January 29, 1571, the Council of Ten finally decided that the new Sea proveditor, Agostino Barbarigo (elected to the post on January 6), be given a *copia del libretto del cavalier Londan cerca l'impresa del Morea* as well as the *libro dato dall'Eparco cerca le battaglie navali*, so that he would be informed. He also ordered on arrival in Zara, to contact and take the Nafplian Georgio Saras, at the time serving in Dalmatia and knowledgeable about the topography of the Peloponnese, on board his galley, so as to use his services where need be. Lastly, the Council handed him letters sent by residents of *Braccio di Maina* and other regions expressing their intention to revolt against the Ottomans.⁴⁴ From then on, it was Agostino Barbarigo and the Sea general captain (*capitano generale da mar*), Sebastiano Venier, who were to undertake the support of the revolt having

42 DAL BORGO, «La descrizione del Peloponneso di Andrea Londano», cit., p. 136 and fn. 18.

43 HASSIOTIS, *Oι Έλληνες στις παραμονές της ναυμαχίας της Ναυπάκτου*, cit., pp. 116-117. Cf. MANOUSSACAS, «Lepanto e i Greci», cit., p. 223; GIOTOPOULOY-SISILIANOU, *Αντώνιος ο Επαρχος*, cit., p. 6 fn. 2; Georgios S. PLUMIDIS, *Αιτήματα και πραγματικότητες των Ελλήνων της Βενετοκρατίας (1554-1600)*, Ioannina, University of Ioannina, 1985, p. 33 no 111; PRETO, *I servizi segreti di Venezia*, cit., pp. 317, 326 fn. 146; DAL BORGO, «La descrizione del Peloponneso di Andrea Londano», cit., pp. 135-136 fn. 17. A summary of the naval action plan was published by MALTEZOU, «Il riuso di testi militari bizantini nel XVI secolo», cit., pp. 532-535.

44 HASSIOTIS, *Oι Έλληνες στις παραμονές της ναυμαχίας της Ναυπάκτου*, cit., p. 117. Cf. MANOUSSACAS, «Lepanto e i Greci», cit., p. 223; DAL BORGO, «La descrizione del Peloponneso di Andrea Londano», cit., pp. 135-136 and fns. 16-17; TSIKNAKIS, «Επαναστατικές κινήσεις στη βορειοδυτική Πελοπόννησο», cit., p. 222; MALTEZOU, «Il riuso di testi militari bizantini nel XVI secolo», cit., pp. 529-530.

started in Mani (Fig. 4) and meant to expand it in the rest of the Peloponnese.⁴⁵

Finding it impossible to meet the ever-growing demands of the war operations, Venice addressed Pope Pius V, asking him to mobilize the Christian forces of the West. He took action immediately pushing in different directions.⁴⁶ His efforts bore fruit resulting in the establishment of the Holy League (*Sacra Liga*) on May 20, 1571, with Don Juan de Austria (1547–1578) being in command of the Christian fleet. The three admirals, Giovan Andrea Doria, Marcantonio Colonna and Sebastiano Venier, heads of the Spanish, papal and Venetian galleys respectively, also played a decisive role in the operations.⁴⁷

In an effort to create bridgeheads, Don Juan took advantage of the secret plans, devised both by Venetians and Spaniards, in the best way, and sought to foment a nationwide uprising in almost the entire Ottoman-occupied Greek territory.⁴⁸

It was in such an encouraging climate that the Christian armada set sail for the Greek seas. However, once the occupation of Famagusta was known, the Christians restricted themselves to the Ionian Sea. Finally, on October 7, 1571, the Christian Holy League faced the enemy galleys at the Echinades Islands, *Curzolari* according to the western sources, small islands off Lepanto, in a battle which ended with an almost complete destruction of the Ottoman fleet.⁴⁹

The Peloponnese was one of the first areas to revolt. Centered at Mani, whose inhabitants had been at odds with the Ottoman rulers for years, revolts soon expanded to the biggest part of Messinia.⁵⁰ That would also be the case in the region of Achaia. The revolted inhabitants of Aegialia would soon be joined by those inhabiting the region opposite Aegialia, namely that of Parnassida.⁵¹ The region

45 HASSIOTIS, *Oι Έλληνες στις παραμονές της ναυμαχίας της Ναυπάκτου*, cit., pp. 117, 170, 221.

46 See Aldo STELLA, «Lepanto nella storia e nella storiografia alla luce di nuovi documenti», *Studi Veneziani*, n.s., 51 (2006), pp. 216-221.


47 *Ibid.*, pp. 232-233.

48 Kostas G. TSIKNAKIS, «Η ναυμαχία της Ναυπάκτου και οι επαναστατικές κινήσεις στον ελληνικό χώρο», in Kostas G. TSIKNAKIS (Ed.), *Πρακτικά της Επιστημονικής Συνάντησης: Η απήχηση της ναυμαχίας της Ναυπάκτου στην ευρωπαϊκό κόσμο (Ναύπακτος, 13 Οκτωβρίου 2012)* (Συνέδρια – 16), Athens & Venice, Hellenic Institute of Byzantine and Post-Byzantine Studies in Venice – Demetrios and Aegli Botsaris Foundation, 2013, pp. 53-89, where all the relevant bibliography.

49 STELLA, «Lepanto nella storia e nella storiografia», cit., pp. 231-236.

50 TSIKNAKIS, «Η ναυμαχία της Ναυπάκτου», cit., p. 59 and fn. 26.

51 Michel LESURE, *Lépante, la crise de l'Empire Ottoman*, Paris, Julliard, 1972, pp. 94-95 and



4 The Castle of Porto Kagio in Mani (Maina) [«Fortezza di Maina»] besieged by the Venetians in 1570. Source: Giovanni Francesco CAMOCIO, *Isole famose, porti, fortezze, e terre marittime sottoposte alla Ser.ma Sig.ria di Venetia, ad altri Principi Christiani, et al Sig.or Turco, novamente poste in luce*, Venice, Alla libraria del segno di S. Marco, [c. 1574].

of Nafplio, guarded by a large number of forces, appears not to have participated in the mobilization that had started.

There was much that could be done in the immediate future. However, the Venetians' appeals for the Christian fleet taking more action so as to conquer cities in the Peloponnese and Euboea were not heard. The powers that had formed

193; MANOUSSACAS, «Lepanto e i Greci», cit., p. 233; TSIKNAKIS, «Η Μονή Ταξιαρχών του Αιγίου στα τέλη του 16ου αι.», cit., p. 60; IDEM, «Επαναστατικές κινήσεις στη βορειοδυτική Πελοπόννησο», cit., pp. 225-226; IDEM, «Η ναυμαχία της Ναυπάκτου», cit., p. 63.

the Holy League set different priorities. As a result, the possibility to reconquer a substantial number of revolted regions of the Ottoman-occupied Greek territory was lost.

Taking advantage of the absence of concerted action from the side of the Christian coalition, the Ottomans managed to suppress revolts in almost all Greek regions. We have no information on the region of Nafplio. It was only in the northwest side of the Peloponnese that some revolutionary cells were still found.⁵²

Over this period of time the Greeks who lived in Venice were following these developments with mixed emotions. Early optimism soon changed to disillusionment over the turn of events. These developments were naturally of particular interest to Londanos, who, experiencing them, must have had unpleasant feelings given that his plan had not been implemented; still, he did not give up trying. Searching for ways to get more political forces involved in the issue of liberating the Peloponnese, he did not hesitate to turn in another direction; hence, in February 1572, he sent a more complete plan of intervention in the Peloponnese to the Grand Duke of Tuscany, Cosimo I de' Medici. He, though, did nothing more than express his satisfaction at reading it.⁵³

And while discussions on the Christian fleet taking new action started in the summer of 1572, the Venetians kept seeking ways to proceed into the Ottoman-occupied Greek territory. In this climate of war, with various confusing and conflicting opinions as to the points of the final attack, the idea to retake Nafplio was not abandoned; the issue was raised by individuals coming from Nafplio, who could see that the occupation of their hometown was not in the plans of the Christian forces.

One of them was Georgis Mormoris, who was in Venice at the time.⁵⁴ He was

52 MANOUESSACAS, «*Lepanto e i Greci*», cit., pp. 234-235; TSIKNAKIS, «Η Μονή Ταξιαρχών του Αγίου στα τέλη του 16ου αι.», cit., pp. 60-61; IDEM, «Επαναστατικές κινήσεις στη βορειοδυτική Πελοπόννησο», cit., pp. 225-226; IDEM, «Η ναυμαχία της Ναυπάκτου», cit., pp. 67-71.

53 DAL BORGO, «*La descrizione del Peloponneso di Andrea Londano*», cit., p. 137 and fns. 23-24.

54 On his activity in the city in those years, see Kostas G. TSIKNAKIS, «Μεταφορές αρχαιοτήτων και μαρμάρων από την Κρήτη για την επισκευή του Δουκικού Παλατιού της Βενετίας το έτος 1576», in Gogo K. VARZELIOTI and Kostas G. TSIKNAKIS (Eds.), *Γαληνοτάτη. Τιμή στη Χρύσα Μαλτέζου*, Athens, National and Kapodistrian University of Athens, Department of Theatre Studies – Benaki Museum, 2013, p. 773 and fn. 33, where the relevant

born to the well-known Naflpian family,⁵⁵ whose members, after the fall of the city, settled mainly in Crete.⁵⁶ On his merchant ship, he often travelled back and forth between Crete and Venice, serving many needs. On one of his trips, he had apparently visited Nafplio, so by a letter submitted to the Heads of the Council of Ten on April 21, 1572, he developed concrete proposals on the occupation of the city.⁵⁷ Due to lack of space, his plan, which was a mixture of wishful thinking and risky ventures, cannot be detailed here. I propose to deal with this in another essay, in which I propose to discuss all his moves, which, among other things, aimed at the liberation of Nafplio. However, it is worth noting that his views aroused the interest of the Council of Ten, which dealt with his case on May 5.

bibliography. On his activity in the city in following decades, see in Katerina B. KORRE (Ed.), *Ta Πρακτικά των Συνελεύσεων της Ελληνικής Αδελφότητας Βενετίας: εκλογές και αποφάσεις. Βιβλίο Α'* (1558–1601) (Graecolatinitas nostra. Πηγές 11), Athens & Venice, Hellenic Institute of Byzantine and Post-Byzantine Studies in Venice, 2012, *passim*.

55 For Mormoris' family, see HASSIOTIS, *Oι Έλληνες στις παραμονές της ναυμαχίας της Ναυπάκτου*, cit., pp. 140-141 fn. 3. As to the most recent bibliography about the family, see mainly Dionysios BERNICOLAS-HATZOPoulos, «Emmanuel Mormori and the Alfonso Piccolomini incident», *Thesaurismata*, 19 (1982), pp. 90-101; Dionyssios HATZOPoulos, «New information on the Mormori family», *Thesaurismata*, 21 (1991), pp. 358-367; Angeliki TZAVARA, «Devozione, violenza e uva passa. Le famiglie di Mourmouris e Catello di Nauplion nel XV secolo», in Chryssa MALTEZOU, Angeliki TZAVARA and Despina VLASSI (Eds.), *I Greci durante la venetocrazia: Uomini, spazio, idee (XIII–XVIII sec.). Atti del Convegno Internazionale di Studi (Venezia, 3–7 dicembre 2007)* (Convegni 13), Venice, Istituto Ellenico di Studi Bizantini e Postbizantini di Venezia, 2009, pp. 597-611; Katerina B. KORRE, «Η Napoli di Romania των stradiotti (15ος–16ος αι.): πώς ο αγώνας για την κατοχή του χώρου μετασχηματίζεται σε πατρίδα», *Ναυπλιακά Ανάλεκτα*, 9 (2017); Eftychia D. LIATA (Ed.), *Της Βενετίας τ' Ανάπλι. 300 χρόνια από το τέλος μιας εποχής 1715–2015. Επιστημονικό Συμπόσιο. Ναύπλιο, 9–11 Οκτωβρίου 2015. Πρακτικά*, Nafplio, Municipality of Nafplio – Cultural Foundation “Ioannis Kapodistrias”, 2017, pp. 109-110.

56 For their presence on the island, see Nikolaos B. TOMADAKIS, «Ιλαρίων Γραδενίγος μητροπολίτης Ηρακλείας και οι σύγχρονοι αυτώ λόγιοι και σχετικοί Κρήτες. Σ'. Οικογένεια Μούρμουρη-Mormori», *Επετηρίς Εταιρείας Βυζαντινών Σπουδών*, 41 (1974), pp. 34-51+fig. IE'; Maria G. PATRAMANI, «Ο ποιητής του Αμύντα Γεώργιος Μόρμορης και ο κόσμος του: ψηφίδες από την ανθρωπογεωγραφία της κρητικής διασποράς (1645–1669) και την πνευματική παραγωγή στα Κύθηρα του 18ου αιώνα», *Νόστος*, 5 (2008), pp. 207-221; Katerina B. KORRE, «Ο βίος και η πολιτεία της προσφυγικής οικογένειας Μούρμουρη (Mormori) στα Χανιά του 16ου αιώνα. Προσωπογραφία», in *12o Διεθνές Κρητολογικό Συνέδριο (Ηράκλειο, 21–25.9.2016). Περπαγμένα*, <https://12iccs.proceedings.gr/el/proceedings/category/38/33/748> (08.08.2019).

57 ASVE, *Consiglio dei Dieci, Secrete*, filza 16 (March 1572–February 1573): letter submitted by Georgios Mormoris (April 21, 1572). Cf. HASSIOTIS, *Oι Έλληνες στις παραμονές της ναυμαχίας της Ναυπάκτου*, cit., p. 225 fn. 1.

In fact, in an effort to keep the case of Nafplio alive, the Council encouraged Mormoris' initiative.⁵⁸

In the meantime, with great difficulty and after strong pressure from Venice, the Christian fleet was reestablished. Again, it was Don Juan de Austria who was appointed head of it, accompanied by Marcantonio Colonna, Giacomo Foscarini and Gil d'Andrade, representatives of the three main forces of the Holy League.⁵⁹

One of its first decisions was to take action in the Greek peninsula, in some regions of which, during the winter of 1571–1572, the revolutionary climate was renewed. Secret agents acting on behalf of the Venetians and the Spaniards, sought to form new alliances with influential local figures.⁶⁰ Despite rumors that the Christian fleet would soon be operating in Greek waters attempting the final attack to conquer the Peloponnese, none of the aforementioned ambitious plans materialized.⁶¹ The fleet's delay in setting sail, in early September, was indicative of its intentions. After some wasted movements in the Ionian Sea, it focused its efforts on conquering Methoni (Fig. 5), unsuccessfully, though.⁶² The hopes of


58 ASVE, *Consiglio dei Dieci, Secrete*, reg. 10 (March 1572–February 1573), ff. 25v-26r. Cf. HASSIOTIS, *Oι Έλληνες στις παραμονές της ναυμαχίας της Ναυπάκτου*, cit., p. 225 fn. 1; Katerina B. KORRE, *Μισθοφόροι stradioti της Βενετίας. Πολεμική και κοινωνική λειτουργία (15ος–16ος αιώνας)*, Unpublished doctoral thesis, Corfu, Ionian University, Department of History, 2017, p. 375 and fns. 1221-1222.

59 For the rapid developments in those months, see TSIKNAKIS, «Επαναστατικές κινήσεις στη βορειοδυτική Πελοπόννησο», cit., p. 230-231; IDEM, «Η ναυμαχία της Ναυπάκτου», cit., p. 75. For more detailed information, see Kostas G. TSIKNAKIS, «Η νοτιοδυτική Πελοπόννησος θέατρο πολεμικών επιχειρήσεων το 1572», in Athanasios Th. FOTOUPOULOS (Ed.), *Πρακτικά του Γ' Διεθνούς Συνεδρίου Ανατολικών και Αφρικανικών Σπουδών: Η Πελοπόννησος κατά την Τουρκοκρατία και τη Βενετοκρατία (1460–1821) (Γαστούνη, 5–7 Σεπτεμβρίου 2008): Αφιέρωμα εις Μιχαήλ Β. Σακελλαρίου*, Athens, 2022, pp. 576-603 (in print).

60 TSIKNAKIS, «Επαναστατικές κινήσεις στη βορειοδυτική Πελοπόννησο», cit., p. 231; IDEM, «Η ναυμαχία της Ναυπάκτου», cit., p. 75-84; IDEM, «Η νοτιοδυτική Πελοπόννησος θέατρο πολεμικών επιχειρήσεων το 1572», cit.

61 TSIKNAKIS, «Επαναστατικές κινήσεις στη βορειοδυτική Πελοπόννησο», cit., p. 231; IDEM, «Η ναυμαχία της Ναυπάκτου», cit., pp. 84-86; IDEM, «Η νοτιοδυτική Πελοπόννησος θέατρο πολεμικών επιχειρήσεων το 1572», cit.

62 MANOUESSACAS, «Lepanto e i Greci», cit., pp. 237-238; TSIKNAKIS, «Η νοτιοδυτική Πελοπόννησος θέατρο πολεμικών επιχειρήσεων το 1572», cit. For more detailed information about the failed siege of Methoni, see Kostas G. TSIKNAKIS, «Η Μεθώνη στη διάρκεια του Τέταρτου Βενετοτουρκικού Πολέμου (1570–1573)», in Angeliki PANOPOLOU (Ed.), *Πρακτικά της Επιστημονικής Διημερίδας: Η Μεθώνη και η περιοχή της από την αρχαιότητα έως τα νεότερα χρόνια. Αρχαιολογικές και ιστορικές προσεγγίσεις (Μεθώνη, 16–17 Μαΐου 2015)*, Athens, National Hellenic Research Foundation, Institute of Historical Research –



5 The siege of Pylos (Navarino) and Methoni [Modon(e)] by the fleet of the Holy League (1571). Source: Giuseppe ROSACCIO, *Viaggio da Venetia, a Costantinopoli: per mare, e per terra & insieme quello di Terra Santa [...] opera utile à mercanti, marinari & à studiosi di geografia*, Venice, Giacomo Franco, 1598.

the locals, who expected their struggle for liberation to be supported, were disappointed. With the departure of the Christian fleet from the area at the beginning of October, the final remnants of the Greek resistance in the southwest Peloponnese were violently crushed by the Ottoman forces.⁶³

In the following months, the new Pope, Gregory XIII, would seek to reestablish the Holy League and send the Christian ships back to the Greek seas.⁶⁴ His

Association of Friends of the Castle of Methoni, 2022 (in print).

63 TSIKNAKIS, «Επαναστατικές κινήσεις στη βορειοδυτική Πελοπόννησο», cit., pp. 231-232; IDEM, «Η ναυμαχία της Ναυπάκτου», cit., pp. 86-87; IDEM, «Η νοτιοδυτική Πελοπόννησος Θέατρο πολεμικών επιχειρήσεων το 1572», cit.

64 On Pope Gregory XIII's efforts to prolong the Holy League's action, see Gaetano Coz-

initiatives, however, met with firm opposition from Spain, which was reluctant to offer help in this perspective. Seeing that the continuing war was making its situation worse, Venice speeded up negotiations with the Ottomans, aiming at its ending. The signing of the peace treaty on March 7, 1573, formally ended the Fourth Venetian–Ottoman War.⁶⁵

All information presented here is extremely valuable as it sheds light on a practically unknown period in Nafplio's history, that is, the first decades after its occupation by the Ottomans. As is apparent from plans of all the secret agents, the city constituted a powerful military center in the Peloponnese.

Andreas Londanos' and Georgios Mormoris' proposals are worth lingering over for a moment. There is so much anguish hidden in the descriptions of the documents, as is always the case with this kind of documents. Dozens of people collaborated under extremely difficult conditions to gather this information. Certainly, the result is not far from reality. We are provided with a complete picture of Nafplio's defense potentials over the last decades of the 16th century. Despite any deficiencies, conquering it presented considerable difficulties. This played an important role in the *Serenissima*'s decision not to go ahead with its siege. However, in order not to displease the Nafplians living in Venice, whose services were of major importance to them, the Venetian authorities took care to clarify that their issue was not abandoned but postponed indefinitely.

In this same period Spain's attitude gives rise to a number of questions. While encouraging initiatives for rebellion against the Ottomans, once these mature, it distances itself letting them fade. However, this seemingly contradictory attitude is easy to justify: it is the result of a broader policy of skepticism regarding the area of the eastern Mediterranean, which Spain adopted at the time.⁶⁶

zi, «Un documento sulla crisi della “Sacra Lega”: le confidenze del padre Francisco Toledo all’Avogadore di Comun Nicolò Barbarigo (ottobre 1572)», *Archivio Veneto*, s. 5, 67 (1960), pp. 76-96. Cf. TSIKNAKIS, «Η ναυμαχία της Ναυπάκτου», cit., p. 86.

65 For the talks before signing the Peace Treaty and the side effects caused by the Venetian initiative, see Mario BRUNETTI, «La crisi finale della Sacra Lega (1573)», in *Miscellanea in onore di Roberto Cessi*, Vol. 2, Rome, Edizioni di Storia e Letteratura, 1958, pp. 145-155. See also STELLA, «Lepanto nella storia e nella storiografia», cit., pp. 245-249; TSIKNAKIS, «Η ναυμαχία της Ναυπάκτου», cit., pp. 86-87.

66 Spain's attitude is commented on by BÁDENAS, in «Η διστακτική πολιτική της ισπανικής μοναρχίας στην Ανατολή», cit., pp. 11-28.

Among the above tactics of the powerful political forces, simple citizens are experiencing the developments in a different way. Away from their hometown, Nafplians living in Venice felt disappointed by the turn of events. Different, however, were the feelings of their compatriots still living in Nafplio, who, alone and defenseless, were left to cope with the ever-increasing Ottoman aggression in the years to come.

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The Multifaceted Role of the Cypriot Élite in the Defense of Cyprus before and during the Venetian–Ottoman War (1570–1571)

by CHRYSOVALANTIS PAPADAMOU*

ABSTRACT. Cyprus constituted a Venetian base of geostrategic importance in the Levant and its most profitable possession in the *Stato da Mar*. For these reasons, during the last years of its dominion over the island, Venice tried – though not with any particular success, as later events would demonstrate – to implement a program of organizing defenses against Ottoman expansionist aspirations; this involved the construction of new fortifications and the strengthening of already existing fortresses, the consolidation of local military forces and their reinforcement with specialized officials and additional units. The present study investigates the prominent economic and political role of the local élite (feudal lords, noblemen, and wealthy bourgeois of Nicosia), firstly, in the aforementioned pre-war activities and, secondly, during the War of Cyprus (1570–1571). Given the fact that its members maintained their luxury mansions and resided in the Cypriot capital, their interest focused on the latter and drastically affected the decisions of the Venetian administration as well as the outcome of the military operations during the Siege of Nicosia by the Ottoman troops.

KEYWORDS: REPUBLIC OF VENICE, *STATO DA MAR*, OTTOMAN EMPIRE, WAR OF CYPRUS (1570–1571), CYPRIOT ÉLITE, NICOSIA.

Waiting for the Ottoman attack against Cyprus

Throughout the sixteenth century, Ottoman expansionist aspirations in the eastern basin of the Mediterranean continued to grow, following the conquest of various regions of North Africa: Egypt (1516–1517), Algeria (1519), Cyrenaica (1521), and Tripolitania (1551). As for Cyprus, the

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last outpost of Christendom at the southeastern tip of the Mediterranean, for a long time it succeeded in evading the imperialistic ambitions of the Ottomans. Nevertheless, throughout the period of Venetian domination on the island there was an underlying fear of an imminent Ottoman attack, while small-scale pirate raids were not uncommon.¹

Upon the accession of the new Ottoman sultan, Selim II (1566–1574), to the throne, Venice attempted to preserve its sovereign rights on Cyprus by renewing the peace treaty it had concluded with the former's father, Suleiman the Magnificent. However, seeking a great conquest that would be the crowning achievement of his reign, as after all tradition dictated, Selim II wished to implement the aggressive policy of his predecessors by including Cyprus in his schemes of conquest. According to his counselors, the island was considered a "key" to controlling the Eastern Mediterranean, at the same time serving as an intermediate stopover for Ottomans on the pilgrimage to their holy city, Mecca.²

Due to the expansionist ambitions of Selim II, therefore, the air throughout Europe was heavy with fear of a large-scale Ottoman offensive. This feeling became even more pervasive with the conclusion of the Hungarian War and the Treaty of Adrianople, signed on February 17, 1568, between the German Emperor Maximilian II and the Sultan. The Ottoman forces were able to disengage from that particular front and could now be used in a new area of operations.³ As a consequence, the Ottoman threat brewing beneath the surface across Europe as well as a steady flow of sketchy information leaking from Constantinople to the

1 Andreas ORPHANIDES, «Πειρατικές επιδρομές στην Κύπρο στα χρόνια της Βενετοκρατίας», *Κυπριακός Λόγος*, 55-56 (1978), pp. 12-26; Kostas G. TSIKNAKIS, «Η Κύπρος στη δίνη του ανταγωνισμού των ευρωπαϊκών δυνάμεων (15ος-16ος αι.)», in Nikos MOSCHONAS (Ed.), *Κύπρος. Σταυροδρόμι της Μεσογείου*, Athens, National Hellenic Research Foundation, 2001, p. 88; Andreas ORPHANIDES and Nicholas COUREAS, «Piracy in Cyprus and the Eastern Mediterranean during the Late Lusignan and Venetian Periods (15th–16th Centuries)», *Επετηρίδα Κέντρου Επιστημονικών Ερευνών*, 33 (2007), pp. 121-162, with extensive bibliography.

2 TSIKNAKIS, «Η Κύπρος», cit., pp. 87-91; Stathis BIRTACHAS, *Society, Culture and Government in the Venetian Maritime State: The Case of Cyprus* [Κοινωνία, πολιτισμός και διακυβέρνηση στο βενετικό Κράτος της Θάλασσας: Το παράδειγμα της Κύπρου], Thessaloniki, Vanias Publishers, 2011, p. 147.

3 George Hill, *History of Cyprus*, Vol. 3, Cambridge, At the University Press, 1972, p. 880; Robert MANTRAN, «L'Impero Ottomano, Venezia e la Guerra (1570–1670)», in Maddalena REDOLFI (Ed.), *Venezia e la difesa del Levante: da Lepanto a Candia 1570–1670*, Venice, Arsenale Editrice, 1986, pp. 227-229.

European capitals, speaking of a renewed Ottoman offensive, increased the odds of an attack on specific targets. As early as 1567, news regarding the hectic flurry of Ottoman military preparations began to flood the Republic. On October 20, 1567, intelligence mentioned Malta or Cyprus as possible targets. Messages from the following year (October 30, November 18 and 28, December 14, 1568) were similar in content, while on June 11 and 25, 1569, the Venetian *bailo* in Constantinople informed the *Serenissima* that the objective of the Ottomans was Spanish-held Puglia. For their part, on July 23 of the same year, in an effort to eliminate the chances of an attack against their Mediterranean territories, the Venetians asked Selim II to abide by the Venetian–Ottoman treaty of peace and friendship they had signed in the past.⁴

Finally, at the beginning of 1570 Selim decided to invade Cyprus and in April of that year the Ottoman armada set sail from Constantinople for the island, led by Piali Pasha and Lala Mustafa Pasha. The Ottoman fleet, numbering approximately 350 ships, approached the shores of Cyprus on July 1, 1570, and the landing at the Saline of Larnaca took place a few days later.⁵

Strengthening the island's defenses in the face of war

The Ottoman threat pushed Venice into adopting a more systematic approach towards improving the defense capabilities of its possession during the last decade of Venetian dominion in Cyprus; and this despite the difficult conditions it faced at that period, such as the partial destruction of its fleet from a fire that broke out in the Venetian arsenal (September 13, 1569), the famine that plagued the Venetian hinterland (*terraferma*), the inability of the Venetian navy to prevent the depredations of the Uskok pirates in the Adriatic, the decrease in state revenues

4 Ioannis HASSIOTIS, *Oι Έλληνες στις παραμονές της ναυμαχίας της Ναυπάκτου. Εκκλήσεις, επαναστατικές κινήσεις και εξεγέρσεις στην ελληνική χερσόνησο από τις παραμονές ώς το τέλος των Κυπριακού πολέμου (1568–1571)*, Thessaloniki, Society for Macedonian Studies, 1970, pp. 19-21; HILL, *History*, cit., pp. 878-879.

5 *Ibid.*, pp. 892-896; Aikaterini ARISTEIDOU, «Ο κυπριακός πόλεμος (1571–1573) και η κατάληψη της Λευκωσίας και της Αμμοχώστου από τους Τούρκους σύμφωνα με ανέκδοτες πηγές του ιστορικού αρχείου της Ραγούνας», *Επετηρίδα Μουσείου Αγώνα*, 1 (1979), pp. 12-48; EADEM, «Μεχμέτ πασά Σοκόλοβιτς και Κυπριακός Πόλεμος», *Κυπριακά Σπουδά*, 51 (1987), pp. 72-74; Gilles GRIVAUD, «Η κατάκτηση της Κύπρου από τους Οθωμανούς», in Theodoros PAPADOPOULOS (Ed.), *Ιστορία της Κύπρου*, Vol. 6, *Τουρκοκρατία*, Nicosia, Archbishop Makarios III Foundation / Office for Cyprus History, 2011, pp. 58-59.


as a result of the commercial competition between Venice and other European powers (France, England, Portugal, Spain, Habsburg Empire) and Joseph Nasi in the Mediterranean.⁶

In this context, Venice dispatched experienced military men and engineers to the island, with orders to evaluate the situation and recommend solutions aimed at optimizing its defenses. For instance, in 1562 Ascanio Savorgnan submitted a report to the Venetian Senate with regard to his overall impressions during his sojourn in Cyprus. In his report he mentioned, among other things, that Nicosia was not in any imminent danger, it being a considerable distance from the sea, and that the fortifications of this city should not be further reinforced. Instead, he proposed the construction of new fortifications either in the Saline of Larnaca or in Limassol.⁷

Nevertheless, when fears of the imminent Ottoman assault on Cyprus began to grow, Venice once again dispatched Giulio Savorgnan, brother of the aforementioned Ascanio, as well as Sforza Pallavicino, on the island (1567). The former would be responsible for the fortifications that would have to be either repaired or rebuilt according to the precepts of modern military engineering, mainly taking into consideration the need to effectively counter the ever-increasing use of gunpowder artillery; the latter, as a military expert, would recommend to the Venetian Senate ways of better organizing the defenders. With the help of both the Republic of San Marco and the Cypriots, particularly the nobles, the two experts spent significant amounts of money on configuring and reinforcing the island's major fortified cities, i.e. Nicosia, Famagusta and Kyrenia. For example, in the spring of 1567 Venice disbursed 50,000 ducats for the island's fortifications and

6 Maria Pia PEDANI, «Tra economia e geo-politica: la visione ottomana della guerra di Cipro», *Annuario dell'Istituto Romano di Cultura e Ricerca Umanistica*, 5 (2003), pp. 287-298; GRIVAUD, «Η κατάκτηση της Κύπρου», cit., pp. 149-150.

7 Gianni PERBELLINI, «Le fortificazioni del Regno di Cipro nello Stato veneto (X-XVI sec.)», *Κυπριακά Σπονδαί*, 50 (1987), pp. 215-220; IDEM, *The Fortress of Nicosia, Prototype of European Renaissance Military Architecture*, Nicosia, Leventis Foundation, 1994, pp. 9-10; Antonio MANNO, «Politica e architettura militare: le difese di Venezia (1557-1573)», *Studi Veneziani*, n.s. 11 (1986), pp. 91-137; Gilles GRIVAUD, *Venice and the Defence of the Regno di Cipro. Giulio Savorgnan's Unpublished Cyprus Correspondence*, translated by G. Cunningham, Nicosia, Bank of Cyprus Cultural Foundation, 2016, pp. 163-222; Stathis BIRTACHAS, *Venetian Cyprus (1489-1571). Reports by the Dominion's Supreme Administrative Officials*, Thessaloniki, Epikentro Publishers, 2020, pp. 343-344.



1 Thanks to the plans of Giulio Savorgnan, Nicosia acquired a star-shaped enceinte with 11 bastions. Source: Giuseppe ROSACCIO, *Viaggio da Venetia, a Costantinopoli: per mare, e per terra & insieme quello di Terra Santa [...] opera utile à mercanti, marinari & à studiosi di geografia*, Venice, Giacomo Franco, 1598.

an additional 50,000 for the dispatch of soldiers and materiel for the fortresses.⁸

Thanks to the plans of Giulio Savorgnan, Nicosia acquired a star-shaped en-

8 John HALE, «From Peacetime Establishment to Fighting Machine: The Venetian Army and the War of Cyprus and Lepanto», in Gino BENZONI (Ed.), *Il Mediterraneo nella seconda metà del '500 alla Luce di Lepanto*, Florence, Leo S. Olschki, 1974, pp. 175–179; Gilles GRIVAUD, «Aux Confins de l'Empire Colonial Vénitien: Nicosie et ses Fortifications (1567–1568)», *Επετηρίδα Κέντρου Επιστημονικών Ερευνών*, 13–16 (1984–1987), pp. 269–273; Iain FENLON, *The Ceremonial City. History, Memory and Myth in Renaissance Venice*, New Haven, Yale University Press, 2007, p. 157; Gilles GRIVAUD, «Un société en guerre: Chypre face à la conquête ottomane», in Angel NICOLAOU-KONNARI (Ed.), *Η Γαληνοτάτη και η Ευγενεστάτη: Η Βενετία στην Κύπρο και η Κύπρος στη Βενετία / La Serenissima and La Nobilissima: Venice in Cyprus and Cyprus in Venice*, Nicosia, Bank of Cyprus Cultural Foundation, 2009, pp. 194–195; Walter PANCIERA, «Giulio Savorgnan e la costruzione della fortezza di Nicosia (1567–1570)», in Evangelia SKOUFARI (Ed.), *La Serenissima a Cipro. Incontri di culture nel Cinquecento*, Rome, Viella, 2013, pp. 135–138.




2 Nicosia, the Famagusta Gate. Photo by A. Savin. Source: Wikimedia Commons.

ceinte with 11 bastions (Fig. 1). In order to facilitate the construction of the new fortifications, it was deemed necessary to demolish some of the city's residential districts, while only three of the eight existing gates were preserved: those of Famagusta (Fig. 2), Kyrenia (Fig. 3) and Paphos. Nevertheless, despite efforts to complete the fortification of the island's capital before the outbreak of war, this proved unfeasible.⁹

As regards Famagusta, during the Middle Ages it constituted an important center for transit trade in the Eastern Mediterranean. Furthermore, it was the last

9 PERBELLINI, *The Fortress of Nicosia*, cit., pp. 8-10; Benjamin ARBEL, «Η Κύπρος υπό ενετική κυριαρχία», in Theodoros PAPADOPOULOS (Ed.), *Ιστορία της Κύπρου*, Vol. 4, *Μεσαιωνικόν βασίλειον-Ενετοκρατία*, Nicosia, Archbishop Makarios III Foundation / Office for Cyprus History, 1995, pp. 472-474; Nicola COLDSTREAM and Maria IAKOVOU, «Βενετικές οχυρώσεις», in Dimitra PAPANIKOLA-BAKIRTZI and Maria IAKOVOU (Eds.), *Βυζαντινή Μεσαιωνική Κύπρος: Βασίλισσα στην Ανατολή και Ρίγαινα στη Δύση*, Nicosia, Bank of Cyprus Cultural Foundation, 1997, pp. 175-177; BIRTACHAS, *Society, Culture and Government*, cit., pp. 60-62; PANCIERA, «Giulio Savorgnan», cit., pp. 138-142; Fausto LANFRANCHI, «Giulio Savorgnano a Nicosia. Nascita di una Fortezza 'alla Moderna' (1567-1570)», *Studi Veneziani*, 71 (2015), pp. 277-444; GRIVAUD, *Venice and the Defence*, cit., pp. 259-476.



3 Nicosia, the Kyrenia Gate. Photo by A. Savin. Source: Wikimedia Commons.

Christian outpost in the Levant, putting up a vigorous fight against Ottoman expansionist policies during the last quarter of the sixteenth century. Throughout the period of Venetian domination, the administrators paid close attention to the fortifications of the city. More specifically, when Venetian rule was established in Cyprus, it was decreed that 10% of the revenues of the Public Treasury would be permanently allocated to funding work on the fortifications of Famagusta.

At the same time, from 1506 onwards an extra amount of 100 ducats per month was spent for that purpose that would increase over time according to the specific needs. It is estimated that 178,902 ducats were spent on the fortifications in question over the period 1491–1528. It should also be noted that, to carry out these building projects, the administration of the island drew upon the services of the adult population of “free” peasants (*francomati*), who were obligated to offer the state ten days (later reduced to six) of compulsory service (*angaria*) annually. In addition, each year Venice sent professional artisans to Famagusta for that purpose.¹⁰ According to the Venetian military engineer Giovanni Girolamo Sanmicheli, tasked with supervising construction work on the fortifications of Famagusta in 1558, the city was “the key to the Kingdom”, since its economic significance went hand in hand with its central geographical and military location.¹¹


The fortifications of Famagusta owe much to the designs of military engineers, the most important of whom were Ercole Martinengo (1555), Giovanni Girolamo Sanmicheli (1558), Luigi Brungoli (1561), Ascanio and Giulio Savorgnan (1562 and 1567).¹² These works show the transition from the medieval enceinte to the bastioned fortifications of the Early Modern period (Fig. 4). Nevertheless, certain Venetian officials viewed the city walls as strong or even impregnable, while in the case of the Martinengo Bastion, constructed in 1560, one comes across an

10 MANNO, «Politica e architettura militare», cit., pp. 112-117; ARBEL, «Η Κύπρος», cit., pp. 472-473; COLDSTREAM and IAKOVOU, «Βενετικές οχυρώσεις», cit., pp. 177-179; BIRTACHAS, *Society, Culture and Government*, cit., pp. 57-58; GRIVAUD, *Venice and the Defence*, cit., p. 83; Gilles GRIVAUD, «Martiale et marcienne, Famagouste entre 1474 et 1571», in Gilles GRIVAUD, Angel NICOLAOU-KONNARI and Chris SCHABEL (Eds.), *Famagusta. History and Society*, Vol. 2, Turnhout, Brepols, 2020, pp. 376-387.

11 Giovanni Girolamo Sanmicheli was charged with overseeing the fortifications of Corfu as well as Famagusta. He viewed the former as the “key to Italy” and the latter as the “key to the Kingdom of Cyprus”. See MANNO, «Politica e architettura militare», cit., pp. 95-96; Gilles GRIVAUD and Nasa PATAPIOU (Eds.), *Pietro Valderio, La guerra di Cipro*, Nicosia, Cyprus Research Centre, 1996, pp. 167-168; Stefano TOSATO, *Patrimonio veneto nel Mediterraneo. Fortezze veneziane dall'Adda all'Egeo: le difese della Repubblica di Venezia nei disegni della Biblioteca comunale di Treviso (secoli XVI-XVIII)*, Venice, Marco Polo System, 2014, pp. 11, 17-19; GRIVAUD, «Martiale et marcienne» cit., p. 373.

12 PERBELLINI, «Le fortificazioni del Regno», cit., pp. 206-214; MANNO, «Politica e architettura militare», cit., pp. 100-104; Nasa PATAPIOU, «Οι οχυρώσεις της Αμμοχώστου επί βενετοκρατίας (ΙΣΤ’ αι.)», *Επετηρίδα Κέντρου Επιστημονικών Ερευνών*, 25 (1999), pp. 79-130.

FORTIFICATIONS OF FAMAGUSTA



4 Diagram of the fortifications of Famagusta, by Xwejnusgozo. Source: Wikimedia Commons.

architectural design that is exceptionally successful and advanced by the standards of the day. Furthermore, because of its crucial importance to the Kingdom of Cyprus, the city served as the seat of the *capitano* of Famagusta, who was invested with administrative and judicial powers that were largely independent from those of the *Reggimento* of Nicosia. In fact, in peacetime the *capitano* was in charge of all the armed forces on the island, while in times of war or an emergency Venice would dispatch to Cyprus a *provveditore generale*, who would assume command of the troops.¹³

13 ARBEL, «Η Κύπρος», cit., pp. 459-460, 466-471; IDEM, «Κύπρος: Επαρχία της Βενετικής Δημοκρατίας. Συνέχειες και Ασυνέχειες», in Dimitra PAPANIKOLA-BAKIRTZI and Maria IA-KOVOU (Eds.), *Βυζαντινή Μεσαιωνική Κύπρος: Βασίλισσα στην Ανατολή και Ρίγαινα στη*



5 Kyrenia, eastern view of the fortress and the ancient harbor of the town.


Source: <https://www.romeartlover.it/Cipro4.html#>.

The Venetians also paid some attention to the fortress of Kyrenia (Cerines), the specifications of which, however, were only meant to meet the technological demands of the Middle Ages (Fig. 5). Thus, during the period from 1504 to 1528 a total of 33,868 ducats were expended for works on the fortifications of the fortress in question, according to the report of the *luogotenente* Silvestro Minio (1529). Furthermore, on March 11, 1562, the Venetian Senate voted to introduce a special tax to finance the fortress's reinforcement.¹⁴

As far as the island's lesser strongholds were concerned, the Venetians were content to either preserve or dismantle them. In the Kyrenia Mountains, the castles of Kantara (Fig. 6), Saint Hilarion and Buffavento (Fig. 7), though in use during the early Venetian period, were later abandoned. This was due to the overall defense strategy followed by the Venetians, who preferred concentrating their military forces in the coastal areas rather than splitting them among a large num-


Δύση, Nicosia, Bank of Cyprus Cultural Foundation, 1997, pp. 161-168; BIRTACHAS, *Society, Culture and Government*, cit., pp. 31-33.

14 ARBEL, «Η Κύπρος», cit., p. 473-474; BIRTACHAS, *Venetian Cyprus*, cit., p. 97.



6 The castle of Kantara. Source: Alexander DRUMMOND, *Travels through different Cities of Germany, Italy, Greece, and several parts of Asia [...]*, London, W. Strahan for the author, 1754.

ber of smaller forts, especially inland ones. However, in the case of Cyprus not even this strategy was implemented with any sort of consistency, since the fate of the castles along the Kyrenia Mountains was shared by the fortresses of Limassol and Paphos. In the case of the former, after the surprise Ottoman raid of 1539 the Venetians decided to demolish the castle of Limassol, so that it would not be used as an enemy stronghold in a similar future circumstance. As for Paphos, the two small coastal castles were neglected and in 1540 the city's fortress was demolished. In 1558, Giulio Savorgnan proposed building three new fortresses along the coastal regions of the island (outside Paphos, in Saint Nicholas of the Cats and



7 The castles of Saint Hilarion and Buffavento. Source: Alexander DRUMMOND, *Travels through different Cities of Germany, Italy, Greece, and several parts of Asia [...]*, London, W. Strahan for the author, 1754.

in the vicinity of Kyrenia), so that a potential Ottoman attack could be repulsed.¹⁵ A few years later, in 1567, Giulio proposed the construction of a fortress in the Saline, which had developed into an important financial center for transit trade with Syria. This plan, however, never materialized, a fact that made it easier for the Ottomans to launch an amphibious assault in that very area in June of 1570. Therefore, Nicosia and Famagusta were the Venetians main centers of resistance; consequently, it was there that the outcome of the War of Cyprus and the political fortunes of the island would be decided.¹⁶

The role of the Cypriot élite in the defense of the island

Let us examine the reasons for the Cypriot élite's peaceful cooperation with the Venetian authorities from the beginning of the Venetian rule throughout the period. After the annexation of the Kingdom of Cyprus to the Venetian Maritime State, the new overlords kept the institutional framework of the existing feudal system unchanged. Years of experience in colonial administration had taught them that a radical shake-up in the institutions could bring about political and social unrest. Thus, throughout the Venetian presence on the island, collaboration between the upper classes and the overlords was taken for granted. A telltale sign of the cooperation between the two parts was the decision of Venice to create, shortly before the fall of the island (1566), a Council consisting of 11 members of the Cypriot élite, that would aid the Venetian *luogotenente* in discharging his duties.¹⁷

During the Venetian period, the aristocracy on Cyprus included families of French, Spanish, Venetian, Syrian and Greek-Cypriot descent. They formed the backbone of the upper-echelon social group of feudal lords, nobles andbour-

15 GRIVAUD, *Venice and the Defence*, cit., p. 87-88.

16 BIRTACHAS, *Society, Culture and Government*, cit., p. 63; Angel NICOLAOU-KONNARI and Chris SCHABEL, «Limassol under Latin Rule», in Angel NICOLAOU-KONNARI and Chris SCHABEL (Eds.), *Lemesos. A History of Limassol in Cyprus from Antiquity to the Ottoman Conquest*, Newcastle, Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2015, pp. 351-352.

17 Benjamin ARBEL, «The Cypriot Nobility from the Fourteenth to the Sixteenth Century: A New Interpretation», in Benjamin ARBEL, Bernard HAMILTON and David JACOBY (Eds.), *Latins and Greeks in the Eastern Mediterranean after 1204*, London, Frank Cass, 1989, pp. 177-178; ARBEL, «Η Κύπρος», cit., pp. 489-498; BIRTACHAS, *Venetian Cyprus*, cit., pp. 325-326, 331-332, 488-489 (Report of Giovanni [Zuan] Francesco Stella).

geois. This privileged élite, consisting of approximately 180-200 families, derived substantial income from landed estates and capitalizing on the island's agricultural production.¹⁸ The aforementioned aristocrats owned palaces in the island's capital, which was the seat of the college of governors (*Reggimento*, also known as *Rettori*), and at the same time they maintained country houses on their fiefs. Ten families were particularly prominent among the local élite and played an important role in the affairs of the island, interfering with the decisions of the aristocratic community's council, holding a monopoly on public offices and receiving the bulk of the agricultural production. They were the families of Singlitico, Podocataro, de Nores, Sozomeno, Negron, Costanzo, Davila, Fabrice, Flatro, and Acres (or Dacres). Their financial clout and social prestige were enhanced during the Venetian period thanks to those families' transactions, and the close ties they developed, with their overlords, as well as to the marriage alliances they concluded with Venetian patricians.¹⁹ Moreover, the pursuit of public and ecclesiastical offices on the part of the higher echelons of local society aimed both at supplementing their income and at ensuring the financial security of those younger family members who – due to paternal estates being inherited solely by

18 Wipertus H. RUDT DE COLLENBERG, «Δομή και προέλευση της τάξεως των ευγενών», in Theodoros PAPADOPoulos (Ed.), *Ιστορία της Κύπρου*, Vol. 4, *Μεσαιωνικόν Βασίλειον-Βενετοκρατία*, Nicosia, Archbishop Makarios III Foundation / Office for Cyprus History, 1995, pp. 831-832; Aikaterini ARISTEIDOU, «Ένοικιάσεις και πωλήσεις φέουδων επί Βενετοκρατίας στην Κύπρο κατά την περίοδο 1509-1517», *Επετηρίδα Κέντρου Επιστημονικών Ερευνών*, 23 (1997), pp. 115-123. Also see Miriam Rachel SALZMANN, *Negotiating Power and Identities. Latin, Greek and Syrian Élites in Fifteenth-Century Cyprus*, Mainz, Verlag de Römischt – Germanischen Zentralmuseums, 2021.

19 Among the noble families of Cyprus that formed marriage alliances with Venetian families were, e.g., the de Nores family with the Querini, Orio, Pesaro, and Corner families; the Podocataro family with the Pesaro, Querini, Michiel, and Zorzi families; the family of Singlitico with the Pesaro and Barbarigo families, etc. See ARBEL, «Η Κύπρος», cit., p. 496; RUDT DE COLLENBERG, «Δομή και προέλευση», cit., p. 829 fn. 40, 834-837; Nasa PATAPIOU, «Ο Κύπριος έμπορος Florio Audet. Συμβολή στην προσωπογραφία Κυπρίων επί βενετοκρατίας», *Επετηρίδα Κέντρου Επιστημονικών Ερευνών*, 31 (2005), pp. 147-148; BIRTACHAS, *Venetian Cyprus*, cit., pp. 417, 420-421; Stathis BIRTACHAS, «Produzione di cereali e crisi alimentare e sociale a Cipro veneziana (1560-70): la testimonianza dei pubblici rappresentanti nelle loro relazioni finali», in Bruno CREVATO-SELVAGGI (Ed.), *Atti del VIII Convegno internazionale Venezia e il suo Stato da mar. Alimentazione, cibo, gastronomia nello Stato da mar / Proceedings of the 8th International Congress Venice and its Stato da Mar. Food and Gastronomy in the Venetian Stato da Mar (Venezia / Venice, 13-15 febbraio / February 2020)*, Rome, Società Dalmata di Storia Patria, 2022, pp. 295-296.

firstborn children – did not possess land.²⁰

Apart from their participation in the administration of the island, some feudal lords and nobles bought baronial titles from the *Serenissima*, after the families of the original holders had died out. This process begins with Giorgio Contarini, cousin of Queen Caterina Cornaro, who secured the title of County of Jaffa (1476).²¹ Afterwards, in the 1520s, the hereditary title of count was acquired by the scions of families in possession of substantial wealth, namely the Singlitico and the de Nores. Specifically, Eugenio (Zegno) Singlitico received the title of County of Rochas in 1521 and Zuan (Jean) de Nores that of County of Tripoli in 1529. The aforementioned titles had originated in the Crusader states of Syria and Palestine.²²

Collaboration between local élites and the island's Venetian administration was mutually beneficial: on the one hand, the former secured a series of privileges and a share in controlling the local administrative machinery; on the other, it was viewed by the latter as a necessary tool in dealing with the various political and socio-economic problems that might arise, as was all too often the case with the feudal lords and nobles in Crete.²³ Thus, apart of course from the military service owed by the – by now obsolete – feudal cavalry to the ruler,²⁴ the Cypriot élites provided their support to the Venetian administration on a number of occasions. It happened, for example, in 1537, when Hayreddin Barbarossa attacked Corfu (August 27, 1537).²⁵ It was then that the Cypriot feudal lord Giacomo Singlitico

20 ARBEL, «The Cypriot Nobility», cit., pp. 175–190; IDEM, «Η Κύπρος», cit., pp. 489–498; Aikaterini ARISTEIDOU, «Πλούσιοι και φτωχοί στη βενετοκρατούμενη Κύπρο», in Chryssa MALTEZOU (Ed.), *Διεθνές Συμπόσιο: Πλούσιοι και φτωχοί στην κοινωνία της ελληνολατινικής Ανατολής*, Venice, Hellenic Institute of Byzantine and Post-Byzantine Studies, 1998, p. 385; BIRTACHAS, *Society, Culture and Government*, cit., pp. 86–87.

21 RUDT DE COLLENBERG, «Δομή και προέλευση», cit., p. 832.

22 Jean RICHARD, «Pairie d'Orient latin: les quatre baronnies des Royaumes de Jérusalem et de Chypre», *Revue Historique de Droit Français et Étranger*, 27 (1950), pp. 67–88; IDEM, *Orient et Occident au Moyen Âge: contacts et relations (XIIe–XVe s.)*, London, Variorum Reprints, 1976, cap. XV; Benjamin ARBEL, «Greek Magnates in Venetian Cyprus: The Case of the Singlitico Family», *Dumbarton Oaks Papers*, 49 (1995), p. 330; IDEM, «Η Κύπρος», cit., pp. 491–493.

23 BIRTACHAS, *Society, Culture and Government*, cit., p. 102.

24 Gilles GRIVAUD and Aspasia PAPADAKI, «L'institution de la *mostra generale* de la cavalerie féodale en Crète et en Chypre vénitienne durant le XVIe siècle», *Studi Veneziani*, n.s., 12 (1986), pp. 165–199.

25 Eugenio BACCHION, *Il dominio veneto su Corfù (1386–1797)*, Venice, Altino, 1956, pp. 69–

reinforced the Venetian military forces on Corfu by sending money, grain, rusk, and cotton («[...] 8,410 staria di formento, et cantari cipriotti 120 di biscotto et il tratto in danari, di 25 sacchi di cotton [...]»).²⁶ The supplies Giacomo shipped to Corfu were especially valuable in times of military conflict, since they constituted basic necessities.²⁷ Additionally, Giacomo reinforces the garrisons of Kyrenia and Lapethos with soldiers and horses from his fiefs. These actions only become known to us several decades later, in 1613, when Caterina, daughter of Giacomo Singlitico, fled to Venice after the fall of Nicosia to the Ottomans (1570). In a petition addressed to the Venetian Senate, Caterina emphasized her family's contribution not only during the War of Cyprus, but also throughout the period of Venetian domination on the island, and asked for the financial aid of five ducats that she received from the Venetian state every month to be transferred after her death to her niece, Cecilia de Nores. In recognition of her family's services and sacrifices, on March 29, 1613, the Senate approved her request.²⁸

81; Michael MALLETT and John HALE, *Military Organization of a Renaissance State: Venice, c. 1400 to 1617*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1984, pp. 227-233; Elli YOTOPOLOU-SISSILIANOU, «Οι Τούρκοι στην Κέρκυρα», in Ennio CONCINA and Aliki NIKIFOROU-TESTONE (Eds.), *Κέρκυρα: Ιστορία, Αστική ζωή και Αρχιτεκτονική 14ος-19ος αι.*, Corfu, Cultural Association "Korkyra", 1994, pp. 49-58.

26 ARCHIVIO DI STATO DI VENEZIA (hereafter: ASV), Senato, Terra, filza 205, unnumbered fols, August 14, 1612.

27 Grain and rusks were necessary for the troops, as were rusks for feeding the crews of both warships and merchantmen. The production of rusk took place mainly in Venice, as well as in major harbors of the *stato da mar*, such as Famagusta and Candia. Large quantities of grain were needed to make rusk and in Cyprus this crop was found in abundance. See Charalambos GASPARIS, «Εμπόριο και φορολόγηση προϊόντων», in Chryssa MALTEZOU (Ed.), *Βενετοκρατούμενη Ελλάδα. Προσεγγίζοντας την ιστορία της*, Venice, Hellenic Institute of Byzantine and Post-Byzantine Studies in Venice, 2010, pp. 256-257; BIRTACHAS, *Venetian Cyprus*, cit., pp. 233, 234-235, 314, 366.

28 Caterina resided in Nicosia and during the Siege of the city she lost seven of her children, along with several other members of her family (five brothers, among them the *collaterale generale*, county Eugenio Singlitico). After the conquest of Nicosia, Caterina was taken prisoner by the Ottomans and, after her release, she settled in Venice with her only surviving child, Francesco. For the petition of Caterina Singlitico, see ASV, Senato, Terra, filza 205, unnumbered fols, August 14, 1612. For the Senate's approval, see ASV, Senato, Terra, reg. 83, fol. 47r (olim 24r), March 29, 1613. Cf. Chrysovalantis PAPADAMOU, *Cypriot Refugees in Venice after the War of Cyprus (1570-71). Reconstruction of Everyday Life, Social and Cultural Integration (1570-1650)* [Κύπριοι πρόσφυγες στη Βενετία μετά τον Πόλεμο της Κύπρου (1570-71). Ανασυγκρότηση του βίου, κοινωνική και πολιτισμική ένταξη (1570-1650)], PhD diss., Nicosia, University of Cyprus, 2019, pp. 212, 457.

Because of the Ottoman danger, cooperation between local élites and the *Reggimento* of Cyprus intensified during the 1560s. As Bernardin Belegno, outgoing counsellor to the *luogotenente* of Nicosia, pointed out in his final report (1563), the local élite was willing to assist the Venetian administration in an emergency, despite the fact that their ranks included rich and powerful families that could cause problems for the dominant city.²⁹ Two years later, in his final report (1565), the outgoing *provveditore generale* and *sindico* Bernardo Sagredo also stressed the deference shown to the island's administrators by the aristocracy.³⁰

The Venetians knew that, if the interests of the Cypriot aristocracy were jeopardized, a backlash was definitely to be expected. Thus, in the face of the Ottoman danger, they tried to follow a conciliatory policy, as was characteristically the case a few years prior to the Ottoman invasion, when the Cypriot élite was included in the administration's decision-making process. Specifically, in early 1559 the Community of the feudal lords, nobles and bourgeois of Nicosia dispatched two delegations to Venice, spurred on by the recommendations of the military experts who had been sent to the island to propose solutions on how better to organize its defense. The first delegation was dispatched after Ercole Martinengo proposed building an additional fortress on the island. The delegation, consisting of Eugenio Singlitico, Giacomo de Nores and Andrea San Zuanne, asked the senators to select the territory of Kyrenia as the site where the new fortress was to be constructed (January 7, 1559). The reason behind this was that the port in question was only a short distance from Nicosia. At the same time, it stressed the inadequacy of the fortress of Famagusta to protect the Cypriot population in the event of an invasion. Finally, it demanded that additional military forces be dispatched to the island. In fact, in an effort to put even more pressure on the *Serenissima* to meet its demands, the Community of Nicosia sent a second delegation to Venice, consisting of Tuttio Costanzo, Zufre Babin, Hieronimo Attar, Hieronimo Bustron, Ugo Flatro, Piero Hierusalem, and Hieronymo Zappe (February 24, 1559). The second delegation reiterated the requests of the first and, in addition, accused the *capitano* of Famagusta of oppressing the nobles. However, Venice only met the Cypriot aristocrats' demands in part, sending military forces to the island. As for the construction of a new fortress, the Senate did not reach a decision, wishing to

29 BIRTACHAS, *Venetian Cyprus*, cit., pp. 261, 376, 386.

30 *Ibid.*, pp. 315, 397.

consult beforehand with its experts.³¹

Consequently, in 1562 the Senate dispatched Ascanio Savorgnan to the island for an on-site inspection of defensive preparations. In a report submitted to the Venetian Senate, Savorgnan noted that Nicosia was not in any imminent danger, since it lay far from the coasts, and for this reason its fortifications should not be further reinforced. This view of his encountered stiff opposition from the noblemen who lived in Nicosia, due to the existential threat their families and fortunes faced. These noblemen demanded the immediate reinforcement of the capital city's fortress. As a result of their pressure, and to avoid unpleasant complications, the Venetian administration acquiesced to the demands of the Cypriot élite and went ahead with the reinforcement and refurbishment of the city walls of Nicosia.³²

Thus, despite the differences, and in addition to the manpower they provided from their fiefs, the feudal lords also spent significant sums of money for the completion of the fortifications of Nicosia. More specifically, the island's financially prosperous feudal families offered (from 1567 onwards) the Venetian administration 10,000 ducats each. In return for this financial contribution, the administration went on to name 7 of the 11 bastions after the families that had contributed to their construction: Rochas (Singlitico), Tripoli (de Nores), Podocatario, Flatro, Caraffa, Costanzo, and Davila (Fig. 8).³³

Apart from the above-mentioned families, there were also those who spent smaller amounts of cash on strengthening the island's defenses, such as Giovanni Paolo Bustron, son of the late Gieronimo, cavalier, who shortly before the invasion of the Ottoman forces gave the administration 2,100 ducats, as well as 7,000 *mozza* of grain from his fiefs.³⁴ Demetrio Fini did the same, offering significant sums of money to reinforce Nicosia, as well as a large – though undefined – number of foot soldiers and cavalry.³⁵


31 GRIVAUD, *Venice and the Defence*, cit., pp. 114-121.

32 GRIVAUD, «Η κατάκτηση της Κύπρου», cit., pp. 147-148.

33 BIRTACHAS, *Society, Culture and Government*, cit., pp. 61-62.

34 ASV, Senato, Mar, filza 97, unnumbered fols, June 17, 1587.

35 The information in question, as well as others regarding the contribution of the Fini family to the defense of Nicosia, are drawn from petitions by Vincenzo, grandson of the aforementioned Demetrio and son of Emanuel, to the Venetian authorities to be awarded Venetian nobility (1649), as well as the prestigious office of the Procurator of Saint Mark



8 Nicosia and its fortifications. The Venetian administration named 7 of the 11 bastions after the families that had contributed to their construction. Source: Giovanni Francesco CAMOCIO, *Isole famose porti, fortezze, e terre maritime sottoposte alla Ser.ma Sig.ria di Venetia, ad altri Principi Christiani, et al Sig.or Turco, novamente poste in luce*, Venice, alla libraria del segno di S. Marco, [ca. 1574].

In addition, more than a few aristocrats agreed to sacrifice their luxury res-

(*Procuratore di San Marco*) [1658]. See a passage from the 1649 petition of Vicenzo Fini: «[...] Obblando le memorie più antiche e brevemente restringendosi a questi ultimi tempi, sempre memorabile per le lagrime sempre fresche in piangerne l'eccidio, furono il padre e l'avo miei che difesero col petto e con l'oro Nicosia, che sostennero a proprie spese numero grande di milizie a piedi ed a cavallo e che somministrarono più volte somme grandi di denaro a rappresentanti eccellentissimi in sovvegno di quegli urgentissimi disastri. Fu pure l'avo istesso, furono quattro i suoi figliuoli che fra gl'incendi di quelle armi sulle mura della città assediata e combattute imprimerono col sangue i cattaveri sopra i loro bene-

idences to the expansion and reinforcement of the new city walls of Nicosia. Specifically, the administration proceeded with the demolition of 1,800 houses, 11 palaces, 3 monasteries and 80 churches, which resulted in the overall transformation of the cityscape.³⁶ Among the houses pulled down was the palace belonging to the de Nores family, more specifically to Giason de Nores, situated near the Caraffa Bastion; moreover, Giason de Nores also lost additional revenues amounting to 3,000 ducats.³⁷

Furthermore, shortly before the outbreak of war, Cypriot feudal lords organized, in collaboration with the Venetian administration, military units consisting of men from their fiefs, whom they drilled and armed at their own expense. For instance, Giofre Corner contributed to the defense of the island by recruiting and organizing 300 men of military age, whom he maintained at his own expense;³⁸ Giovanni Muscorno offered 200 foot soldiers from his lands to the defense of Nicosia, as well as his entire fortune;³⁹ on 1 May 1570, Alessandro Podocatario brought to Famagusta 300 foot soldiers from his fiefs, whom he supplied with clothing worth 341 ducats, as well as arms, while he also collected foodstuffs


meriti sepolcri [...].» See also a passage from the 1658 petition: «Questa ricchissima casa [...] del Regno di Cipro [...] ha goduto nobiltà e titoli qualificati; e nell'aggressione di quel Regno mostrò una generosissima fede verso la Serenissima Repubblica, avendo con milizie a piedi e a cavallo condotte a proprie spese sostenuto gran parte della difesa più agli ultimi periodi di Nicosia; resosi il predetto Vicenzo in Venetia dopo la perdita dal Regno ha continuato lo stesso zelo al pubblico servizio e merito li predetti onori [...].» Library of the MUSEO CIVICO CORRER, Cod. Cicogna 1064, unnumbered fols.; Chrysovalantis PAPADAMOU, «Cypriots in Venice after the War of Cyprus (1570/71): Prosopographical Approaches: The Case of the Fini Family» [«Κύπριοι στη Βενετία μετά του Πόλεμου της Κύπρου (1570/71). Προσωπογραφικές προσεγγίσεις: η περιπτώση της οικογένειας Fini»], *Thesaurismata*, 44 (2014), p. 228. A special study on this particular family is in preparation.

36 PERBELLINI, «Le Fortificazioni del Regno», cit., pp. 193-225; Gilles GRIVAUD, «Nicosie remodelée (1567). Contribution à la topographie de la ville médiévale», *Επετηρίδα Κέντρου Επιστημονικών Ερευνών*, 19 (1992), pp. 285-294; GRIVAUD, *Venice and the Defence*, cit., p. 270.

37 The demolition of the house of Giason is confirmed by a petition his wife, Lucretia Beneditti, filed to the Venetian Senate, requesting financial assistance: «[...] perso insieme con la patria tre mila ducati d'entrata, quando di più ci fu distrutto un bellissimo palazzo perché impediva la fortezza di Nicosia [...].» See ASV, Senato, Terra, filza 153, unnumbered fols., March 28, 1599; PAPADAMOU, *Cypriot Refugees*, cit., pp. 453-454 (the edited document).

38 On Giofre Corner, see ASV, Senato, Mar, reg. 44 (1578-1580), fols. 114r-v (olim 84r-v), March 7, 1579; ASV, Senato, Mar, filza 73, unnumbered fols. (November 8, 1578); PAPADAMOU, «Cypriots in Venice», cit., p. 228.

39 ASV, Collegio, Supplice di dentro, b. 6, August 29, 1578.



9 The Ottoman Siege of Nicosia (1570). Source: Giovanni Francesco CAMOCIO, *Isole famose porti, fortezze, e terre maritime sottoposte alla Ser.ma Sig.ria di Venetia, ad altri Principi Christiani, et al Sig.or Turco, novamente poste in luce*, Venice, alla libraria del segno di S. Marco, [ca. 1574].

(cheese, barley, legumes etc.) from his estates to feed the city.⁴⁰ It is worth noting that Alessandro Podocataro, along with his father Filippo and brother Tuzio, were the only noblemen who agreed to abandon their palaces in Nicosia and move with their military forces to Famagusta, following the order issued by the Venetian administration for the feudal lords' military levies to be split between Nicosia and Famagusta.⁴¹

40 Important evidence regarding Alessandro's contribution to the defense of Famagusta are drawn from a petition of his to the Venetian Senate. See ASV, Senato, Mar, filza 50 (1571), unnumbered fols., February 16, 1571.

41 GRIVAUD, «Η κατάκτηση της Κύπρου», cit., p. 167. Cf. Alessandro PODOCATARO, *Relatio-*

The meeting to discuss how to organize the defense of the island and what actions to take during the imminent Ottoman attack was held at the newly-built palace of Giacomo de Nores, County of Tripoli, in Asha [Assia] (April 6 or 10, 1570). The civil and military authorities of Nicosia and Famagusta gathered there: the *luogotenente* Nicolò Dandolo, the *collaterale generale* Eugenio Singlitico, Marcantonio Bragadin, *capitano* of Famagusta, and the *capitano* Astorre Baglioni, charged with organizing the Venetian resistance, first in Nicosia and later in Famagusta. A number of noblemen, including Marco Zaccaria, Giovanni Sozomeno καὶ Zuanne Bragadin, also took part in this council of war. Among other things, at this meeting it was decided to distribute the men of the civil militia (*cernide*) among the two urban centers (out of a total of 5,000 men, 3,500 were stationed at Nicosia and the other 1,500 at Famagusta), for Cypriot feudal lords to relocate to Famagusta to strengthen the city's forces, as well as to bring in the cereal crop or to destroy it, should its harvest prove impossible.⁴²

In addition to organizing military contingents, during the operations Cypriot noblemen were also commissioned as army officers. The following instances are listed by way of indication: Giacomo de Nores, Count of Tripoli, commander of artillery units, commander of a company of 70 pikemen and commander of a unit of feudal cavalry;⁴³ Ugo Flatro, who during the Siege of Nicosia was put in charge of the Flatro Bastion along with one of his sons and his son-in-law, Tomaso Ficardo, and also served as *luogotenente general della cavallaria della nobiltà*,⁴⁴ Paleologo Corner, son of the feudal lord Giofre Corner, who led a com-

ne di Alessandro Podocatario de' successi di Famagosta dell'anno 1571 ora per la prima volta pubblicata, edited by Andrea TESSIER, Venezia, 1876; modern edition in Paschalis M. KITROMILIDES (Ed.), *Κυπριακές πηγές για την ἀλώση της Αμυοχώστου*, Athens, Institute of Neohellenic Research / National Hellenic Research Foundation, 2011, pp. 37-87.

42 GRIVAUD, «Η κατάκτηση της Κύπρου», cit., pp. 52, 167-169.

43 Chryssa MALTEZOU, «Η περιπέτεια ενός ελληνόφωνου Βενετού της Κύπρου (1571)», in Theodoros PAPADOPoulos and Benedict ENGLEZAKIS (Eds.), *Πρακτικά των Δεύτερων Διεθνούς Κυπριολογικού Συνεδρίου*, Vol. 2, Nicosia, Society of Cypriot Studies, 1986, p. 237; ARBEL, «Η Κύπρος», cit., pp. 492; GRIVAUD, «Η κατάκτηση της Κύπρου», cit., pp. 126, 168-169.

44 The reference to Ugo Flatro is known through a petition his daughter Isabella submitted to the Senate on February 15, 1596: «[...] povera et infelice Isabella cipriotta fu figliuola del quondam signor Ugo Flatro, cavalier feudatario nella città di Nicosia, et relicta del quondam signor Tomaso Ficardo [...].» In her petition, Isabella detailed her father's contributions before and during the war. She further noted that her family offered money for the construction of a bastion in Nicosia which was named after them (Flatro) and that, during

pany of light cavalry (*stradioti*); the brothers Pier Paolo and Zuanne Singlitico, sons of Marco, who had bands of militiamen under their command; Alessandro Podocataro, who served as the commanding officer of a company of native men-at-arms; Hector Podocataro, who commanded a unit of foot soldiers; Giovanni Sozomeno, commander of engineers;⁴⁵ Emanuel Flangino, who led 100 defenders in Nicosia and, at the same time, offered substantial quantities of cotton for the protection of the capital's bastions;⁴⁶ Giacomo Zaccaria, who was in charge of 300 infantry;⁴⁷ et al. But the most important military position held by a Cypriot nobleman during the War of Cyprus was that of *collaterale generale*. By a decision of the Senate in 1570, Eugenio Singlitico, County of Rochas, was recalled from the Venetian *terraferma*, where he was serving at the time, and posted to his homeland of Cyprus, to assume the duties of *collaterale generale* alongside the Venetian *luogotenente* Nicolò Dandolo. These two men assumed command of the capital and the responsibility to defend it against the Ottoman invasion.⁴⁸

However, it was the miscommunication between military and civilian authorities, particularly the *Rettori* of Nicosia, that determined, in many cases, the outcome of the operations, tipping the balance in favor of the Ottomans and thus costing the defenders many lives. A characteristic example is the act of insub-

the Siege of the city, her father took command of the bastion in question. He was taken prisoner after the fall of the city; later he was ransomed by a merchant and fled to Venice, where he lived in poverty. It was there that he petitioned the government of Venice for financial assistance. Various individuals came forward to verify the claims in her petition, including Giovanni Sozomeno. In the end, the Senate voted to allow her a monthly pension of two ducats (January 15, 1599). See ASV, Senato, Terra, reg. 69, fol. 205v (olim 182v); ASV, Senato, Terra, filza 153 (1599), unnumbered fols., February 15, 1596.

45 Guido Antonio QUARTI, *La Guerra contro il Turco a Cipro e a Lepanto: 1570-1571. Storia documentata*, Venice, G. Bellini, 1935, pp. 266-269.

46 ASV, Notarile, Atti, b. 4853, fols. 104v-105v, August 7, 1577; and fol. 219v, November 29, 1577.


47 The information is drawn from a petition by the aristocratic brothers Alvise and Andrea Zaccaria (March 10, 1579), who served in the military forces of the Venetian *terraferma* in 1579. In this petition, they asked the Venetian government for an increase in their salaries. Furthermore, wishing to reinforce their argument, they noted that they had been loyal subjects of Venice, fought in the War of Cyprus, lost their fortune and relatives, and that their uncle, Giacomo Zaccaria, commanded 300 infantrymen. The Senate decided to raise the monthly salary of Alvise from 23 to 25 ducats, and that of Andrea from 20 to 23 ducats (May 25, 1579). See ASV, Senato, Terra, reg. 52, fol. 208v (olim 177v); ASV, Senato, Terra, filza 77 (1579), unnumbered fols., March 10, 1579.

48 GRIVAUD, «Η κατάκτηση της Κύπρου», cit., p. 169.

ordination of the *collaterale generale* Eugenio Singlitico during the landing of the Ottoman forces at Larnaca on 3 July 1570. Singlitico, in consultation with *capitano* Astorre Baglioni, commander-in-chief of the military forces, decided to repulse the Ottomans as the latter reached the Saline. Consequently, Singlitico, along with captains Andrea del Berretin and Lazzaro Coccapani, camped in the vicinity with a detachment of approximately 400 mounted *stradioti* and 100 arquebusiers, in order to keep the Ottoman invasion force under close surveillance and strike at the first opportunity. The agreed-upon plan was for the military force under Singlitico to join that of Astorre Baglioni, which was to come from Famagusta and consist of 300 horsemen and 200 infantrymen. Then the combined groups would attack the Ottomans. Disobeying the orders he had received from Baglioni, however, Singlitico refused to attack the invaders and ordered his troops to return to Nicosia, leaving Baglioni and his force exposed; shortly before reaching Larnaca, the latter were informed of Singlitico's withdrawal, at which point they had to return to Famagusta without having accomplished anything. In this way, the Venetian armed forces missed the opportunity to attack the Ottoman troops while the latter were landing on the island. It is interesting to note at this point that on July 5, 1570, the *luogotenente* Nicolò Dandolo was blaming the failure of the operation on Astorre Baglioni and not on Eugenio Singlitico, a fact that demonstrates the tense conflicts and lack of communication between the defenders' commanders.⁴⁹

Further evidence of this lack of communication may be found in another incident that took place during the Siege of Nicosia (Figs. 9 and 10), a few weeks before the fall of the city. On August 15, 1570, at the instigation of the *collaterale generale* Singlitico, it was decided to send a force consisting of 400 mounted *stradioti* and 2,000 Italian and Greek foot soldiers in a surprise assault to destroy the Ottoman cannons. Singlitico's proposal was approved by the Venetian *luogotenente* Dandolo, on the condition, however, that the Cypriot élite would not take part. The plan of attack that was drafted consisted of three parts. The first entailed a group of soldiers that would sortie from the Famagusta Gate, reach the vicinity of the Davila Bastion without a fight, there to give the signal for a second group to attack and then proceed to spike the enemy guns. The second part of the plan called for 600 soldiers to sally forth from the Costanzo Bastion

49 *Ibid.*, pp. 59-60 and fn. 54 (different versions of the incident by Venetian officials).



10 Map of Nicosia, by an unknown cartographer, depicts «Nicosia, royal city of Cyprus during its conquest by the Ottomans» in 1570 (24 x 34cm). B/2005/0,248 © The Leventis Municipal Museum of Nicosia. Courtesy of the Museum.

against the Ottoman forces, while the third involved an attack by the cavalry of the *stradioti* in support of the first group, who would attempt to destroy the guns. The operation, however, did not go as planned. As the troops were emerging from the Famagusta Gate, the Greek soldiers disregarded the orders issued to them and broke into a disorderly charge against the Ottoman forces, at the same time giving the signal for the second group to attack. Even though Dandolo was made aware of the misunderstanding that had arisen, his refusal to let the cavalry reinforce the attackers resulted in confusion and panic, and several defenders lost their lives. Dandolo's decision was caused by the fact that his explicit orders had been disobeyed by certain feudal lords, who got embroiled in the operation by surreptitiously infiltrating the ranks of the *stradioti*. As a result, the mishandling of the situation by the commanders and the insubordination of the feudal cavalry


led to the operation ending in failure and to the death of several officers and men who took part in the attack. Taking advantage of this climate of miscommunication and disobedience permeating the ranks of the Venetian army, the Ottomans mounted a vicious assault against the Costanzo Bastion, causing significant material damage and loss of life to the defenders. We should stress here the general phenomenon of widespread insubordination on the part of the noblemen and their unwillingness to participate in various critical stages of the Siege.⁵⁰

Ultimately, the Siege of Nicosia lasted 45 days. A number of different factors determined the outcome in favor of the attackers: the inability to complete the fortifications; the way the two commanders, Nicolò Dandolo and Eugenio Singlitico, as well as the feudal cavalry, mishandled the situation; the lack of communication between leaders and the men under them; and the lack of assistance from the outside world. On September 9, 1570, the Ottomans succeeded in storming into the city. Looting and slaughter lasted more than three days and, according to the sources, the victims on the first day numbered more than 20,000, with a proportionate number of prisoners. Several members of the Cypriot élite are included among the hundreds of victims. The fate of the aristocrats was sealed in the battles for Nicosia and those who survived the massacres were either hauled to the slave markets of the Levant or forced to relocate to the West; only a very small number remained on the island. According to the chroniclers of the War of Cyprus, the casualty rate among the noblemen who took part in the battles for Nicosia was particularly high.⁵¹

With regard to Famagusta, aristocratic participation in the city's defense was minimal compared to that of Nicosia, because most of them had congregated in the capital. Of course, the military situation in Famagusta was much better than in Nicosia, since work on the fortifications had been completed, the bands of merce-

50 *Ibid.*, pp. 76-77, 167.

51 Wipertus H. RUDT DE COLLENBERG, «Les Litterae Hortatoriae accordées par les Papes en faveur de la rédemption des Chypriotes captifs des Turcs (1570-1597) d'après les fonds de l'Archivio Segreto Vaticano», *Επετηρίδα Κέντρου Επιστημονικών Ερευνών*, 11 (1981-1982), pp. 13-167; IDEM, «Δομή και προέλευση», cit., p. 841. For lists of prisoners, see: BAŞBAKANLIK OSMANLI ARŞIVİ, Maliyeden Müdevver, defter 221 bis; Vera COSTANTINI, «Destini di guerra. L'inventario ottomano dei prigionieri e otore di Nicosia (Settembre 1570)», *Studi Veneziani*, n.s. 45 (2003), pp. 229-241; Stefanos KAKLAMANIS (Ed.), *Andrea Cornaro. Historia Candiana. Μια αφήγηση του Δ' βενετοούρκικου πολέμου (1570-1573). Κύπρος – Ναύπακτος*, Nicosia, Cyprus Research Centre, 2017, pp. 487-494.



11 The Ottoman Siege of Famagusta (1570–1571).

Source: Giuseppe ROSACCIO, *Viaggio da Venetia, a Costantinopoli: per mare, e per terra & insieme quello di Terra Santa [...] opera utile à mercanti, marinari & à studiosi di geografia*, Venice, Giacomo Franco, 1598.

naries were receiving their rations and salaries regularly, there was an organized hospital for treating the wounded, and, generally speaking, morale among both the troops and the population was high. In contrast with the situation that prevailed in Nicosia, where the defenders were discontented with the *luogotenente* Nicolò Dandolo, in Famagusta the populace had faith and trust in the supreme commanders Marcantonio Bragadin, Astorre Baglioni and Lorenzo Tiepolo.⁵² Thanks to the spirit of collaboration and determination these commanders exhibited, and to the loyal cooperation between them and their subordinates, the besieged put up a stiff resistance in Famagusta and the Siege (Figs. 11 and 12) lasted almost a year, causing significant loss of life in the Ottoman camp. Yet, the failure of the allied fleet to arrive and reinforce the defenders forced Bragadin,

52 HILL, *History*, cit., pp. 988–998; ARISTEIDOU, «Μεχμέτ πασά Σοκόλοβιτς», cit., pp. 73–74; FENLON, *The Ceremonial City*, cit., pp. 162–163; Federico MORO, *Venezia in guerra. Quattordici secoli di storia, politica e battaglie*, Venice, La Toletta, 2011, pp. 181–183.

the *capitano* of Famagusta, with the consent of its inhabitants, to proceed with the surrender of the city on August 5, 1571.⁵³

After the capitulation of Famagusta, some of its defenders were massacred, while others were taken prisoners. Because the city had surrendered, the Ottomans captured only a small number of prisoners. The survivors either left the island or chose to make their peace with the new political order. Especially the members of the upper echelons of society who submitted to the Ottomans remained on the island, participating in the Ottoman administration and, in this way, preserving their estates, or at least part of them. To achieve that, most of them converted to Islam. This is deduced from the fact that non-Muslims could not hold office.⁵⁴

The Ottoman conquest marked the end of a long period of Latin dominations (Frankish, Genoese and Venetian) on the island and the dismantling of the legal and political edifice it had imposed on Cypriot society, which was based on Western feudal institutions and the Assizes of Jerusalem. With the coming of the Ottoman overlords, the feudal socio-economic establishment was replaced by a military state with a combined secular and religious authority.⁵⁵

Conclusions

The *Serenissima* attempted in various ways to shield its distant possession of Cyprus. It was within this framework that, during the last decade of its rule on Cyprus, it stepped up measures to strengthen the defenses, dispatching experienced military consultants to the island and spending large sums of money to complete the works. While Venice was implementing its defensive strategy, the ruling class of the feudal lords, nobles and bourgeois of Nicosia, who understood that a possible political change would bring about either a loss of privileges and

53 HILL, *History*, cit., pp. 1008-1027; Gigi MONELLO, *Accadde a Famagosta. L'assedio turco ad una fortezza veneziana ed il suo sconvolgente finale*, Cagliari, Scepsì & Mattana, 2006, pp. 32-36; GRIVAUD, «Η κατάκτηση της Κύπρου», cit., pp. 113-117.

54 RUDT DE COLLENBERG, «Δομή και προέλευση», cit., pp. 840-841. Also see Costas P. KYRIS, «Modes de survivance, de transformation et d'adaptation du régime colonial latin de Chypre après la conquête ottomane», *Επετηρίδα Κέντρου Επιστημονικών Ερευνών*, 13-16, 1 (1984-1987), pp. 255-268.

55 Gilles GRIVAUD, «Δίκαιον – Οικονομία», in Theodoros PAPADOPOULOS (Ed.), *Iστορία της Κύπρου*, Vol. 6, *Tουρκοκρατία*, Nicosia, Archbishop Makarios III Foundation / Office for Cyprus History, 2011, pp. 274-275.


a reduction in its overall political and social power or its complete disappearance into the new regime, did not remain on the sidelines. Thus, it contributed to the fight against the Ottomans with men and supplies. In addition to cash donations, Cypriot feudal lords supplied significant amounts of grain and other materials from their fiefs, that would come in handy during the imminent Siege of Nicosia, as well as manpower, both for military service and as laborers in the fortifications. Of particular importance was the financial aid amounting to 10,000 ducats, that each of the seven wealthiest families of the island contributed towards constructing the bastions of Nicosia. In this way, on the one hand, they secured their families and estates, and on the other, they enhanced their prestige.

Throughout the Venetian period, the Cypriot élite developed strong relationships with the *Serenissima* and its senior officials, a fact that ensured mutual benefits and, of course, facilitated the imposition of Venetian rule over the local populations; on the other hand, it profoundly affected the efficiency and smooth functioning of the local administrative machinery. Not only did the significant political, social and financial standing of the noblemen of Nicosia ensure them access to the possession's Central Financial Office and Land Registry (*Secreta*) and Public Treasury (*Camera*); it also enabled them to forge marriage alliances with prominent families of Venetian patricians, to manipulate the policies of local officials, and even to influence the decisions of Venice itself on key issues, e.g. the defense of the island in the face of Ottoman expansion at the expense of the Venetian *stato da mar*. These phenomena are documented in the sources and reached their peak during the final decade of Venetian rule (1560–1570/1), going so far as to assume the character of a display of insubordination to the orders of the *Rettori* of Nicosia on the part of certain aristocrats. A characteristic example is their reaction to the views of the Venetian military experts regarding the usefulness of fortifying the Cypriot capital. In this case, in fact, the Venetian Senate chose to meet the exorbitant demands of its aristocratic allies on Cyprus, rather than adopt the militarily sound expert opinions mentioned above. Consequently, it went ahead with the reinforcement of the fortifications of Nicosia, thus creating a star-shaped enceinte with 11 bastions.

The non-alignment of members of the Cypriot élite with the policies of the rulers whenever they believed that their interest demanded it may be observed before, as well as during, the military operations against the Ottoman invasion forces. For instance, when, during the meeting at Asha (Assia), the Venetian com-

mand decided to split the military forces between Nicosia and Famagusta, only the members of the Podocatario aristocratic family agreed to abandon their palaces in the capital and move to Famagusta with the armed bands under their command. The rest of the aristocrats of Nicosia disobeyed the commanders' orders and refused to abandon the Cypriot capital. Another example of their disobedience to Venetian commands may be observed during the Siege of Nicosia: specifically, during the failed sortie organized by the *collaterale generale* Eugenio Singlitico (August 15, 1570). In the attack attempted against the besiegers, a number of noblemen disregarded the orders of the *luogotenente* Nicolò Dandolo, resulting in confusion and a breakdown in communication, which ultimately led to the besieged suffering a crushing defeat. After all, the poor cooperation between the noblemen and the Venetian officials had already been in evidence since the beginning of the Ottoman invasion. It was at precisely that point that the advantage of repulsing the numerically superior Ottoman forces at the Saline of Larnaca was lost. Even though Eugenio Singlitico and Astorre Baglioni had agreed to lead their respective military forces in an attack against the disembarking Ottomans, at the last moment the former recalled the military corps he commanded and returned to Nicosia empty-handed. The failure of noblemen and Venetian officials to work together reached a breaking point with the lack of communication between the two military commanders of Nicosia, Dandolo and Singlitico, a fact that greatly contributed to the capture of the city after a Siege of only 45 days. On the contrary, such phenomena were absent in the case of Famagusta, the fortress of which withstood the Ottoman Siege for almost a year.

As was to be expected, and as was intimated above, the Cypriot élite was harmed beyond repair by the outcome of the Venetian-Ottoman conflict in Nicosia. The noblemen of Nicosia lost their fiefs, numerous family members, their famed luxury palaces and their estates in general. Besides, the fact that the Ottomans had taken the city by storm and not by treaty meant that its inhabitants were not subject to the Ottoman law of war. According to the latter, those who surrendered voluntarily had the right to either convert to Islam or submit and pay a perpetual head tax. Those who refused to surrender, however, would find themselves subject to the practical consequences of the conquest: captivity or death. It should be noted that on this issue too the case of Famagusta is different, since the second largest city of Cyprus ultimately surrendered to Lala Mustafa Pasha and came under Ottoman military jurisprudence, as described above. Moreover,



12 The Ottoman Siege of Famagusta (1570–1571). Source: Giovanni Francesco CAMOCIO, *Isole famose porti, fortezze, e terre maritime sottoposte alla Ser.ma Sig.ria di Venetia, ad altri Principi Christiani, et al Sig.or Turco, novamente poste in luce*, Venice, alla libraria del segno di S. Marco, [ca. 1574].

the inhabitants of Famagusta who fell into Ottoman hands were definitely fewer when compared to those of Nicosia, because 3,660 people fled the city shortly before its capitulation.⁵⁶

Despite the above-mentioned problems in the relationship between the Cypriot élite and the Venetian administration of Cyprus, both before and during military operations, the loss of its army units and the treasure it had invested in the defense

56 GRIVAUD, «Η κατάκτηση της Κύπρου», cit., p. 98.

of the island, as well as the loss of its important possession, the *Serenissima* made arrangements, both collectively and individually, to alleviate the suffering of those who had escaped the War and were seeking refuge in the city of the Doges and the other possessions of the *stato da mar* in the Levant. It was the standing practice of the Venetian government after every Venetian–Ottoman conflict to succor the loyal subjects (refugees or otherwise) who had served it, by providing them with food, monetary assistance etc., by granting them land and/or by rehiring the war veterans in the Venetian armed forces.⁵⁷

In addition to posting noblemen from Nicosia who had contributed to the defense of Cyprus to various administrative and military positions, as well as offering them financial assistance, the Venetian government was also taking care to provide security to their wives and/or children. The response of the Senate to the petitions of the latter concerning the granting of financial aid was immediate.⁵⁸

In conclusion, the War of Cyprus (1570–1571) left its mark on the lives of the island's inhabitants regardless of their social background. As for the feudal lords, nobles and bourgeois in particular, the vast majority of them had linked their destinies with the Republic of Venice and lost their privileges, economic power, and numerous family members. This explains, to a large extent, the vast sums of money they expended on the island's defenses, the military equipment they provided during operations, and their personal service in the army. After the War, the survivors and those released from captivity settled in various other Venetian possessions or even in the city of the lagoon itself, where the authorities, in recognition of their loyalty and service before and during the War of Cyprus, offered them a chance to rebuild their lives; but not, however, the opportunity to reclaim

57 Typical cases of Greek subjects of Venice who received government aid after a Venetian–Ottoman conflict in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries included Naupliots, Monemvasians, Cypriots, and Cretans. See for instance Chryssa MALTEZOU, «Πρόσφυγες από την Κρήτη στα Κύθηρα (Αγνωστες πληροφορίες από το αρχείο των Κυθήρων)», *Επετηρίς Εταιρείας Βυζαντινών Σπουδών*, 39–40 (1973), pp. 518–526; Marianna KOLYVA-KARALEKA, «Αποκατάσταση Ναυπλιωτών και Μονεμβασιωτών προσφύγων στην Κρήτη το 1548», *Byzantinische und Neugriechischen Jahrbücher*, 22 (1977–1984), pp. 375–452. On the re-employment of the veterans of War of Cyprus in the Venetian army and navy, see Stathis BIRTACHAS and Chrysovalantis PAPADAMOU, «Veterans of the War of Cyprus (1570–71): Captivity, Liberation and Restitution through their Recruitment into the Venetian Armed Forces. A First Approach», *Nuova Antologia Militare. Rivista interdisciplinare della Società Italiana di Storia Militare*, 1, 3 (June 2020), pp. 113–133.

58 See e.g. ASV, Senato, Terra, reg. 69, fol. 205v (olim 182v); and reg. 83, fol. 47r (olim 24r).

their former grandeur and socio-economic status. Their contribution to the War is ingrained in Cypriot collective memories through the journals and memoirs some of them have left behind,⁵⁹ but mainly through the names of the surviving bastion of the city walls of Nicosia, the construction of which was funded by the major Cypriot feudal families.

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59 See e.g. PODOCATARO, *Relatione*, cit.; Giovanni SOZOMENO, *Narratione dell guerra di Nicosia, fatta nel Regno di Cipro da' Turchi l'anno MDLXX*, Bologna, per Biagio Bignami, 1571. Cf. BIRTACHAS and PAPADAMOU, «Veterans of the War of Cyprus», cit., *passim*.

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The Venetian fleet in front of Preveza, 1690. Oil on canvas, by an unknown artist.
Preveza, Photo Collection of the Actia Nicopolis Foundation.

Musical Responses to the Lepanto Victory Sources and Interpretations

by VASSILIKI KOUTSOBINA*

ABSTRACT: The present study explores the musical repertory composed immediately following the 1571 Battle of Lepanto, and during the ensuing decades, and places the musical works in the wider context of the festive and commemorative celebrations in praise of the victory. By interpreting the poetic and musical choices of composers who contributed to the Battle repertory under the prism of visual, textual, and symbolic representations of the Battle, the study brings forth the intricate political mechanisms of war- and power-rhetoric, of which Renaissance music was an integral part.

KEYWORDS: BATTLE OF LEPANTO, POLYPHONIC MUSIC, VENETIAN–OTTOMAN WARS, SYMBOLISM, ANDREA GABRIELI.

The artistic production that followed the victory of the allied Christian forces against the Ottoman fleet at the 1571 Battle of Lepanto has been without precedent. Magnificent visual representations, portraits of the main agents, engravings of the battle formation and the actual engagement, maps with the topography of the conflict are all familiar to the Lepanto scholar. The monumental narrative paintings by Veronese, Tintoretto, Vincentino, Vasari, El Greco etc. are replete with symbolisms, whose interpretations have been the subject of multiple studies. Some of the allusions therein are obvious, even if the spectator's gaze requires a few moments to become acquainted with the outburst of colors, objects, figures, and symbols. Others require a greater degree of familiarity with the historical events, the political context, or the circumstances surrounding the commissioning and execution of a work of art.

Literary testimonies memorializing the victory also abound, and their interpretation requires a careful first reading for an initial approach of their mediating mes-

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sages. Within such plethora of written testimonies and visual representations one is left to wonder whether the sounds of music contributed at all to the spectacular celebrations of the Christian victory. The answer seems self-evident: within the rich musical tradition of Renaissance Europe, in general, and Renaissance Italy, in particular, musical creation could not have remained indifferent. To the vast array of celebrations, ranging from triumphal processions, plays, poetry, and orations to paintings, sculptures, commemorative medals and woodcuts, composers throughout Italy, from Spain, and elsewhere contributed with polyphonic works both in the sacred and secular realms.¹ For the music historian, the Battle of Lepanto in fact stands out as one of the few, if not the only military confrontation of the early modern era to which composers responded so widely and unanimously.

Literary sources often refer to the magnificent music that was heard in one or another civic or religious celebration. Immediately after the victorious news reached Venice, Mass was sung in St. Mark with great splendor. Contemporary witness Rocco Benedetti talks about «concerti divinissimi», which combined both church organs along with various other instruments and singing, in an outpouring of divine harmony:

[...] si fecero concerti divinissimi, perché sonandosi quando l'uno, e quando l'altro organo con ogni sorte di stromenti, e di voci, conspiranno ambi a un tempo in un tuono, che veramente pareva, che s'aprissero le cattaratte dell'harmonia celeste, & ella diluviasse da i chori angelici.²

[...] they made the most divine concerts, as one or the other organ sounded together with all kinds of instruments, and of voices, keeping together the same tempo and the same tone, which truly seemed as if the cataracts of

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- 1 The literature on the festivities and artistic production in response to the Lepanto victory is extensive and growing. I will point out a few comprehensive studies that are pertinent to the present essay: Gino BENZONI (Ed.), *Il Mediterraneo nella seconda metà del '500 alla luce di Lepanto*, Florence, Leo S. Olschki, 1974, especially the essays Carlo DIONISOTTI, «Lepanto nella cultura italiana del tempo», pp. 127-151 and Anna ALLUCCHINI, «Echi della battaglia di Lepanto nella pittura veneziana del '500», pp. 279-287; Cecilia GIBELLI, *L'immagine di Lepanto: la celebrazione della vittoria nella letteratura e nell'arte veneziana*, Venice, Marsilio, 2008; Ernst H. GOMBRICH, «Celebrations in Venice of the Holy League and of the Victory of Lepanto», in Michael KITSON and John SHEARMAN (Eds.), *Studies in Renaissance and Baroque Art presented to Anthony Blunt on his 60th Birthday*, London, Phaidon, 1967, pp. 62-68.
 - 2 Rocco BENEDETTI, *Ragguglio delle allegrezze, solennità, e feste, fatte in Venetia per la felice vittoria*, Venice, Gratioso Perchacino, 1571, f. A4r. Unless otherwise indicated, translations are the author's.

celestial harmony have opened up, and she [harmony] poured forth from angelic choruses.

The present study places the musical works in response to Lepanto in the wider context of the festive and commemorative celebrations that followed the victory and interprets the poetic and musical choices of composers who contributed to the Battle repertory under the general prism of visual, textual, and symbolic representations of the Battle. Placed in this wider context, the study demonstrates how the common themes that emerged through the panorama of celebratory acts were appropriated and transformed via the medium of polyphonic music. But which were indeed these works, who were the composers involved, and why is the musical perspective so rarely included in modern discussions that tackle the different artistic facets of the victorious commemorations? The answer lies partly on the very nature of musical art and its medium of transmission, the musical score, that does not allow direct access to the final, in this case, acoustic result. In other words, the audience faces an artistic medium which cannot be captured without the specialized understanding of musical notation and, more importantly, without a mediator – the performing body – who will materialize in sound the written record during a live performance or through a recording medium.

In a series of essays published since 1987, Ian Fenlon has offered an overall review of the repertory composed in response to the Lepanto victory.³ David

3 A selection of Ian FENLON's writings include: «*In destructione Turcharum: The Victory of Lepanto in Sixteenth-Century Music and Letters*», in Francesco DEGRADA (Ed.), *Andrea Gabrieli e il suo tempo: atti del convegno internazionale (Venezia, 16–18 Settembre 1985)*, Studi di musica Veneta, Vol. 11, Florence, Leo S. Olschki, 1987, pp. 293–317; «The Arts of Celebration in Renaissance Venice», *Proceedings of the British Academy*, 73 (1987), pp. 201–235, and its reworking in Lepanto: «Music, Ceremony, and Celebration in Counter-Reformation Rome», in *Music and Culture in Late Renaissance Italy*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2002, pp. 139–161; *The Ceremonial City: History, Memory and Myth in Renaissance Venice*, New Haven, Yale University Press, 2007; «Old Testament Motets for the War of Cyprus (1570–71)», in Max DELAERE and Pieter BERGÉ (Eds.), «*Recevez ce mien petit labeur*: Studies in Renaissance Music in Honour of Ignace Bossuyt, Leuven, Leuven University Press, 2008, pp. 71–82; and more recently, «The Memorialization of Lepanto in Music, Liturgy and Art», in Paul BERNJAMIN (Ed.), *Celebrazione e autocritica: la Serenissima e la ricerca dell'identità veneziana nel tardo Cinquecento*, Rome, Viella, 2014, pp. 61–78, and «Music, Ritual, and Festival: The Ceremonial Life of Venice», in Kathelijne SCHILTZ (Ed.), *A Companion to Music in Late Sixteenth-Century Venice*, Leiden, Brill, 2018, pp. 125–148. In a recent article I have discussed in detail the allegorical implications of the Lepanto repertory and have pointed out a few works that are not included in

Bryant has proposed a number of additional polyphonic settings with possible associations to the immediate celebrations or annual commemorations of the Battle.⁴ The works securely attributed are either those whose edition or text make explicit reference to the Battle or one of its main figures or those for which external evidence strongly supports their inclusion in the Battle repertory. While this process may seem straightforward, several factors complicate secure attributions. First, a significant number of these works set biblical excerpts or employ allegorical language without direct reference to the event. Devising a Lepanto canon is further complicated by the nature of sixteenth-century musical sources. A brief digression on this issue will point out the obstacles that surviving sources of polyphonic music pose in assembling a corpus of musical works related to Lepanto.

The style of European and Italian art music during this period is that of vocal polyphony, that is, choral music in which multiple simultaneously unfolding melodies sing the same text.⁵ Typically, the choruses sung *a cappella*, that is, without any instrumental accompaniment, as was typical in sixteenth-century church practice, especially of this post-Tridentine period to which the Battle belongs. These choruses involved 4-6 different singing lines, which were printed in separate music books (the so-called part-books). Therefore, a complete edition of polyphonic music comprised a set of four or more part-books, one each for the soprano part, the alto, the tenor, etc. Every set was printed in a few hundred copies depending on the popularity of the composers or of the repertory. The loss of a significant number of such sources frequently results in a survival rate of a single copy, which is furthermore often incomplete, missing one or more of the part-books (in a comparison with the visual arts, this equates to a loss of half or more of e.g., Veronese's *Lepanto Allegory*). The immediate consequence is that the reconstruction of the

Fenlon's writings. See Vassiliki KOUTSOBINA, «Music at the Time of Cervantes: The Musical Imprint of the Battle of Lepanto», in Gerassimos D. PAGRATIS (Ed.), *Πόλεμος, Κράτος και Κοινωνία στο Ιόνιο Πέλαγος (τέλη 14ου–αρχές 19ου αιώνα)*, Athens, Ionian Society for Historian Studies – Erodotos Publishers, 2018, pp. 349-372.

- 4 David BRYANT's discussions of Lepanto repertory first appeared in his studies: *Liturgy, Ceremonial and Sacred Music in Venice at the Time of the Counter-Reformation*, 2 vols., PhD diss., King's College, University of London, 1981; «Andrea Gabrieli e la ‘musica di stato’ veneziana», in *Andrea Gabrieli 1585–1985, Catalogo del XLII Festival di Musica Contemporanea*, Venice, Biennale di Venezia, 1985, pp. 29-45.
- 5 It was not unusual, however, for composers to incorporate two different texts, especially in the genre of the motet.

work is not possible, something that hinders both its musical performance – thus availability to a wider audience – and its musical analysis, a process that can yield important information on how a composer “read” and interpreted through musical means the poetic text depending on the circumstances, the demands of his position, or the political agenda of the patron he was serving. This is particularly important since the humanistic sixteenth century increasingly valued the written word, and composers’ skills were measured according to their ability to project successfully and powerfully the emotions and meanings of the text they set.

From Fenlon’s and Bryant’s research, it becomes obvious that composers whose output is most securely associated with Lepanto were naturally serving within the orbit of the main figures and milieus that were involved in the formation of the Holy League and the execution of its objectives. The main participants of the alliance were the Republic of Venice, the Spanish Crown, the Papal States, the Republic of Genoa, and the Knights of Malta. As composers serving at ecclesiastical institutions were not obliged to compose exclusively sacred or liturgical music, the repertory under scrutiny involves compositions from both the sacred and secular realms. Table 1 presents a list of compositions attributed or attributable to Lepanto, arranged by genre.⁶ The main genres of the era – the motet, mass, and madrigal – are all represented in the panorama of Lepanto celebratory polyphony. By the sheer number of motets within the Table, it becomes obvious that composers chose the motet as the genre *par excellence* for their ceremonial compositions. Not restricted by the specific textual limitations of the Mass Ordinary cycle (Kyrie, Gloria, Credo, Sanctus, and Agnus Dei), these Latin poems sung by an ensemble of four, five, six, eight (or even more) singers offered a powerful medium of religious contemplation, replete with symbolic associations. In contrast to the fixed texts of the Mass, motets could borrow inspiration from any event of the Old or New Testament, and their lines could be paraphrased versions of the scriptural texts or entirely new poetic constructs.⁷ Therefore, these devotional liturgical or para-liturgical outlets of affective piety offered composers a forum for musical experimentation towards greater text expression, spiritual contemplation, and demonstration of compositional competency.

6 The list is by no means comprehensive as more works with connections to Lepanto gradually emerge.

7 For the polyphonic mass, composers traditionally chose to set the five texts of the *ordinarium missae* since Guillaume de Machaut’s first complete cycle in the fourteenth century.

Table 1 Polyphonic works attributed or attributable to the Lepanto victory^a

MOTETS	
Andrea Gabrieli	<i>Benedictus Dominus Deus Sabaoth</i> (8) <i>O salutaris hostia</i> (8) <i>Isti sunt triumphatores</i> (6)
Giovanni Croce	<i>Benedictus Dominus Deus Sabaoth</i> (8) <i>Percussit Saul</i> (8)
Giovanni Bassano*	<i>Beato virgo et martyr Iustina</i> (5)
Pietro Vinci	<i>Intret super eos formido: 'In destructione Turcharum'</i> (5)
Jacobus de Kerle	<i>Cantio octo vocum de sacro foedere contra Turcas</i> (8, 4)
Fernando de las Infantas	<i>Cantemus Domino: 'Pro victoria navalli contra Turcas Sacri foederis classe parta. Anno 1571'</i> (5)
MASSES	
Giovanni Croce	<i>Messa sopra la Battaglia</i> (8) <i>Missa Percussit Saul</i> (8)
Costanzo Porta	<i>Missa 'Da pacem'</i> (8)
MADRIGALS	
Andrea Gabrieli	<i>Asia felice – Et io più all'hor felice Affrica – Felice Europa</i> (4) <i>Sento, sento un rumor – Alla battaglia o forti cavalieri</i> (8) [the text does not specify a naval battle]
Giovanni Pierluigi da Palestrina	<i>Saggio Santo Pastor</i> (5) <i>Le selv'havea d'intorn' al lido Eusino</i> (5)
Giovanni Ferretti	<i>Quae pars est, ô Seli Salamelech</i> (6)
Ippolito Baccusi	<i>Fuor, fuori o muse</i> (6) <i>Ai più soavi accenti</i> (5)
Bartolomeo Lombardo	<i>Trionfo de la victoria navale de la Santa Lega</i> (5 and 6 voices, lost)
Joan Brudieu	<i>Oid los que'n la yglesia</i> (4)

^a Numbers in parentheses denote the number of voices. An asterisk indicates composers active in Venice or the Veneto.

Within the overall range of musical creations, musicians residing in or associated with Venice claim the “lion’s share” in the production of commemorative music. Indeed, by the middle of the sixteenth century the Basilica of St. Mark,

the Doge's private chapel and the principal church of the state, has become the most important center of music-making in Europe. The radiance of the *cappella marciana* was empowered not only by the Doge's political agenda of ensuring civic and religious superiority and control, but also by the city's vibrant trading scene and its flourishing music-printing and instrument-making industry. The position of *maestro di cappella*, held since 1491, acquired special significance and gravity with the successful career of the Flemish composer Adrian Willaert (ca. 1490–1562), who occupied the position from 1527 to 1562. His successor and disciple Gioseffo Zarlino (who served as *maestro di cappella* between 1565 and 1590) was one of the most influential musical figures of the sixteenth century. As the responsibilities of the *cappella* grew steadily with the addition of festal days in the city's calendar, the Procurators of the Basilica deemed necessary to institute another position of importance, that of organist, and, later, the position of *vice-maestro di cappella*. Under Zarlino's direction the organists assumed greater responsibilities as composers for the provision of official music.⁸ During the time of Lepanto, the position of organist was held by Andrea Gabrieli (from ca. 1566 to 1585), whose contribution to the Lepanto repertory is explored below.

Studies of the major themes in Venetian commemorative rhetoric of the Battle have demonstrated that the projection of the outcome as a victory of Christ and of Venetians as a Chosen Race – through parallelisms with the Israelites – permeate the celebratory language.⁹ This is most explicitly pronounced in the title of Celio Magno's popular 1571 play with music, *Il trionfo di Christo per la vittoria contra Turchi*.¹⁰ The theme of Christ's victory is naturally explored in the polyphonic masses related to Lepanto, but also more implicitly in the texts of the polyphonic motets. From Andrea Gabrieli's pen come the eight-voice motets *Benedictus*

8 Ellen ROSAND, «Music in the Myth of Venice», *Renaissance Quarterly*, 30, 4 (1977), pp. 519–521. Zarlino had established himself as a theorist of distinction with the publication of his treatise *Le institutioni harmoniche* in 1558, but apparently, he has not been equally interested in composition. Zarlino held the position of *maestro di cappella* during the Lepanto battle.

9 Further on this theme in Staale SINDING-LARSEN, *Christ in the Council Hall: Studies in the Religious Iconography of the Venetian Republic*, Acta ad archaeologiam et artium historiam pertinentia, Vol. 5, Rome, “L’Erma” di Bretschneider, 1974, pp. 139–149.

10 *Il trionfo* was a *sacra rappresentazione* performed in front of Doge Alvise Mocenigo on December 26, 1571. The music is now lost. Magno has also written *La bella e dotta canzone sopra la vittoria dell’armata della santissima Lega, nuovamente seguita contra la turchesca*, n.p., n.d.

Dominus Deus Sabaoth, O salutaris hostia, and the six-voice *Isti sunt triumphatores*. Bryant has attributed all three to some Lepanto celebration, although the relationship of *O salutaris hostia* and *Isti sunt triumphatores* still remains more tenuous.¹¹ Another eight-voice *Benedictus Dominus Deus Sabaoth* with identical text, this time by Giovanni Croce (ca. 1557–1609), appeared in a printed edition of 1594. Croce, a pupil of Zarlino, became *vice-maestro di cappella* at St. Mark's in the early 1590s and secured the position of *maestro* in 1603. His Ordinary cycle *Messa sopra la Battaglia* bears strong ties to Lepanto, while two more works could be Lepanto-associated: the motet *Percussit Saul* and the derivative mass, *Missa Percussit Saul*.¹² The only other extant Mass associated with Lepanto is the eight-voice *Missa 'Da pacem'* of Costanzo Porta (1528–1601), pupil of Willaert and a renowned contrapuntist, who has served briefly in Padua as *maestro di cappella*.¹³ While Croce's music appeared in print at quite a chronological distance from the 1571 naval confrontation, Porta's mass must have been composed almost immediately following the victory, as it is preserved in a manuscript dating from ca. 1574–1579.¹⁴ A final composition, a motet for five voices, also stems from Venetian orbit and presents yet another aspect of the impact of the victo-

11 Modern edition in David BRYANT (Ed.), *Concerti di Andrea, et di Gio: Gabrieli organisti della Sereniss. Sig. di Venetia [...] libri primo et secondo (Con privilegio, Venezia, Angelo Gardano 1587)*, Edizione nazionale delle opere di Andrea Gabrieli, Vol. 11, 1, Milano, Ricordi, 1989. The *Concerti* also includes the eight-voice madrigal *Sento, sento un rumor – Alla battaglia, o forti cavalieri*, also attributable to some Lepanto celebration. *Ibid.*, p. 17.

12 Bryant suggested that both *Benedictus Dominus Deus* and the *Messa sopra la Battaglia* were composed for a Lepanto commemoration. BRYANT, *Liturgy, Ceremonial and Sacred Music*, cit., p. 93 and fn. 405. *Benedictus Dominus Deus* appeared in Giovanni CROCE, *Motetti a otto voci [...]*, Venice, Giacomo Vincenti, 1594; the mass appeared two years later in Giovanni CROCE, *Messe a otto voci*, Venice, Giacomo Vincenti, 1596. It is possible that Croce composed the two works as part of his duties after assuming responsibilities as *vice-maestro di cappella* at the Basilica. This later date for the mass indirectly reveals the longevity of Lepanto commemorations in Venice. *Percussit Saul* and the derivative mass have been proposed also by FENLON, «Music, Ritual, and Festival», cit., p. 144.

13 Lilian P. PRUETT, «Porta, Costanzo», in *Oxford Music Online*, last accessed February 5, 2022, <https://www.oxfordmusiconline.com/>.

14 Loreto, Archivio della Santa Casa, Codex 34, ca. 1574–1579, pp. 133–175. This mass was not published with the twelve masses of Costanzo PORTA's, *Missarum liber primus*, Venice, Gardano, 1578. See Lilian P. PRUETT, «Parody Technique in the Masses of Costanzo Porta», in James W. PRUETT (Ed.), *Studies in Musicology: Essays in the History, Style, and Bibliography of Music in Memory of Glen Haydon*, Westport, CT, Greenwood Press, 1976, pp. 212 and 215. Modern edition in Siro CISILINO (Ed.), *Opera omnia*, Vol. 10, Padua, Biblioteca Antoniana, 1964–1970.



1 Icon (egg tempera on wood) of Saints Sergius, Justina and Bacchus, on whose feast day (October 7) the naval Battle of Lepanto took place; by the Cretan painter Michail Damaskenos (1584–1593). The author combined two traditions, depicting on the one hand the military Saints of the Orthodox Church Sergius and Bacchus, and on the other Justina, Saint of the Catholic Church and a patroness of Padua. The icon was transferred from Chandax (Candia) to Corfu after the Cretan War. Courtesy of the Antivouniotissa Museum, Corfu; West Narthex (A.M. 141). © Hellenic Republic, Ministry of Culture and Sports / Ephorate of Antiquities of Corfu.

ry on the Republic's festal calendar: Giovanni Bassano's *Beato virgo et martyr Iustina*, which however appeared in print much later, in 1598.¹⁵ The motet's text refers to Santa Giustina, whose name became inscribed in Venetian consciousness and memory as inexorably connected to the victorious outcome, since the

15 Giovanni BASSANO, *Motetti per concerti ecclesiastici a 5, 6, 7, 8 & 12 voci*, Venice, Giacomo Vincenti, 1598.

Battle took place on the martyr's festal day (October 7) [Fig. 1].

Gabrieli's motet *Benedictus Dominus Deus Sabaoth* provides an excellent example of symbolic synthesis, in which military imagery – and the allusions to the Battle it is able to evoke – is intertwined with the themes of divine intervention and of the Venetians as a Chosen People, within an overall framework of exalting thanksgiving:

Benedictus Dominus Deus Sabaoth. Benedicti qui pugnat in nomine Domini. Manus enim Domini fortis, et terribilis: manus Domini pugnat pro eis, manus Domini protegit illos. Pugnavit Sanson, pugnavit Gedeon: vicit Sanson, vicit Gedeon. Pugnaverunt nostri in nomine Domini: pugnavit Dominus pro nobis, et vicit Dominus inimicos eius. Laetamini, et exultate, et psallite.

Blessed be the Lord of Hosts. Blessed be those who fight in the name of the Lord. The hand of the Lord is powerful and inexorable: the hand of the Lord fights for them, the hand of the Lord protects them. Samson has fought, Gideon has fought. Samson has won, Gideon has won. Our men fought in the name of the God: the Lord fought for us and won over his enemies. Let us exalt and sing his praise.¹⁶

The text does not directly derive from the scriptures but is a synthesis of the invocation “*Benedictus Dominus Deus Sabaoth*,” which directly evokes the “*Sanctus-Benedictus*” section of the Roman-Catholic Mass, and thus to the Christian ecclesiastical ritual, with the Biblical image of the victories of Samson and Gideon, both liberators of the Israelites, with the intervention of God's hand. Both men's devotion to God secured them immense physical power through divine Grace. The specific lines set by Gabrieli was not a haphazard choice nor an isolated instance in Lepanto artistic production. In a letter to Ferdinando de' Medici about the sketches of his famous Sala Regia fresco *The Consigning of the Standard*, Giorgio Vasari expressed the wish that Divine Grace, a main figure within his painting, would utter the words “*Deus Sabaoth*”.¹⁷ Undoubtedly,

¹⁶ The motet was issued posthumously by Gabrieli's nephew, Giovanni. BRYANT (Ed.), *Concerti di Andrea, et di Gio: Gabrieli*, cit.

¹⁷ Vasari's intentions for the *Consigning* fresco were explained in a letter to Ferdinando de' Medici, dated 23 February 1572. The *Consigning of the Standard* was part of the triptych that Vasari was commissioned to execute for the Sala Regia at the Vatican palace. After Pius's death in May 1572, his successor Gregory XIII had the fresco recalled. Christina STRUNCK, «The Barbarous and Noble Enemy: Pictorial Representations of the Battle of

these are the very words which in the Christian Mass invoke God as a supreme general, the Lord of all Powers, who guides the wars against the church's enemies. In the synthesis of the two textual elements, the Christian and the Biblical, Gabrieli transmits the re-iterated idea of a powerful military Venetian Republic as a "messenger of God in the image of Christ."¹⁸ Divine intervention through the image of the powerful hand of God is also a common *topos* in textual and visual representations. Two papal medals struck in 1571 and 1572 also carry the same message: «Dextera Domini Fecit Virtutem» (The right hand of the Lord has shown strength) and «Dextera Tua, Domine, Percussit Inimicum» (Your right hand, Lord, shattered the enemy, Song of Moses, *Exodus* 15). According to the textual record, the latter motto was inscribed in the façade of Santa Maria in Aracoeli on the occasion of the Thanksgiving Mass that marked the culmination of Marcantonio Colonna's triumphal entry into Rome.¹⁹ Within the many examples in the stock of visual imagery, Vasari's *Battle of Lepanto* fresco (in its top left part) also features Christ hurling the thunderbolt against the Turks (Fig. 2).

The notion of God's hand intervening to crash any resistance has been reiterating in Spanish expressions of divine mediation in support of King Philip II. Fernando de Herrera's *Canción en alabanza de la Divina majestad por la victoria del señor don Juan*, otherwise known as the *Canción a la batalla de Lepanto*, is one of the most popular poetic commemorations of the naval victory in Spanish literature and unequivocally expresses the patriotic and religious spirit of Tridentine Spain.²⁰ Reference to the power of God's hand therein appears no less than ten times. Fernando de las Infantas's five-voice motet *Cantemus Domino*: 'Pro Victoria navalli contra Turcas Sacri foederis classe parta. Anno 1571' (see Table 1) vividly depicts the Israelites' crossing of the Red Sea and the destruction of the Egyptians. The motet's text derives from the Song of Moses, *Exodus* 15, and through its Pharaonic reference alludes both to the Spanish king's victory

Lepanto», in James G. HARPER (Ed.), *The Turk and Islam in the Western Eye, 1450–1750: Visual Imagery before Orientalism*, Farnham, Routledge, 2011, p. 219.

18 BRYANT (Ed.), *Concerti di Andrea, et di Gio: Gabrieli*, cit., p. 17.

19 For this info and for images of the medals see Rick SCORZA, «Vasari's Lepanto Frescoes: 'Apparati', Medals, Prints and the Celebration of Victory», *Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes*, 75 (2012), pp. 185–186.

20 The poem appeared at the end of Fernando de HERRERA's prose book, *Relación de la guerra de Chipre, y suceso de la batalla naval de Lepanto*, Seville, Picardo, 1572.

against the Infidels and to his fervent campaign for the defense of Catholicism against the heretical tendencies of the Reformation. The passage could not have been more pertinent in the parallels it draws between the fate of Pharaoh's army and the gruesome reality of the naval warfare: «Electi principes eius submersi sunt in mari rubro, abissi operuerunt eos, descendederunt in profundum quasi lapis» (his chosen captains also are drowned in the Red Sea. The depths have covered them: they sank into the bottom as a stone). In the next line the notion of God's powerful hand appears again: «Dextera tua Domine magnificata est in fortitudine percussit inimicum» (Thy right hand, O Lord, is become glorious in power: thy right hand, O Lord, hath dashed in pieces the enemy), the same passage that was inscribed on the papal medal above.²¹

In the context of the prevalent symbolic rhetoric that assigns the victory to Christ's divine guidance, it is possible to interpret an inherent musical feature that is present in most of the masses and motets of Table 1. With the exception of Bassano's motet for Santa Giustina and Vinci's *Intret super*, both for five voices, as well as the six-voice *Isti sunt triumphatores*, all other sacred settings employ an eight-voice texture.²² Such choice undoubtedly reflects the performance practice at St. Mark's, which, since the time of Willaert, has relied on the acoustic splendor produced by the antiphonal singing between divided choirs (the *cori spezzati*) often placed in the different arches and galleries of the Basilica.²³ It

21 Fernando de las Infantas (1534-ca. 1610), Spanish composer and theologian, moved to Rome in 1571 or 1572, with a pension granted by Philip II of Spain. His interventions to the Spanish king delayed the revisions of the Roman *Graduale* entrusted to Giovanni Pierluigi da Palestrina and Annibale Zoilo by Pope Gregory XIII. *Cantemus Dominus* appeared in Fernando de las INFANTAS, *Sacrarum varii styli cantionum [...] liber secundus*, Venice, Scotto, 1578; modern edition in Jorge MARTIN (Ed.), *Fernando de las Infantas, The Complete Motets: Motets for 5 Voices*, n.p., Ars Subtilior, 2017. Translation of this passage based on *The Bible: Authorized Version*, The Bible Societies, 1994. De las Infantas was especially attuned to the military expeditions of Philip II, since he had also composed the motets *Ecce quam bonum*, for the formation of the Sacred Treaty in 1570, and a prayer for the lifting of the 1565 Turkish Siege of Malta, titled *Congregati sunt* and subtitled «In oppressione inimicorum». The latter siege awakened the Christian powers towards the necessity of military unity, which resulted in the formation of the 1570 Sacred League.

22 I have argued elsewhere about the moderate textures of *Isti sunt triumphatores* and *Beato virgo et martyr Iustina*. KOUTSOBINA, «Music at the Time of Cervantes», cit., pp. 363-364.

23 For a study on the performance circumstances and practice of this repertory see David BRYANT, «The 'cori spezzati' of St Mark's: Myth and Reality», *Early Music History*, 1 (1981), pp. 165-186. These are the «concerti divinissimi» that Rocco Benedetti was referring to in the excerpt quoted above (see fn. 2).



2 Giorgio Vasari, *Battle of Lepanto*, Sala Regia, Vatican Palace, photo by Sailko 2017.
Source: Wikimedia Commons.

also denotes that these motets and masses were composed for some ceremonial occasion which called for the employment of larger forces, as certainly the commemoration of Lepanto would have been. Within the highly symbolic language of these settings, however, it is also possible that the unanimity in the choice of texture was not coincidental, but aimed at a heightened symbolic, albeit not verbal, representation of the Battle as Christ's victory effected via his divine guidance of the Christian forces.


In the medieval and renaissance Judeo-Christian tradition of Biblical exegesis, number symbolism flourished. Two of the most prominent exponents of this tradition had been St. Augustine and Hugo of St. Victor. Different numerological systems – Pythagoreanism, Neoplatonism, Babylonian astrology, and gematria (the derivation of numbers from letters, according to different number-alphabets) – were often conflated.²⁴ Number eight has been traditionally associated with the name of Christ and in the Bible with the idea of a new beginning and of regeneration (e.g., God chose to mark the new week on the eighth day). Above all, eight has come to be considered closely tied to the name of Jesus, whose resurrection marked a new beginning and regeneration.²⁵ Certainly, the victory at Lepanto marked a new beginning and an era of freedom from the Ottoman threat.

Most pronounced towards this interpretation is the choice of eight-voice texture for Jacobus de Kerle's motet *Cantio octo vocum de sacro foedere contra Turcas*. The theological meaning of such choice is thrown into relief, when one considers the context of the publication in which the motet first appeared. The *Cantio* holds a position of prominence as the only composition for eight voices concluding a collection otherwise devoted to five- and six-voice motets. The compilation's title clearly demarcates this setting «quibus addita est recens cantio octo vocum, de sacro foedere contra Turcas» from the rest of «quinis et senis vocibus», while at the same time betrays its last minute addition («recens») to the publication, which apparently was issued immediately after the victory, in 1572 (Fig. 3).²⁶ Yet, while the motet's expanded texture may be justified by its celebratory character, its verses provide further evidence of the Christological significance embedded in the number of the singing parts. The motet unfolds

24 Modern studies on medieval number symbolism include Vincent F. HOPPER, *Medieval Number Symbolism: Its Sources, Meaning, and Influence in Thought and Expression*, New York, Columbia University, 1938; rev. ed. Dover, 2000; Christopher BUTLER, *Number Symbolism*, New York, Barnes & Noble, 1970; and George FERGUSON, *Signs and Symbols in Christian Art*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1961.

25 In Greek gematria, 'Iesous' is represented by the number 888, thus establishing eight as the personal number of Jesus. An overview of musicological approaches to numerology in medieval and renaissance music can be found in Reinhard STROHM, «Numbers, Binchois, and Ockeghem», in Suzannah CLARKE and Elizabeth E. LEACH (Eds.), *Citation and Authority in Medieval and Renaissance Musical Culture: Learning from the Learned*, Rochester, The Boydell Press, 2005, pp. 160-163.

26 Jacobus de KERLE, *Liber modulorum sacrorum, quinis et senis vocibus, quibus addita est recens cantio octo vocum, de sacro foedere contra Turcas*, Munich, A. Berg, 1572. Fenlon does not mention de Kerle's motet, nor Porta's mass discussed above or Lombardo's cycle.



3 Discantus (top-voice) partbook of Jacobus de KERLE, *Liber modulorum sacrorum, quinis et senis vocibus, quibus addita est recens cantio octo vocum, de sacro foedere contra Turcas*, Munich, A. Berg, 1572. Attribution – Non-Commercial – Share Alike 4.0 International (CC BY-NC-SA 4.0) <https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/> deed.de. Source: <https://stimmhuecher.digitale-sammlungen.de//view?id=bsb00094023>

in five sections scored for different choir ensembles. The first and last sections, both on the same text («Gaudentes gaudeamus»), are scored for eight voices, while the middle verses are set for four voices in different combinations of register. In contrast to the allusive character of Old Testament themes that prevail in Lepanto-related motet repertory, de Kerle's *Cantio* refers directly to the Holy League and the victory of the Christians not only in its title, but also in the body of the text of its outer movements («foedus Christianorum»), and it is exactly those that employ the full eight-voice ensemble. Even more importantly, de Kerle, a Flemish composer who had spent most of his life serving religious institutions in the north, did not favor eight-voice textures whether in his secular or sacred output throughout his career, and certainly not in the 1570s, when the

Cantio was composed.²⁷ The only eight-voice compositions, aside from *Cantio*, come from much later and were included in a collection of four, five, and eight-voice sacred settings from 1585.²⁸ This selective approach towards eight-voice texture, even by composers further away from Venetian orbit, such as de Kerle, or its unique presence within Costanzo Porta's canon (in his *Missa da pacem*) is certainly intriguing. Within the symbolic and allegorical richness embodied in the celebratory rhetoric, the numerological interpretative approach is one of the many to be considered, especially since renaissance polyphonic compositions frequently incorporate numeric symbolisms.²⁹

Gabrieli's ceremonial motets are not his only contribution to the Lepanto festivities. Apparently, he was summoned to compose for the extravagant *mascherata* that took place during the following Carnaval. The *Ordine, et dechiaratione di tutta la mascherata, fatta nella città di Venetia la domenica di Carneuales*, printed in Venice in 1572, provides a detailed account of the event.³⁰ The spectacle included triumphal chariots (*carri trionfanti*), Turks disguised as slaves, and music. It required the participation of 340 people, and according to the printer's account 187 of them were the musicians. One of the chariots carried the personified figures of the three continents, who sung to Gabrieli's music. In this musical "triptych" Asia, Africa, and Europe sung each a four-voice chorus. The members of each choir were dressed accordingly to enhance the performance with a visual effect. Four singers in women's costumes "alla Turchesca" represented Asia. The second choir was dressed "alla Moresca" to personify Africa, while Europe was dressed "all'Italiana". In their lyrical, elegant verses all three continents express a "global" sentiment of relief in the aftermath of the enemy's destruction, and bring out a message of hope and brotherhood:

27 Wilfried BRENNCKE, «Jacobus de Kerle», in *Oxford Music Online*, last accessed February 5, 2022, <https://www.oxfordmusiconline.com/>.

28 Jacobus de KERLE, *Selectiorum aliquot modulorum*, Prague, Georg Nigrin, 1585.

29 See fn. 25. An extreme example of the symbolical potential of the number of singing parts in Renaissance music is Thomas Tallis's motet *Spem in alium* scored for 40 voices, divided in eight five-voice ensembles. It was possibly written for the celebration of the 40th birthday of Queen Elizabeth I.

30 *Ordine, et dechiaratione di tutta la mascherata, fatta nella città di Venetia la domenica di Carneuales. M. D. LXXI. Per la gloriosa vittoria contra Turchi*, Venice, Giorgio Angelieri, 1572.

Asia felice hor ben posso chiamarmi,
Ch'è vint'in mar di me l'empio nemico.
Ma più sarò quando con gaudio l'armi
De' figli miei faransi ogn'un amico.

I can now indeed call myself happy Asia,
since my wicked enemy is overcome at sea.
But I shall be happier still when with joy
the forces
of my sons will make each one their friend.

A brotherhood, however, that is subordinate to the hegemony of Europe and, more importantly, of Catholic faith. In a restrained yet polemical language Europe concludes the madrigal declaring:

Felice Europa anch'io godo non meno,
Chè più che mai con gloriose prove,
Hor sotto un vero Dio, non falso Giove,
Havrò del mond' un'altra volta il freno.

And I too, happy Europe, rejoice no less;
for more than ever, after glorious ordeals,
now *under a true God, not a false Jove*
[emphasis mine],


I shall have the reins of the world again.³¹

In post-Tridentine rhetoric, Catholicism was the sole guarantor of the Christian faith. One is left to wonder about the source of inspiration for this chariot. For a contextual interpretation we would have to turn to one of the most well-documented sources on the Battle's details: the enormous engraving of Michele Tramezzino printed in Rome in 1572 (Fig. 4).³² Many visual representations rely on the details that Tramezzino provides, and it has been demonstrated that Vasari's triptych at the Sala Regia owes a great deal to it.³³ Amidst the wealth of information, and in the central bottom part of the engraving, Tramezzino includes the arrangement of the three world powers (Fig. 5). Europe represents the united Christian forces, Asia represents the Ottoman world, while Africa stands for the north African pirates, who fought by the Turks' side. While it is certain that Vasari was well acquainted with Tramezzino's engraving, we cannot be equally certain about Gabrieli. Certainly, however, such symbolisms quickly became common

31 All translations from Andrea GABRIELI, *Complete Madrigals*, ed. Arthur T. MERRITT, Recent Researches in the Music of the Renaissance, Vol. 42, Madison, WI, A-R Editions, 1981, p. xiii.

32 *Disegno dell'armate, Christiana, et Turchesca [...] nell'andarse ad incontrare et il conflitto*, Rome, Michele Tramezzino, 1572. Digital reproduction in <https://militarymaps.rct.uk/other-16th-century-conflicts/battle-of-lepanto-1571-disegno-dellarmate-christiana>, last accessed February 5, 2022.

33 SCORZA, «Vasari's Lepanto Frescoes», cit., p. 154.



4 Disegno dell'armate, Christiana, et Turchesca [...] nell'andarse ad incontrare et il conflitto, Rome, Michele Tramezzino, 1572. Royal Collection Trust / © Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth II 2022; free for non-commercial use.

Source: <https://militarymaps.rct.uk/other-16th-century-conflicts/battle-of-lepanto-1571-disegno-dellarmate-christiana>.

stock, and travelled across places, media, and artists.

Given the leading role of Pope Pius V in the formation of the League and his perseverance in pursuing the alliance's objectives, it is indeed surprising that the victory of Lepanto has not left a more distinctive mark on Roman polyphonic repertory, despite the fact that Giovanni Pierluigi da Palestrina (ca. 1525–1594), prominent composer of the Counter-Reformation, was active during this period as *maestro di cappella* of the Cappella Giulia.³⁴ Although it is known that for Marcantonio Colonna's triumphal entry in Rome, mass was sung by the papal

³⁴ The Cappella Giulia was instituted by Pope Julius II in 1513 and was responsible for the performance of music in St. Peter. Palestrina has been serving as its *maestro di cappella* since April 1571.



5 *Disegno dell'armate Christiana, et Turchesca [...] nell'andarse ad incontrare et il conflitto*, Rome, Michele Tramezzino, 1572, detail. Royal Collection Trust / © Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth II 2022; free for non-commercial use.

Source: <https://militarymaps.rct.uk/other-16th-century-conflicts/battle-of-lepanto-1571-disegno-dellarmate-christiana>.

chapel – which implies the performance of polyphony – no such Ordinary cycle has been so far identified, leaving yet another lacuna in the ceremonial repertory. In fact, Roman musical responses to the Lepanto victory found expression not in the domain of sacred music, but in the secular genre of the madrigal. Palestrina composed the spiritual madrigals *Saggio Santo Pastor* and *Le selv'havea d'intorn' al lido Eusino* in praise of the Pope's divinely guided maneuvers and Don Juan's bravery, respectively.³⁵ *Saggio Santo Pastor* extols papal wisdom to which eventually the victory is attributed and, in its intentional historical reference to Constantine, the first Roman emperor, traces the sacred lineage of Rome's spiritual and state leaders. Such imperial references are common within the ceremonial rhetoric surrounding Colonna's *trionfo*. In the context of the historical events, the connection with Constantine was certainly explicit on the standard that the pope entrusted to Colonna to carry to Lepanto, and which bore the motto «In hoc signo vinces».³⁶ The same motto guided Constantine in his major victories that culminated in the Edict of Milan in 313. Upon Colonna's return, the glorious Roman past was furthermore evoked through the rostral column that Pius awarded to Colonna.³⁷ A sonnet by Petrarch, adapted to fit the occasion, was summoned to underline this event.³⁸ The sonnet derives from the *Canzoniere* (*Rerum vulgarium fragmenta*, no. 269), and the first stanza reads as follows:

35 *Le selv'havea d'intorn' al lido Eusino* makes also reference to the War of Cyprus. Both madrigals were issued in the *Quarto libro delle muse a cinque voci composto da diversi ecceentissimi musici [...]*, Venice, Gardano, 1574; modern edition in Giovanni Pierluigi da PALESTRINA, *Il primo libro dei madrigali spirituali a 5 voci secondo la stampa originale del 1581*, ed. Raffaele CASIMIRI, *Le opere complete di Giovanni Pierluigi da Palestrina*, Vol. 9, Rome, Edizione Fratelli Scalera, 1940.

36 SCORZA, «Vasari's Lepanto Frescoes», cit., pp. 147-148. Colonna's standard is now at the Gaeta Cathedral.

37 Rostral columns integrating rams of ships were erected since ancient Greek and Roman times to commemorate a naval victory.

38 Fenlon reports that the sonnet appeared in a broadside bound with Domenico TASSOLO and Baldassarre MARIOTTI, *I trionfi, feste et livree, fatte [...] nella felicissima, & honorata entrata dell'illusterrimo signor Marcantonio Colonna*, Venice, [Domenico Farri], 1571. FENLON, «*In destructione Turcharum*», cit., p. 301, fn. 13. I have not been able to consult this source, but the paraphrased sonnet accompanied by explanatory notes certainly appeared in Luigi Grotto's *Trofeo*, one of the most popular Lepanto publications. *Trofeo della Vittoria Sacra, ottenuta dalla Christianiss. Lega contra Turchi nell'anno 1571. Rizzato da i più dotti spiriti de' nostri tempi, nelle più famose lingue d'Italia. Con diverse Rime, raccolte, e tutte insieme disposte da Luigi Grotto cieco d'Hadria. Con uno brevissimo Discorso della Giornata*, Venice, Sigismondo Bordogna & Franc. Patriani, [1572], p. 79.

Rotta è l'alta colonna e 'l verde lauro	The high column and the green laurel are broken
Che facean ombra al mio stanco pensero;	that cast a shade for my weary thoughts:
Perduto ò quel che ritrovar non spero	I have lost what I do not hope to find again
Dal borrea a l'austro, o dal mar indo al mauro.	in north or south wind, from ocean to ocean. ³⁹

The lines were modified both to change the tone from dark to joyful and to underline the connection to Marcantonio Colonna and the rostral column:

Giusta è l'alta COLONNA, e 'l verde lauro
 Che fan grand' ombra al mio stanco pensero;
 Ritorna hor quel, che ritrovar non spero
 Dal Borea à l'Astro, ò dal mar' Indo a Mauro.⁴⁰

The text was «accomodato leggiadramente, e cantato sotto l'nome del Senato e Popolo Romano, in lode del Signor Marc'Antonio Colonna, mentre in Roma vittoriosa entra, in modo trionfale». This song, whether sung or recited, is much more pertinent than Fenlon suggests. Petrarch wrote the sonnet in 1348 on the deaths of Giovanni Colonna and of Laura. Giovanni Colonna, a cardinal who favored the return of papacy to Rome, was associated to Petrarch during the latter's exile in Avignon. The multiplicity of allusions across themes and time certainly did not go unnoticed in the context of the celebrations: the ancient roman past evoked through the reference to the rostral column (colonna) and the consequent pun with Colonna's name (inherent in the original poem), the recent Roman past which fought heresy (by reference to Giovanni Colonna), and its continuity in the present effected via Marcantonio Colonna (descendant of the same Colonna family with which Petrarch was associated) and Pope Pius V (in his efforts against Christianity's enemies).

In stark contrast to the language of the motets and madrigals or the Petrarchan sonnet (if it was indeed set to music) stand the popular songs that circulated in pamphlets recounting war events. The language therein becomes sarcastic and disdainful, and directly attacks the enemy. Many of these vernacular songs adopt

39 Translation in <https://petrarch.petersadlon.com/canzoniere.html?poem=269>, last accessed February 5, 2022.

40 Reproduced here from FENLON, «*In destructione Turcharum*», cit., p. 301, fn. 13.

the *ottava rima*, eight 11-syllable lines rhyming abababcc, which had become the poetic meter of choice to narrate war poetry in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. The texts, which were declaimed or sung to simple melodic formulas, are rich in negative, scornful adjectives for the enemy, and graphic descriptions of the realities of war. In contrast to the polyphonic compositions that required a trained chorus, these simple, improvisatory pieces were performed in public spaces and addressed a wider, often less-cultivated audience. A distinct series of texts called “lamenti” recounted the regrets of the enemies to have engaged in the conflict. Amidst the rich repertory of such ephemera emerge the verses of Antonio Molino, whose earlier *grechesco* poems were set to music by the most famous Venetian composers of the time.⁴¹ One of his contributions, for which no music survives, is the *Lamento de Selin* (Selim II), a dialogue of Selin with Molino’s alter ego, Manoli Blessi, also in *greghesco*. Selin laments his inevitable doom:

<p>Se da li Scithi torno, a la mia prola, no me cognoserà, ma via da drago me cacerà da loro in pene e in guai. <i>Di pistevò</i> [emphasis mine] più mai reposo aver.</p>	<p>If I return to the Turks, to my own home, My folks will not recognize me but like a dragon Will chase me away to pains and trouble. I don’t believe I will ever rest.</p>
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The poet advises Selin to follow the path of redemption:

<p>Tel segnarò mi, stolto: Returna el terre, e l’stadi, a chi hastu tolto.</p>	<p>I will teach you, imbecile: Return the lands and countries you have taken.</p>
<p>A chesto modo l’ volto To allegro tornerà, gratioso e humano;</p>	<p>This way your face Will become happy, gracious, and humane;</p>
<p>Nol sarasto plio turco, ma christiano.</p>	<p>You will not be a Turk anymore, but a Christian.⁴²</p>

41 The multi-faceted talents of Antonio Molino made him a popular figure in Venetian circles. Under the pseudonym Manoli Blessi, he established the genre of the *greghesca*, poetry in an artificial language mixing Venetian dialects and Greek. Andrea Gabrieli contributed seven songs in Antonio MOLINO’s, *Di Manoli Blessi il primo libro delle Greghesche, con la musicha Disopra, composta da diversi Autori*, Venice, Antonio Gardano, 1564, and dedicated to him his second book of madrigals of 1570. Literature on Molino is growing as he has attracted the attention of music, literature, and history scholars.

42 Text reproduced here from Guido A. QUARTI, *La battaglia di Lepanto nei canti popolari*

The association of the Infidel with the dragon, omnipresent in the popular verses and iconography of the 1570s, had made its appearance in musical sources around the middle of the fifteenth century, as the seminal work of Anne Walters Robertson has demonstrated.⁴³ The series of *Caput* masses and a *Caput* motet composed in the second half of the fifteenth century emphasized in musical terms the victory of Christ, Mary, or both over sin, a theological notion that had been represented in iconography and literature by the crushing of “the head of the dragon” (*caput draconis*). After 1453, however, the good-evil struggle began to be allegorized as an apocalyptic battle between Christian West and Islamic East.⁴⁴ In music, this change of focus became manifested in the abandonment of the “caput” theme and the emergence of the series of *L’homme armé* masses. In these Ordinary polyphonic cycles, the structural unit around which the polyphony is woven, the *cantus firmus*, becomes the popular melody *L’homme armé*, in which the “armed man” – the soldier of Christ or Christ himself – takes upon himself the defeat of evil, “the dragon”, now personified in the image of the Turk.⁴⁵ The decisive moment of the Lepanto battle, in the immediate aftermath of the horrendous events of the War of Cyprus (1570–1571), rendered the allusion redundant.⁴⁶

dell’epoca, Milan, Instituto Editoriale Avio-Navale, 1930, p. 189. The words «di pistevo» show the *greghesco* component.

43 ANNE WALTERS ROBERTSON, «The Savior, the Woman, and the Head of the Dragon in the *Caput* Masses and Motet», *Journal of the American Musicological Society*, 59, 3 (2006), pp. 537–630. Attention to the repertory of *Caput* masses was first drawn by Manfred F. BUKOFZER, «*Caput*: A Liturgico-Musical Study», in *Studies in Medieval and Renaissance Music*, New York, Norton, 1950, pp. 217–310.

44 WALTERS ROBERTSON, «The Savior», cit., p. 603.

45 The bibliography on the tune and its derivative polyphonic settings is extensive. A selection of scholarship regarding its origins and symbolisms include Lewis LOCKWOOD, «Aspects of the *L’homme armé* Tradition», *Proceedings of the Royal Musical Association*, 100 (1973–1974), pp. 44–58; Leeman PERKINS, «The *L’homme armé* Masses of Busnois and Okeghem: A Comparison», *Journal of Musicology*, 3, 4 (1984), pp. 363–398; Richard TARUSKIN, «Antoine Busnoys and the *L’homme armé* Tradition», *Journal of the American Musicological Society*, 39 (1986), pp. 255–293; Flynn WARMINGTON, «The Ceremony of the Armed Man: The Sword, the Altar, and the *L’homme armé* Mass», in Paula HIGGINS (Ed.), *Antoine Busnoys: Method, Meaning, and Context in Late Medieval Music*, Oxford, Clarendon, 1999, pp. 88–130; Craig WRIGHT, *The Maze and the Warrior: Symbolism in Architecture, Theology, and Music*, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 2001; Alejandro E. PLANCHART, «The Origins and Early History of *L’homme armé*», *The Journal of Musicology*, 20, 3 (2003), pp. 305–357. Around 50 masses based on the *L’homme armé* tune have been identified. *Ibid.*, p. 306.

46 In 1570, Giovanni Pierluigi da PALESTRINA dedicated a five-voice *L’homme armé* mass

The Turk as dragon is a *topos* omnipresent in the popular verses of the 1570s, yet entirely absent from the polyphonic compositions that paid tribute to the Battle. The *Lamento de Selin* offers a perfect example in which the contrast between the highly abstract and restrained language of the verses set polyphonically and the personal, direct, and insolent style of the popular verses is most pronounced.

In Renaissance Europe, music was mainly commissioned by and intended for courtly patrons. Music resounded in palaces, courts, and academies as well as in cathedrals, convents, and monasteries. The performances ranged from intimate to public, involving mainly invited guests. Occasionally, however, the performance of music took to the streets where listeners came from all walks of life. From the selective survey of music in praise of the Lepanto victory it becomes evident that all types, whether the declamatory singing of the street song, the *mascherata* chorus, the polyphonic mass, or the eight-voice motet, turned away from intimate environments and aimed for larger audiences and public spaces. Poetry, musical texture, medium, and drama were all summoned to create a lasting imprint to the audience. Composers of polyphonic music, who were certainly familiar with the allegorical language of much visual and printed texts, incorporated the symbolisms in subtle and intricate ways, which had more to offer than the “divine sounds” they produced, especially when catered to sophisticated audiences with the skills to unravel their meanings. Vincenzo Borghini, iconographic advisor to Vasari during the preparation of the Sala Regia frescoes, urged the painter to tightly knit verbal and visual puzzles therein, so as to invite the spectator to unveil the painting’s true meaning, its “*vero senso*”, and thus feel satisfied by the discovery.⁴⁷ Unveiling the connections between events, patrons, agents, symbols, works of art, and music creations contributes to a deeper understanding, to a “*vero senso*”, of the intricate political mechanisms of war- and power-rhetoric, of which Renaissance music was an integral part.

to Philip II. It was included in his *Missarum liber tertius*, Rome, Valerio e Luigi Dorico, 1570. No such composition, however, is known to have been associated with Lepanto.

47 SCORZA, «Vasari’s Lepanto Frescoes», cit., p. 188.

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Memorie della guerra di Candia (1645–1657): la cronaca di un testimone oculare*

di IRENE PAPADAKI **

ABSTRACT: Among the holdings of Biblioteca Estense Universitaria in Modena, one can find an unpublished Chronicle of the first 12 years of the Cretan War. This is the *Cronica della Guerra di Candia*, a 596-page densely-written text authored by Martio Stefanoni from Rome during his stay in the besieged Candia and at sea, while he was involved in the military operations of the Venetian armada. Stefanoni undertook the writing of the Chronicle at the encouragement of Francesco Zeno, a member of the Stravaganti Academy. A highly educated and deeply sensitive person, truly moved by the sufferings of the ordinary people, Stefanoni presents the dramatic historical events with realism and contemplation, trying to find their underlying causes both in the history of the opponent peoples and in the weaknesses and the passions of human nature. His Chronicle preserves eyewitness accounts unknown from other sources. It is a valuable resource not only for the political and military studies, but also for the ideological and cultural history of modern times.

KEYWORDS: VENETIAN–OTTOMAN WARS, MARTIO STEFANONI, CHRONICLE, CRETAN WAR, CHANDAX, 1645–1657.

Il Codice a.H.5.19 (It. 446) della Biblioteca Estense Universitaria di Modena contiene un’ampia cronaca dei primi 12 anni della guerra di Candia, autografa e firmata dallo scrittore romano Martio Stefanoni, non noto da altre fonti. Quasi all’inizio del testo, Stefanoni afferma:

Io non volevo descrivere li accidenti di questa guerra. Ritrovandomi in Candia, città felicissima della Serenissima Repubblica di Venetia, ho visto quel tanto che mai mi credeva di vedere: me armato giorno e notte, come

* Versione italiana dell’articolo «Με τη ματιά ενός αυτόπτη μάρτυρα: Το Χρονικό του Κρητικού Πολέμου του Martio Stefanoni», in Giannis MAVROMATIS, Eirini LYDAKI e Eirini PAPADAKI (a cura di), *Κρητικός Πόλεμος (1645–1669): Άγνωστες πτυχές*, Heraklion, Biblioteca comunale Vikelaia, 2021, pp. 325-346.

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tutti gli altri huomini della città, per ostare alli pericoli de nemici. Tornai a pigliar la penna per schrivere prima le dolutioni del popolo della afflita città con tante rovine di essa per non restar infruttuoso in quel poco di tempo che mi era concesso per mio riposo. Sempre io hebbi speranza di vedere la recuperatione di questo christianissimo regno. Ho visto la astrusciata et assediata città da turchi. Se la libertà, gli lassarò le mie benedictioni perpetuamente. Tutti li successi che occorrerano, così fori come dentro della città, mentre che la guerra starà in piedi, con li successi delle armate nostre in mare, in terra, descriverò così la parte nostra come quella de turchi (f. 8r).¹


Si tratta, quindi, dell’opera di un testimone oculare che, trovandosi in Candia allo scoppio della guerra, decide di registrare le proprie esperienze nella città sotto assedio e quello che apprendeva da altre fronti a terra e in mare. Trascorreva allora il settimo decennio della sua vita.² Altrove – all’interno della narrazione – aggiunge:

Mi do il vanto di essere stato il primo autore di scrivere in più caderni li accidenti che seguiranno contro nostri nemici et i nemici contro di noi. Mi son sforzato al meglio che io ho poduto. Sarà adornata con la verità. Così sarà bella, gustosa alli lettori. La cronica servirà per passatempo de lettori. Andai considerando sempre le vertù con le qualità de nobili guerrieri. Raccolsi le cose più elegante, le più degne che occorsero, con le memorie di quanto io viddi, per essere cosa dilettevole in passar l’otio. Sentirete riforme de costumi, alti et honorati, con la memoria di felicissimi esempli con la vita gloriosa, con paragoni verosimili alle battaglie di terra, ha quelle di mare, contro nemici. Il tutto descriverò senza alcuna adulazione, con bellissimi esempli di persone virtuose e di valore di ottimi guerrieri, non solo per li loro costumi delle dote del’ animo loro, et qual fosse la fortuna hopur la prudenza di essi guerrieri. Li honorati lettori amerano la vertù della mia penna in componere la presente cronica (f. 7r).

Stefanoni si presenta, quindi, come il primo cronista della guerra – si affida cioè principalmente a quanto ha visto e sentito, ma anche a lettere di amici che lo

1 Per la pubblicazione degli estratti della cronaca è stato applicato il metodo diplomatico. Non si correggono errori di ortografia, grammatica o sintassi. Le abbreviazioni si sciolgono senza uso di parentesi. La punteggiatura è stata inserita seguendo i criteri moderni. Con parentesi angolari (⟨⟩) sono indicate le integrazioni di lettere mancanti dal manoscritto a causa dell’usura subita o della fretta con cui il testo era stato redatto. Tra parentesi quadre ([]) sono aggiunti dei punti di sospensione per indicare l’omissione di passaggi.

2 Stefanoni nacque nel 1583, poiché nel 1651 annota nella sua cronaca: «Non posso tanto scrivere carico di anni 68. Non vorrei più lambicarmi il cervello in scrivere in tutto il giorno la cronica della guerra. Vorrei scrivere il fine di essa se così piacesse a Dio» (f. 200r).



1 Biblioteca Estense Universitaria di Modena, Codice a.H.5.19 (It. 446), f. 1r: Dedica del codice da Martio Stefanoni a Francesco Zeno. Su concessione del Ministero della Cultura – Gallerie Estensi, Biblioteca Estense Universitaria.

informavano di eventi a cui non era presente. Ha anche preso in considerazione almeno un libro di storia ottomana,³ nonché altre cronache scritte nello stesso periodo, come si vedrà di seguito. Sebbene lo scrittore si interessi principalmente della registrazione dei fatti nel loro evolversi, le analogie che stabilisce tra i protagonisti della sua cronaca e alcuni personaggi storici e mitologici conferiscono un tono letterario alla narrazione. Questo giustifica anche la definizione della lettura come un atto gradevole per passare il tempo. Si tratta ovviamente di un luogo letterario comune. Dall’altro lato, l’atteggiamento didattico di Stefanoni ben si inquadra nel clima culturale dell’età barocca.

Gli eventi – le onde sul mare della storia, come direbbe Braudel – sono il materiale principale dell’opera, costituita da 298 fogli, ovvero 596 pagine. A seconda della loro importanza, vengono registrati o in giorni consecutivi o con pause di brevi periodi. Stefanoni racconta ciò che ha visto o sentito nella capitale cretese, dalla quale si allontanava solo per brevi periodi quando doveva partecipare alle operazioni militari dell’armata veneziana.⁴ Tuttavia, anche allora aveva con sé la cronaca e aggiungeva sia le notizie che arrivavano da Creta che le proprie esperienze nei Dardanelli, sulle coste della Grecia continentale o sulle isole del mar Egeo (v. p.e. immagini 2-4). Era in grado di riportare in dettaglio i preparativi bellici, le mosse di spionaggio, le battaglie dentro e fuori Creta, i problemi di

3 Stefanoni annota che gli fu donato da un greco nei Dardanelli un libro riguardante «tutti li re et imperatori de Turchi con il principio delle loro imprese et acquisti che fecero in tempo delli ottomani principiorno ha regnare et altro della loro genologia» (f. 161r). Probabilmente si tratta della *Genelogia de sultam Solimano re de turchi con gli progressi particolari de ciascun principe de la casa ottomana con l’ordine particolare de la guardia sua da cavallo & da piedi e il modo del suo procedere alla guerra; item el principio de lo acquisto del regno de Cipri per gli signori Venetiani posseduto hora da essi signori a defensione & salute universale de tutta la christianità*. Il testo fu stampato senza indicazioni topo-cronologiche. Una copia è conservata presso la BIBLIOTECA DEL MUSEO CORRER DI VENEZIA (Op. Cicogna 0067.8). Per la ricca bibliografia italiana dell’epoca sulla storia ottomana si veda indicativamente Paolo PRETO, *Venezia e i Turchi*, Roma, Viella, 2013, con relativa bibliografia.

4 La nave Dragone, sulla quale viaggiava Stefanoni, è raffigurata in alcune fonti iconografiche dell’epoca. Si vedano i piani della battaglia navale tra Paros e Naxos del codice della BIBLIOTECA NAZIONALE MARCIANA DI VENEZIA (d’ora in poi: BNMV), Marc. It. VII, 200 (=10050), dis. n. 43 (carta n. 94), dis. n. 44 (carta n. 96) e dis. n. 45 (carta n. 98); pubblicati da Stefanos KAKLAMANIS, «Ο Λέων της Βενετίας και η Ημιούληνος στο Αρχιπέλαγος. Η ναυμαχία της Παρονάξιας (8–10 Ιουλίου 1651)», in Giorgos TOLIAS (a cura di), *To Αιγαίο πέλαγος. Χαρτογραφία και ιστορία: 15ος–17ος αι.*, Atene, Fondazione culturale della Banca nazionale greca, 2010, pp. 63-91, in particolare pp. 72-82.

approvvigionamento di alimenti, munizioni e uomini, le difficoltà di pagamento degli stipendi dei soldati, le avversità causate dal maltempo e dai terremoti, le malattie che affliggevano entrambi i campi, la carenza di medici e di conoscenze mediche – il che causava (come enfaticamente annotava Stefanoni) l’uccisione di un maggior numero di guerrieri cristiani da parte dei medici che dagli ottomani. Stefanoni partecipava all’entusiasmo generale causato dalle vittorie veneziane nei Dardanelli, dalle conquiste di terre e fortezze in Dalmazia, dai rinforzi inviati dal papa e da altre potenze europee, e dalle notizie sulle intenzioni dei russi di intervenire nella guerra. Arricchiva il suo testo con riferimenti sul contesto politico e diplomatico. Monitorava le strategie e le nuove armi testate sui campi di battaglia. Non esitava ad esprimere giudizi sull’onestà e l’efficacia dei funzionari che prendevano le decisioni cruciali. Prestava particolare attenzione alla diffusione di quelle dicerie che avevano un grande impatto su strati più ampi della popolazione. La sua sensibilità culminava davanti alle sofferenze del popolo. Un esempio:

Questo anno fu una rigorosa vernata con grandissimi patimenti di legne, freddi et senza denari. Il bassa, nostro nemico, fori della città, seppe egli che noi pativamo la vernata; fu tanto gagliarda et ricorosa da crudelissimi venti, abbondantia de venti et con abondantia di neve sopra li monti che sonno fori attorno la città, tutti coperti et innalzati dalle molte neve. Ci mandò a dire il bassa che, se volevamo noi mangiare, che noi buttassemo a terra la nostra cosa. Et che noi abbruggiassemmo le legne, le quali mantenevano le loro habitationi. Dice il bassa: «Se io fossi stato patrono di Candia, noi havemo abrugiate galiotte turche et saiche nemiche; con detti legni se riparremo dal freddo». Et che il bassa sappia che per lo avenirli li nostri signori volevano pigliare et rovinare la armata turca. La povertà di Candia ne godè della detta et maledetta armata almeno per far foco et cosinare quello che alhoro gli faceva bisogno (f. 257r).

Come traspare dal brano appena citato, la cronaca di Stefanoni conserva la vivacità della testimonianza diretta. Invece di comporre una narrazione a posteriori, registra i fatti mentre si svolgono. Da questo punto di vista Stefanoni sembra incline alla crescente tendenza della sua epoca verso il giornalismo.⁵

⁵ Per questa tendenza si veda, a titolo indicativo, Mario INFELISE, *Prima dei giornali. Alle origini della pubblica informazione (secoli XVI e XVII)*, Roma & Bari, Laterza, 2002. Per la circolazione delle notizie durante la guerra di Candia cfr. Johann PETITJEAN, *L'intelligence des choses: une histoire de l'information entre Italie et Méditerranée*, Roma, École française de Rome, 2013, pp. 381-427; Anastasia STOURAITI, «Η γυναίκα του Χάνδακα: τεπατογονία, φύλο και ἐντυπες ειδήσεις στον απόχρο του Κρητικού Πολέμου», in Stefanos

L'immediatezza della narrazione viene accentuata dalla struttura dell'opera. Ogni sezione occupa un fascicolo, di solito di sei fogli, e si conclude spesso con un breve indice dei contenuti e/o con la firma dell'autore. In alcuni casi, se gli eventi da raccontare finiscono prima dell'esaurimento della carta a disposizione, lo scrittore non lascia che lo spazio vuoto vada sprecato. Vi registra, invece, osservazioni di natura morale, politica, storica, letteraria o anche aneddotica. Sia da queste deviazioni che dall'abitudine di Stefanoni di lottare con la scrittura, narrando gli stessi pensieri o eventi in modi diversi, si evince che si tratta in sostanza di un testo in formazione, attraverso il quale possono emergere le diverse fasi della composizione dell'opera.

Stefanoni aveva sin dall'inizio deciso di offrire la sua cronaca a colui che lo aveva incoraggiato ad occuparsi della sua scrittura: Francesco Zeno, sacerdote cattolico e dal 1648 vicario arcivescovile nella cattedrale di San Tito a Candia.⁶ A lui è rivolta la dedica della prima pagina (f. 1r) [immagine 1] e anche le note dedicatorie che si ripetono alla fine di molti fascicoli del manoscritto.


Francesco Zeno fu uno dei più eminenti studiosi di Candia nell'ultimo periodo della dominazione veneziana. Membro dell'Accademia degli Stravaganti,⁷

KAKLAMANIS (a cura di), *O Κρητικός Πόλεμος (1645–1669). Όψεις των πολέμου στον χώρο και τον χρόνο [= Κρητικά Χρονικά / Cretica Chronica 39 (2019)]*, Heraklion, Society of Cretan Historical Studies, 2019, pp. 381-407, con la relativa bibliografia.

- 6 Per Francesco Zeno si veda Nikolaos M. PANAGIOTAKIS, «Ἐρευναὶ ἐν Βενετίᾳ», *Thesaurismata*, 5 (1968), pp. 45-118, in particolare pp. 89-104 [ripubblicato in IDEM, *Κρητική Αναγέννηση. Μελετήματα για τον Βιτσέντζο Κορνάρο*, a cura di Stefanos KAKLAMANIS e Giannis K. MAVROMATIS, Atene, Casa editrice Stigmi, 2002, pp. 11-101, in particolare pp. 76-96]; George PELIDIS, «Χειρόγραφα από το Χάνδακα στη Βενετία το 17ο αιώνα. Η βιβλιοθήκη του Francesco Zeno», in Asterios ARGYRIOU, Konstantinos A. DIMADIS e Anastasia Danai LAZARIDOU (a cura di), *Ο ελληνικός κόσμος ανάμεσα στην Ανατολή και τη Δύση 1453–1981*, vol. 2, Atene, Casa editrice Ellinika Grammata, 1999, pp. 165-179.
- 7 Per la rinascita di questa Accademia intorno al 1637 e per le attività dei suoi membri cfr. principalmente PANAGIOTAKIS, «Ἐρευναὶ ἐν Βενετίᾳ», cit., pp. 84-104; Alfred L. VINCENT, «Commedia dell'arte in Crete? The evidence of Santo Zeno», *Thesaurismata*, 24 (1994), pp. 263-273, e IDEM, «“Ολιμπράντος ο Τρομερός” καὶ οι γκιόστρες στη Βενετοκρατούμενη Κρήτη», in Chryssa MALTEZOU, Theocharis DETORAKIS e Christoforos CHARALAMPakis (a cura di), *Ροδωνιά. Τιμῇ στον Μ. I. Μανούσακα*, vol. 2, Rethymno, Università di Creta, 1994, pp. 621-632; George PELIDIS, «L'orazione di Matteo Zeno sull'impresa dell'Accademia degli Stravaganti di Candia», in † Nikolaos M. PANAGIOTAKIS (a cura di), *Ἄνθη Χαπίτων*, Venezia, Istituto Ellenico di Studi Bizantini e Postbizantini, 1998, pp. 633-640; IDEM, «Fuor dal comun sentiero. L'Accademia degli Stravaganti di Candia: innesto socio-culturale italiano», in Chryssa MALTEZOU, Angeliki TZAVARA e Despina Vlassi (a cura di), *I Greci*

DISSENGO DELL' ORDINANZA DELL' ARMATA VENETA NELLA BATAGLIA DI
PARIS
CONTRO L' ARMATA TURCHA SEGVITA ADI 10 LVGLIO 1681.

ANTI GUARDIA CAR' BARBARO



2 BIBLIOTECA NAZIONALE MARCIANA DI VENEZIA (BNMV), Marc. It. VII, 200 (=10050),
dis. n. 43 (carta n. 94). Su concessione del Ministero della Cultura – Biblioteca
Nazionale Marciana. Divieto di riproduzione.

ha presentato varie sue opere durante le riunioni accademiche. Altre orazioni di Zeno furono presentate pubblicamente in onore di importanti funzionari veneziani: del capitano generale Alvise Mocenigo, dopo la vittoria dei veneziani nel 1651 vicino all’isola di Naxos, e dei capitani generali Leonardo Foscolo, Lorenzo Marcello e Lazzaro Mocenigo (nel 1651, 1656 e 1657 rispettivamente). Ha inoltre scritto un’orazione in onore del capitano generale Francesco Morosini, letta nella cattedrale di San Tito a Candia nel 1658. Le orazioni sono tramandate nel manoscritto Marc. It. XI, 84 (=7235) sotto il titolo unitario *Li cinque campioni di Marte*.⁸ Simili iniziative furono intraprese anche da altri membri dell’Accademia durante la guerra di Candia.⁹ Partecipavano così attivamente alle vicende politiche, esprimendosi pubblicamente a favore della politica della Serenissima per la difesa dell’isola.

Stefanoni non aveva l’intenzione di conferire alla sua cronaca manoscritta un’ampia diffusione. Era in grado però di fornire al suo protettore Francesco Zeno la materia prima, la registrazione degli eventi, su cui lui poteva costruire i propri discorsi pubblici.

Gli obiettivi dei due coincidevano in parte. Zeno presentava le iniziative degli ufficiali veneziani responsabili della difesa dell’isola come dimostrazioni di virtù militare. Stefanoni trattava alcuni dei militari cristiani come *exempla* di coraggio e prudenza. Tuttavia, il suo carattere ed anche il genere di scrittura di cui si occupava, gli davano l’opportunità di esprimere anche le sue riserve sull’integrità di altri funzionari. Ardiva perfino di indicare alcuni di essi come responsabili della cattiva gestione della città:

In quel tempo fora di modo venivamo tiraneggiato il popolo della città di Candia per caggionne dellì pessimi agoverni di esso popolo male aventureati [...] Persa era la giustitia per noi. Quella volta la misericordia era cieca et sorda alle exlemationi de afamati suditi. La carità era morta per la poverà.

durante la venetocrazia: Uomini, spazio, idee (XIII–XVIII sec.), Venezia, Istituto Ellenico di Studi Bizantini e Postbizantini, 2009, pp. 617-629.

8 BNMV, Marc. It. XI, 84 (=7235): «Li cinque campioni di Marte, ispediti dalla Gran Monarchessa dell’acque alla direttion delle armate maritime et terrestri per la diffesa del gran Regno di Giove; benedictioni celesti annunciate da Francesco Zeno, già preposito e vicario generale della metropoli di Candia et hora vescovo di Capo d’Istria, nell’atto di dargli la benedictione con la Reliquia di San Tito nella sudetta chiesa cattedrale cretense». Cfr. PAGIOTAKIS, «Ἐπευνεῖται ἐν Βενετίᾳ», cit.

9 *Ibid.*, pp. 96-99.

Quelli che havevano da ministrare la giustitia delle vittuarie erano talmente rapaci et avidi al denaro, poco pensiero del patimento de poveri suditi. Tanto comportavano a quelli che havevano robba da vendere. Fornite le case de commessarii, vendevano la robba ha modo loro senza alcuna tempa di giustitia. Si sapevano quello che tolsero li commessari a ciò vendessero la robba loro come volevano. Li suditi nudi, affamati, senza alcuno aiuto. Li palazzi et le case de commandati erano piene de videlli, pollamme de ogni sorte, le mandrie de porci e de castrati; al horo abbondanza di pan bianco; il miglior vino che veniva in questo porto con loro pochissimo discomodo de loro danari; et fornir tanti palazzi et capi da guerra, capitani, ingegneri et tanti altri con le loro autorità. Li suditi con li loro danari, sanguine, stenti, sudori, fatiche, non potevamo aver cosa alcuna, con pesso et con mesure ingiuste (f. 207r).

Stefanoni percepiva che le tensioni all'interno del campo cristiano erano principalmente di natura sociale. Sebbene la cattiva gestione dei governanti allargasasse il divario tra ricchi e poveri, provocando diserzioni dei cristiani verso il campo degli ottomani, i greci continuavano a combattere diligentemente per difendere la loro patria:

Io ho veduto greci in questa guerra boni soldati et fedeli al loro Prencipe e tutti loro desiderosi della libertà di tutto il Regno e della patria loro; et in tutte le occasioni della guerra non rifutorno mai il servitio publico con la loro vita propria, sicome li ho visti in effetto tante et tante volte. Se incontrò oggi un soldato con un cittadino greco cadiotto. Il soldato disse al detto greco ha ribbello cane senza fede. Le sudette parole furon dette et riferite al generale Moresini, il quale di subito fece dare a quel soldato 3 tratti di corda. Et così andava crescendo lo odio de soldati greci. Assai in Candia erano quelli che si occupavano nelle domestiche sedetioni per rovinare le case de cittadini et altri passavano per altre rapine, andavano sollevando gli animi de capi da guerra. Li più tristi soldati son quelli che biastemavano li greci, che facevano li fatti loro (f. 191r).

Incidenti causati da una folla di soldati indisciplinati e da persone attive ai margini della società sono registrati sporadicamente nella cronaca. In combinazione con il malgoverno e le condizioni soffocanti dell'assedio, generavano già alla fine di settembre 1649 per Stefanoni una situazione insopportabile:

Intesi in Candia Dio biastemato, renegato, detesto et più strapazzo quel Santissimo Nome da bocche fedite de peccatori. Le chiese alcune furon profanate da cattivi christiani e da pessimi sacerdoti et da donne pecatrice. Furono le chiese sagrileggiate da soldati da diverse nationi; e peggio si fece in tempo di peste. Li villaggi abbruggiati, la città distrutta, non dico da chi. Li castelli subvertiti, le fortezze rovinate, gli huomini uccisi et non se ne

parlava. Per la città le donne forzate et uccise secondo la malignità di quelli tali usurpatori dello honore de povere persone. Le vergine violate. I beni persi et acquistati da nemici. In guerra non ci è fede ne legge ne amore ne homanità ne umiltà ne carità del tutto estinte. Le honestà annullate, cosa niuna in aiuto del prossimo. Orgoglio, ambitione, crudeltà, arogantia, disubidienza, furto, avaritia, latrocini, spurgiuri, fraude in pietà, fornicatione, adulterio, ira, incesto, diverse biasteme in bocca di ogni persona, vendette, scelleraggine, ogni furfantaria. Tutte queste cose si fanno in guerra. Non si porta rispetto solo ha chi ha danari assai. Ogni male germogliava. Il prossimo il tutto è annullato. Per questo mi ritirai sopra una nave, per non sentir tante oribil biasteme, le maledictioni, li sospiri de poveri suditi. Prego il pietoso et misericordioso Giesù con la sua Santissima Madre che annulli et annichili questa ingiusta e maledetta guerra a beneficio de fedeli timorosi de Iddio, che ci provederà alle meschinità. Il Prencipe aiuterà li suoi suditi (f. 156r).

Riflettendo sulle cause profonde della guerra, Stefanoni osserva:

Vado scrivendo con le lagrime nelli occhi considerare il male venturo, con le infinite miserie nostre. Anchora impariamo ha conoscere li danni particolari con i communi pericholi per cau<s>a desensioni de Prencipi, che uno infedele Monarca, apparso happoco, va lui ponendo in giogo sopra le spalle de tutti li potentati di tutta la Europa. La ragione de stati è maggiore di quella della religione catholica. Non piaccia ha Dio che ella non si tiri seco uno crudel incendio rovinoso ha tutto il christianesimo (f. 2r).

Da questo punto di vista, Stefanoni sembra far proprie le aspirazioni della politica del Vaticano alla pace tra gli stati cristiani dopo la Guerra dei Trent'anni e all'organizzazione di una comune strategia anti-ottomana, che in questo caso coincidevano anche con gli interessi di Venezia.¹⁰ Idee del genere pervadono tutta la narrazione, ma raramente appaiono in primo piano, poiché principalmente sono le registrazioni degli eventi a emergere sulla superficie della storia. Stefanoni si esprime con maggior libertà verso la fine dell'opera. Lì, interrompendo il flusso dell'attualità, si abbandona a deviazioni più estese. Riprende cioè considerazioni espresse negli spazi vuoti dei fogli precedenti e le sviluppa in modo più approfondito. Affronta così questioni come il valore della parola scritta, l'importanza della filosofia, la ricerca della bellezza. Ecco un esempio:

Socrate disse che la bellezza è una tiranide di breve tempo. Plato disse che è un privilegio di natura. Teofrasto disse che <è> un segreto inganno.

¹⁰ Per le aspirazioni e le contraddizioni della politica vaticana cfr. Géraud POUMARÈDE, *Il Mediterraneo oltre le crociate. La guerra turca nel Cinquecento e nel Seicento tra leggende e realtà*, a cura di Frédéric IEVA, Torino, UTET, 2011, in particolare pp. 175-322.



3 BIBLIOTECA NAZIONALE MARCIANA DI VENEZIA (BNMV), Marc. It. VII, 200 (=10050), dis. n. 44 (carta n. 96). Su concessione del Ministero della Cultura – Biblioteca Nazionale Marciana. Divieto di riproduzione.

Teocrito disse che è un dilettevole dono. Carmeade disse che è un solitari regno. [...] Aristotele disse che bellezza non si può comandare quanto è degna. Homero afferma che è una donna gloriosa di natura. Ovidio la chiama una certa gratia di Dio. Tolete quello che vi piace. Io credo che non è se non un dono di Dio. Fu domandato a Diogene qual fosse il più nobile del mondo. Rispose colui che sa disprezzare le ricchezze, gloria, piacere et poi vi<v>rà et vincerà le cose contrarie a queste, cioè povertà, infamia, dolore et morre et soffrire con un cuore invincibile. Che cosa è povertà io ve lo so dire per esperienza, non per fama. Povertà non altro che una candela con il lume della quale si discopre di molte miserie, al quale l'huomo è sottoposto (ff. 274v-275r).

La constatazione è rimarchevole. Pur sentendo l'orrore della guerra – con i cadaveri accatastati, le membra umane mozzate, mostrate come trofei, le persone

scuoiate vive, come dice altrove – Stefanoni non cessa di cercare il significato della bellezza. Lo associa con la gentilezza dell'anima. E sottolinea che la grandezza o la miseria di quest'ultima si rivela alla luce della povertà. La narrazione è più scorrevole verso la fine della cronaca. Abbandonando gli eventi, si concentra su importanti questioni filosofiche ed etiche. Qui trovano maggior spazio i casi esemplari dell'antichità classica, della Bibbia, della letteratura medievale e rinascimentale, tratti dal patrimonio culturale comune del campo cristiano. Attraverso questi *exempla* Stefanoni cerca di giustificare l'atto stesso dello scrivere:

Licurgo fu quello che diede la legge a li Lacedemonii. Numa Pompilio honorò li tempii. Marco Marcello pianse la fortuna di coloro che erano vinti da lui. Giulio Cesare perdo<nò> a suoi nemici. Ottaviano fu onorato da suoi popoli. Severo giovava a tutti. Hettor Troiano era animoso a guerregiare. Hercole Tebano usò le sue forze. Pirro, re della Albania, fu inventore di molte cose. Marco Regolo soferse tanti tormenti. Tito fu padre degli orfani. Traiano edificò tanti edificii. Fu tenuto il bono Adriano e Antonio il pietoso. Semiramis peccò con suo figliolo carnalmente, da lui uccisa. Tarquato forzò Lucretia. Bruto ammazzò Cesare. Silla sparse sangue. Catelina tiraneggiò sopra la sua patria. Gicurto ammazzò li proprii fratelli. Caligola violò la sorella. Nerone ammazzò la madre. [...] Domitiano faceva ammazzare la sua gente da gente aliena et lui amazzava mosche. Como sapessimo noi, come se non per li scrittori? (f. 248v)

Modelli da imitare o esempi da evitare, filtrati dalle conoscenze dell'epoca e dalle memorie personali dell'autore,¹¹ vengono menzionati con la convinzione che la storia umana si ripete. Come gestiscono però le persone intorno a Stefanoni le letture a loro disposizione?

Vedereti certi huomini, non huomini, ma non huomini, ma più tosto bestie – mi vien quasi voglia di nominarli – che sonno tanti loquaci nel parlare et tanti restretti nello studiare che non vi è libro che loro non abbiano letto o veduto et guardato. Che prosuntione fu quella. Ogniuno son dati alli danari. Vederete 3 o 4 in una compagnia. Uno pigliará libro in mano, comincerà ha leggere 2 o 3 parole. Dirà uno è troppo proliso. Uno altro dirà e farà ha sproposito. Dirà uno altro è tristo volgare. Dirà uno altro è finto. L'altro è

11 Non ci sono testimonianze dirette sull'educazione di Stefanoni. È comunque presumibile che abbia studiato presso un istituto italiano, probabilmente nella sua città natia, Roma. Per l'organizzazione degli studi in Italia fino al tardo Rinascimento cfr. principalmente Paul F. GRENDEL, *Schooling in Renaissance Italy. Literacy and Learning, 1300–1600*, Baltimore & Londra, The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989. Per le attività educative dell'ordine cattolico dei gesuiti cfr. anche IDEM, *The Jesuits & Italian Universities, 1548–1773*, Washington, DC, Catholic University of America Press, 2017.

curioso. L’altro dirà che è malitoso tal che odia la brevità. La dottrina riman suspecta et lo autore, non valente di qualche macula. Certi altri sfacciatacci ci sonno di quelli che sonno senza vergogna. Hanno ardire di parlare che non gli resta cosa da vedere et non anno visto. Si vantono che non è cosa da scoprire, che non è cosa che non habbiono scoperta. Affermano non ci è cosa da leggere che essi non habbiono letta. Giurarano non vi è cosa da scrivere che essi non habbiono scritta. Altri se assicurono che non ci è cosa da sapere che loro non sappiano (f. 266v).

Considerando il rapporto di Stefanoni con Francesco Zeno, è ipotizzabile che si riferisca ad alcuni studiosi di Candia, perfino a membri dell’Accademia degli Stravaganti.

Non è da escludere che lo sfogo di Stefanoni sia stato provocato da critiche negative per la propria opera. Ci sarebbe infatti un motivo per accusarlo di mancanza di originalità: l’affinità di alcuni brani della sua cronaca con un’altra narrazione dei primi anni della guerra di Candia dal titolo *Frammenti istorici della guerra di Candia*, apparsa alle stampe come opera di Sertonaco Anticano (immagine 5).¹² Come esplicitamente afferma nella prefazione dell’edizione, l’autore non usa il suo vero nome, ma uno pseudonimo. In realtà, non fece che un anagramma del suo nome. Si trattava di Antonio Santacroce, membro dell’Accademia degli Incogniti di Venezia.¹³ L’edizione dei *Frammenti* fu intrapresa nel 1647 dallo stampatore dell’Accademia Francesco Valvasense a Venezia. La copertina

12 *Frammenti istorici della guerra di Candia di Sertonaco Anticano, cioè invasione del Regno, resa di Canea, successi di terra, presa di Retimo, morte del general Corner, successi di mare, morte del capitan delle navi Morosini*, In Bologna, Con licenza de’ Sup. e privilegi, 1647. A spese di Gio. Battista e Giuseppe Corvo, librari in Roma. Il libro fu stampato di nuovo a Milano nel 1648: *Frammenti istorici della guerra di Candia di Sertonaco Anticano, cioè invasione del Regno, resa di Canea, successi di terra, presa di Retimo, morte del gener(al) Cor(ner), successi di mare, morte del capitan delle navi Morosini, all’ullustrissimo et eccellentissimo sig(nor) Prencipe don Hercole Theodoro Trivultio, Prencipe del Sacro Romano Imperio, Misocco & Valle Misolina, Cavagliero dell’Ordine del Tosone d’oro & Governatore Generale delle Milizie dello Stato di Milano & c.*, In Milano, per Lodovico Monza stampatore alla piazza de’ Mercanti, MDCXXXVIII.

13 Per Santacroce e l’Accademia degli Incogniti si veda principalmente Monica MIATO, *L’Accademia degli Incogniti di Giovan Francesco Loredan. Venezia (1630–1661)*, Firenze, Leo S. Olschki, 1998; Emanuela BUFACCHI, «Alcune osservazioni sulla censura romana e gli accademici Incogniti», *Esperienze letterarie*, XL/3 (2015), pp. 41–56, e più recentemente Davide CONRIERI (a cura di), *Gli Incogniti e l’Europa*, Bologna, EMIL, 2018, con la relativa bibliografia. Alla stessa accademia apparteneva ancora uno scrittore che si occupò della storia della guerra di Candia, Girolamo Brusoni. Si veda Girolamo BRUSONI, *Historia dell’ultima guerra tra’ Veneziani e Turchi*, Venezia, Stefano Curti, 1673.

del libro indicava però la città di Bologna come luogo di pubblicazione. L'uso di un falso luogo di stampa fu una delle cause che condussero lo stampatore davanti al tribunale dell'Inquisizione a Venezia.¹⁴ Secondo l'inchiesta, il segretario dei Riformatori dell'Università di Padova gli avrebbe dato oralmente il permesso di pubblicare i *Frammenti* e utilizzare la falsa indicazione topografica. Si trattava di una pratica comune nello stato veneziano in casi di testi che potevano provocare reazioni politiche o diplomatiche.¹⁵

Per valutare le affinità tra i *Frammenti* di Santacroce e la cronaca di Stefanoni, vengono riportati qui due passaggi dall'inizio delle loro opere:

La grandezza dell'imperio de' Turchi cominciò nella casa Ottomana. Osmano, che fù il primo della famiglia, uscì da un tugurio, passò il Volga, si fè largo nell'Asia, e con non minor sagacità che valore vi piantò il trono, il quale assicurato dalla fortuna, e difeso dalla forza, gettò così profonde radici, ch'irrigate dal sudore e dal sangue, si sparsero in lungo spatio nell'Africa, e nell'Europa. Maometto, che fù il Legislatore, ed il pseudo-profeta di costoro, li regolò con nuove leggi, e vecchie superstizioni in si fatta maniera, che dimosse la ignoranza senza contaminare la semplicità (*Frammenti*, p. 1).

La grandezza et principio della casa ottomana. Osman fù il primo di questa scommunicata fameglia. Saltò fori di uno tugurio, passò il Volga, si fece larco nella Asia, con sagacità del volere vi piantò il trono, assicurato dalla fortuna, diffesa dalle forze. Gettò colui così profonde radice, adacquate con sudori del sangue. Si sparse nell'Africa e nella Europa. Mamet che fù il sligliatore e pessimo profeta. Coloro se allegrorno con nove legge, con vecchie soperstitioni in si fatta maniera. Messe la ingnoranza, senza contaminare la semplicità di quella gente (Stefanoni, f. 2v).

Il testo di Stefanoni segue quello di Santacroce quasi alla lettera. Analoghe somiglianze si presentano anche in altri passaggi, che riguardano principalmente questioni di storia ottomana o vicende dai fronti di guerra in cui Stefanoni non era presente.¹⁶ Sarebbe quindi ipotizzabile che quest'ultimo abbia ottenuto una copia dei *Frammenti* mentre scriveva la sua opera e ne abbia tratto dei dati per arricchirla, integrandoli alle proprie testimonianze e conoscenze. Sembra però che questa sua scelta sia stata criticata in misura sproporzionata rispetto al suo vero

14 Per il processo di Valvasense si veda MIATO, *L'Accademia degli Incogniti*, cit., pp. 130-166.

15 Si veda Mario INFELISE, *I padroni dei libri. Il controllo sulla stampa nella prima età moderna*, Roma & Bari, Laterza, 2014, in particolare pp. 189-194.

16 L'argomento viene trattato in dettaglio nell'introduzione all'edizione della cronaca di Stefanoni, che è in fase di preparazione.



4 BIBLIOTECA NAZIONALE MARCIANA DI VENEZIA (BNMV), Marc. It. VII, 200 (=10050), dis. n. 45 (carta n. 98). Su concessione del Ministero della Cultura – Biblioteca Nazionale Marciana. Divieto di riproduzione.

debito nei confronti di Santacroce che, in fondo, coprì gli eventi della guerra solo fino al 1647. Questo spiegherebbe perché Stefanoni abbia concluso il paragrafo sugli studiosi, soprariportato, con un'enfatica affermazione sulla paternità della cronaca: “Opera di Martio Steffanoni romano e non tolta mai de niuno” (f. 266v). Altrove lo scrittore consiglia i suoi lettori di diffidare delle imprecisioni di alcune cronache che coprono gli eventi della stessa guerra:

Furono alcuni scrittori, li quali presero di molti errori in scrivere la detta cronica. Dissero molte falsità. Scrissero senza alcuna verità (f. 51r).¹⁷

17 È notevole che l'autore dei *Frammenti* Antonio SANTACROCE, nella sua opera intitolata *La Secretaria di Apollo* (Venezia, Francesco Storti, 1653), ammetta la necessità dell'auto-censura: «La storia ha obbligazione d'esser vera, e privilegio d'esser libera; ma la verità

La cronaca di Stefanoni si chiude un po' bruscamente, nel giugno 1657. Uno degli ultimi eventi importanti registrati è l'arrivo a Candia dell'ex Patriarca di Costantinopoli, Ioannikios II. Stefanoni, informato dei suoi contatti col Vaticano, ma non della sua detronizzazione, esprime un giudizio positivo su di lui:

Li 12 novembre fece la entrata in Candia, fece la entrata del' Illustrissimo Patriarca de greci per tutta la Grecia. Era patrona e comandava ali greci nelle cose della loro chia. Fu sbarcato dal molo di Candia. Andorno a levarlo dal vascello con tutti li papadi che erano in Candia. Andorno ha levarlo tutti con li loro petraschili. Fecero una grande et nobile processione. [...] In quanto a me lo ho visto come un santo sacerdote, poiché lui non vol stare dove stanno li turchi; vole stare dove è il capo della christianità (f. 288r).

Le concessioni di Ioannikios II alla chiesa cattolica, imposte dalla sua posizione precaria nel Patriarcato e dall'evolversi della guerra,¹⁸ suscitarono invece dei grandi sospetti in Francesco Zeno. Come vicario dell'arcidiocesi cattolica, considerò minaccioso il raduno del clero ortodosso e del popolo di Candia intorno a Ioannikios e rivolse ripetuti appelli alle autorità veneziane per la sua rimozione. Gli sforzi di Zeno, tuttavia, non ebbero le conseguenze volute, poiché l'alleanza degli ortodossi dell'isola con i Veneziani contro gli Ottomani era allora una priorità per la politica della Serenissima.¹⁹ Francesco Zeno decise di lasciare Candia poco dopo, probabilmente nell'estate del 1658.²⁰


Non sarebbe da escludere che quest'ultima divergenza tra Zeno e Stefanoni, così come i loro divergenti punti di vista, già commentati, allargassero la distanza tra i due e condussero alla fine della stesura della cronaca. La lettera con la quale Stefanoni dedica la sua opera al suo dotto protettore fu scritta – come riferito esplicitamente nel testo – 12 anni dopo lo scoppio della guerra, cioè nel 1657. Stefanoni sembra aver conservato l'originale – il manoscritto autografo, rintracciato da noi – ed aver consegnato a Zeno una copia “in pulito”. Oppure si limitò ai fascicoli della cronaca che aveva consegnato a Zeno in passato, sporadicamente. È da notare che nel catalogo superstite della biblioteca di Zeno sia incluso un

non l'ha, d'esser manifesta. Molte cose si sanno, ma non possono dirsi; molte si dicono, e non possono scriversi, molte si scrivono e non devono pubblicarsi». Si veda Linda BISELLO, «Forme del libertinismo: a margine di una recente antologia», *Lettere Italiane*, 65/1 (2013), pp. 95-114, in particolare p. 109.

18 Si veda Roger AUBERT, «Joannikios II», *Dictionnaire d'histoire et de géographie ecclésiastiques*, vol. 27, Parigi, Letouzey et Ané, 2000, colonna 1379, con la relativa bibliografia.

19 PANAGIOTAKIS, «Ἐρευναὶ ἐν Βενετίᾳ», cit., pp. 92-93.

20 *Ibid.*, p. 100.



5 [Antonio SANTACROCE], *Frammenti istorici della guerra di Candia*, Bologna 1647
[in realtà: Venezia, Francesco Valvasense], frontespizio.

manoscritto contenente «Framenti de sucessi in Candia nella guerra col Turco».²¹ Ma la paternità dell'opera lì viene tacita.

Il manoscritto autografo, firmato da Stefanoni, si conserva oggi nella Biblioteca Estense Universitaria di Modena insieme ad altre opere più note sulla guerra di Candia, come il diario dell'assedio della città di Francesco Villa per gli anni 1667–1668,²² e la relazione di Francesco Morosini sulla perdita dell'isola, scritta

21 PELIDIS, «Χειρόγραφα από το Χάνδακα στη Βενετία», cit., p. 173.

22 BIBLIOTECA ESTENSE UNIVERSITARIA DI MODENA (d'ora in poi: BEUM), Codice a.G.6.14 (It. 388): Marchese VILLA, *Diario dell'assedio di Candia*, XVII sec. Cfr. Roberto SCONFIENTE,

6 Battaglia navale delle flotte veneziana e olandese combinate
contro gli ottomani a Focea (Focchie) nel 1649.

Dipinto di Abraham Beerstraten, 1656. Rijksmuseum,
Amsterdam. Fonte: Wikimedia Commons.



dopo il ritorno nella metropoli veneziana.²³ Nell'Archivio di Stato di Modena si

ZA, «Note di Poliorcetica sulle Relazioni del Marchese Villa», in *Presenze sabaude per la difesa di Candia, 1645–1669. Atti della giornata di studio 4 aprile 2009*, Torino, Società Piemontese di Archeologia e Belle Arti, in corso di pubblicazione. L'origine ferrarese – e non francese – di Francesco Villa Ghiron – come erroneamente appare sporadicamente nella bibliografia, poiché fu capo di forze militari francesi – traspare da una serie di lettere ed altri documenti conservati presso l'Archivio di Stato di Modena. Si veda ARCHIVIO DI STATO DI MODENA (d'ora in poi: ASMO), Carteggio Particolari, b. 1448.

23 BEUM, Codice a.K.3.17 (It. 167): Franciscus MOROSINI, *Relazione delle cose da lui operate nella guerra di Candia*, XVII sec.



conservano pure altre fonti sulla guerra di Candia,²⁴ correlate al vivo interesse degli Estensi sullo svolgersi degli eventi. La famiglia ducale di Modena aveva inviato aiuti al campo cristiano.²⁵ Probabilmente per questa ragione la cronaca di Stefanoni passò nella loro biblioteca. Tuttavia, non abbiamo rintracciato finora testimonianze dirette sulla storia del manoscritto.

Da quanto già riferito si evince che il manoscritto di Stefanoni costituisce una fonte storica di primo ordine per la drammatica quotidianità della guerra di Candia, considerata dal punto di vista di un cristiano cattolico colto, non veneziano. La sua condizione economica e sociale lo rendeva solidale al popolo della città e partecipe alle sue sofferenze e speranze. Poiché ogni racconto non è che una ricostruzione del passato storico, basata sulla personale visione del mondo dell'autore e sul contesto socioculturale e politico, le testimonianze di Stefanoni andrebbero confrontate con i frammenti della storia della guerra tramandati da altre fonti.²⁶ Indicativa, comunque, degli intenti dell'autore è la frase con cui Stefanoni decise di difendere la verità della sua penna:

La cronica sarà la luce, testimonio della verità. [...] Se la cronica non fosse vera, li veri et valorosi soldati restariano morti. Le vertù de virtuosi sempre con verità. Quando io havessi scritto altrimenti, la cronica non saria veridica. Le debolezze delle mie fatiche non prometton tanto campo. Lasso in qualche loco al giudicio de lettori (f. 1v).

24 ASMO, Cancelleria Ducale, Esterio, Ambasciatori, agenti e corrispondenti estensi fuori d'Italia, Levante.

25 Per il coinvolgimento degli Estensi nella guerra di Candia, a favore, tra l'altro, degli interessi di Francia, cfr. POUMARÈDE, *Il Mediterraneo oltre le crociate*, cit., pp. 344-362.

26 Per la storia della guerra di Candia, oltre agli studi già citati, cfr. principalmente Kenneth M. SETTON, *Venice, Austria, and the Turks in the Seventeenth Century*, Philadelphia, American Philosophical Society, 1991; Ekkehard EICKHOFF, *Venezia, Vienna e Turchi. Bufera nel Sud-Est Europeo 1645-1700*, Milano, Rusconi, 1991; Guido CANDIANI, «Conflitti di intenti e di ragioni politiche, di ambizioni e di interessi nel patriziato veneto durante la guerra di Candia», *Studi Veneziani*, n.s. 36 (1998), pp. 145-275, come pure il recente catalogo della mostra Francesco Morosini 1619-1694. *L'uomo, il doge, il condottiero*, a cura di Bruno BURATTI, Roma, Ist. Poligrafico e zecca dello Stato, 2019. Per bibliografia ulteriore cfr. anche Eirini LYDAKI, Eirini PAPADAKI e Giannis MAVROMATIS (a cura di), *Κρητικός Πόλεμος 1645-1669: Τεκμήρια Ιστορίας*, Heraklion, Biblioteca comunale Vikelaia, 2019, pp. 95-98.



7 Battaglia navale tra la flotta veneziana e quella ottomana vicino a Naxos durante la guerra di Creta (1651). Fonte: Vincenzo CORONELLI, *Archipelago*, Venezia 1688.

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Assalto dal mare in Arcipelago: Alessandro del Borro nella guerra di Candia, 1654–1656

di GUIDO CANDIANI*

ABSTRACT: In the central years of the War of Candia, fought between the Republic of Venice and the Ottoman Empire during the period from 1645 to 1669, the troops organized and directed in the service of the Most Serene Republic by the Tuscan Marquis Alessandro del Borro were the protagonists of a series of raids against the islands of the Aegean – the Archipelago in Venetian terminology – under the nominal rule of the Sublime Porte. Inserted in the more general context of naval and amphibious warfare, these incursions were halfway between a more markedly military strategy and another one more closely linked to the war of robbery, which several times marked negatively the events of the “Arcipelagus Turbatus” during the Venetian–Ottoman conflict for Crete. This essay aims to define the nature and the characteristics of use of these units specifically trained for an assault from the sea to the Ottoman positions in the Aegean.

KEYWORDS: CRETAN WAR, AEGEAN SEA, ARCHIPELAGO, ALESSANDRO DEL BORRO, VENETIAN AMPHIBIOUS WARFARE, WAR AND RAPINE.

Negli anni centrali della guerra di Candia, combattuta tra la Repubblica di Venezia e l’impero Ottomano tra il 1645 e il 1669, le truppe organizzate e dirette al servizio della Serenissima dal marchese toscano Alessandro del Borro furono protagoniste di una serie di incursioni contro le isole dell’Egeo – l’Arcipelago nella terminologia veneziana – sotto il nominale dominio della Porta. Inserite nel più generale contesto della guerra navale e anfibia, queste incursioni si collocarono a mezza strada tra una strategia più accentuatamente militare e una maggiormente legata alla guerra di rapina, che più volte contraddistinse in negativo le vicende dell’“Arcipelagus Turbatus” durante il conflitto veneto-turco per Creta. Il saggio si propone di definire la natura e le

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caratteristiche d’impiego di questi reparti specificatamente addestrati per un assalto dal mare alle posizioni turche dell’Egeo.

Dal servizio nella guerra dei Trent’anni a quello della Repubblica di Venezia

Nato ad Arezzo nel 1600,¹ il nostro protagonista poteva considerare un figlio d’arte, dato che il padre Girolamo Alessandro si era fatto una certa fama combatendo in marchese Alessandro del Borro di Ungheria al soldo dell’Impero, dove era divenuto capitano, e aveva poi sovrinteso ad alcune fortezze del Granducato di Toscana. Dopo studi di matematica e meccanica sotto la guida di Giulio Parigi,² nel 1619 era entrato quale corazziere nella compagnia di Ottavio Piccolomini, ingaggiato in Germania per la prima fase della guerra dei Trent’anni.³ Nel 1625 ricevette una prima patente quale capitano a Milano per una compagnia franca di 300 «alemanni» da ingaggiare al servizio della Spagna.⁴

Tornato al servizio dell’Impero, nel 1627 ottenne dallo stesso comandante imperiale Wallenstein una patente di capitano nel reggimento del colonnello Tommaso Cerboni, salendo poi di grado a sergente maggiore (1631) e tenente colonnello (1633), quest’ultima patente essendogli assegnata ancora da Wallenstein, che poi lo mise al comando temporaneo del reggimento del colonnello Philipp Friedrich Breuner. Quando però il generalissimo imperiale si ribellò, Del Borro

1 Sulla vita di Alessandro del Borro, cfr. Gino BENZONI, «Del Borro, Alessandro», in *Dizionario Biografico degli Italiani* (d’ora in poi: *DBI*), vol. 36, Roma, Istituto della Encyclopedie Italiana, 1988, consultabile all’indirizzo [https://www.treccani.it/enciclopedia/alessandro-del-borro_\(Dizionario-Biografico\)/](https://www.treccani.it/enciclopedia/alessandro-del-borro_(Dizionario-Biografico)/).

2 Su Parigi, architetto e matematico, nonché scenografo ufficiale dei granduchi di Toscana, cfr. Annamaria NEGRO SPINA, «Parigi, Giulio», in *DBI*, vol. 81, Roma, Istituto della Encyclopedie Italiana, 2014, consultabile all’indirizzo [https://www.treccani.it/enciclopedia/giulio-parigi_\(Dizionario-Biografico\)/](https://www.treccani.it/enciclopedia/giulio-parigi_(Dizionario-Biografico)/). Tra le materie che Parigi insegnava vi era l’architettura militare.

3 La *Istoria genealogica* parla di «reggimento Piccolomini», ma quest’ultimo all’epoca era solo capitano e, presumibilmente, comandava una semplice compagnia. Eugenio GAMURRINI, *Istoria genealogica delle famiglie nobili toscane, et umbre [...]*, vol. III, Firenze, Nella stamperia di Francesco Livi, 1673, p. 252; Elisa NOVI CHAVARRIA, «Piccolomini, Ottavio», in *DBI*, vol. 83, Roma, Istituto della Encyclopedie Italiana, 2015, consultabile all’indirizzo [https://www.treccani.it/enciclopedia/ottavio-piccolomini_\(Dizionario-Biografico\)/](https://www.treccani.it/enciclopedia/ottavio-piccolomini_(Dizionario-Biografico)/).

4 GAMURRINI, *Istoria genealogica*, cit., p. 252.



1 L'isola-fortezza di Suda. Fonte: Olfert DAPPER, *Naukeurige Beschrywing der Eilanden in de Archipel der Middelantsche Zee [...]*, Amsterdam, Wolfgangh, 1688.

rimase fedele all'imperatore (e a Piccolomini), fortificando Passau su ordine del compatriota.

Nel 1634 Del Borro partecipò alla battaglia di Nördlingen (6 settembre), presumibilmente con il medesimo reggimento Breuner, posizionato in prima linea sulla destra dello schieramento ispano-imperiale agli ordini di Mattia Galasso (Mathias Gallas), meritandosi una lettera di elogio da parte dello stesso imperato-

re Ferdinando II.⁵ Prima della battaglia aveva partecipato agli assedi di Stettino e di Ratisbona, quest'ultima arresasi il 26 luglio 1634. A Ratisbona si era segnalato per aver ideato delle «macchine» particolarmente efficaci nel favorire la caduta della piazza, mettendo a frutto gli studi nell'arte delle fortificazioni, come peraltro aveva già fatto nel 1628, quando era stato incaricato di ispezionare le fortificazioni dello Holstein, e nel 1632, nei lavori di difesa di Vienna.⁶

Divenuto uomo di fiducia di Galasso, nel 1639 comandò la fanteria preposta alla difesa di Praga, distinguendosi e meritandosi la nomina a sergente generale di battaglia l'anno successivo. Nel 1641 contribuì in modo determinante al recupero di Zwickau, nel corso della campagna condotta dagli imperiali a sostegno dell'elettore di Sassonia. L'anno successivo, quale premio per il soccorso portato a Friedberg, assediata dagli svedesi, fu nominato generale dell'artiglieria imperiale.

Del Borro non aveva comunque interrotto i legami con la Toscana e nel medesimo 1642, su richiesta del granduca Ferdinando II, ottenne una licenza imperiale per ispezionare le fortificazioni dello stato.⁷ Dopo un breve ritorno in Germania, nel 1643 venne posto alla testa delle operazioni granducali nella guerra di Castro in qualità di luogotenente del principe Mattias, fratello di Ferdinando II, con cui doveva aver già operato in Germania.⁸


Del Borro rimase al servizio granducale fino al 1649, quando ottenne licenza per Vienna, dove l'imperatore lo nominò maresciallo di campo e lo inviò in Spagna al seguito della figlia Maria Anna, destinata in moglie a Filippo IV. A Madrid ottenne la nomina a maestro di campo generale per guidare le truppe impegnate in Catalogna contro i francesi, cooperando con l'altro comandante spagnolo, Francisco de Orozco marchese di Mortara. Le operazioni furono favorevoli agli spagnoli, ma Orozco ottenne nel 1651 il richiamo di Del Borro, che non aveva accettato di passare formalmente ai suoi ordini.

5 BENZONI, «Del Borro», cit.; GAMURRINI, *Istoria genealogica*, cit., 253; <http://www.oocities.org/aow1617/Nordlingen2.html>.

6 BENZONI, «Del Borro», cit.

7 Secondo GAMURRINI, *Istoria genealogica*, cit., p. 255, Del Borro era stato inviato in Italia anche per raccogliere truppe per l'Imperatore non solo in Toscana, ma anche a Modena e Milano.

8 Il principe Mattias aveva tra l'altro partecipato anch'egli alla battaglia di Nördlingen. Cfr. Giampiero BRUNELLI, «Medici, Mattias de'», in *DBI*, vol. 73, Roma, Istituto della Encyclopædia Italiana, 2009, consultabile all'indirizzo [https://www.treccani.it/encyclopædia/mattias-de-medici_\(Dizionario-Biografico\)/](https://www.treccani.it/encyclopædia/mattias-de-medici_(Dizionario-Biografico)./).



2 Atene e il Golfo Saronico o di Egina. Fonte: Vincenzo CORONELLI, *Morea, Negroponte & adiacenze*, [Venice, ca. 1708].

Di questo contrasto cercò di approfittare l'ambasciatore veneziano a Madrid, Pietro Basadonna, per proporre di guadagnare l'ormai celebre Del Borro al servizio di Venezia, impegnata da sei anni in una difficile guerra contro l'Impero Ottomano per il controllo di Creta (guerra di Candia, 1645–69). Sul momento la proposta non andò in porto e Del Borro rimase in Spagna, con nuovi incarichi militari, fino al 1653, quando rientrò in Toscana. Qui finalmente il residente veneziano, Giovanni Ambrogio Sarotti, riuscì, dopo una serrata trattativa condotta

nel febbraio del 1654, a condurlo al servizio della Serenissima.⁹ Del Borro venne ingaggiato «senza altro titolo», ma «con autorità [...] di generale dell’infanteria, cioè della prima carica, che venga data a’ forastieri»¹⁰ e l’intesa che dovesse dipendere dal solo Capitano Generale da Mar, il comandante in capo di tutte le forze veneziane in Levante, e con espressa «superiorità» sugli ufficiali, superiori e non, dell’esercito (ma non di quelli della marina). Lo stipendio previsto era di 10 mila ducati annui, analogo a quello che aveva percepito in Spagna.¹¹

Al servizio della Repubblica. Suda ed Egina

Del Borro partì per Venezia nella seconda decade marzo del 1654.¹² All’inizio di maggio si imbarcò dalla città lagunare per il Levante con il Capitano Generale da Mar Alvise Mocenigo. Grazie alla sua fama di esperto in materia, il primo compito affidatogli fu quello di ispezionare le fortificazioni veneziane. In questo ruolo ebbe modo di entrare in rapporto con Francesco Morosini, allora Provveditore d’Armata, che dopo l’improvvisa morte a Candia di Mocenigo (17 ottobre) assunse il comando effettivo delle operazioni e con il quale avrebbe strettamente collaborato nella successiva campagna. Subito Morosini distaccò due galee per inviare Del Borro a ispezionare la baia, strategicamente importante, di Suda, controllata da una isola-fortezza veneziana (immagine 1).¹³ La missione aveva anche lo scopo di valutare qualche possibile iniziativa militare, dato che, per quanto l’isola-fortezza controllasse la baia, le rive erano cadute in mano agli

9 ARCHIVIO DI STATO DI VENEZIA (d’ora in poi: ASV), *Senato Dispacci Ambasciatori*, Firenze, filza 62, disp.ci n. 113, 14.2.1654; 114, 15.2.1654.

10 Andrea VALIER, *Storia della guerra di Candia*, vol. I, Trieste, Colombo Coen, 1859, p. 281.

11 ASV, *Senato Dispacci Ambasciatori*, Firenze, filza 62, disp. n. 114, 15.2.1654, cc. 247v, 249r.; n. 117, 21.2.1654, c. 259r.

12 Quindi non alla fine di febbraio, come scrive Benzoni. Il 6 marzo assicurò al residente veneziano che sarebbe partito entro tre-quattro giorni, ma il 21 non era ancora giunto in Laguna, nonostante il Granduca gli avesse prestato la propria lettiga per il viaggio fino all’imbarco a Rimini o fino a Ferrara nel caso avesse voluto proseguire via terra. ASV, *Senato Dispacci Ambasciatori*, Firenze, filza 63, disp. n. 120, 7.3.1654, c. 4r; n. 123, 27.3.1654, cc. 10r, 11r.

13 ASV, *Provveditori da Terra e da mar e altre cariche* (d’ora in poi: PTM), filza 1221, disp. F. Morosini n. 78, 17.10.1654. Sulla fortezza di Suda, cfr. Maria ARAKADAKI, «Fortezza della Suda: Ιστορικές και αρχιτεκτονικές διερευνήσεις [Forteza della Suda: approfondimenti storico-architettonici]», *Kρητική Εστία*, IV, 7 (1999), pp. 51-112.

ottomani sin dai primi anni di guerra.¹⁴

Morosini si stava impegnando da tempo in una strategia, sia alternativa che complementare rispetto a quella del blocco navale dei Dardanelli attuata a partire dal 1647,¹⁵ che mirava a sfruttare la libertà d’azione concessa alla flotta veneziana in Egeo. Mentre l’*Armata grossa* chiudeva i Dardanelli, quella *sottile*¹⁶ poteva dedicarsi a una serie di operazioni di carattere anfibio condotte soprattutto dalle galee contro le posizioni costiere ottomane e che aveva quale mira non secondaria la possibilità e fare razzie e bottino. Già l’anno precedente il Provveditore d’Armata aveva attaccato Nauplia, importante piazza del Peloponneso, dove era stato conquistato un forte distaccato e catturati 22 cannoni, 14 dei quali di bronzo.¹⁷ Nella tarda primavera del 1654 aveva effettuato un’incursione contro *Porto Lione* (il Pireo), dove aveva catturato e incendiato 13 mercantili in procinto di salpare con rifornimenti per l’esercito ottomano a Creta.¹⁸

Del Borro rientrò dalla missione a Suda ai primi di novembre, ma, contro le speranze accarezzate da Morosini, sconsigliò di effettuare qualsiasi operazione a Creta, data la scarsità di truppe disponibili per operazioni anfibie di qualche rilievo nell’isola, dove l’esercito ottomano manteneva un esercito numeroso e agguerrito. In base al suo contratto, Del Borro non dipendeva da Morosini, che non era Capitano Generale, ed era libero di scegliere se agire a Creta o imbarcarsi con la flotta per operare con essa. Lo stesso Morosini era indeciso su dove fosse più opportuno che egli operasse,¹⁹ ma in ogni caso la relativa indipendenza del marchese avrebbe creato una serie di attriti con il Provveditore d’Armata che, in assenza di un nuovo Capitano Generale, manteneva il comando effettivo delle forze veneziane in Levante.²⁰ Quando Del Borro chiese un corpo di almeno

14 ASV, *PTM*, filza 1221, disp. F. Morosini n. 80, 30.10.1654.

15 Sul blocco, cfr. Guido CANDIANI, «Stratégie et diplomatie vénitiennes: navires angle-hollandaises et blocus des Dardanelles, 1646–1659», *Revue d’Histoire Maritime*, 9 (2008), pp. 251–282.

16 La flotta veneziana era costituita da un’*Armata grossa*, formata della unità a vela, e da una *sottile*, con quelle a remi.

17 ASV, *PTM*, filza 1221, disp. F. Morosini n. 54, 30.8.1653 e all. s.d. I pezzi in bronzo, superiori a quelli in ferro, potevano anche essere facilmente rifusi e costituivano un bottino privilegiato.

18 ASV, *PTM*, filza 1221, disp. F. Morosini n. 73, 27.5.1654.

19 ASV, *PTM*, filza 1221, disp. F. Morosini n. 84, 16.11.1654.

20 ASV, *PTM*, filza 1221, disp. F. Morosini n. 83, 8.11.1654.

5 mila uomini per poter operare a Creta contro gli ottomani, ben sapendo che non avrebbe mai potuto avere una simile forza, Morosini si lamentò di trovare «veramente questo Signore se non in tutto alieno dalle operattioni, inclinato almeno alle proposizioni impossibili da effettuarsi». Pare che Del Borro giocasse anche sulle divergenze tra Morosini e il Provveditore Generale di Candia Andrea Corner,²¹ tanto che il Provveditore d'Armata si vide costretto, di fronte a «quelle dichiarationi che ha sempre meco con sommo mio rammarico praticato, con le quali sempre si riporta a quello che mi habbi discorso in voce [...] a riddurlo ad esponer in foglio i propri sentimenti, né mi è stato possibile il poterne conseguir l'effetto». Esclusa ogni operazione a Creta, Morosini rivolse nuovamente la propria attenzione all'Egeo (Arcipelago nella terminologia veneziana), anche se gli equivoci sorti lo avevano convinto che non si potesse fare affidamento sul marchese «in ogni occasione che succeda di disbarco o per l'acquisto di schiavi», uno degli obiettivi primari del Provveditore d'Armata.²²

In vista delle future operazioni, Del Borro stava già organizzando una compagnia di cavalleria che avrebbe dovuto operare dalla flotta come forza da sbarco veloce. Per formarla furono scelti soldati *oltremarini* (l'organico originariamente previsto era di 50 uomini), posti al comando del Capitano Giorgio Burich.²³ Gli oltremarini erano soldati di origine dalmata e poi soprattutto albanese e anche greca, sovente sudditi ottomani, che venivano arruolati con la specifica possibilità di essere imbarcati sulle unità della flotta, in particolare le unità a remi minori che operavano lungo le coste dalmate e dell'Albania veneta.²⁴ Non si trattava comunque di truppe espressamente addestrate per le operazioni anfibie, sicché la compagnia organizzata da Del Borro potrebbe essere stata la prima forza veneziana organizzata con lo specifico scopo di effettuare operazioni di sbarco. Va

21 Su Corner, che dirigeva la difesa di Creta, cfr. Claudio Povolo, «Corner, Andrea», in *DBI*, vol. 29, Roma, Istituto della Enciclopedia Italiana, 1983, consultabile all'indirizzo [https://www.treccani.it/enciclopedia/andrea-corner_\(Dizionario-Bio grafico\)/](https://www.treccani.it/enciclopedia/andrea-corner_(Dizionario-Bio grafico)/).

22 ASV, *PTM*, filza 1221, disp. F. Morosini n. 91, 6.1.1655.

23 ASV, *PTM*, filza 1221, disp. F. Morosini n. 89, 14.12.1654 [ma sul retro 19.12].

24 Sulle compagnie oltramarine impiegate nel Seicento in Dalmazia, cfr. Guido CANDIANI. *Un corpo di polizia marittima: le galeotte veneziane della Dalmazia (1670-1684)*, in *Extra moenia. Il controllo del territorio nelle campagne e nei piccoli centri*, a cura di Livio ANTONELLI, Soveria Mannelli, Rubbettino, 2013, pp. 39-63. Una carrellata storica, non sempre attendibile, in Ennio CONCINA, *Le trionfanti et invittissime armate venete: Le milizie della Serenissima dal XVI al XVIII secolo*, Venezia, Filippi, 1972, pp. 29-41.



3 La Battaglia dei Dardanelli del 1656, in un'incisione di Pieter Casteleyn (1657).

Fonte: Wikimedia Commons.

comunque tenuto presente che da sempre la guerra anfibia faceva parte integrante delle operazioni navali in Mediterraneo, sicché ogni primogenitura in questo campo risulta in definitiva aleatoria, nonostante il tema dei “fanti da mar” e delle loro origini sia stato sovente sollevato da una certa storiografia di carattere celebrativo.

Spostatasi agli inizi di febbraio la flotta nell’isola di Paros, Del Borro esercitava «giornalmente con particolar studio» non solo questa compagnia, ma anche le altre truppe imbarcate per le future operazioni anfibie.²⁵ Purtroppo le fonti analizzate non offrono indicazioni sul tipo di addestramento intrapreso dal marchese. Non c’è neppure alcun riscontro documentario su eventuali sistemi per mettere rapidamente a terra dalle galee non solo gli uomini, ma anche i cavalli. Vi è solo

25 ASV, PTM, filza 1221, disp. F. Morosini n. 94, 2.2.1655.

un generico accenno a «ponti flottanti per un disbarco forzoso sotto il calor d’una nave» che Del Borro aveva suggerito a fine 1654 per una ventilata operazione nella baia di Suda, proposta che Morosini aveva giudicato inutile perché «con le prove delle galere [...] potea farsi ogni disbarco».²⁶

L’occasione per mettere alla prova questo addestramento venne rapidamente. Spostatasi a Siros, la flotta salpò il 15 febbraio in direzione dell’isola di Egina (immagine 2), scelta da Morosini come obiettivo iniziale della nuova campagna. Il 17 febbraio era in vista dell’isola e il giorno dopo effettuò un’attenta ricognizione delle coste «per riconoscer i posti», assicurarsi che i turchi non potessero inviare rinforzi dalla terraferma e distruggere le imbarcazioni che gli abitanti avrebbero potuto utilizzare per fuggire una volta resisi conto che quello veneziano era un vero assalto e non una semplice incursione.²⁷

Lo sbarco avvenne la mattina del 19 febbraio, sotto la direzione di Del Borro, con il quale Morosini si era precedentemente accordato e che scese a terra tra i primi. Le raccomandazioni di Morosini si limitavano al rispetto delle «chiese [...] nella salvezza dell’honore, nell’acquisto d’huomini da remo e nella riserva dei grani et armi che si fossero trovati a pubblico beneficio, ogn’altra cosa poi lasciavo a sua libera dispositione». Lo sbarco venne eseguito con prontezza, mentre Del Borro assegnava a ciascuna delle quattro “brigate” disponibili, organizzate con criteri “nazionali”, la propria posizione sulla base dell’esercitazioni effettuate a Paros. Agli oltremarini, la cui brigata consisteva in tre “squadroni” divisi a loro volta per nazionalità (albanesi, croati, greci e cimarioti) venne assegnata l’ala destra; il centro era occupato da una brigata di francesi e una di tedeschi, mentre una quarta brigata di italiani era posizionata all’ala sinistra. La compagnia di cavalleria oltremarina formata a dicembre copriva la fanteria, ma poi venne inviata in avanti da Del Borro per catturare qualche prigioniero e ottenere informazioni, insieme a un distaccamento di 90 «corridori» scelti pare tra la brigata degli oltremarini. Dalle informazioni raccolte, i difensori potevano contare su circa 700 armati.

Una volta effettuato lo sbarco, Morosini aveva cercato di convincere gli isolani, ancora dubiosi che si trattasse di un vero e proprio assalto, a una rapida resa, ma essi preferirono ritirarsi verso il centro dell’isola, parte nella fortezza del

26 ASV, *PTM*, filza 1221, disp. F. Morosini n. 91, 6.1.1655.

27 Per le operazioni a Egina, cfr. ASV, *PTM*, filza 1221, disp. F. Morosini n. 96, 2.3.1655; GADMURRINI, *Istoria genealogica*, cit., pp. 264-270.

borgo di Paleochora e parte sulle vicine colline, divisi in tre gruppi. Del Borro si mise quindi alla testa degli oltremarini, con due squadroni a cavallo della strada, il terzo di rinforzo e la cavalleria sulla sinistra, superando con una manovra a tenaglia una breve resistenza, conquistò il borgo e si diresse poi a investire la fortezza, dove si era ritirata una parte degli isolani. La fortezza era posizionata in un terreno difficile da investire, ma i difensori mancavano di acqua e Del Borro aveva a disposizione alcuni mortai, «essendosi sempre osservato – ricordava Morosini – che nien altra cosa è più habile a render confusione in luochi tali che l'uso de simili istromenti». Il borgo fu preso dalla brigata oltremarina, sostenuta sulla sinistra dalla cavalleria, che per strada disperse dei gruppi armati di isolani. Gli oltremarini furono poi raggiunti dalle altre tre brigate, con francesi e tedeschi che cominciarono ad investire la fortezza. Non fu però necessario un assalto, perché i difensori, di fronte alla minaccia di un bombardamento da parte dei mortai che 50 bombardieri scelti andavano posizionando, preferirono arrendersi il giorno successivo, 20 febbraio. Egina si impegnò a pagare il *carazo*, il tributo che sia i veneziani, sia gli ottomani, pretendevano dalle isole dell'Egeo in cambio della propria “protezione”, cioè della speranza di non essere saccheggiate dall'uno o dall'altro dei contendenti.²⁸

Dopo la resa, Del Borro ordinò una «caccia generale» degli abitanti fuggitivi, incaricandone due compagnie della brigata francese. Morosini poté così raccogliere i desiderati rematori, dato che vennero scovati 300 abitanti adatti alle galee, ai quali si aggiunse qualche turco dei pochi presenti a Egina;²⁹ si aggiunsero anche 50 «figlioli di non più di 10 anni», distribuiti quali mozzi e aiutanti per le maestranze di bordo. Furono concessi tre giorni di saccheggio «non solo alli soldati, perchè l'avevano guadagnata; ma a tutti quelli, che sapevano desiderare di portar via, e ritornar a portare a Mare quanto li piaceua».³⁰ Nel bottino figurò anche un

28 Sul *carazo*, cfr. B. J. SLOT, *Arcipelagus Turbatus. Les Cyclades Entre Colonisation Latine Et Occupation Ottomane c. 1500-1718*, I, Leiden, Nederlands Instituut voor het Nabije Oosten, 1982, pp. 79-80, 172-173. Sulla tassazione e sul meccanismo di riscossione delle tasse attuato dai veneziani nell'Arcipelago durante la prima guerra di Morea, si veda nel presente fascicolo speciale il saggio di Georges KOUTZAKIOTIS, «Aspects de l'intendance des Vénitiens dans l'Archipel au cours de la guerre de Morée (1684–1699)» e relativa bibliografia.

29 I turchi fatti prigionieri furono 43, compresi donne e bambini, che vennero divisi tra i vincitori con l'impegno di convertirli al cristianesimo.

30 GAMURRINI, *Istoria genealogica*, cit., p. 270.

certo numero di animali, che servirono a rifornire le mense di bordo; mancarono invece i cannoni, praticamente assenti nelle difese dell’isola.

Nuove divergenze sorsero con Del Borro relativamente alla conservazione o demolizione della fortezza di Egina. Il marchese avrebbe preferito mantenerla armata di sole *periere*,³¹ ritenute sufficienti data la forza del sito, e dando al presidio, previsto in una compagnia con due altre di stanza nel borgo, viveri e acqua per sostenersi a lungo. L’isola sarebbe stata utile quale sentinella avanzata e come base per sostenere le popolazioni del Peloponneso, quali i mainoti, in costante agitazione contro gli ottomani.³² Il 27 febbraio una consulta dei principali comandanti veneziani decise invece di demolirla, dato che era troppo lontana dal mare per poter essere soccorsa efficacemente in caso di necessità, considerata anche l’ostilità della popolazione locale e la vicinanza alla terraferma controllata dagli ottomani: non senza ironia, l’incarico fu dato allo stesso Del Borro. Il marchese ebbe inoltre uno scontro con il Governatore di Galeazza Barbaro Badoer,³³ la cui guardia gli aveva impedito l’ingresso nella fortezza e con il quale venne a male parole: dovette intervenire Morosini, che consegnò Badoer sulla propria galeazza e aprì un procedimento a suo carico.

I veneziani si reimbarcarono il 2 marzo, chiudendo la prima operazione anfibia della campagna. Il successo era stato sicuramente agevolato dalla debolezza dei difensori, ma l’addestramento impartito da Del Borro e la sua direzione avevano mostrato la loro validità. In particolare, si era distinta nelle fasi iniziali e più delicate la compagnia di cavalleria oltremarina formata in dicembre, per quanto il suo organico fosse limitato a 35 dei 50 uomini originariamente previsti. Ciò convinse Morosini a concedere una seconda compagnia, questa volta di 40 corazzieri; dato che mancavano cavalli, Del Borro venne autorizzato a servirsi provvisoriamente della nuova compagnia anche come fanteria.³⁴

31 Le *periere*, come suggerisce il nome, erano artiglierie originariamente pensate per sparare palle di pietra che, data la minor densità del ferro, richiedeva una carica di polvere ridotta, da impiegare essenzialmente come armi anti-personale. La principale loro caratteristica era il fatto di essere a retrocarica.

32 Sfruttando la propria abilità, Del Borro aveva disegnato una mappa delle possibili difese dell’isola.

33 Su Badoer, cfr. Angelo VENTURA, «Badoer, Barbaro Giacomo», in *DBI*, vol. 5, Roma, Istituto della Enciclopedia Italiana, 1963, consultabile all’indirizzo [enciclopedia/barbaro-giacomo-badoer_\(Dizionario-Biografico\)/](http://enciclopedia/barbaro-giacomo-badoer_(Dizionario-Biografico)./).

34 ASV, *PTM*, filza 1221, disp. F. Morosini n. 97, 15.3.1655. L’anno successivo, il nuovo

Operazioni a Volo senza Del Borro

Nell’attesa dell’arrivo del nuovo Capitano Generale da Mar Lazzaro Marcello, e mantenendo la propria strategia del mordi e fuggi, Morosini decise in effettuare un’incursione nella terraferma greca, attaccando Volo, sbocco marittimo dell’importante flusso di granaglie dalla Tessaglia.³⁵ Del Borro non ebbe però modo di partecipare di persona all’operazione, secondo il Provveditore d’Armata a causa di un equivoco. Dato che la galea sulla quale il marchese era imbarcato doveva spalmare, questi si era spostato sulla *Concordia*, la nave dove teneva il proprio bagaglio e «gl’strumenti da guerra più essentiali». In vista della nuova operazione, Morosini gli chiese di tornare sulla galea, mezzo più adatto per un’operazione anfibia. Galee e Navi salparono separate il 19 marzo, ma quando era già in mare, il Provveditore d’Armata, cha navigava con le unità a remi, venne a sapere che Del Borro era rimasto sulla *Concordia*, dove inoltre risultavano imbarcati l’unico ingegnere dell’Armata, il *petardiere* (responsabile della guerra di mina) e i bombisti con tutti i loro strumenti per il tiro dei mortai, nonostante Morosini avesse loro ordinato di rimanere sulle galee.³⁶

Morosini decise di proseguire egualmente, contando sul fatto che le navi potessero ricongiungersi con lui prima dell’attacco. Per ogni evenienza scelse comunque di affidare le operazioni di sbarco al Sergente Maggiore di battaglia André Breton, che, in servizio dall’inizio della guerra, già aveva operato a Egina con la brigata francese. Si portò quindi in avanti con nove galee scelte, inoltrandosi nel Golfo di Volo la mattina del 21 marzo, ma una bonaccia frenò anche le unità a remi (che, quando possibile, navigavano a vela), impedendo il previsto sbarco notturno a sorpresa. Morosini decise di agire comunque anche alla luce del sole, ma verso il tramonto, in modo da poter sfruttare l’incipiente arrivo delle tenebre. Volo aveva difese nettamente superiori a Egina, con mura «a botta di cannone» fiancheggiate, nel tratto rivolto verso il mare, da due forti torrioni. Vi

Provveditore d’Armata Barbaro Badoer avrebbe affermato che «l’invenzione di cavallaria in armata è la più proficua che s’habbi già mai praticata». *Ibid.*, filza 1222, disp. B. Badoer n. 8, 29.7.1656.

35 Morosini sottolinea comunque che da tre anni il traffico era praticamente sospeso, perché tutto il frumento era convertito in biscotto per la flotta ottomana. Sull’impresa di Volo, cfr. ASV, *PTM*, filza 1221, disp. n. 98, 2.4.1655.

36 La *Istoria genealogica* accusa invece Morosini di aver tenuto scientemente lontano Dal Borro «volendo solo la gloria lui». GAMURRINI, *Istoria genealogica*, cit., p. 271.


era inoltre una cittadella interna altrettanto forte. Morosini si presentò davanti alla piazza un paio di ore prima del tramonto del 22 marzo [questa è la data che sembra dedursi dalla documentazione], e subito gli abitanti si apprestarono alla difesa, chiedendo aiuto ai luoghi vicini con reiterati tiri di artiglierie. Donne e bambini vennero fatti rapidamente evacuare con quanto più bagaglio possibile.

Se Del Borro era rimasto fuori gioco, non così le truppe da lui addestrate, che vennero fatte sbarcare sollecitamente fuori dal tiro utile dell'artiglieria della munita piazza. Il Provveditore d'Armata le divise in cinque “squadre”, anche questa volta su base nazionale, con l'obiettivo di creare anche una competizione tra le varie “nazioni” (oltremarini, francesi, tedeschi, italiani e greci) per conseguire un successo ancora più rapido. Le truppe marciarono poi verso la piazzaforte, protette da tre galee, mentre le restanti galee battevano le mura con la propria artiglieria, danneggiando anche la città. I difensori risposero al fuoco tentando di allontanare le galee e riuscirono a colpirne qualcuna, ma senza provocare gravi danni. L'arrivo del resto dell'Armata sottile, con la poderosa artiglieria delle galeazze, rafforzò il tiro dei veneziani, mentre si riusciva, nonostante l'assenza del *petardiere* e degli altri specialisti, a minare la (pare unica) porta delle mura. Nel contempo si posizionavano le scale d'assalto, disorientando i non numerosi difensori.

Respinto (con il contributo del figlio di Alessandro Del Borro, Girolamo) un soccorso portato da un distaccamento di cavalleria ottomana,³⁷ la porta fu fatta saltare e gli attaccanti poterono entrare in città prima della mezzanotte, facendosi «valorosamente [...] strada col ferro». Incontrando una «pertinace difesa», fecero strage di turchi, 107 cadaveri dei quali vennero trovati la mattina seguente per le strade e sulle mura. Gli ottomani tentarono un'ultima difesa nella cittadella, ma alle prime luci dell'alba preferirono darsi alla fuga, calandosi dalle mura che guardavano verso la campagna. Anche gli attaccanti lamentarono però perdite non lievi, con 46 morti e circa 100 feriti, colpiti soprattutto dai moschetti nemici. Il bottino contemplò 27 cannoni, 20 dei quali di bronzo,³⁸ ma poca polvere (5-6

³⁷ Figlio di secondo letto di Alessandro, Girolamo Del Borro parteciperà anche alla fase finale dell'assedio di Candia, iniziatisi nel 1667. BENZONI, «Del Borro», cit.

³⁸ Tra i pezzi catturati vi era una «bellissima» colubrina e alcuni *cannoni* del genere veneziano da 60. Ricordiamo che per designare il calibro delle proprie artiglierie medie e grandi, Venezia utilizzava la libbra sottile, di circa un terzo più leggera della libbra grossa. Cfr. Marco MORIN, *La battaglia di Lepanto: alcuni aspetti della tecnologia navale veneziana*,



4 La Battaglia dei Dardanelli del 1656: «VITORIA OTTENVTA DALA SEREN.
MA / REPVBBLICA DI VENETIA / CONTRA TVRCHI / LANNO M·D·C·LVI· ADI
XXVI / GIVGNO COMANDATA DAL / ECC.mo SIG.r LORENZO MARCELLO».

François Collignon, stampatore ed editore (c. 1610–1687). Royal Collection Trust / © Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth II 2022; immagine gratuita da utilizzare per fini non commerciali. Fonte: <https://militarymaps.rct.uk/other-17th-century-conflicts/battle-of-the-dardanelles-1656-vitoria-ottenvta-dala>.

mila libbre), perché i turchi pensavano che fosse sufficiente una difesa di un paio di giorni prima di essere soccorsi dai territori vicini. Solo il giorno prima del reimbarco dei veneziani però – oltre una settimana dopo – un contingente di sei mila uomini, guidati dallo stesso beylerbey della Grecia, si avvicinò alla piazza, senza peraltro poter operare alcunché. Oltre alla polvere, anche il bottino di uomini si rivelò scarso e i nemici resi schiavi per il servizio al remo non superarono i 30 (oltre ad alcuni «figlioli e poche donne»), frustrando uno dei principali obiettivi della strategia di Morosini. Il Provveditore d'Armata poté consolarsi in parte con la grande quantità di biscotto trovata in 27 magazzini cittadini, che le ciurme impiegarono otto giorni a caricare, riempendo «sotto e sopra» le coperte di galee e galeazze. La distribuzione dell'ingente quantità sollevò comunque forti contrasti, perché, dato che nella fretta il biscotto era stato caricato ovunque fosse possibile, le ciurme pretendevano che ogni unità potesse tenere la quantità da essa caricata, indipendentemente dalle necessità comuni. Morosini dovette intervenire, arrivando a far giustiziare il *tarifa* (responsabile dei viveri) della propria galea generalizia. Alla fine, piuttosto che procedere a una difficile redistribuzione, venne attribuito un valore di 2 soldi per ogni libbra di biscotto caricato, da addebitare a saldo di ciascuna unità. Dopo aver fatte saltare in più punti le mura, in particolare quelle rivolte al mare con i due torrioni che le fiancheggiavano, nonché la principale moschea della città, la sera del 30 marzo i veneziani salparono, contemplando dal mare i numerosi incendi che avevano appiccato prima della partenza.

Il fallito attacco a Malvasia

Conclusa l'impresa di Volo, Morosini, sempre in attesa di congiungersi con le navi (e con Del Borro), si preoccupò di incassare il *carazo* da parte delle isole “debitrici”. Si portò quindi a Sciato, subito fuori il Golfo di Volo, la quale offrì «volontariamente» il tributo, mentre la decina di turchi presenti nell'isola si presentò «spontaneamente» al Provveditore d'Armata, che preferì non agire nei loro confronti per dare un esempio di magnanimità che sperava potesse portare a simili «rassegnazioni» in altre isole. Dato che il contante, 1.800 reali, non era sufficiente, gli isolani si impegnarono a pagare in natura con la fornitura entro ottobre

in *Meditando sull'evento di Lepanto. Odierne interpretazioni e memorie*, Venezia, Corbo e Fiore, 2004, pp. 71-72 (69-77).

di 10 mila *chilò* (361 mila litri) di frumento, che equivalevano a un contributo di circa 15 mila reali: se non avessero consegnato il pattuito, sarebbero passati al sistema applicato contro Egina. Non senza cinismo, Morosini osservò che avere un’isola «contumace» all’anno non sarebbe poi stato un male, dato che si sarebbe avuta una scusa per ottenere a buon mercato schiavi per le galee. Dopo Sciato, anche le vicine Chilidromi (Alonneso) e Scopelo fecero segno di obbedienza alla Serenissima, anche se 25 abitanti di Chilodromi vennero trattenuti al remo quali ostaggi in attesa della piena contribuzione dell’isola.

Il 6 aprile Morosini arrivò a Schiro e il giorno dopo venne raggiunto dalle navi, tra le quali la *Concordia* con Del Borro. Il ritardo delle unità a vela era dovuto non solo al vento contrario, ma anche al fatto che si fossero dirette a Termia (Citno) e Milos per riscuotere a loro volta il *carazo*. Il Provveditore d’Armata si lamentò per l’assenza del marchese a Volo, con ingegneri e «strumenti più necessari», appunti ai quali Del Borro rispose adducendo a pretesto il fatto che la galea non fosse andata a prenderlo prima della partenza delle navi. Una scusa che non convinse affatto Morosini («dalla nave alla galera si può come si vuole, essendo ambidue nel porto istesso, passar con la feluca»), ma il Provveditore d’Armata finse di credergli con il «concepir disgusto verso chi havesse mancato in ciò, ch’egli asserviva».³⁹ I rapporti tra i due, pur formalmente corretti, rimanevano tesi.

L’Armata si spostò quindi ad Andro per passare agli ordini del nuovo Capitano Generale da Mar Girolamo Foscarini, che aveva raggiunto l’isola il 22 aprile. Nella notte sul 3 maggio giunse però «innaspettata» la morte di Foscarini, lasciando nuovamente il comando supremo a Morosini e Dal Borro, probabilmente poco felice dei nuovi sviluppi, ai suoi ordini.⁴⁰ Fu dunque il Provveditore d’Armata a condurre, come già stabilito, la flotta ai Dardanelli per riproporne il blocco, nonostante fosse una strategia poco amata da Morosini; il quale infatti, appena possibile, lasciò l’Armata grossa ai Dardanelli per portarsi con quella sottile all’attacco di Malvasia, importante piazza del Peloponneso e punto d’imbarco per i rifornimenti destinati alle truppe ottomane operanti a Creta.

Mentre la flotta era davanti agli Stretti, Del Borro continuò ad esercitare le truppe ad operazioni anfibie, effettuando degli sbarchi sulla costa controllata dagli ottomani. Le truppe ebbero modo di evidenziare il loro addestramento

39 ASV, *PTM*, filza 1221, disp. F. Morosini n. 99, 18.4.1655.

40 ASV, *PTM*, filza 1221, disp. F. Morosini n. 100, 5.5.1655.

proteggendo efficacemente le acque della flotta. Morosini ebbe questa volta modo di apprezzare l'operato del marchese, che trovava anche la «soddisfazione» delle truppe, alla cui testa si faceva vedere «con la pica alla mano». Tanto che il Provveditore d'Armata non poté «contenere verso di lui quell'espressioni di stima e di riconoscenza, che ho stimano al suo merito dovute».⁴¹

Il 18 giugno la consulta decise di far partire il grosso dell'Armata sottile con Morosini, che con 25 galee (sette delle quali maltesi) e quattro galeazze⁴² si diresse a Micono (Mykonos) via Chio e Nicaria (Icaria).⁴³ Dopo aver toccato la vicina Delo (Sdilles),⁴⁴ si portò a Malvasia, che doveva essere presa «non già per forza d'assalto, come altre volte si è procurato, ma per via d'assedio, come non tanto per difficile mi viene al presente persuaso». In particolare, Morosini sperava che la mancanza d'acqua, la cui raccolta era sufficiente solo per un mese in base alle informazioni raccolte, costringesse i difensori alla resa. Morosini ne parlò con Del Borro, «come quello, del valore del quale dovrà esser ben ordinata l'imprese». Benché questi si mostrasse «inclinato d'impiegarsi con tutto l'ardore», il Provveditore d'Armata non poté non chiamare in causa «Iddio» affinché il marchese condividesse effettivamente i suoi propositi. I dubbi di Morosini sembrano trovare conferma nella *Istoria genealogica*, che afferma come il marchese «così comandato lo seguitò, ma con poca volontà, sapendo molto bene, che era cosa da non riuscirne, assediare una fortezza delle più considerabili in tutta la Monarchia Ottomanna, e conseguentemente provvista di tutte le cose per molti anni, non che per tre, o quattro mesi, come credeva il Moresini».⁴⁵

I dubbi di Del Borro sull'efficacia di un assedio prolungato trovarono conferma nelle operazioni intorno alla piazza, che si prolungarono senza esito per oltre due mesi. Il marchese «obbedì» a quanto ordinatogli da Morosini, pur «sapendo, che tutto questo era cosa vana, e di nessun profitto»,⁴⁶ organizzando lo sbarco delle truppe e facendo costruire un forte sulla striscia di terra che collegava la

41 ASV, *PTM*, filza 1221, disp. F. Morosini n. 102, 27.5.1655; GAMURRINI, *Istoria genealogica*, cit., p. 271.

42 Vi erano anche due navi per il trasporto dei materiali. VALIER, *Storia*, cit., vol. II, p. 15.

43 ASV, *PTM*, filza 1221, disp. F. Morosini n. 103, 22.6.1655.

44 ASV, *PTM*, filza 1221, disp. F. Morosini n. 104, 25.6.1655.

45 ASV, *PTM*, filza 1221, disp. F. Morosini n. 105, 29.6.1655; GAMURRINI, *Istoria genealogica*, cit., p. 272.

46 *Ibid.*

penisola sulla quale era situata Malvasia con la terraferma. Morosini cominciò un bombardamento con i proiettili esplosivi dei mortai «che sopra ogn’altra cosa apportano terrore e danno», offrendo nel contempo la resa alla piazza e sottolineando con i difensori gli esempi per loro negativi di Egina e Volo a confronto con quello di Sciato. Il comandante ottomano rifiutò però la resa, sottolineando di non temere l’effetto delle bombe.⁴⁷ Del Borro suggerì un attacco generale portato contemporaneamente contro tre settori diversi del borgo ai piedi della fortezza, ma il Provveditore d’Armata, pur condividendo le motivazioni militari della proposta, non volle impegnarsi in una impresa a suo giudizio troppo rischiosa anche per le scarse informazioni riguardo i soccorsi che gli ottomani stavano raccogliendo a sostegno della piazza.⁴⁸ L’8 settembre arrivò in effetti dall’entroterra un contingente di circa due mila turchi, che, in attesa del grosso con altri cinque-sei mila uomini, iniziarono a piazzare una batteria di controassedio. Almeno inizialmente Del Borro sembra aver sottostimato la minaccia, che costrinse gli assedianti a ritirarsi dalle posizioni più esposte. Si verificò inoltre uno spiacevole contrasto tra il marchese e il colonello Guerra Galeffi, che, pur facendo parte del seguito di Del Borro, aveva partecipato all’impresa di Volo, suscitandone la gelosia: anche in questo caso Morosini gli diede ragione, relegando Galeffi in galea.⁴⁹ La minaccia ottomana e l’arrivo della stagione autunnale spinsero alla fine Morosini all’abbandono dell’assedio e, dopo aver reimbarcato tutte le artiglierie e le munizioni, l’Armata salpò da Malvasia il 15 settembre. Si trattava di un chiaro insuccesso, che il Provveditore d’Armata cercò di scaricare anche su Del Borro, non troppo velatamente accusato di non aver saputo contrastare efficacemente la minaccia proveniente dalla terraferma.⁵⁰

47 ASV, *PTM*, filza 1221, disp. F. Morosini n. 106, 15.7.1655.

48 ASV, *PTM*, filza 1221, disp. F. Morosini n. 109, 9.8.1655.

49 ASV, *PTM*, filza 1221, disp. F. Morosini n. 111, 11.9.1655. Un’altra vittima delle rimostranze di Del Borro fu il tenente colonnello Giacomo «Cheler» [Keller?], rimosso a sua volta da Morosini dopo essere stato accusato dal marchese di aver mancato alla «propria diligenza». *Ibid.*, n. 113, 28.10.1655.

50 ASV, *PTM*, filza 1221, disp. F. Morosini n. 112, 7.10.1655.

Dardanelli, Tenedo e Lemno

L'assedio di Malvasia fu l'ultima importante operazione in veste di Provveditore d'Armata di Francesco Morosini, il quale passò a dirigere la difesa di Creta quale Provveditore Generale dell'Armi del Regno di Candia.⁵¹ Rimasto con la flotta, agli inizi del 1656 Del Borro passò agli ordini, questa volta effettivi, del nuovo Capitano Generale da Mar Lorenzo Marcello, arrivato a Creta il 12 gennaio 1656.⁵² I due sembrano essersi subito intesi, anche perché il Capitano Generale gli diede ampie assicurazioni sul fatto che a Venezia si fosse contenti del suo servizio e chiese l'aiuto di Del Borro per regolare le truppe dell'Armata, riformando le compagnie troppo piccole e sostituendo i comandanti di quelle dirette da ufficiali non appartenenti alla loro «nattion, [...] abuso contro le regole militari».⁵³ In attesa di portarsi ai Dardanelli per una ripresa della strategia del blocco,⁵⁴ Del Borro, «non tralasciaua fra tanto, che in tutti i luoghi, dove poteva fermare il piede disbarcare le milizie in terra, per continuare ad esercitarle, per farle maggiormente atte a qualsiuoglia incontro».⁵⁵ Marcello acconsentì inoltre che Del Borro inviasse a Venezia un suo emissario per una «leva» di cavalleria, che avrebbe dovuto rinforzare i contingenti già presenti in Armata.⁵⁶

La flotta giunse davanti agli Stretti il 22 maggio⁵⁷ e fin dal primo giorno le truppe dirette da Del Borro furono impegnate nel proteggere gli sbarchi per rac-

51 Nel rientro da Malvasia, Morosini ordinò un rapido sbarco nel Golfo di Atene, con un'incursione contro Megara per raccogliere frumento. VALIER, *Storia*, cit., vol. II, p. 28; anche ASV, *PTM*, filza 1221, disp. F. Morosini n. 116, 2.12.1655 (manca il disp. n. 114, che potrebbe essere relativo a questa operazione).

52 ASV, *PTM*, filza 1097, disp. L. Marcello n. 13, 24.1.1656, c. 61r. Su Marcello, cfr. Roberto ZAGO, «Marcello, Lorenzo», in *DBI*, vol. 69, Roma, Istituto della Enciclopedia Italiana, 2007, consultabile all'indirizzo [https://www.treccani.it/enciclopedia/lorenzo-marcello_\(Dizionario-Biografico\)/](https://www.treccani.it/enciclopedia/lorenzo-marcello_(Dizionario-Biografico)./).

53 ASV, *PTM*, filza 1097, disp. L. Marcello n. 13, 24.1.1656, c. 65r; n. 17, 19.2.1656, cc. 115v-116r.

54 Del Borro pensava anche a delle nuove operazioni nel Peloponneso, che però Marcello riteneva avrebbero disperso eccessivamente le limitate forze veneziane. ASV, *PTM*, filza 1097, disp. L. Marcello n. 29, 7.4.1656, cc. 191r-v.

55 L'Armata sottile, salpata da Candia il 26 marzo, si trattenne in Arcipelago in attesa dell'arrivo dell'Armata grossa, che aveva svernato tra Corfù e Venezia e che la raggiunse ad Andro il 5 maggio. GAMURRINI, *Istoria genealogica*, cit., p. 272.

56 ASV, *PTM*, filza 1097, disp. L. Marcello n. 28, 6.4.1656, cc. 183r-v; filza 1222, disp. Provveditore d'Armata Barbaro Badoer n. 4, 30.6.1656, all. Id. 2.7.1656.

57 ASV, *PTM*, filza 1097, disp. L. Marcello n. 38, 25.5.1656, c. 237v.



5 Mappa dei Dardanelli e delle isole di Tenedo e Lemno. Fonte: Wikimedia Commons.

cogliere non solo acqua fresca, ma anche foraggio per gli animali vivi imbarcati quali riserva alimentare. Come racconta l'*Istoria genealogica*, «bisognò ogni giorno sbarcare le Milizie, tanto bene ammaestrate» e nonostante la «moltitudine de' Turchi, che ad ogni momento si lasciavano vedere squadronati, con tut-

to ciò valse tanto l'esercizio militare, così continuato dal Marchese, che questa Campagna in terra si dissero più messe, sotto padiglioni, e in più luoghi a vista pure dell'i Squadroni de' Turchi; cosa veramente inaudita, e in tempo di guerra col turco mai praticata, mentre altre volte le milizie a pena smontate in terra sopravvenute da turchi saltavano in mare per provare la salute nell'annegarsi».⁵⁸ Il comando di Marcello si esaurì però ben presto per la morte del Capitano Generale alla battaglia dei Dardanelli del 26 giugno (immagine 3), determinando un ulteriore mutamento nell'autorità superiore, passata ora al Provveditore d'Armata Barbaro Badoer.⁵⁹ Come verso Morosini, anche nei confronti di Badoer, Del Borro non aveva obblighi di subordinazione e ciò avrebbe provocato contrasti ancora più forti rispetto a quelli del passato.

Nella battaglia Del Borro aveva combattuto, insieme a un figlio, a bordo della galeazza del Governatore Marco da Riva, dove «animò le ciurme ai vogo e le milizie al difendersi valorosamente», nonostante avesse sempre dichiarato la sua incompetenza nei combattimenti navali.⁶⁰ Nonostante la morte di Marcello, lo scontro si chiuse con una grande vittoria veneziana (immagine 4) e si pose subito il problema del come sfruttarla al meglio. Badoer convocò una consulto, nel corso della quale Del Borro propose di attaccare l'isola di Tenedo, subito fuori gli Stretti, una proposta che venne senz'altro accettata.⁶¹ Questa volta non si trattava, come ai tempi di Morosini, di effettuare una breve incursione per ottenere tributi e schiavi, ma di occupare stabilmente un importante punto strategico dal quale controllare più facilmente i Dardanelli e favorirne il blocco. Se la strategia fosse

58 GAMURRINI, *Istoria genealogica*, cit., p. 272.

59 Marcello fu colpito al fianco da un proiettile di artiglieria, che uccise altri quattro uomini. ASV, *PTM*, filza 1222, disp. Provveditore d'Armata Barbaro Badoer n. 4, 30.6.1656. L'*Istoria genealogica* afferma che il comando supremo venne preso da Lazzaro Mocenigo, ma ciò avvenne solo alcuni mesi dopo e Del Borro non servì mai sotto il nuovo Capitano Generale.

60 GAMURRINI, *Istoria genealogica*, cit., p. 273. La galeazza ebbe 7 rematori e 2 soldati uccisi, 2 rematori e 6 soldati feriti. ASV, *PTM*, filza 1222, disp. Provveditore d'Armata Barbaro Badoer n. 5, 30.6.1656 [sic], all. 29.6.1656. Sulla battaglia, cfr. Guido CANDIANI, *Vele, remi e cannoni: l'impiego congiunto di navi, galee e galeazze nella flotta veneziana, 1572-1718*, in *Mutazioni e permanenze nella storia navale del Mediterraneo (secc. XVI-XIX)*, a cura di Id.-Luca Lo BASSO, Milano, Franco Angeli, 2010, pp. 145-147 (116-162); Guido CANDIANI, *I vascelli della Serenissima: guerra, politica e costruzioni navali a Venezia in età moderna, 1650-1720*, Venezia, Istituto Veneto di Lettere, Scienze e Arti, 2009, pp. 49-50.

61 ASV, *PTM*, filza 1222, disp. B. Badoer n. 5, 30.6.1656.

stata diversa, lo strumento principale per attuarla sarebbero rimasti le truppe organizzate e dirette dal marchese.

Dopo aver lasciato un distaccamento di cinque navi, quattro galee e due galeazze ai Dardanelli, il grosso della flotta si presentò davanti a Tenedo (immagine 5) il 5 luglio.⁶² Le truppe vennero subito fatte sbarcare nel porto dell'isola, sotto la consueta direzione di Del Borro, sul quale anche Barbaro faceva grande affidamento. Mentre scendeva a terra il marchese venne colpito allo stomaco da una palla di moschetto, ma il proiettile, sparato da lontano, lo percosse senza ferirlo. «Messi i segnali del disbarco», questo avvenne, «con tutte sorti di barche»,⁶³ sotto la protezione delle artiglierie di prua delle galee. Una volta a terra, le truppe furono rapidamente inquadrati, poi i soldati, sempre protetti dal fuoco delle galee, avanzarono con «buona ordinanza»: i francesi a destra a ridosso della costa, i tedeschi al centro, gli oltremarini a sinistra fino alle propaggini collinari; gli italiani formavano la riserva, appoggiati sulla sinistra da una compagnia di cavalleria pesante (corazze) e una leggera (archibugieri a cavallo). Solo dopo lo sbarco dalle galee delle truppe d'assalto, scesero a terra anche i soldati imbarcati sulle navi, che andarono a rinforzare francesi e tedeschi. Questi ultimi avanzarono in formazione a triangolo con tre e quattro reggimenti (due uniti in un unico corpo) rispettivamente. Sulla sinistra procedevano gli oltremarini, divisi a loro volta in tre «squadroni», e ulteriormente a sinistra i tre reggimenti italiani. In definitiva erano tredici le formazioni in marcia, divise in quattro corpi, il che evidenziava l'affiatamento delle truppe.

Inizialmente i turchi avevano cercato di contrastare lo sbarco con una sessantina di cavalieri, spalleggiati da circa 360 fanti. Posizionata la cavalleria all'estrema sinistra, Del Borro la lanciò all'attacco alla guida di Francesco Villalta che «dopo i primi spari mischiatisi seco ad armi bianche» mise in fuga il nemico «fin dentro le mura della medesima fortezza» (immagine 6).⁶⁴ Presumibilmente

62 Per le operazioni a Tenedo, cfr. ASV, *PTM*, filza 1222, disp. B. Badoer n. 7, 25.7.1656; GADMURRINI, *Istoria genealogica*, cit., pp. 273-276.

63 *Ibid.*, p. 273.

64 Per la sua azione, Villalta (ferito da una coltellata alla mano) venne promosso, su proposta dello stesso Del Borro, a colonnello del reggimento su quattro compagnie che si andò a costituire con la cavalleria dell'Armata. ASV, *PTM*, filza 1222, disp. B. Badoer n. 7, 25.7.1656, all. 12.7.1656. Tutte le promozioni dovevano essere comunque approvate e ratificate dal Senato veneziano.

quello che era un altro reparto ottomano si era trincerato su una collina di fronte alla fortezza, fortificando alcuni mulini presenti. Da qui tentarono due volte di contrattaccare per sostenere le truppe che agivano sul piano, ma i veneziani «con il vantaggio delle picche non solo sostennero e ruppero, ma fugarono gl'inimici». Prima di sera avevano conquistato i trinceramenti dei mulini e Del Borro poté passare la notte nel borgo conquistato. Le truppe ebbero ordine di trincerarsi contro eventuali sortite dalla fortezza, ma l'oscurità della notte, la stanchezza e il «dolce vino del Tenedo» crearono difficoltà nel far eseguire questi lavori.⁶⁵

La fortezza si presentava ben costruita, circondata da «buone» mura con un fossato che la isolava dal resto dell'isola e che poteva essere riempito con acqua di mare, e con un «castello» nella parte alta dotato di grandi mura fiancheggiate da torri bastionate di forma triangolare. Tuttavia le case del borgo erano a ridosso della controscarpa e offrivano agli attaccanti un comodo riparo per approcciare le mura, elemento subito sfruttato dai veneziani; venne inoltre allestita una strada coperta intorno alla fortezza in modo da poter spostare in sicurezza artiglieria e truppe. Dalla strada iniziarono, attraverso il fossato, i lavori di mina delle mura, mentre si posizionavano le artiglierie destinate a fare breccia. Con i cannoni delle navi si costituì una batteria di dodici pezzi ai piedi dell'adiacente Monte San Atanasio, mentre sulla collina dei mulini ne venne posizionata un'altra con quattro pezzi; altri pezzi, anche di grosso calibro, vennero posti all'interno delle case che si affacciavano sulla controscarpa. In totale furono sbucati ventisei cannoni, a cui si aggiunsero cinque mortai. Durante la messa in opera i pezzi rimasero silenziosi «per non assuefar i turchi con il poco tormento di non stimar il maggiore». Tutti i lavori furono diretti da Del Borro, che ancora una volta poteva mettere a frutto le proprie competenze ossidionali.

La sera del 6 luglio⁶⁶ iniziò il bombardamento dei mortai, mentre nel tempo si promettevano agli ottomani onorevoli condizioni di resa. Una bomba colpì un deposito di munizioni presso uno dei torrioni del castello, demolendolo in gran parte e uccidendo numerosi difensori. Il tiro dei mortai proseguì per tutta la notte e la mattina del 7 luglio si aggiunse quello dei cannoni delle batterie. Questi

65 Per frenare gli eccessi della truppa, Badoer «eccitò» Del Borro a far sfondare le botti trovate nel borgo.

66 Nel citato disp. n. 7, Badoer parla di «secondo giorno», quindi il 6 luglio, mentre la *Istoria genealogica* (ripresa da BENZONI, «Del Borro», cit.) riporta, non è chiaro perché, la data dell'11 luglio. Il 6 luglio è correttamente riportato da VENTURA, «Badoer», cit.

iniziarono ad aprire una breccia nelle mura e si registrò un primo assaggio di assalto. A questo punto i difensori decisero che la parte migliore del coraggio fosse la discrezione e aprirono trattative di resa, risoltesi rapidamente con la consegna della fortezza. Ottennero l'imbarco per la terraferma ottomana portando con sé «una veste per ciascuno, sei cavalli, e armi a principali, e il resto tutto dovevano deporre nelle moschee e case della fortezza». L'8 luglio, circa 1.500 turchi,⁶⁷ comprese alcune donne e bambini, si imbarcarono sugli arsili di tre galee scelte tra quelle che erano state catturate agli ottomani nella battaglia dei Dardanelli, portando con sé, grazie alla connivenza di chi controllava l'imbarco, anche «oro e drappi». La cosa non mancò di «commuovere» le truppe dei vincitori, il cui rancore non deve essere stato particolarmente mitigato dal bottino di 65 cannoni trovati nell'isola, comprese due grandi petriere.⁶⁸ Ci sono cifre discordanti sulle perdite veneziane nel corso dell'attacco a Tenedo: Badoer parla di 54 morti e 80 feriti, l'*Istoria genealogica* riferisce di 58 morti e 173 feriti.

A differenza di Egina e Volo, Tenedo doveva essere conservata,⁶⁹ sicché si pose il problema di migliorarne le difese. In una nuova consulta, Del Borro (che il governo veneziano gratificò di una «condotta» di 1.000 ducati al figlio Nicolò per i meriti del padre)⁷⁰ propose non solo di riparare i danni inflitti alla fortezza durante l'attacco, ma anche di spianare buona parte delle case che la circondavano e che avevano notevolmente favorito il successo veneziano. Veniva previsto un presidio di 400 fanti «di tutte le nazioni». Tenedo avrebbe anche dovuto fare da centro di raccolta per i *carazi* dovuti dalle isole vicine,⁷¹ nonché da base per i corsari occidentali che agivano in Egeo.⁷² Memore dell'istruzione ricevuta in gioventù, il marchese preparò un disegno della fortezza, sfortunatamente assente

67 Da un allegato senza data al disp. n. 7, le truppe ottomane arresesi nella fortezza ascendevano a 570 uomini, 130 dei quali giannizzeri.

68 I pezzi in bronzo erano 39. ASV, *PTM*, filza 1222, disp. B. Badoer n. 8, 29.7.1656, all. s.d.

69 Del Borro – ricordando probabilmente la decisione di abbandonare Egina presa da Francesco Morosini contro il suo parere – scrisse a Badoer per sottolineare che non dovevano esservi dubbi sulla necessità di tenere la piazza, «perché dall'azioni militari, le più profittevoli sono il prender e mantener, essendosi sempre tempo di poter restituire o cambiare». ASV, *PTM*, filza 1222, disp. B. Badoer n. 7, 25.7.1656, all. 15.7.1656.

70 GAMURRINI, *Istoria genealogica*, cit., p. 277.

71 Del Borro prevedeva anche un parziale demolizione di una moschea, mentre una seconda moschea doveva essere trasformato in chiesa di rito latino.

72 ASV, *PTM*, filza 1222, disp. B. Badoer n. 7, 25.7.1656, all. ti 15 e 17.7.1656.

dalla documentazione.⁷³ I suggerimenti vennero accolti, mentre il presidio fu accresciuto a 504 uomini.⁷⁴

Il successo di Tenedo convinse, pare anche questa volta su suggerimento di Del Borro, a intraprendere la conquista della vicina Lemno (immagine 5), in modo da controllare in modo ancora più fermo l'accesso ai Dardanelli. L'Armata

73 ASV, *PTM*, filza 1222, disp. B. Badoer n. 9, 29.7.1656, all. 29.7.1656.

74 ASV, *PTM*, filza 1222, disp. B. Badoer n. 10, 11.8.1656, all. s.d.

6 La fortezza di Tenedo; foto di Haluk Comertel.

Fonte: Wikimedia Commons.



si presentò davanti all'isola il 5 agosto, ma solo il 10 il vento, fino ad allora contrario, permise di avvicinarsi alla costa.⁷⁵ Lo sbarco venne effettuato l'11 agosto, con truppe il cui morale era particolarmente elevato dopo i recenti successi. Ricalcando lo schema di Tenedo, i turchi inizialmente sembrarono voler contrastare lo sbarco con qualche reparto di cavalleria e fanteria, ma senza troppo convinzione ed entro sera i veneziani avevano conquistato il borgo ai piedi della

75 ASV, *PTM*, filza 1222, disp. B. Badoer n. 10, 11.8.1656 e all. 11.8.1656.



fortezza. Quest'ultima era posizionata «sull'eminenza di un grebano [luogo impervio] scosceso», ma, come a Tenedo, case contigue alla muraglia permettevano agli attaccanti di avvicinarsi coperti alla fortezza. Il giorno successivo vennero sbarcati 18 cannoni e 5 mortai, che vennero posizionati anche con la supervisione di Badoer, il quale assegnò ad ogni cannone «un gentiluomo» che doveva dirigere la «propria ciurma», il che lascerebbe supporre che ai pezzi venissero impiegati anche rematori delle galee. Sempre come a Tenedo, Del Borro fece posizionare «diverse batterie» all'interno delle case del borgo.

Prima dell'attacco finale, il 14 agosto inviò a Badoer una lettera che fu il germe del successivo dissidio tra i due. Nella missiva il marchese comunicò di aver promesso di sua iniziativa ai soldati che se la fortezza si fosse arresa, i prigionieri sarebbero stati equamente divisi tra gli equipaggi della flotta e le truppe,⁷⁶ ma se si fosse presa a viva forza tutti i turchi presi sarebbero stati di esclusiva proprietà dei soldati. Si trattava di una «novità non più praticata né pur in alcun tempo promossa, come troppo pregiudizievole a pubblici interessi, tanto più che altro maggior interesse non ha quest'armata che il dominio de' schiavi, senza de' quali rimarrebbe per la maggior parte inutile et insufficiente». Ogni uomo preso doveva essere messo a disposizione della flotta.⁷⁷ Ne nacque una *querelle* tra Badoer, appoggiato dalla consulta, e Del Borro, che accusò il Provveditore d'Armata di non aver «la pratica delle buone usanze, né de riti militari». Dato però che il marchese era impegnato nell'assedio della fortezza, Badoer lasciò per il momento cadere la cosa, ma il conflitto sarebbe esploso dopo la conquista dell'isola.

Le batterie furono posizionate in quattro giorni e il 16 agosto [questa e le date seguenti sono solo desumibili dalla documentazione] cominciò il tiro contro due punti delle mura, che però erano protette da un «buon terrapieno». Del Borro ottenne altri quattro cannoni, portando il totale a 22, grazie ai quali si cominciò ad aprire una breccia. Sebbene la breccia fosse limitata e non mancassero di viveri e munizioni, dopo otto giorni (20 agosto) i turchi si convinsero ad esporre bandiera bianca e ad aprire le trattative di resa. Del Borro offrì condizioni analoghe a quelle del presidio di Tenedo, con il passaggio in terraferma «salva la vita e un vesti-

76 Erano condizioni analoghe a quelle proposte da Del Borro a Francesco Morosini prima dell'attacco a Egina ed accettate da quest'ultimo. GAMURRINI, *Istoria genealogica*, cit., p. 264.

77 Dal 25 giugno, l'Armata aveva perso 248 rematori, ma acquisito 397 schiavi, con un guadagno netto di 149 rematori. ASV, *PTM*, filza 1222, disp. B. Badoer n. 12, 31.8.1656.

to», approvate da Badoer. I difensori furono imbarcati il 21 sugli arsili di galea e portati in terraferma, ma i soldati, evidentemente insoddisfatti delle condizioni di resa, si presero «licenza» di spogliare parte del loro bagaglio. Badoer si lamentò con Del Borro per questi eccessi e il marchese venne rispedito a terra per riportare l'ordine, non prima che dalla galea del Provveditore d'Armata si sparassero due colpi di *falcone* (uno dei pezzi minori che affiancavano il cannone di corsia) «d'apparenza» quale avvertimento. La cavalleria intanto batteva l'isola, sventando tra l'altro lo sbarco di alcuni piccoli soccorsi che erano stati inviati dagli ottomani.⁷⁸ Il bottino comprese 49 tra cannoni e petriere, 33 dei quali di bronzo.⁷⁹

I contrasti sorti a Lemno – acuiti da un ulteriore episodio accaduto in un isolotto deserto a ridosso di Lemno, dove si erano spostate parte delle truppe per disperderle contro i rischi di pestilenzia⁸⁰ – avevano guastato i rapporti tra Badoer e del Borro, che peraltro abbiamo visto aveva già chiesto e ottenuto licenza dall'allora Capitano Generale Marcello di rientrare in Italia per poter affrontare la propria situazione patrimoniale, compromessa dalla morte del suocero. In attesa di lasciare il Levante, il marchese presentò un nuovo parere su eventuali azioni da intraprendere a Creta. Delle tre forme di azione a suo avviso possibili, «la sorpresa, l'intrapresa e la guerra viva», solo l'ultima aveva qualche possibilità di riuscita, ma Del Borro ribadiva la necessità, già espressa due anni prima al suo arrivo in Levante, di un esercito da campagna di almeno 10 mila uomini.⁸¹ In ottobre, chiese nuovamente licenza, questa volta per raggiungere a Zante il nuovo Capitano Generale da Mar Lazzaro Mocenigo, in arrivo da Venezia. L'incontro doveva servire per fissare gli obiettivi della campagna del 1657, ma non è escluso che il marchese sperasse di ottenere una licenza invernale per curare i propri interessi patrimoniali.⁸²

In ogni caso, salpò da Paros, dove si era portata l'Armata, agli inizi di novembre, ma durante il viaggio Del Borro, «al solito della sua pur troppo nota natura», volle affrettare la navigazione senza attendere l'arrivo di due navi che dovevano

78 La cavalleria catturò 24 uomini, mentre la fregata che ne trasportava altri 26 preferì rinunciare.

79 ASV, *PTM*, filza 1222, disp. B. Badoer n. 11, 25.8.1656 e all.ti.

80 ASV, *PTM*, filza 1222, disp. B. Badoer n. 12, 31.8.1656.

81 ASV, *PTM*, filza 1222, disp. B. Badoer n. 14, 20.9.1656.

82 ASV, *PTM*, filza 1222, disp. B. Badoer n. 16, 3.11.1656 e lett. Del Borro 25.10.1656.

scortarlo e perdendo inoltre contatto con le altre due che navigavano con lui.⁸³ La nave sulla quale era imbarcato, il mercantile armato noleggiato inglese *Margaret*, venne sorpresa da sette navi barbaresche nelle acque della Sapienza. Nel combattimento che seguì Del Borro fu gravemente ferito e si spense a Corfù, dove era riparata la nave, il 2 dicembre.⁸⁴

Il periodo di comando in Levante di Alessandro del Borro coincise con la fase di maggiori successi veneziani nel corso della guerra di Candia, sia sul mare che a terra. Le grandi vittorie navali ai Dardanelli del 1655 e 1656 trovarono un corrispettivo terrestre con la presa di Tenedo e Lemno, che provocò tra le altre cose un terremoto politico a Istanbul, facendo salire al gran visirato la famiglia di origine albanese dei Köprülü. Le truppe organizzate, addestrate e dirette dal marchese si distinsero anche nella conquista di Egina e Volo, fallendo solo a Malvasia, dove però l'insuccesso fu probabilmente agevolato dalla strategia di Francesco Morosini di puntare su un lungo assedio piuttosto che su un rapido assalto generale, come chiesto da Del Borro. La capacità di effettuare rapidi e riusciti sbarchi raggiunta in quegli anni dai veneziani sotto la direzione del generale toscano trova in qualche modo una controprova nella successiva operazione anfibia condotta nel 1660 nella baia di Suda, dove invece approssimazione e frettolosità portarono a un grave rovescio veneziano.⁸⁵

Purtroppo le fonti finora consultate non consentono di stabilire il tipo di addestramento impartito alle truppe in vista di queste operazioni e le specifiche modalità di sbarco, in particolare quelle della cavalleria, che non aveva facile posto a bordo ed era di difficile messa a terra. I documenti non attestano neppure la presenza di particolari artifici tecnici (rampe, ponti volanti o altro), ma ciò potrebbe anche essere legato alla loro presenza di *routine* nella flotta veneziana. Quello che si può affermare è che Del Borro riuscì ad organizzare, addestrare e amalgamare un complesso militare organico, nonostante le diverse nazionalità che componevano l'esercito della Serenissima, dando ad esso un certo *esprit de corps* corroborato dai successi conseguiti. Che poi la Repubblica non sia stato

83 ASV, *PTM*, filza 1222, disp. B. Badoer n. 22, 7.2.1657, all. lett. Governatore di Nave Giovanni Andrea Bragadin a B. Badoer, 17.1.1657.

84 Nel combattimento rimasero illesi il figlio Nicolò e la moglie, che lo aveva seguito in Levante. BENZONI, «Del Borro», cit.

85 Cfr. Géraud POUMARÈDE, *Pour en finir avec la Croisade. Mythes et réalités de la lutte contre les Turcs aux XVI^e et XVII^e siècles*, Paris, PUF, 2004, pp. 423-427.

in grado di tramutare questa esperienza in qualcosa di maggiormente organico e duraturo è legato alla natura congiunturale e mercantile, se così si può dire, della politica militare veneziana, sempre restia a passare a fasi più strutturate e “moderne”, ma, almeno in apparenza, più costose. Il rimanere legati a schemi d’ingaggio (e rapida smobilitazione) di tipo rinascimentale rendeva più difficile mantenere in vita le pur notevoli esperienze maturate nelle non poche fasi belliche della prima età moderna della Serenissima.

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The *Scala di Narenta*: A Rural Inland Port between the War of Candia (1645–1669) and the Morean War (1684–1699)

by ERICA MEZZOLI*

ABSTRACT: The article aims to highlight the characteristics of the process concerning the completion of the Bosnian–Venetian commercial project regarding the opening of an inland maritime trade post in the last section of the Neretva river – precisely in the locality of Gabela – between the War of Candia (1645–1699) and the Morean War (1684–1699). The goal of the narrative is to enhance the societal, everyday life and spatial dimensions of an issue that at first glance might seem purely of an economic and territorial conquest nature. The article is based on the sources – thus, also perspective – of the Republic of Ragusa (Dubrovnik).

KEYWORDS: TRADING SEA POST, GABELA, NERETVA, REPUBLIC OF RAGUSA, REPUBLIC OF VENICE, OTTOMAN EMPIRE, 17TH CENTURY.

It is often the case that research interests in the social and economic matter of the Western Balkans in the Early Modern Times focus exclusively on the economic behaviour of the Venetians and the large port cities of the Adriatic basin, primarily, of course, Venice and then – after a certain lead – the Republic of Ragusa (Dubrovnik). The economic and commercial agencies of Ottoman subjects are hardly ever considered, and forms of economic collaboration between Ottoman and non-Ottoman subjects are rarely taken into consideration. However, when research focuses on the Ottoman merchant class, it can provide a lively and exciting image of the Ottoman social and economic realities and its juridical and institutional structures and practices.¹ Similarly, historiography has neglect-

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1 Cf. Erica MEZZOLI, «La guerra degli altri. La (stra)ordinaria vicenda di un gruppo di mercanti ottomani tra politica, diplomazia e commercio al tempo dell'Armada spagnola in

ed the essential role of intermediate gateways and of what is known as *poussière portuaire*, both within the framework of the regional economic and social fabric and at a macroeconomic level.² Nonetheless, the observation of the activity of small ports – especially if placed on the border of the State – can offer us an uncommon insight into socioeconomics and institutional dynamics in the Early Modern Age.³

Likewise, also entrepreneurship and trade/business activities are often conceived in mere terms of «personality characteristics» that unveil in an aseptic economic environment, without taking into consideration that «entrepreneurial decisions are made in a socio-cultural and emotional context rather than exclusively via pure economic contracting relations».⁴ In this way, in addition to socially driven features (e.g., social capital), another important aspect is equally discarded from the analysis of entrepreneurship and business: its spatial dimension.⁵

Conversely, Chris Steyaert and Jerome Katz underline how entrepreneurship is a societal rather than an economic fact. From this methodological position, three statements derive: the first informs us that «entrepreneurship takes place

Adriatico (1617–1621)», *Nuova Rivista Storica*, 98, 1 (2014), pp. 57–74. Regarding the Ottoman perspective on the Adriatic, see: Maria Pia PEDANI, «Ottoman Merchants in the Adriatic. Trade and Smuggling», *Acta Histriae*, 16, 1–2 (2008), pp 155–172.

- 2 Gilbert BUTI and Gérard LE BOUËDEC, «Présentation», *Rives méditerranéennes*, 35 (2010) [= Gilbert BUTI and Gérard LE BOUËDEC (Ed.), *Les petits ports*], last accessed February 10, 2022, <https://journals.openedition.org/rives/3833>.
- 3 Cf. Cátia ANTUNES and Louis SICKING, «Ports on the Border of the State, 1200–1800: An Introduction», *International Journal of Maritime History*, 19, 2 (2007), pp. 273–286; Gérard LE BOUËDEC, «Small Ports from the Sixteenth to the Early Twentieth Century and the Local Economy of the French Atlantic Coast», *International Journal of Maritime History*, 21, 2 (2009), pp. 103–126.
- 4 John P. ULHØI, «The Social Dimension of Entrepreneurship», *Technovation*, 25 (2005), p. 941.
- 5 In this regard, see Hans WESTLUND and Roger BOLTON, «Local Social Capital and Entrepreneurship», *Small Business Economics*, 21 (2003), pp. 77–113; Giles MOHAN and John MOHAN, «Placing Social Capital», *Progress in Human Geography*, 26, 2 (2002), pp. 191–210; Edward J. MALECKI, «Regional Social Capital: Why it Matters», *Regional Studies*, 46, 8 (2012), pp. 1023–1039. Social capital, human capital and geographical capital can also equally influence work activities and vocational training. In this regard, see Erica MEZZOLI, «Nulle Part. Les sujets ottomans apprentis dans la guilde des orfèvres de Raguse au XVIIe siècle», in Andrea CARACAUSSI, Nicoletta ROLLA and Marco SCHNYDER (Eds.), *Travail et mobilité en Europe XVIe–XIXe siècles*, Villeneuve d'Ascq, Presses Universitaires du Septentrion, 2018, pp. 187–207.



1 Territory of the Republic of Ragusa, mouth of the Neretva (in the map *Narenta*) river and Spalato (Split). Source: Nicolas DE FER, *Golfe de Venise*, ca. 1716. Accessible in:

David Rumsey Historical Map Collection, last accessed March 6, 2022,

<https://www.davidrumsey.com/luna/servlet/detail/RUMSEY~8~1~279579~90052566:Le-Golfe-De-Venise#>. Public domain.

in multiple sites and spaces»; the second says that those spaces always have a political nature, so «a geography of entrepreneurship is always a geopolitics»; and finally, the third statement tells us that «entrepreneurship is a matter of everyday activities rather than actions of elitist groups of entrepreneurs». Therefore, the geographical, discursive and social dimensions of entrepreneurship are intensely welded to the economic one.⁶ Furthermore, war and all its implications are further able to complicate and enrich variables in the entrepreneurial processes and business activities.⁷

At least partially, the above-mentioned historiographical observations and methodological considerations are valid for the case concerning this article, when

6 Chris STEYAERT and Jerome KATZ, «Reclaiming the Space of Entrepreneurship in Society: Geographical, Discursive, and Social Dimensions», *Entrepreneurship & Regional Development*, 16 (2004), pp. 179-180.

7 Cf. Jeff FYNNE-PAUL (Ed.), *War, Entrepreneurs, and the State in Europe and the Mediterranean, 1300–1800*, Leiden & Boston, Brill, 2014.

Muslim merchants from Bosnia – particularly from Sarajevo and Mostar – took part in the Venetian project of “opening” a small land traffic terminal at the mouth of the Neretva river (Fig. 1) in Ottoman territory at the end of the War of Candia (1645–1669).

Although this was not a new matter,⁸ during the 17th century the question of the “opening” of the “new” sea trading post of Gabela, which, along with Spalato (Split), would have operated in direct competition with the Republic of Ragusa, arose officially in autumn 1667. At that time, the Ragusean ambassadors (Fig. 2) Marino di Caboga and Orsato de Sorgo came to the court of the Sanjak-bey (administrative and military high-ranking officer ruling a province) of Hercegovina and told his *kahya* (butler, personal secretary) to be aware of the «desire of the Venetians to open an *entrepôt* in Narenta for the interest of Bosnian merchants».⁹

At the time of the events narrated, Gabela was a small village along the last section of the Neretva river that was not new to the market and commercial practices despite its size. There, Raguseans had played a role of great importance since the Middle Ages. The Ottoman presence in the valley and in the mountains surrounding the Neretva river dates back to the end of the 16th century when the Ottomans extended their rule over a large part of Herzegovina and Dalmatia. They consolidated the conquest after 1503 when they occupied the whole region, with the exception of the Venetian centre of Almissa (Omiš). Despite the formal adjustments in the conditions of their presence due to the Ottoman conquest, Raguseans maintained a pivotal position in Gabela as they enjoyed a monopoly on the salt trade.¹⁰ Also, the locality played a vital role in the trade of Ottoman

8 The question concerning the absorption into the Venetian orbit of the Ottoman river port on the Neretva, named in literature and documents simply as Narenta or Gabela, was present in the Venetian agenda even before the opening of the port of Split (1590). In 1583, the Captain of Spalato, Nicolò Correr, claimed that, for the successful opening of Spalato, among the various measures, the Ottoman authorities needed to agree to close their port in Narenta. A few years later, in 1589, the *V Savi* also agreed that if they wanted to attract Turkish merchants to Split, it was a priority to allow them to buy salt, rice, and soap at a lower price than that of the Raguseans in Narenta. Renzo PACI, *La ‘scala’ di Spalato e il commercio veneziano nei Balcani fra Cinque e Seicento*, Venice, Deputazione di storia patria per le Venezie, 1971, pp. 54-58.

9 Državni Arhiv u Dubrovniku (hereafter: DAD), *Acta Sanctae Mariae Maioris – XVII Century* (hereafter: ASMM XVII), Ambassadors Marino di Caboga and Orsato de Sorgo, Mostar, November 23, 1667, 1868-1.

10 Faruk TASLIDŽA, «Uspon i pad osmanske Gabele», *Hercegovina*, 19 (2020), p. 7; Vesna Mi-

Herzegovina.¹¹ Gabela attracted the merchants of the hinterland who procured their salt from the Raguseans, and they sold wax, wool, leather and other sheep farming products.¹²

As reported by a likely Venetian source, edited by Franjo Rački, in the first half of the 17th century Gabela was a fortified citadel of about 300 inhabitants and a colony of Raguseans who sold salt there.¹³ Also, Evliya Çelebi – who travelled these places in 1665 – described Gabela as a small city that was a maritime trading post (*bender iskeles*) too.¹⁴ In the Ragusan sources, it is almost always called Narenta or, for its trading purposes,

ović, «Beylerbey of Bosnia and Sancakbey of Herzegovina in the Diplomacy of the Dubrovnik Republic», *Dubrovnik Annals*, 9 (2005), pp. 37-69; Vesna Miović, *Dubrovačka Republika u spisima namjensnika bosanskog ejaleta i hercegovačkog sandžaka*, Dubrovnik, Državni Arhiv u Dubrovniku, 2008, pp. 97-100.

11 Faruk TASLIDŽA, «Trgovina Hercegovačkog sandžaka u prvim decenijama XVII stoljeća», *Prilozi*, 40 (2011), pp. 71-74.

12 Seid TRALJIĆ, «Trgovina Bosne i Hercegovine s lukama Dalmacije i Dubrovnika u XVII i XVIII stoljeću», *Pomorski Zbornik*, 1 (1962), pp. 355-357.

13 Franjo RAČKI, «Prilogi za geografsko-statistički opis bosanskoga pašalika – Opis bosanskoga pašalika iz XVII veka», *Starine*, 14 (1882), pp. 175-176.

14 TASLIDŽA, «Uspon i pad», cit., p. 12.



2 Ragusean nobles. The Republic appointed its ambassadors among the representatives of the noble class. Source: Nicolò DE NICOLAI, *Le Navigazioni et Viaggi fatti nella Turchia*, Venice, Francesco Ziletti, 1580.

as *scala di Narenta* (Narenta seaport). Therefore, we are not dealing with an actual opening since the place had already been operating as a trading post for at least a couple of centuries. Instead, we can define the operation as the absorption of Gabela in a sort of Bosnian–Venetian institutional and commercial condominium whose construction, as we will see, did not necessarily require the conquest and the formal Venetian sovereignty over that locality and surrounding areas.

From the point of view of the exposition, it was decided to narrate the story as precisely as possible to enhance the liveliness of the acts and behaviours of the people involved and the strong social dimension in the events of a commercial nature that will be illustrated.

Prior Events. Mostar, spring 1666:

Marino di Nicolò Gozze and Mustafa Effendi have a conversation

In the Ragusean sources, the first mention of the Gabela affair dates back to spring 1666, when the Ragusean ambassador Marino di Nicolò Gozze learnt about the Venetian sights on the commercial outpost during a conversation with a prominent of Mostar, Mustafa Effendi. During an ordinary wartime chat between acquaintances, the Bosnian notable asked his Ragusean companion if he had news of the peace negotiations between the Venetians and the Ottomans. When the Ragusean replied that he knew nothing about it, out of the blue, Mustafa Effendi retorted that the Venetians were lobbying hard to open a trading post in Gabela to sell salt there. This was reliable information obtained from the Herzegovinian merchants who went to Venice for trade. Gozze blurted out that this could not be possible: salt traffic in Gabela had always been a Ragusa prerogative. That was a fact certified by custom, by the *hatt-i şerif* (sultanic edicts) and, finally, by various *emiri* (orders). Moreover, he added that in his opinion the sultan would never have put his tributaries in such a difficult position. Indeed, he would not have helped the earning possibilities of his arch-enemies, like Venice.¹⁵ To the Ragusean's words, Mustafa Effendi replied adamantly:

That is it. You, the Raguseans, are not strong enough to oppose the sultan's will. The Venetians can negotiate peace right now and start another war in a few years [...]. Perhaps it is true that this undertaking will not be fulfilled, but everyone around here is happy about it, because it would allow a more

15 DAD, *Miscellanea – XVII Century*, Ambassador Marino di Nicolò Gozze, Mostar, April 26, 1666, XIII–100.

comfortable and more accessible trade.¹⁶

Cozze could not come to terms with that. He decided to console himself with the thought that the sultan would indeed have at heart the fate of the Raguseans by keeping his oaths, and indeed, this operation could not be influenced by the will of a few merchants from Mostar and Sarajevo who wanted to save on transport expenses. Mustafa Effendi nodded without much conviction to the Ragusan ambassador's words and left.¹⁷

Who knows what, and from whom does he get the information?

Let us now return to the autumn of 1667, when Caboga and Sorgo had an encounter with the Sanjak-bey of Herzegovina. The ambassadors reported that they knew that a certain Hacı Ahmet from Bosnia had gone to Venice to negotiate with the Venetians about opening the new port. The Raguseans added that they also knew that in the port of Venice, three vessels loaded with rice, salt and other merchandise were ready to set sail and then dock at the mouth of the Neretva river. Furthermore, the Venetians were forcing the Turkish merchants present in Venice who wanted to head towards Ragusa, to embark on those three vessels. The Sanjak-bey said that he had not received any communication on the subject from Constantinople and that he would send a man of his trust to Narenta to get a feel for the situation.¹⁸

If the authorities said they knew nothing, there were always those who knew more. In a conversation with a merchant from Mostar, the ambassadors learned that Hacı Ahmet had already been in Venice for four months, negotiating. He had also written to a matchmaker in Herzegovina to agree with the Venetians in Dalmatia to order the *hajduci* (bandits, highwaymen) to disturb and damage all caravan traffic to and from Ragusa. The ambassadors also discussed the matter with the *kahya* of the Herzegovinian Sanjak-bey. Through his connections in Sarajevo, the *kahya* had come to know that the Pasha of Bosnia strongly supported

16 «Così è. Voi non sete forti di levar il capo contro il Gran Sg.re e li Ven.ni faranno la pace addesso e dopo puochi anni un'altra volta e quando gli piacesse possono far guerra seco, [...] è verisimile che non si potrà riuscire ma questa novità applaudono tutti questi louchi per la comodita di più facile trafigo». *Ibid.*

17 *Ibid.*

18 DAD, ASMM XVII, Ambassadors Marino di Caboga and Orsato de Sorgo, Mostar, November 23, 1667, 1868–1.

the opening of this new commercial outpost. The Pasha of Bosnia had sent one of his emissaries to Narenta to establish that all the necessary preparations were in place should a Venetian ship arrive in that locality or Makarska. In this case, the unloading operations would have proceeded smoothly, and the goods sent to Sarajevo. The *kahya* added that the Sanjak-bey was aware of everything and that he had sent his *kapıcı kahya* (chief of the guards) to Narenta to understand under which order the Pasha of Bosnia could make concessions of that kind to the Venetians, since such measures were in direct contrast with the sultan's orders.

However, from other conversations the Ragusean ambassadors had in confidence with other people, they learned – «to be very true» – how the facts unfolded and who was aware of everything. From those confidants, they learned that the Venetians had promised 20,000 sequins to the Pasha of Bosnia and Musli Effendi, his previous *defterdar* (the Ottoman official in charge of finances), to take action at the highest levels.¹⁹ Thus, Musli Effendi had sent one of his envoys to Candia (Crete) to obtain a commandment to fulfil the Venetians' aim from the Grand Vizier through his *kahya*, and now that commandment was already in the hands of the Pasha of Bosnia. The well-informed claimed that everyone knew everything about those facts – including the Henzegovinian Sanjak-bey – although they claimed otherwise.²⁰ At the *kapıcı kahya* return from Narenta, the Sanjak-bey wished to inform the Raguseans about the situation by sending them an *agha* (military official of the Jannisary corps). The *agha* reported that the Bosnian Pasha had given instructions that if ships and a Venetian ambassador arrived in Narenta, the local authorities were to escort the ambassador to Sarajevo to have him confer with him, but were not to unload the goods from the vessels without his express order.²¹ Furthermore, the Sanjak-bey wanted to let them know that he had been joined by a delegate from the Pasha of Bosnia. The man had told him that the Pasha would share with him the money promised by the Venetians, if he gave his support for the realization of the commercial outpost on Narenta.

19 On corruption practices in Ottoman Bosnia and Herzegovina, see Erica MEZZOLI, «Trade, Diplomacy, and Corruption in Seventeenth-Century Ottoman Bosnia: The Ragusan Experience of a Complex Relationship», in Gábor KÁRMÁN (Ed.), *Tributaries and Peripheries of the Ottoman Empire*, Leiden & Boston, Brill, 2020, pp. 161-187.

20 DAD, ASMM XVII, Ambassadors Marino di Caboga and Orsato de Sorgo, Mostar, November 23, 1667, 1868-1.

21 *Ibid.*, Mostar, November 29, 1667, 1868-2.

The Bosnian Pasha believed that this small port would be of great use for the *reaya* (the taxpayers, here used in the sense of “people”, “population”) and the merchants, who did not dare to go to Ragusa for fear of the *hajduci* who attacked the caravans, stole horses and merchandise and enslaved the carters. Indeed, once the new trading post was opened, the Venetians themselves would remedy the problem of the brigands that infested Bosnia and Herzegovina.²² Precisely in this regard, the *agha* told Caboga and Sorgo that once the small port was opened, the Venetians would deal with the *hajduci* problem in seven *kadiluk* (administrative unit which corresponded to the jurisdiction of a judge) – those surrounding the commercial outpost²³ –, promising a sequin as compensation for every robbery or kidnapping committed in those *kadiluk* and, as a further guarantee, they would also “pledge” one of their patricians.²⁴

The encounter with the «little old mother»

On December 1, 1667, the Sanjak-bey of Herzegovina left for Duvno, but he did not want to be followed by the Raguseans. Even the ambassadors did not want to stay in Mostar due to the severe plague epidemic in the city. They decided to head first towards Stolac and then continue in the direction of Počitelj. It was precisely in the latter locality that they learned of the presence in the vicinity of a person who could help them a great deal. The ambassadors found out that:

the old little mother of the Grand Vizier’s *kahya* was – by the will of her son – with a certain Mahmut Effendi, who was very solicitous towards her; he wrote the letters to the *kahya* and handled everything related to the woman – so, we felt it was necessary to have a meeting with the woman as soon as possible.²⁵

22 *Ibid.*

23 It is probable to identify those *kadiluk* in the territorial jurisdictions of Gabela, Duvno, Ljubinje, Stolac, Mostar, Blagaj, Imotski relating to the territory of the Neretva valley or adjacent to it, existing in Herzegovina at the end of the 17th century. Zijad ŠEHĆ and Ibrahim TEPIĆ, *Povijesni atlas Bosne i Hercegovine. Bosna i Hercegovina na geografskim i historijskim kartama*, Sarajevo, Sejtarija, 2002, pp. 61-62.

24 DAD, ASMM XVII, Ambassadors Marino di Caboga and Orsato de Sorgo, Dubrave [near Mostar], December 20, 1667, 1868-3.

25 «la vecchierella madre del S.r Chiehaia di S.r Supremo Vesire si trovava raccomandata dal medesimo a certo Mahmut effendi, quale era il tutto appresso di ella, e che lui scriveva tutte le lettere al S.r Chiehaia e governava tutte le sue cose onde stimamo necessario prima abboarsi con la donna». *Ibid.*

In order to get an encounter with the woman (Fig. 3), the Raguseans approached her trusted man, Mahmut Effendi, preparing him lunch in their accommodation and offering him «four weights of sugar» (*quattro capi di zucaro*). Eventually, Mahmut Effendi was willing to organize the meeting. However, «not being usual», the ambassadors could not speak directly with the woman. He said he would introduce the two men to her door, «so that we could hear one another». ²⁶

Finally, the day of the meeting with the mother of the *kahya* of the grand vizier Köprülü Fazil Ahmet Pasha arrived. The ambassadors went to her home with sugar and satin cloths as gifts, begging her to take up their cause by writing a letter to her son, «knowing that the *kahya* would do more for her – whom he loves so much – than for anyone else». ²⁷

She appreciated the gifts and was very sorry to learn that the opening of the port of Narenta would put Ragusa in great difficulty. At the end of their private talk, the ambassadors managed to wrest half a promise from the woman. She would write a letter in favor of the Raguseans to her son, *kahya* of Köprülü Fazil Ahmet Pasha, if, and only if, the Sanjak-bey of Herzegovina was the first promoter of the Republic of Ragusa's cause at the Porte. In exchange for the letter, the woman wished to receive a gift from the Republic: «two hounds, a male and a female, and they have to be beautiful and good». ²⁸

Thanks to Mahmut Effendi the two Raguseans also gathered new information and clarified the most confusing news. According to Ottoman gentleman, the Bosnia's previous *defterdar* had nothing to do with all those machinations. Defining himself as a trusted man of the current Bosnian *defterdar* – a certain Sciaban Effendi –, Mahmut Effendi was present when:

Sciaban Effendi and the *mola* [juriconstit] of Sarajevo, along with the Pasha of Bosnia, sent the *arz* [order] and the *mahzar* [court decree] to the Grand Vizier to our disadvantage and in order to get the opening of the outpost at Narenta, swearing that Musta Effendi [the Sanjak-bey of Herzegovina] was utterly unrelated to the matter. ²⁹

26 «ben si ci introduurrebbe avanti la sua porta accio ella puossa sentire il nostro e noi il suo parlare». *Ibid.*

27 «sapendo che il S.r Chiehaia farebbe più per lei che tanto ama che per alcun altro». *Ibid.*

28 «direte ai vostri SS.ri che in ogni modo mi mandino dua Cani brachi un maschio et una femina che siano belli e boni». *Ibid.*


29 «il detto Sciaban effendi et il Mula di Saraio insieme col S.r Passa di Bosna mandarno l'arsi [arz] e masari [mahzar] al S.r Supremo Vesire contro di noi per procurare l'apertura della

At these revelations, the ambassadors asked if the *defterdar*, the Pasha and the *mola* had obtained any commandments in their favor from the grand vizier or the *kaymmakampaşa* (lieutenant who replaced the Grand Vizier if he was absent). Mahmut Effendi replied, swearing that he knew nothing «other than what the common people said». However, he did not believe it at all:

because if they had already obtained a commandment, by now they would have registered it in the *sicill* [*kadi*'s register] of the seven *kaza* [equivalent of *kadiluk*] in question; but now certainly the Venetians would have done everything to obtain that commandment, and for that purpose they had offered 12,000 sequins to the Pasha of Bosnia, 8,000 sequins to the Sanjak-bey of Herzegovina, 4,000 to the *defterdar* and the *mola* of Sarajevo, in addition to gifts to all the *agha* of Narenta and Mostar, privileges to the merchants and, to the subjects of the seven *kaza*, the promise that they would never be harassed by the *hajduci* again.³⁰

scala à Narente, nel quale negotio ci giurò che Musta effendi nulla s'habbi ingerito».
Ibid.

30 «perché se il commandamento havessero ottenuto di quello sin hora havebbero fatto siglat [recorded in *sicill*] in tutti i Cadiluchi ma ben si credeva anzi teniva per certo che adesso i Venetiani procurarano più che mai che l'ottenessesse detto commandamento per il quale offerivano al S.r Passa di Bosna M/12 [12.000] zechimi, a questo di Herzegovi-



3 An Ottoman lady in her home clothing.
Source: Nicolò DE NICOLAI, *Le Navigazioni et Viaggi fatti nella Turchia*, Venice, Francesco Ziletti, 1580.

It must be said that Mahmut Effendi, or as the Ragusa ambassadors call him, «farmer of the mother of the *kahya* of the Grand Vizier», was indeed a wealth of information. Also, from him, they learned of the Venetian propaganda – most likely propagated by Hacı Ahmet – aimed at the merchants of Sarajevo, who were strongly advised not to go to Ragusa for security reasons. Concerning the operations in the shadow of Hacı Ahmed in Venice, «the hoi polloi commonly said» that he had already taken the commandment to Venice and that the arrival of Venetian vessels loaded with merchandise and salt in Narenta was about to happen at any moment. Regarding the expected arrival of the Venetian ships *en route* to the mouth of the Neretva, the ambassadors learned from Gio Batista Leporini, the Ragusa salt seller in Narenta, that those vessels had already arrived in Spalato (Split) and were just waiting for suitable meteorological conditions in order to navigate towards their final destination.³¹

What the locals thought

On December 20, 1667, from Sarajevo, the *defterdar* Sciaban Effendi sent a letter to an *agha* (Fig. 4) in Narenta. The Ragusa ambassadors succeeded in detaining the courier carrying the communication and, not without effort, managed to learn the contents of the letter «in which [Sciaban Effendi] writes these precise words»:

The Venetian vessels carrying merchants and merchandise are likely about to arrive at that [Neretva river] mouth. Therefore, be vigilant. As soon as you see them, you will report to me and to the Pasha here in Sarajevo. In addition, you will also notify Ibrahim Agha and Salih Agha, who have already been sent to Mostar. They will wait there for your news on the arrival of the vessels, and then they will move to Narenta to attend the necessary operations – one on my behalf and the other one on Pasha's behalf. If the Pasha hadn't detained me for some important business, I would have come to you personally. Anyway, I'll see you soon. The Pasha and I are very much counting on you and your help regarding the circumstance of the arrival of those vessels.³²

na otto, et al Tefterdaro e Mula di Sarai quattro, oltre li regali à tuti li aghe di Nar.[en]te e Mostaro, privilegii ai Mercanti et à tutti i suditti di sette Cadiluchi che non sarebbero molestati dalli haiduchi». *Ibid.*

31 *Ibid.*

32 «Non essendo comparsi sin hora più Vaselli Venentiani con mercanti e mercantie a code-

As reported by the Ragusa salt seller Gio Batista Loporini in Narenta, the information about the arrival of the Venetian vessels in Split was confirmed by another source. A man from Vrgorac said he knew that the Venetian ships, besides the merchandise,

were also carrying
the timber necessary
to build the salt
deposits (*case del sale*)
and the lazaretto to erect right at
the mouth of the river.³³


However, at this point in the story, one wonders what the locals thought of this Bosnian–Venetian commercial project. In their letters, Caboga and Sorgo reported that the locals, with a few rare exceptions, were thrilled with the opening of

ste boche dovrano coparire quanto p.
ma onde voi invigilarete, et al arivo di
quelle subbito darete parte al S.r Passa
et a me qui in Saraio, come anche avi-
sarete Imbraim Agha e Salih Agha, che
gia da qui sono spediti a Mostaro, et ivi
doverano aspettare sino che da voi sarano
avvisati del arivo dei sudetti Vaselli, doven-
do ambi doi transferirsi a Narente per asi-
stere uno per conto mio, et altro per conto
del S.r Passa, et io personalm.te sarei ve-
nuto costi se dal S.r Passa non fui trattenuto
per alcun servitio di importanza però ci
vederemo quanto prima. Intanto et io et il
S.r Passa con gran ansietà stiamo aspettan-
do da voi particolar aiuto sup.[r]a la venu-
ta di sudetti Vaselli». *Ibid.*, Dubrave [near
Mostar], December 21, 1667, 1868–4.

33 *Ibid.*

4 An Ottoman *agha*.

Source: Nicolò DE NICOLAI,
*Le Navigazioni et Viaggi
fatti nella Turchia*, Venice,
Francesco Ziletti, 1580.



that small port.³⁴ It should be noted that the most significant disadvantage of the Raguseans – a circumstance that strongly compromised the possibility of intercession by the Sanjak-bey of Herzegovina in their favor – was represented by the great difficulty, due to the ongoing war, of transporting their salt from Ston to Narenta. The Ottoman official, while reassuring the ambassadors that without the sultan's *hatt-i şerif* he would never have allowed the disembark of the Venetian salt in Narenta, warned them that if Ragusa had not been able to supply Narenta with salt, he would have been forced to report to the sultan that the opening of that entrepot was absolutely essential.³⁵ The Raguseans indeed had a monopoly on the salt trade in Narenta. However, their market dominance was conditional on whether they could supply Narenta with the goods. Otherwise, others would have been allowed to bring and sell it in their place.³⁶

After a certain period of silence, the Sanjak-bey of Herzegovina ordered a trusted *agha* of Narenta, a certain Hussein Agha, that if the Venetian ships were to arrive, the situation should be managed in two ways according to the case. In the first scenario, if the Venetians exhibited the commandment of the sultan authorizing them to moor, the *agha* would first have to demand the customs duties. On the contrary, if the Venetians had neither the sultan's commandment or any other order from the Bosnian Pasha, he would not intervene in any way. In that case, he would have to make a note of the wares and merchants.³⁷

The return to the Sanjak-bey on the scene was probably because the word was spreading that the Venetian ships were already off the Hvar (Lesina) island coast, as Gio Battista Leporini reported to the ambassadors. The salt seller added that the main convoy was delayed, because it was still waiting for a galley from

³⁴ *Ibid.* However, according to the two Raguseans, the most enthusiastic and the real promoter “from the bottom” of the enterprise was a «certain Begho Curt Aghich, propte[r] [causa] of Narenta and the main proponent of the opening of this port». *Ibid.*, Buna [near Blagaj], January 1, 1668, 1868–7.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, Dubrave [near Mostar] 20 December 1667, 1868–3.

³⁶ The privilege granted to the Raguseans to have the monopoly of the salt trade in Narenta, except in cases where they were unable to bring it, was enshrined in many sultan commandments. Some reference to the sultan commandments issued in the 17th century. DAD, *Privilegi* (XX.2): Ahmed I, year 1609 No. 5, c. 324; Ahmed I, year 1617 No. 1, c. 323; Osman II, year 1618 No. 4, c. 374; Osman II, year 1618 No. 19, cc. 395–396; Murad IV, year 1635 No. 14, c. 435; Mehmet IV, year 1649 No. 190, c. 744.

³⁷ DAD, ASMM XVII, Ambassadors Marino di Caboga and Orsato de Sorgo, Buna [near Blagaj], January 1, 1668, 1868–5.

Venice with «a public person» on board who, upon arrival in Narenta, would have to go immediately to Sarajevo to the Pasha, while the merchants and merchandise stayed on board.³⁸ The ambassadors decided to reach the Sanjak-bey in Mostar, accompanied by one of his trusted men and, evidently, also belonging to the pro-Ragusa faction of Narenta notables: Hussein Agha. However, the *agha* and the ambassadors preferred not to enter the city due to the fear of contracting the plague that was raging in Mostar. They thought it would be more comfortable and safer to stay overnight in the meadows outside the city to be able to meet the Sanjak-bey when he would leave Mostar to go to Herceg Novi.³⁹

Good news

Despite all the worries, some reassurance began to come from Sarajevo in those days. The Bosnian Pasha had finally decided to free the caravans stationed in Sarajevo, allowing them to head towards Ragusa. The two Raguseans believed that this decision was reached when the Pasha knew for sure that the Venetians did not have any commandment from the sultan allowing them to disembark at Narenta. Since the success of the Narenta enterprise conditioned this block, he no longer considered it appropriate to detain those caravans to divert them towards the new port, whose opening was not complete. In any case, in order to secure further guarantees, the ambassadors returned to see the mother of the *kahya* of the Grand Vizier and to remind her of the letter she was to have written to her son. The woman's position had not changed: before writing her letter, she wanted to be sure that Sanjak-bey of Herzegovina was on the Republic of Ragusa's side. The Raguseans made Hussain Agha swear that the Sanjak-bey was their ally because he, like them, had the sole purpose of serving the sultan. But the woman remained adamant.⁴⁰

In the meantime, however, excellent news was arriving from Ragusa. From the report of the ambassadors, it can be understood that the Republic sent a communication which informed Caboga and Sorgo that the ambassadors who carried the tribute⁴¹ had met the sultan in Plovdiv. On that occasion, they learnt

38 *Ibid.*, Narenta, December 25, 1667, 1868–5.

39 «stare alla travia [on the grass; on the meadows] per poterlo incontrare a quelle strade dove vedaremos che voltarà di certo». *Ibid.*, Buna [near Blagaj], December 29, 1667, 1868–6.

40 *Ibid.*

41 Regarding the Republic of Ragusa as a tributary state of the Ottoman Empire, see Niko-

that the sultan had not granted any commandments in favor of the Venetians to accomplish the enterprise. Of course, this now placed the Ragusa's ambassadors in an advantageous position over the Bosnian Pasha.⁴²

However, good news followed bad news. Notice arrived from Sarajevo about the caravans that had been blocked on their way to Ragusa. Although the Bosnian Pasha had finally made up his mind to allow merchants to travel the Sarajevo-Ragusa route, now it was the merchants themselves who did not want to travel that route. They feared the raids of the *hajduci* during the journey by land to reach the Republic of Saint Blaise and the attacks of the pirates during the following navigation towards Venice. From a merchant, the ambassadors learned that only his caravan and that of a group of Ragusa furriers had left Sarajevo in the direction of Ragusa. The other caravans were still stationary in Sarajevo, because the merchants received constant notices from Venice – news probably spread by Hacı Ahmed, the ambassadors suggested – about the great danger of the Sarajevo–Ragusa–Venice intermodal route.

Although the sultan did not want to endorse the Bosnian–Venetian enterprise of Gabela, the Republic decided to “invest” 500 sequins in the “friendship” with the Sanjak-bey of Herzegovina all the same. This was also so that he would prevent any docking of Venetian ships – this hypothesis was receding further and further – and write a letter to the sultan in favor of the Ragusa’s cause. Once both the Sanjak-bey alliance and the sultan’s refusal to support the Bosnian–Venetian project were certain, the ambassadors would have greater bargaining power with the Bosnian Pasha. In this way, the Ottoman official would abandon the smear campaign against Ragusa and openly encourage the caravans to head towards the

laas H. BIEGMAN, *The Turco–Ragusan Relationship. According to the Firmans of Murad III (1575–1595) extant in the State Archives of Dubrovnik*, The Hague & Paris, Mouton, 1967; Vesna Miović, *Dubrovačka Republika u spisima osmanskih sultana*, Dubrovnik, Državni Arhiv u Dubrovniku, 2005; Vesna Miović, «Diplomatic Relations between the Ottoman Empire and the Republic of Dubrovnik», in Gábor KÁRMÁN and Lovro KUNČEVIĆ (Eds.), *The European Tributary States of the Ottoman Empire in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Century*, Leiden & Boston, Brill, 2013, pp. 187–208; Lovro KUNČEVIĆ, «Janus-faced Sovereignty: The International Status of the Ragusan Republic in the Early Modern Period», in KÁRMÁN and KUNČEVIĆ (Eds.), *The European Tributary States*, cit., pp. 91–121.

42 DAD, ASMM XVII, Ambassadors Marino di Caboga and Orsato de Sorgo, Buna [near Blagaj], January 1, 1668, 1868–7.

Republic of Saint Blaise.⁴³

Finally, on January 1, 1668, the ambassadors managed to have a meeting with the Sanjak-bey near Mostar. The ambassadors asked to speak only with the officer and his closest collaborators. The Sanjak-bey replied that the meeting could be held only after dinner. So, the Raguseans went to his rooms at two in the morning. As “encouragement”, they offered him 400 sequins, 60 to his *kahya*, 20 to the *divan effendi* (secretary, scribe) and other 20 to the other dignitaries of his court. Despite many reassurances about his hostility towards the Bosnian–Venetian commercial enterprise, the Ottoman official was very afraid to write those letters. The official told them that, although the Bosnian Pasha and six hundred great Bosnian merchants were against Ragusa, he was sure the sultan would trust his words. However, the real problem was represented by the Pasha of Bosnia, who would be very offended by this. Furthermore, the Pasha was also the brother-in-law of the sultan and, therefore, possessed a significant influence over him. Finally, – of course – he also wanted economic encouragement from the Ragusa to be more conspicuous.⁴⁴ Caboga and Sorgo replied that they only asked him to inform the sultan as precisely as possible about all the possible and dangerous consequences that the realization of Gabela’s project could present. The scenario envisaged by the Ragusa ambassadors was the following: at first, the Venetians would build the lazaretto, closing the mouth of the Neretva; later, they would build houses and other buildings and, finally, they would undoubtedly also erect a fortress which, in order to be demolished, would certainly require the sultan’s armed intervention. Nevertheless, despite that picture the official remained unmoved, but he did agree to the ambassadors’ request to think about it a little longer and invited them to follow him on the journey to Stolac the next day. In Stolac, the Raguseans tried to have a further encounter with the Sanjak-bey but were unsuccessful.⁴⁵

A few days later, Caboga and Sorgo met the Sanjak-bey and his court again on the road to Nikšić. This time, the Ottoman officer approached them and asked to discuss the price for his help: to write those letters supporting Ragusa to the sultan, the officer wanted 1,000 sequins for him and 300 for his *kahya*. However,

43 *Ibid.*

44 *Ibid.*, Stolac, January 4, 1668, 1868–8.

45 *Ibid.*

this time the Raguseans were inflexible: 400 sequins was their offer, take it or leave it. The officer tried again to negotiate his price, but the two ambassadors were ordered to return to Ragusa and there, in all probability, they went after this last meeting.⁴⁶

Anyway, it is possible to affirm that, after the reassurances received by the sultan through the ambassadors of the tribute and the non-mooring of the Venetian ships at the mouth of the Neretva, for Ragusa the tension and the concern subsided.


Finally, the project is completed

The Bosnian–Venetian trading post project on the Narenta was born and died down during the War of Candia and was reawakened during another war, that of Morea.

In a communication dated May 26, 1693, a Venetian *capo di piazza* (a prominent merchant) reported to the *V Savi* that normally Bosnia's commercial traffic went to Split, where the goods were loaded on galleys and thus arrived in Venice. On the contrary, in times of war the local merchants regularly went to Ragusa (Fig. 5), which was becoming rich, not so much by the duties it imposed on goods, but especially by the prices imposed on the sale of salt. The merchants were looking for another trading post, a convenient and safe place to carry goods. The *bosnesi* (or *bossinesi*) merchants did not consider Split a suitable place to carry their goods, because it was too far inside the Venetian territory. However, not even Risan or the Herceg Novi area (both in Montenegro now) were considered suitable options due to the inland populations, who continually plundered the caravans in transit. The merchants proposed the Neretva valley – where they had already begun to route trade with goods from Mostar – naming the locality of Gabela as the hub of commercial traffic. However, at that time the goods remained stationary in Gabela and could not reach the coast, because the fortress called Forte Opus, located on a tiny island at the mouth of the Neretva river, prevented communication with the sea. Thus, Forte Opus could have served as an intermediate trading outpost for the commercial traffic between Ottoman Bosnia and Venice, so that:

the goods – either they will be brought to Forte Opus or unloaded from the

46 *Ibid.*, Gliubigne [Ljubinje], January 5, 1668, 1868–9.



5 The evolution of the city of Ragusa. On the left the ancient settlement, on the right the old city before the 1667 earthquake. DRŽAVNI ARHIV U DUBROVNIKU, Unknown author, via Wikimedia Commons.

caravans further inland, in Mostar and Gabela – will not be able to pass the river mouth in order to enter the sea without its [Venice's] permission, and [the merchants] will also have to recognize the Rule of the August Republic through the payment of the duties that will be established.⁴⁷

The communication of the following day, May 27, 1693, in which Nicolo Cottoni pointed out that the war had seriously compromised the trade of Bosnia,

47 «le merci, o saranno adiritura portate al detto Forte Opus, o scaricate dalle caravane nelli luoghi superiori di Mostar e Gabella, non potranno passare le Bocche della Fiumana per entrar sul mare senza la sua permissione, e doveranno egualmente risconoscer l'Imperio della Repubblica Augusta col pagamento di quei dazi che saranno decretati». Archivio di Stato di Venezia, *V Savi*, Ia serie, Diversiorum, 350, c. 212.

is also of the same tenor. He reiterated that the traffic that once was directed only towards Ragusa now sought other channels of outlet. Meanwhile, rather than going to Ragusa, the local merchants preferred to go to Shkodër, but the journey was long, expensive, and very dangerous due to the *hajduci*. Cottoni also confirmed that Risan and the Herceg Novi areas were not good alternatives to Split due to the bands of brigands that infested the surroundings of the two localities. He too believed that Gabela and Forte Opus were comfortable and safe, both for the Venetians and the Bosnian merchants.⁴⁸

Between 1693 and 1694, the Bosnian–Venetian project had greater success. With the title of France consul of navigation (*console della navigazione*), the Greek Giovanni Milio obtained permission from the sultan to open a trading outpost in the same places, taken into consideration in 1666–1668. In 1693, once Milio made the necessary agreements with Venice and obtained the authorization from the Porta, the Provveditore Generale of Dalmatia and Albania Daniele Dolfin began to prepare the conquest of Gabela.⁴⁹ Without dwelling on the military actions in the area, suffice to say that Gabela, and the terminal part of the Neretva valley, ended up in Venetian hands at the end of 1694.⁵⁰ There, the Venetians established an active commercial terminal until 1718, when the Ottoman re-earned the locality.

A fluid and oblique space

The case study of the Bosnian–Venetian joint venture offers much food for thought. The first consideration that can be made is that it is a story literally crossed by forces that go well beyond the economic, commercial and *raison d'état* dimensions. In our case, the societal, of everyday life, and spatial aspects seem to be pivotal indeed. Precisely for this reason, here we have chosen to value a non-economic facet of this trade and business-related story, namely the one that refers to the question of the control of the territory in relation to trade and the problem

48 *Ibid.*, c. 213.

49 Marko JAČOV, *Le guerre Veneto-Turche del XVII secolo in Dalmazia*, Venice, Atti e memorie della Società dalmata di storia patria, 1991, p. 206-207; Giacomo DIEDO, *Storia della Repubblica di Venezia dalla sua fondazione sino l'anno MDCCXLVII*, Vol. III, Venice, Andrea Poletti, 1751, p. 466.

50 JAČOV, *Le guerre Veneto-Turche*, cit., pp. 206-213.

represented by the *hajduci*. The first aspect to underline and that emerges from the Venetian documents dating back to the Morean War is absolutely obvious: is the confirmation of the directional alternation from the inland cities towards Split and Ragusa, a rotation dictated by the conjunctural conditions of the war. The second is that which has to do with the main trade routes of the region. In fact, alongside the segments Sarajevo–Mostar–Ragusa, Sarajevo–Split, Mostar–Split and Banja Luka–Split, there were other commercial corridors in which the goods concentrated in the city markets sought an outlet. Some of these had a sporadic and temporary character in wartime, such as those leading from the inside to Herceg Novi, Risan and Shkodër. On the other hand, others were consolidating precisely because of the ongoing war, such as the Sarajevo–Mostar–Gabela/Narenta–Forte Opus one taken into consideration.

Furthermore, in this case, it should be emphasized that trade also contributes to redefining the physiognomy and perception of territorial control, making the territory something dynamic and “liquid” among the warring sides. In this way, the two modes of trade in Ottoman Bosnia during the 17th century take shape. The first is “central”, structured and of a purely city nature, in which the representatives of power and the stakeholders operate. The second is “peripheral” and occurs in a rural environment; it is fluid and almost impossible given that the Bosnian–Venetian affaire is located in an exceptional regulatory and institutional horizon, where there is sufficient flexibility and ambiguity to create new commercial possibilities, even during a conflict that sees the subjects involved on antagonistic positions. This “peripheral” mode of commerce is affected and conditioned by the decisions of the “city-centre”, but it is made possible precisely because it is far from the centre.⁵¹

Also, the *hajduci* move in this politically, institutionally and commercially fluid space; it seems they can also manipulate the perception of it and the way to exploit it. Banditry was a problem not only for the safety of the merchants and the goods transported, but also because it damaged and weakened the communication and information systems, two fundamental components of the connective tissue that supported and nourished the Western Balkan region in the Early Modern Age.⁵²

51 Biagio SALVEMINI, *Il territorio sghembo. Forme e dinamiche degli spazi umani in età moderna*, Bari, Edipuglia, 2006, p. 580.

52 In this regard, see Erica MEZZOLI, «Information Networks between the Republic of Ragusa

Banditry is a complex social and economic phenomenon – not to be confused with common crime or with forms of social revolt⁵³ –, whose analysis for the region and the period in question is far beyond the scope of this article. What is worth mentioning here is that during the War of Candia, banditry intensified for social and economic conjunctural reasons and because the Venetians organized and coordinated military actions by brigands in Ottoman territory. In this way, they could count on small guerrilla brigades behind the enemy lines.⁵⁴ On the other hand, and as demonstrated by Vesna Miović, not even the Raguseans were innocent of collaborations and connivance with acts of banditry in the border areas between the Republic of Ragusa and the Ottoman Empire, in particular during the years of the Morean War.⁵⁵

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53 It can be understood as a social phenomenon strictly connected to the characteristics of the Mediterranean pastoral world. Given that banditry finds its peak in moments of crisis represented by war and/or political upheavals in territories, any other increase in the phenomenon is connected to the internal changes to the pastoral economy and to a surplus of young males in the communities that found their livelihood in activities related to sheep farming. Yves-Marie BERCÉ, *Revolt and Revolution in Early Modern Europe: An Essay on the History of Political Violence*, Manchester, Manchester University Press, 1987, pp. 144–148.

54 JAČOV, *Le guerre Veneto-Turche*, cit., p. 153.

55 Vesna Miović, «Svakodnevica dubrovačkih pograničnih sela u doba hajdučije (Morejski rat 1684. – 1699.)», *Analji Zavoda povijesne znanosti HAZU u Dubrovniku*, 35 (1997), pp. 19–36.

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Aspects de l'intendance des Vénitiens dans l'Archipel au cours de la guerre de Morée (1684–1699)


par GEORGES KOUTZAKIOTIS*

ABSTRACT: The present study undertakes to shed light on the ways in which the Venetians tried to cover their pressing needs in money and foodstuffs in order to carry out their naval enterprises in the Aegean during the First Morean War. More specifically, it examines the tax collection mechanism implemented in the Archipelago, so that the Venetian fleet could find a secure livelihood there. This mechanism is described as a process, a method that highlights the modifications it has undergone as well as the role played by various characters in its operation over time. The orientation of the analysis requires that this study be divided into two parts: the first concerns the first years of the war (1684–1690), during which the collection of taxes was part of the operations of the Venetian fleet; the second part refers to the 1690s, when tax collection was entrusted to a private businessman. Consequently, this last part focuses on the action of a one particular individual, which allows us however to approach the commercial activities that had developed in the Archipelago due to the war. Moreover, it enables us to examine the kind of domination that the Most Serene Republic had imposed at least in certain islands of the Aegean (with the exception of Tinos), which historiography has not yet set forth.

KEYWORDS: VENETIAN–OTTOMAN WARS, FIRST MOREAN WAR (1684–1699), AEGEAN SEA, INTENDANCE, TAXATION, COMMERCE.


La présente étude entreprend d'éclairer les modes suivants les Vénitiens essayèrent de couvrir leurs besoins pressants en argent et en denrées alimentaires afin de mener leurs entreprises navales dans l'Égée au cours de la guerre qui les opposa aux Ottomans de 1684 à 1699. Plus particulièrement, elle examine le mécanisme de perception des taxes mis en œuvre dans l'Archipel (Images 1 et 2), de façon à ce que la flotte vénitienne puisse y trouver une subsistance assurée. Ce mécanisme est décrit comme un processus, méthode

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1 «A Map of the Archipelago Islands». Source: William HACKE (éd.), *A Collection of Original Voyages [...]*, Londres, James Knapton, 1699.

qui met en valeur les modifications qu'il a subies ainsi que le rôle joué par divers personnages dans son fonctionnement au fil du temps. L'orientation de l'analyse impose que cette étude soit divisée en deux parties: la première concerne les premières années de la guerre (1684–1690) au cours desquelles la collecte des taxes s'inscrivait dans les opérations de la flotte vénitienne; la seconde partie se réfère à la décennie 1690, qui a vu la collecte confiée à un homme d'affaires



2 «*Archipelagi Meridionalis seu Cycladum Insularum Accurata Delineatio*». Source: Olfert DAPPER, *Naukeurige Beschryving der Eilanden in de Archipel der Middelantsche Zee* [...], Amsterdam, Wolfgangh, 1688.


privé. Par conséquent, cette dernière partie se concentre sur l'action d'une figure particulière, ce qui nous permet d'aborder les activités commerciales qui s'étaient développées dans l'Archipel en raison de la guerre et, de surcroît, de spécifier le genre de domination que la République Sérénissime avait imposé du moins dans certaines îles de l'Égée (à l'exception de Tinos), et dont l'historiographie n'a pas fait état jusqu'à aujourd'hui.

Première période (1684–1690)

Au début de l'été 1684, une escadre de la marine vénitienne fit son apparition dans l'Archipel, annonçant par ses opérations de course le début d'une nouvelle et longue guerre dans l'Égée. Il s'agissait, très précisément, de l'ouverture d'un nouveau front dans la guerre de la Sainte-Ligue contre les Ottomans. Au cours de ce conflit vénéto-ottoman qui dura quinze années et qui fut appelé guerre de Morée, les Cyclades furent, *de facto*, une région contrôlée par les Vénitiens, puisque les principales batailles navales se déroulèrent en dehors de ce complexe insulaire, et que les affrontements qui se déroulèrent dans les eaux des Cyclades se soldèrent par les défaites de la flotte du sultan.¹ L'île de Milos (Images 3 et 4), particulièrement, semble avoir été à de nombreuses reprises, tout comme pendant la guerre de Crète (1645–1669), l'endroit d'où s'élançaient les courses ou au contraire le havre de la flotte vénitienne. Les sources, bien que lacunaires, nous procurent des témoignages indicatifs: en 1689, Milos avait été le lieu de rencontre des escadres du *capitan estraordinario delle navi* Lorenzo Venier et du *capitan ordinario delle navi* Marco Pisani. En 1690, la flotte, sous le commandement de Girolamo Corner, était restée au mouillage un certain temps à Milos; en 1693, commandée par le doge lui-même, Francesco Morosini, elle s'était embossée dans l'île après un périple d'inspection dans l'Archipel; en 1697, elle s'était réfugiée dans cette même baie après trois engagements avec les Ottomans, au cours desquels elle avait subi des pertes considérables.² Il faut spécifier que le

1 Ben J. SLOT, *Archipelagus turbatus. Les Cyclades entre colonisation latine et occupation ottomane c. 1500–1718*, Istanbul, Uitgaven van het Nederlands Historisch-Archaeologisch Instituut te Istanbul, 1982, p. 232. Sur les opérations navales des Vénitiens dans l'Égée, voir particulièrement Ioannis K. CHASIOTIS, «Η κάμψη της οθωμανικής δυνάμεως» [Le fléchissement de la puissance ottomane], in *Iστορία των Ελληνικού Έθνους*, t. 11, Athènes, Ekdotiki Athinon, 2009, pp. 32-35 et 21, où se trouve la cartographie des opérations. Cf. Guido CANDIANI, *I vascelli della Serenissima. Guerra, politica e costruzioni navali a Venezia in età moderna, 1650–1720*, Venise, Istituto Veneto di scienze, lettere ed arti, 2009, chapitres V-IX.

2 Voir respectivement: [Anonyme], «De Venise, le 8 Janvier 1689», *Gazette*, 4 (29 janvier 1689), p. 42 et «De Venise, le 19 Fevrier 1689», *Gazette*, 10 (12 mars 1689), p. 116; Michaïl I. MARKOPOLIS, *Δραματικόν επεισόδιον της ναζιακῆς ιστορίας* [Un épisode dramatique de l'histoire de Naxos], Naxos, Imprimerie du journal Naxos, 1893, pp. 25-26 et Periklis G. ZERLENTIS, *Ιστορικά σημειώματα εκ του βιβλίου των εν Νάξῳ Καπούκινων 1649–1753* [Notes historiques tirées du livre des Capucins de Naxos, 1649–1753], Hermoupolis, N. G. Freris, 1922, p. 104; ARCHIVES NATIONALES DE FRANCE (désormais: ANF), AE B¹ 862, F. Goujon à L. Phéypeaux, chancelier de Pontchartrain, Milos, 8 septembre 1693 et 18



3 Milos, Kimolos (*Argentara*) et Polyagos (*Polimo*). Source: Allain MANESSON MALLET, *Description de l'Univers [...]*, t. 4, Paris, D. Thierry, 1683.

golfe de Milos, – si bien protégé des vents et surtout si vaste, que, aux dires du général Ghiron Francesco Villa, il pouvait accueillir de nombreuses armadas –³ n’était pas le seul abri de la marine vénitienne. Le négociant britannique Bernard Randolph nous informe par ailleurs que la flotte vénitienne avait aussi coutume de mouiller dans l’embrasse marine prolongée par deux bras de mer située entre Milos, Kimolos et Polyaigos, car de là elle pouvait contrôler le passage maritime jusqu’à une grande distance, grâce à des vigies installées sur les éminences des îles voisines, et, en cas d’attaque, elle pouvait rapidement se diriger vers le large.⁴

La remise en question de la domination ottomane dans l’Égée par les Vénitiens ne prit pas seulement la forme d’une activité de course, elle se fit aussi celle par la perception de taxes annuelles auprès des habitants des îles. En outre, grâce à ces rentrées régulières, la Sérénissime pouvait engranger de l’argent et du ravitaillement pour ses entreprises militaires. Ces taxes, quoique variables, encaissées en retard ou bien parfois nullement perçues, portaient le nom de *carazzi* (ou *caraggi*), sur le modèle du terme ottoman *haraç*, et elles étaient versées par la plupart des îles de l’Archipel. Il y avait des exceptions, bien sûr, comme celles de la Crète et de Nègrepont (Eubée) et de plusieurs autres îles (Cos, Lesbos, Limnos, Rhodes, Ténédos et Chios), en raison de la présence militaire des Ottomans. Quoi qu’il en soit, il est impressionnant de constater que les registres fiscaux vénitiens comprenaient aussi des îles de la région des Dardanelles (Imbros, Moschonia, Samothrace), jusqu’à l’«isola di Cassandra» ou «lido di Cassandria», la presqu’île de Cassandra dans la région de la Macédoine.⁵ Cette imposition parallèle des ha-

octobre 1697, ff. 38^v et 91 respectivement; Philip P. ARGENTI, *The Occupation of Chios by the Venetians (1694) Described in Contemporary Diplomatic Reports and Official Dispatches*, Londres, J. Lane, 1935, pp. 6-7.

- 3 Giovanni Battista ROSTAGNO, *Viaggi dell’Illustrissimo, & Eccellenzissimo Sign. Marchese Ghiron Francesco Villa in Dalmatia, e Levante. Con la distinta Relatione de’ Successi di Candia per il tempo, che fu dal medemo diffesa in qualità di Generale dell’Infanteria della Serenissima Repubblica di Venetia*, Turin, G. Sinibaldo, 1668, p. 103.
- 4 Bernard RANDOLPH, *The Present State of the Islands in the Archipelago (or Arches). Sea of Constantinople, and Gulph of Smyrna; with the Islands of Candia, and Rhodes*, Athènes, D. N. Karavias, 1983 (1^{re} éd.: Oxford, 1687), p. 34.
- 5 Alessandro LOCATELLI, *Racconto historico della Veneta Guerra in Levante diretta dal Valore del Serenissimo Principe Francesco Morosini Capitan Generale la terza volta per la Serenissima Repubblica di Venetia contro l’Impero Ottomano...*, Colonia (Venise), G. Albrizzi, 1691, première partie, pp. 88-89; cf. Pietro GARZONI, *Istoria della Repubblica di Venezia in tempo della Sacra Lega contra Maometto IV., e tre suoi Successori, Gran Sultani de’ Turchi*, Venise, G. Manfrè, 1705, p. 779; Konstantinos D. MERTZIOS, «Ο Φραγκίσκος



4 Carte de Milos et des îles voisines. Source: Francesco PIACENZA, *L'Egeo redivivo, o' sia Chorographia dell'Arcipelago [...]*, Modena, Per gli eredi Soliani Stampatori Ducali, 1688.

bitants chrétiens de l'Archipel par les Vénitiens était dénoncée à l'époque par le jésuite Robert Saulger à Louis XIV, même s'il tentait aussi de susciter l'intérêt du roi pour la conquête des Cyclades ou, du moins, pour la recomposition du duché de Naxos : «Il y a plus de cent mille chrétiens dans ces îles qui gémissent aujourd'hui sous la tyrannie des Turcs et sous le jouc intolérable des Vénitiens qui exigent d'eux impitoyablement un second tribut qu'ils ne peuvent pas payer».⁶

Dans les registres vénitiens, les *carazzi* sont calculés uniquement en argent (réaux). D'autres sources nous indiquent cependant qu'ils pouvaient être perçus en nature (céréales, vin) : un ordre du *capitan generale* Francesco Morosini adressé aux habitants de Mykonos fixe que ces derniers aussi pouvaient régler leurs arriérés en nature, particulièrement en orge. En outre, une lettre consulaire provenant d'Andros rapporte que le *capitan estraordinario delle navi* Lorenzo Venier avait envoyé une patache à Skopelos afin de percevoir les *carazzi* en vin comme en argent. Un état de la commune de Mykonos énumère «combien de vin donne chaque foyer à son altesse le *capitan delle navi* Contarini».⁷ La valeur du vin et des autres produits était ôtée à la somme totale que devaient payer les insulaires en argent. Un ordre du *capitan generale* Alessandro Molin adressé à la commune de Naxos est particulièrement révélateur à cet égard : «nous voulons qu'ils aient un bénéfice du vin pour le *carazzi* qu'ils paient», précise-t-il. Un document de la même commune datant de la guerre de Crète montre en outre que les Vénitiens percevaient alors aussi des taxes en nature : «le vin que notre île [Naxos] est tenue de donner chaque année à la Seigneurie Sérénissime».⁸

Μοροζίνι, η Κασσάνδρα, η Καβάλλα και η Θάσος. Αι διενεργηθείσαι κατ' αυτών επιδρομέαί» [Francesco Morozini, Kassandra, Kavalla et Thasos. Les incursions qui furent menées contre elles], *Μακεδονικά*, 3 (1953–1955), pp. 1-4; SLOT, *Archipelagus turbatus*, cit., pp. 232-233, 311-313, 421-422.

6 ANF, AE B¹ 862, R. Saulger à Louis XIV, Milos, 4 octobre 1686, f. 12^r. Sur les propositions faites alors par Saulger au roi de France, voir en résumé SLOT, *Archipelagus turbatus*, cit., pp. 235-236.

7 Voir respectivement: ZERLENTIS, *Iστορικά σημειώματα*, cit., pp. 139-140; BIBLIOTHÈQUE NATIONALE DE FRANCE (désormais: BNF), Fr. 7170, N. della Grammatica à P. de Girardin, 5 octobre 1687, f. 272^r; Periklis G. ZERLENTIS, *Σύστασις των κοινού των Μυκονίων* [Constitution de la commune de Mykonos], Hermoupoli, N. G. Freris, 1924, pp. 53-56 et IDEM, «Παναγιώτης Νικούσιος και Αλέξανδρος Μαυροκορδάτος ἀρχοντες Μυκονίων» [Panagiotis Nikousios et Alexandros Mavrokordatos, archontes des Mykonians], *Νησιωτική Επετηρίς*, 1 (1918), p. 209.

8 Iosif DE KIGALAS, «Περί της υπό Ενετών και Οθωμανών συγχρόνου φορολογίας των νήσων του Αιγαίου» [Sur la taxation simultanée des îles de l'Égée par les Vénitiens et les

B. J. Slot a formulé l'hypothèse que les *carazzi* étaient déterminés sur la base des taxes ottomanes ou, peut-être, sur la base des taxes que les Vénitiens avaient imposées aux îles de l'Égée au cours de la guerre de Crète, car aucun témoignage ne nous est parvenu qu'ils aient établi un nouvel enregistrement. Le même historien, étudiant les données des sommes annuelles que les Vénitiens avaient perçues finalement de chaque île des Cyclades entre 1684 et 1693, a constaté des fluctuations dans les sommes, mais aussi des interruptions dans le versement des taxes. Il a considéré qu'elles étaient dues à l'inefficacité des percepteurs d'impôt plutôt qu'aux réactions des habitants, qui auraient pu craindre l'éventualité de représailles ottomanes. En outre, il a remarqué que les Cyclades avaient versé normalement leurs taxes en 1687, 1689, 1690, 1692, années au cours desquelles la flotte vénitienne avait lancé de grandes attaques contre les Ottomans.⁹

Certaines de ces questions sont élucidées par un document vénitien qui décrit les changements principaux survenus jusqu'en 1694 dans le mode de taxation de l'Archipel. Avant tout, ce texte nous informe que le montant des *carazzi* était défini par le *capitan generale* et qu'il avait fluctué en raison de l'impuissance des insulaires à répondre à l'exigence fiscale des Vénitiens car les habitants, «outre qu'ils étaient pauvres», étaient «soumis à des violences et à des saignements par les Turcs et les corsaires chrétiens, voire même par quelques navires pirates de La Canée, de Rhodes et d'Eubée, qui empêch[ai]ent le commerce entre les îles».¹⁰ Plus précisément, il est rapporté que la somme totale des taxes avait augmenté sous le *capitan generale* Domenico Mocenigo (1690–1692) et qu'elle avait diminué de presque la moitié sous le doge Francesco Morosini, lorsqu'il avait assuré de nouveau le commandement de la flotte (1692–1694). Néanmoins, dans la plupart des îles, cette diminution n'était pas très importante: par exemple, Milos devait verser 7000 réaux au lieu de 10000. En tout état de cause, en 1694, les Vénitiens n'avaient pas réussi à collecter la somme totale des taxes déjà diminuées, en dépit des menaces de punition et, en général, des pressions exercées sur

Ottomans], *Πανδώρα*, 21 (1870–1871), pp. 40-41. Voir aussi Dimitrios P. PASCHALIS, «Αι Κυκλαδες κατά τους μεταξύ των Τούρκων και των Βενετών πολέμους (1644–1669 και 1684–1699)» [Les Cyclades au cours des guerres entre les Turcs et les Vénitiens, 1644–1669 et 1684–1699], in *Eις μνήμην Σπυρίδωνος Λάμπρου*, Athènes, Hestia, 1935, p. 135.

9 SLOT, *Archipelagus turbatus*, cit., pp. 232-233, 311.

10 MERTZIOS, «Ο Φραγκίσκος Μοροζίνι», cit., p. 2.

les habitants,¹¹ dont nous parlerons plus loin.

Il est probable que les *carazzi* avaient aussi augmenté au cours du précédent exercice de Morosini, lorsqu'il était *capitan generale* (1684–1690), puisqu'on conserve deux documents d'élection d'émissaires de la commune de Mykonos qui lui sont adressés, afin de «le prier de faire un geste de pitié vers le grand poids supplémentaire dont [les] accablait le *carasi*», et «de le prier d'être charitable et de [les] cautionner pour qu'ils paient suivant l'ancien *libretto*».¹² Quant à l'«ancien *libretto*» rapporté dans le document, c'était probablement le registre contenant les reçus des versements de la taxe qui attestait du régime en vigueur pendant la guerre de Crète, puisque l'historien contemporain des événements Alessandro Locatelli écrit formellement que les *carazzi* avaient été imposés dans les îles, en juillet 1684, de la même façon que lors de la précédente guerre.¹³ Par ailleurs, une lettre de Morosini adressée aux habitants de Symi témoigne directement du fait que les Vénitiens étaient revenus dans l'Égée non seulement avec les mêmes exigences, mais qu'ils avaient aussi usé de leurs vieux arguments pour assurer le versement ordinaire des taxes par les insulaires: «si vous acceptez l'obligation de donner ce que vous donniez au temps de la guerre passée du *Regno* de Crète, je vous protègerai des corsaires».¹⁴

Cet ordre d'imposition renouvelée des *carazzi* dans l'Archipel était appliqué par deux escadres de la flotte vénitienne placées sous le commandement du *capitan estraordinario delle navi* Alessandro Molin et du *capitan ordinario delle navi* Daniele Dolfin.¹⁵ Le fait que «[le capitan delle nave] collectait les *carazzi* dans

11 *Ibid.*

12 ZERLENTIS, Σύστασις του κοινού, cit., pp. 36-38, 42-45 (voir les extraits correspondants aux pp. 36 et 42).

13 LOCATELLI, *Racconto historico*, cit., première partie, p. 28. Cf. ZERLENTIS, «Παναγιώτης Νικούσιος», cit., p. 203, qui interprète cet «ancien *libretto*» du document comme étant «celui de la guerre de vingt-cinq ans en Crète», sans autre précision.

14 Dimosthenis CHAVIARAS, «Ανέκδοτοι επιστολαί Μοροζίνη και Καποδιστρίου προς τους Συμαίοντες» [Lettres inédites de Morosini et de Kapodistrias adressées aux Symiens], *Παρνασσός*, 3 (1879), pp. 251-252 et IDEM, «Μελέται περί της νήσου Σύμης» [Études sur l'île de Symi], *Vizantijskij Vremennik*, 12 (1906), p. 189. Cf. SLOT, *Archipelagus turbatus*, cit., p. 234, où il est rapporté que le paiement des taxes aux Vénitiens assurait aux insulaires une protection contre les pirates.

15 LOCATELLI, *Racconto historico*, cit., première partie, pp. 28, 49, 88-89, 96, 135. Voir aussi GARZONI, *Istoria*, cit., p. 75 et Michele FOSCARINI, *Istoria della Repubblica Veneta (Degli storici delle cose veneziane, i quali hanno scritto per Pubblico Decreto*, t. 10), Venise, Lovisa, 1722, p. 142.

toutes les îles du Levant» est confirmé par une chronique grecque de l'époque, qui fournit également l'information qu'y participait un corsaire de Zante, Stathis Romanos, le dénommé «Manettas». ¹⁶ Au cours des années suivantes, les *carazzi* des îles étaient perçus par une escadre de la flotte vénitienne placée sous le commandement des successeurs de Molin, d'abord Lorenzo Venier (1686-1689) puis Daniele Dolfin (1689-1690), qui acquit alors le grade de *capitan estraordinario delle navi*. ¹⁷ Pour indication, deux lettres d'un commerçant français installé à Milos nous apprennent aussi que, au début du mois de février de 1687 et au milieu du mois de novembre de 1688, Venier s'y trouvait «pour recueillir les caraches». ¹⁸ L'escadre vénitienne chargée d'assurer la perception des taxes ne semble pas avoir été particulièrement puissante: suivant les renseignements recueillis auprès des consuls de Milos et d'autres îles, l'ambassadeur de France à Constantinople Pierre de Girardin pouvait écrire à son roi, au début de l'année 1687, qu'il s'agissait d'«une très petite escadre très mal armée» et que le vaisseau le plus puissamment armé portait cinquante canons et avait un équipage de quatre-vingts hommes.¹⁹ Mais les rapports des historiens vénitiens sur ce sujet présentent une image différente: l'escadre commandée par Lorenzo Venier, qui avait été envoyée dans l'Archipel pour percevoir les *carazzi* en 1687, était constituée, selon Locatelli, de huit *nave* et de deux brûlots et, selon Garzoni, de dix-sept *nave* et de quatre brûlots. Foscarini présente les mêmes données que Garzoni, auxquelles il ajoute même le nombre de deux mille deux cent soldats. En outre, à un autre endroit de son ouvrage, il mentionne que l'escadre placée sous le commandement de Dolfin, qui naviguait entre les îles en l'année 1690 pour collecter

16 Konstantinos N. SATHAS, *Ελληνικά ανέκδοτα* [Inédits grecs], t. 1, Athènes, Phos, 1867, p. 197. Voir aussi Alexandra KRANTONELLI, «Νέες ειδήσεις για την ελληνική πειρατεία στα τέλη του ΙΖ' αιώνα» [Nouvelles informations sur la piraterie hellénique à la fin du XVII^e s.], *Thesaurismata*, 24 (1994), p. 292.

17 BNF, Fr. 7168, P. de Girardin à Louis XIV, 10 mars 1687, f. 80^r; cf. BNF, Fr. 7169, N. della Grammatica à P. de Girardin, 25 avril 1687, f. 142; BNF, Fr. 7170, N. della Grammatica à P. de Girardin, 5 octobre 1687, f. 272^r; BNF, Fr. 7175, M. Misserel à P. de Girardin, 15 novembre 1687, f. 200^r; LOCATELLI, *Racconto historico*, cit., première partie, pp. 275-276, 294, 304, et seconde partie, pp. 20, 151; GARZONI, *Istoria*, cit., p. 220; FOSCARINI, *Istoria*, cit., pp. 249, 345-346; ZERLENTIS, *Σύστασις του κοινού*, cit., pp. 47-48, 52; IDEM, *Φεονδαλική πολιτεία εν τη νήσω Νάξῳ* [Un régime féodal dans l'île de Naxos], Hermoupolis, N. G. Freris, 1925, pp. 67-68.

18 ANF, AE B¹ 380, M. Misserel à P. de Girardin, Milos, 5 février 1687, f. 13^v; cf. BNF, Fr. 7175, M. Misserel à P. de Girardin, 15 novembre 1687, f. 200^r.

19 BNF, Fr. 7168, P. de Girardin à Louis XIV, 10 mars 1687, f. 80^r.

les taxes, comptait douze *nave*, deux brûlots et une patache appartenant à un corsaire.²⁰

Un ordre de Venier adressé aux notables de Mykonos nous permet de supposer quelle était la procédure de perception des *carazzi*: le *capitan estraordinario delle navi* ordonnait par écrit aux autorités communales de se rendre immédiatement auprès de lui (là où son escadre avait mouillé) afin de lui verser les *carazzi*; dans le cas de dettes de la commune dues au non-paiement des taxes des années précédentes, il leur demandait de produire le registre qui contenait les reçus des versements effectués (*libro bollato con tutte le ricevute che tenessero de pagamenti precedentemente fatti*), de façon à solder leurs comptes. L'ordre se terminait par la menace de pillage et d'incendie des biens des habitants s'ils ne se pliaient jamais pas à cette obligation: «in pena dell'incendio en sacco delle loro cose».²¹

Deuxième période (1684–1690)

La perception des taxes de toutes les îles n'était pas toujours effectuée par le *capitan estraordinario delle navi* lui-même: par exemple, on sait que, au début du mois d'octobre 1687, Venier avait envoyé un capitaine français à Skopelos afin de collecter les *carazzi* de l'île. Il s'agissait d'un navire marchand, une patache, qui battait pavillon français, donc neutre, et qui avait déjà été nolisé par les Vénitiens en d'autres occasions, prenant part à leurs actions comme brûlot.²² Quoi qu'il en soit, le nolisement de navires étrangers pour la collecte des taxes, ou l'implication de ressortissants étrangers dans cette opération, était alors une exception. «Les *carazzi* étaient perçus en principe par un envoyé de *capitan generale*», assure le

20 Voir respectivement: LOCATELLI, *Racconto historico*, cit., seconde partie, p. 20; GARZONI, *Istoria*, cit., p. 220; FOSCARINI, *Istoria*, cit., pp. 249, 345-346.

21 ZERLENTIS, *Φεουδαλική πολιτεία*, cit., pp. 67-68. Voir aussi les menaces qui concluaient les ordres du *capitan generale* Francesco Morosini et de son successeur, Alessandro Molin, respectivement à l'égard de la commune de Mykonos (ZERLENTIS, *Ιστορικά σημειώματα*, cit., pp. 139-140) et de Naxos (DE KIGALAS, «Περί της υπό Ενετών και Οθωμανών», cit., p. 41). Cf. la constatation de PASCHALIS («Αι Κυκλαδες», cit., p. 135) selon laquelle la cruauté avec laquelle les Vénitiens collectaient les taxes auprès des insulaires dépassait celle des Ottomans. Au contraire, SLOT (*Archipelagus turbatus*, cit., p. 233) estime qu'en général le comportement des Vénitiens face aux insulaires au cours de la guerre de Morée était extrêmement correct et que l'on n'avait pas constaté de pillages semblables à ceux qui avaient eu lieu au temps de la guerre de Crète.

22 BNF, Fr. 7170, N. della Grammatica à P. de Girardin, 5 octobre 1687, f. 272^r.

document que nous avons déjà cité, et qui décrit les changements effectués dans le mode de perception des taxes dans l'Archipel.²³ Ce même texte raconte ensuite le revirement que connaît la procédure de collecte des *carazzi* en 1690:

Ensuite, sous les *capitan generali* Corner [Girolamo Corner, 1690] et Mocenigo [Domenico Mocenigo, 1690–1692], la collecte a été confiée au Français Diode, qui, sous pavillon français, sillonnait les îles et percevait les *carazzi*, versant l'argent dans la Caisse de Milos, où la Caisse de la flotte venait le prendre. De nombreux insulaires, afin de payer leur dû, devaient attendre non seulement la récolte mais aussi la vente des produits. La nomination de percepteurs dans chaque île n'est pas intéressante, et il n'est pas intéressant non plus que les notables locaux, auxquels j'ai proposé un pourcentage de 2 % sur les sommes perçues, se chargent de la collecte, car en raison de la crainte des bateaux turcs et des corsaires chrétiens, le transfert sûr de l'argent est une entreprise difficile.²⁴

Mais qui était donc ce Français Diode? Il s'agissait du négociant marseillais, Jean Dieudé, fils de Jean Dieudé et de Batronne Arnaud.²⁵ Du *Journal* de l'ambassadeur Girardin, on peut déduire quelques éléments de sa vie. Après le milieu des années 1670, quand Louis XIV avait envoyé une aide militaire aux habitants de la Sicile révoltés contre les Espagnols, Dieudé avait reçu l'ordre du maréchal de Vivonne de se rendre depuis Messine à Constantinople et de requérir auprès du sultan la permission d'exporter du blé de Crète afin d'alimenter la flotte royale, qui se trouvait alors à Messine. Néanmoins, quand Dieudé fut de retour en cette ville, les Français avaient retiré leurs forces, et c'est ainsi qu'il avait pris la route de Paris afin d'informer le gouvernement qu'il avait finalement obtenu l'ordonnance du sultan. Le ministre Colbert allait ainsi donner à Dieudé la permission d'exploiter cette ordonnance à son propre profit, ainsi qu'une gratification de 1000 écus.

En effet, autour de 1679, Dieudé s'installa en Crète²⁶ et, «ayant accoutumé les pachas et les autres officiers à tirer de grands droits qu'il leur a payé pour la sortie des bleds»,²⁷ il réussit à contrôler l'ensemble des exportations de blé de

23 MERTZIOS, «Ο Φραγκίσκος Μόποζίνι», cit., p. 2.

24 *Ibid.*

25 CENTRE DES ARCHIVES DIPLOMATIQUES DE NANTES (désormais: CADN), Milo et l'Argentière (consulat), v. 1, p. 195.

26 BNF, Fr. 7166, «Mémoire du négoce qui se fait en l'isle de Candie» de Blondel, ff. 206^v-207^r.

27 BNF, Fr. 7162, f. 148^r.

l'île au cours de sept années, ne permettant à aucun autre de ses compatriotes de faire commerce de cette céréale. Il est donc tout à fait compréhensible que l'ambassadeur Girardin, informé de la concurrence illicite provoquée par Dieudé dans le négoce français, fit quelques démarches en 1686 pour qu'il fût expulsé de l'île et renvoyé à Marseille.²⁸ Et c'est ainsi que finalement, la même année, Dieudé quitta la Crète;²⁹ mais il n'allait pas très loin: il s'installa à Milos et, cette fois-ci, il collabora avec les adversaires des Ottomans. Dès le début de l'année 1687, Michel Misserel, négociant français qui faisait la traite des prises de course et des esclaves musulmans destinés aux galères royales, et qui était installé dans l'île,³⁰ rapportait à Girardin que «le S^r Diodé est grand confidant du Cap(ital)ne général [Francesco Morosini] et du Cap(ital)ne des Naves».³¹ La correspondance de Jean-Louis Girardin de Vauvré, intendant de marine à Toulon, avec le secrétariat d'État de la marine à Paris, nous révèle l'objet de quelques conversations secrètes de Morosini avec Dieudé au cours de la même année, et particulièrement sur le rôle d'intermédiaire du commerçant français dans un accord secret passé entre Français et Vénitiens: «Le s^r Dieudé a proposé au s^r Miserel [*sic*], marchand françois estably au Mile, de faire donner aux Vénitiens quatre vaisseaux de trente à quarante pièces de canons que le Capitaine général promet de payer en Turcs de vingt à quarante ans propres pour les galères rendus aux Zantes ou au Mile».³²

En ce qui concerne l'implication du commerçant français dans le processus de collecte des taxes, on savait jusqu'à aujourd'hui par l'historiographie qu'il avait été le plus important des divers agents utilisés par les Vénitiens pour percevoir

28 *Ibid.*, ff. 148-149^r. Voir aussi K. G. KONSTANTINIDIS, «Εκθέσεις και υπομνήματα από την αλληλογραφία του γαλλικού προξενείου Κρήτης» [Exposés et mémoires tirés de la correspondance du consulat français en Crète], *Κρητικά Χρονικά*, 8 (1954), pp. 330, 332.

29 BNF, Fr. 7165, P. de Girardin à J.-L. Girardin de Vauvré, 14 août 1686, f. 237^r; cf. BNF, Fr. 7166, «Mémoire du S^r Maillet, consul de Candie, pour réponse à l'instruction que ie lui avoies envoiées avant mon départ de Marseille», f. 162; BNF, Fr. 7166, P. de Girardin à L. Maillet, 21 décembre 1686, f. 374^r.

30 Sur le commerce des esclaves à Milos et sur le rôle de M. Misserel, voir George KOUTZAKIOTIS, «Corsairing and Slave Trading in the Cyclades during the Late Seventeenth Century», in Gelina HARLAFTIS, Dimitris DIMITROPOULOS et David J. STARKEY (éds), *Corsaires and Pirates in the Eastern Mediterranean, Fifteenth-Nineteenth Centuries*, Athènes, Sylvia Ioannou Foundation, 2016, pp. 55-62.

31 ANF, AE B¹ 380, M. Misserel à P. de Girardin, Milos, 5 février 1687, f. 13^v; BNF, Fr. 7167, M. Misserel à P. de Girardin, Milos, 5 février 1687, f. 300^v.

32 ANF, Marine, B³ 54, lettre de J.-L. Girardin de Vauvré, à Marseille, 16 juin 1687, f. 85 et pièces jointes, ff. 87-88 (l'extrait, f. 88^r).

les taxes et, plus précisément, qu'il avait affermé les impôts des Cyclades au cours des années 1684–1699, puisque la flotte vénitienne ne faisait pas de fréquentes apparitions en ces lieux de l'Égée.³³ Néanmoins, le passage de la source vénitienne à laquelle nous renvoyons plus haut nous permet d'inscrire le rôle de Dieudé dans un cadre temporel et politique déterminé. Le négociant français avait été chargé après 1690 de la collecte des *carazzi* sur toutes les îles de l'Égée (et pas seulement des Cyclades) car il pouvait plus aisément assurer le transfert de l'argent et des denrées remises en guise de paiement, les protégeant des attaques de la flotte ottomane, ainsi que des Barbaresques et des corsaires chrétiens.

Grâce à sa longue présence commerciale dans l'Archipel, Dieudé avait indubitablement à sa disposition le réseau français des propriétaires de navires et des capitaines, qui s'activaient avec une grande liberté de mouvement dans la zone de guerre, puisque la France poursuivait sa politique de neutralité.³⁴ Néanmoins, les autorités françaises ne demeurèrent pas sans rien faire face à ces agissements de leur ressortissant, même si leur réaction se fit attendre. Le 24 novembre 1694, le gouvernement français approuvait les ordres donnés par l'ambassadeur de Constantinople au consul de Milos concernant le désengagement des Français de cette activité, qui indubitablement aurait pu ébranler les relations franco-ottomanes. Plus précisément, François Goujon devait, d'une part, interdire le nolissement par Dieudé de bâtiments français destinés à la collecte des taxes; d'autre part, désarmer tous les navires français qu'utilisait déjà le perceuteur à cet effet et renvoyer leurs équipages en France, puisque leurs capitaines ne disposaient pas du congé de l'amiral.³⁵ Ajoutons que ces bateaux-ci naviguaient sous pavillon français, puisque leurs capitaines s'étaient procurés des passeports auprès des

33 Ben J. SLOT, «Καθολικάί Εκκλησίαι Κιμώλου και των πέριξ νήσων. Ιστορία των Δυτικών ναυτικών Κοινοτήτων των ΝΔ Κυκλαδών και των Εκκλησιών των (1600–1893)» [Églises catholiques de Kimolos et des îles alentour. Histoire des communautés occidentales de marins des Cyclades du Sud-Ouest et de leurs églises, 1600–1893], *Κιμωλιακά*, 5 (1975), pp. 85-86; IDEM, *Archipelagus turbatus*, cit., pp. 232, 237, 242, 421-422 n. 12, 423 n. 35, 425 n. 64.

34 *Ibid.*, p. 242. Sur la politique de la France à cette époque, voir principalement Jean BÉRENGER, «La politique ottomane de la France dans les années 1680», in Daniel TOLLET (éd.), *Guerres et paix en Europe centrale aux époques moderne et contemporaine. Mélanges d'histoire des relations internationales offerts à Jean Bérenger*, Paris, Université de Paris-Sorbonne, 2003, pp. 99-122.

35 ANF, Marine, B⁷ 61, L. Phélypeaux, chancelier de Pontchartrain à P.-A. de Castagnères, marquis de Châteauneuf, Versailles, 24 novembre 1694, f. 793^r.

autorités consulaires de l'Archipel. Ainsi, le gouvernement français allait aussi ordonner à ces mêmes autorités de ne pas fournir de tels documents et, parallèlement, de les reprendre aux capitaines qui en possédaient.³⁶ Il faut d'ailleurs préciser que ces interdictions ne s'adressaient pas à Dieudé, mais aux capitaines de navire français en général. En tout état de cause, le commerçant français ne cessa pas de servir les Vénitiens jusqu'au dernier instant. En mars 1699, alors que la nouvelle de la signature du traité de paix de Karlowitz (26 janvier 1699) avait déjà été annoncée dans l'Archipel, Dieudé se trouvait à Naxos et exigeait le versement des *carazzi* auprès des notables de l'île, lesquels finalement «furent débarrassés du paiement, ledit sieur Dieudet [sic] ayant reçu du capitaine général l'ordre de se retirer sans rien percevoir».³⁷ Ajoutons que le commerçant français percevait en outre auprès des insulaires une commission de 2 % ainsi que des frais de transport, qui n'étaient pas négligeables. Les registres fiscaux de Patmos nous informent précisément qu'en 1690 les notables lui avaient versé «pour les *carazzi* des Francs», outre 300 piastres, 6 piastres comme «son taux [de commission] de deux pour cent» et 50 piastres «pour le prix de course de ce même *kavalier*», et ils lui avaient aussi offert un mouchoir d'une valeur de 4 piastres.³⁸

Outre la collecte des taxes en argent et en nature, Dieudé assurait aussi à la flotte vénitienne des vivres qui provenaient de ses activités de négoce: «[il a] toujours en ce port deux ou trois bâtiments à son propre qu'il faict courir, et qu'il faict charger d'un côté d'autre et ici pour l'armée vénitienne jouissant du pavillon blanc» rapporte F. Goujon.³⁹ Au cours des dernières années de la guerre, on rapporte même qu'il contrôlait presque tout le commerce d'exportation depuis Milos, et qu'il avait fondé une société avec son frère Balthezard, capitaine du vaisseau *S^e Agnès et S^e Marguerite*, dont il était d'ailleurs co-propriétaire. En juin 1697, par exemple, on rapporte que ce vaisseau avait quitté Milos chargé

³⁶ ANF, AE B¹ 862, «Mémoire concernant les isles de l'Archipel» de Digoine, à bord du *Marquis*, 21 juillet 1696, f. 75^r et lettre de F. Goujon à L. Phéypeaux, chancelier de Pontchartrain, Milos, 25 juin 1697, f. 81^v-82^r.

³⁷ MARKOPOLIS, *Δραματικόν επεισόδιον*, cit., pp. 14-15 n. 1. Cf. ZERLENTIS, *Ιστορικά σημειώματα*, cit., p. 107.

³⁸ ARCHIVES DU MONASTÈRE DE SAINT JEAN LE THÉOLOGIEN À PATMOS, registre fiscal de la commune de Patmos, 1690, I.

³⁹ ANF, AE B¹ 862, F. Goujon à L. Phéypeaux, chancelier de Pontchartrain, Milos, 25 juin 1697, f. 81^v.

de riz destiné à la flotte vénitienne.⁴⁰ La majeure part de ce ravitaillement provenait de prises faites par des corsaires catholiques, puisque l'île était devenue alors le centre de ce commerce dans l'Archipel.⁴¹ D'ailleurs, Dieudé se livrait au commerce des prises et au ravitaillement des corsaires en produits de première nécessité (argent, vivres, munitions), tout comme son épouse Catherine, fille du noble crétois Nicolo Danassi et de Calizza Zen.⁴² Bien sûr, les autorités françaises avaient essayé d'empêcher Dieudé de noliser des navires français pour ces opérations qui compromettaient les Français auprès de la Sublime Porte. Le chevalier Digoine du Palais, envoyé par le gouvernement français en 1696 dans l'Archipel pour enquêter sur les conditions qui y régnaient, nous informe qu'avait été émise une ordonnance du roi interdisant à tous les capitaines de vaisseaux et patrons de barque de noliser à Dieudé pour porter des vivres à l'armée vénitienne. Pourtant, constatait-il, «il y a toujours à Nafplio de Romanie [Nafplio] ou à Porto-Porro [Poros] quinze vint bastiments françois chargés de vin ou autres victuailles lesquels plus(ieu)rs prennent pavillon vénitien; sans le secours desdites barques l'armée vénitienne ne pourroit subsister ny mettre à la mer».⁴³ En outre, on sait de la correspondance du consul Goujon avec le ministre Pontchartrain que Dieudé fournissait à des capitaines grecs des congés de l'amiral qui avaient été édités au nom de ressortissants français, donnant ainsi la possibilité à des navires grecs de battre illicitement pavillon français et de transporter ses marchandises.⁴⁴

Le négociant français avait donc rendu des services précieux aux Vénitiens, et on comprend bien qu'il ait reçu d'eux titres et dignités: au départ, il avait été honoré du titre de chevalier de l'ordre de saint Marc et, par la suite, il s'était

40 *Ibid.*, ff. 81^v-82^r; cf. ANF, AE B¹ 862, procès-verbal de F. Goujon contre les frères Dieudé, Milos, 25 juin 1697, ff. 84^r, 85^r; ANF, AE B¹ 862, F. Goujon à L. Phélypeaux, chancelier de Pontchartrain, Milos, 25 mai 1698, f. 110^v.

41 Sur l'activité commerciale particulière qui s'était développée alors dans les Cyclades et surtout à Milos, voir Georges KOUTZAKIOTIS, «Les Cyclades au XVII^e siècle: une entreprise de la course chrétienne dans l'Empire ottoman», in Anne BROGINI et Maria GHAZALI (éds), *Des marges aux frontières. Les puissances et les îles en Méditerranée à l'époque moderne*, Paris, Éditions Classiques Garnier, 2010, pp. 231-242.

42 CADN, Milo et l'Argentière (consulat), v. 1-2, *passim*, où sont enregistrées divers actes notariaux qui s'y rapportent.

43 ANF, AE B¹ 862, «Mémoire concernant les îles de l'Archipel» de Digoine, à bord du *Marquis*, 21 juillet 1696, f. 75^v.

44 ANF, Marine, B⁷ 64, L. Phélypeaux, chancelier de Pontchartrain à F. Goujon, 15 janvier 1698, f. 462^r.

vu attribuer par le *capitan generale* Mocenigo les offices de *diretor, governatore e sopraintendente di tutte le isole del Archipelago*.⁴⁵ En lui conférant des dignités, les Vénitiens avaient du même coup établi l'île de Milos comme siège d'un officier chargé de l'administration et de l'intendance, dont la juridiction, en théorie, s'étendait à toutes les îles de l'Égée. On doit remarquer ici que le négociant français fut nommé *sopraintendente* quelques mois après la reddition de Monemvasia (12 août 1690), événement qui scella la conquête du Péloponnèse par les Vénitiens. Que cette nomination soit en relation ou non avec les visées de Venise après la conquête de la Morée, elle sous-entend que Milos se trouvait sous le contrôle absolu des Vénitiens. Ce n'est donc pas un hasard si le voyageur Jean Dumont, qui visita Milos en 1691, rapporte que l'île est soumise à une administration vénitienne, et par là il signifiait assurément Dieudé: «Elle appartient aux Vénitiens», écrit-il «& ils y tiennent aussi un Podestat, qui même exige quelque Tribut des Habitans».⁴⁶ En effet, Dieudé n'avait pas seulement à remplir des fonctions de collecteur de taxes: les actes de son administration qui nous sont parvenus, rédigés en italien, attestent qu'il agissait comme une sorte de gouverneur (*podestà*), puisqu'il édитait des décisions dont la vigueur concernait au moins les îles de Milos et de Kimolos, et qu'il ratifiait bien sûr des documents d'autres autorités vénitiennes. Il disposait aussi de son propre chancelier, le Maltais Lodovico Corviseri, qui exerçait parallèlement ses tâches de chancellerie au consulat fran-

45 J. Dieudé, pourvu du titre de chevalier de l'ordre de saint Marc et de la charge de «surintendant des îles de l'Archipel», est mentionné pour la première fois dans les sources le 24 octobre 1690 et le 26 juillet 1691 respectivement; voir CADN, Milo et l'Argentièvre (consulat), v. 1, pp. 46, 47, 102-103 et ANF, AE B¹ 862, ff. 139-140^r. Sur l'attribution à Dieudé d'*«una Collana, e Medaglia d'oro [col San Marco]»*, voir LOCATELLI, *Racconto storico*, cit., première partie, p. 202, et seconde partie, pp. 154-155. On doit noter que, au cours de cette même guerre, les Vénitiens avaient nommé un *sopraintendente* grec à Voumitsa, qui avait le grade de *colonello* et qui, outre ses fonctions militaires, exécutait une mission fiscale; voir Ioannis D. PSARAS, *O θεσμός της πολιτοφυλακής στις βενετικές κτήσεις του ελληνικού χώρου (16ος-18ος αι.)* [L'institution de la garde civile dans les possessions vénitiennes de l'espace grec, XVI^e-XVIII^e s.], Thessalonique, Vania, 1988, pp. 32 et 30, où il est précisé que les *sopraintendenti* étaient des surveillants et des régisseurs chargés de l'administration et du ravitaillement. Voir aussi Ioannis D. PSARAS, *H βενετοκρατία στην Τήνο την εποχή των Κρητικού Πολέμου (1645-1669)* [La domination ottomane à Tinos à l'époque de la guerre de Crète], Thessalonique, Université Aristotle de Thessalonique, 1985, pp. 79-80, où est traitée la charge de *sopraintendente* à Tinos.

46 DU MONT, *Voyages de M^r en France, en Italie, en Allemagne, à Malte, et en Turquie...*, t. 4, La Haye, E. Foulque, F. l'Honoré, 1699, p. 155.

çais.⁴⁷ D'ailleurs, avant sa nomination comme *sopraintendente*, il était déjà dans la situation de l'acteur économique et politique le plus puissant de Milos et il jouait le rôle de notable local: les registres de la chancellerie du même consulat témoignent de son initiative, le 30 octobre 1690, de fonder dans l'île un hôpital pour les catholiques. Plus exactement, le chevalier Dieudé avait acheté alors une demeure hors de la ville de Milos, d'une valeur de 300 livres, et il l'avait cédée à la Confrérie du St Sacrement de l'église épiscopale du lieu dans ce but «à condiction qu'il fera mettre ses armes au-dessous de celle du Roy sur la prinsipalle porte dud(i)t hopistal comme premier fondateur d'icelluy».⁴⁸ Notons que, plus tard, le consul Goujon le dénonça au ministre Pontchartrain car, en raison de ses offices vénitiens, Dieudé ne reconnaissait pas son autorité (et par conséquent celle du roi de France) et refusait de verser les droits consulaires perçus sur le trafic de marchandises à bord des navires français «sous ce prétexte de supériorité d'intendent dans ces isles sur les Grecs pour raison du carach, estant un homme tout vénicien à sa démarche et qu'il confesse n'aller plus en France».⁴⁹

Pour ce qui est des compétences du marchand français dans le reste des îles, aucun acte administratif émanant de lui n'a été retrouvé. Néanmoins, le mémoire qu'adressa à ses supérieurs, en 1696, le chevalier Digoine du Palais, nous laisse entendre que la validité des décisions de Dieudé s'étendait à toutes les îles pla-

47 ANF, AE B¹ 862, f. 139^r (copie *ducale* du Sénat ratifié par J. Dieudé) et ff. 139^v-140^r (ordonnance de J. Dieudé); par ces deux actes sont reconnus les droits que le consul français de Milos et de Kimolos percevait sur le trafic de marchandises effectué par des navires battant pavillon français. Voir aussi le reçu de J. Dieudé attestant de la collecte d'argent auprès des autorités communales de Mykonos (*ZERLENTIS, Σύστασις του κοινού*, cit., p. 53). Sur le *podestà*, voir Anastasia PAPADIA-LALA, *O θεσμός των αστικών κοινοτήτων στον ελληνικό χώρο κατά την περίοδο της βενετοκρατίας (13ος-18ος αι.)*. *Mia συνθετική προσέγγιση* [L'institution des communes urbaines dans l'espace grec au cours de la domination vénitienne, XIII^e-XVIII^e s. Approche synthétique], Venise, Istituto Ellenico di Studi Bizantini e Postbizantini di Venezia, 2004, pp. 227, 230, 247, où sont rapportés les cas d'Athènes, de Patras et de Monemvasia; Marina KOUMANOUDI, «Επαμφοτερισμοί της Κυριάρχου στο Κράτος της Θάλασσας. Η διοίκηση του Ναυπλίου κατά την πρώτη βενετοκρατία (1388-1540)» [Ambiguïtés de la Dominante dans l'État de la Mer. L'administration de Nauplie au cours de la première domination vénitienne, 1388-1540], in Eftichia D. LIATA (éd.), *Tῆς Βενετιᾶς τ' Ἀνάπλι. 300 χρόνια από το τέλος μιας εποχής, 1715-2015*, Actes du colloque scientifique de Nauplie, 9-11 octobre 2015, Nauplie, Dème des Naupliens – Fondation culturelle “Ioannis Kapodistrias”, 2017, p. 41-82, où est examiné le cas de Nauplie.

48 CADN, Milo et l'Argentièr (consulat), v. 1, pp. 49-50.

49 ANF, AE B¹ 862, F. Goujon à L. Phélypeaux, chancelier de Pontchartrain, Milos, 25 juin 1697, f. 81^v.

cées sous contrôle vénitien, et que son accord était obligatoire pour toute immixtion étrangère (à savoir «des Francs»), quelle qu'elle fût, dans leurs affaires. Plus précisément, Digoine, formulant dans son mémoire des propositions sur le retour en France de ses compatriotes se trouvant illégalement dans l'Archipel, écrit: «Ceux qui auront le soin d'aller en Levant pour y prendre les matelots fugitifs dans les îles dépendantes de la République, doivent prendre un ordre du S^r Deudet [sic]».⁵⁰ Quoi qu'il en soit, on doit considérer comme certain que Dieudé se livrait à des abus de pouvoir, et que son comportement vis-à-vis des insulaires était particulièrement oppressif. Cette déclaration du consul français de Milos à ce sujet est éloquente : «je ne crois pas que le chev(ali)er Dieudé ait aucune loi, sa vie est d'athée, et son esprit a toute malice, à faire mill'oppressions sur les isolans».⁵¹

Après la signature du traité de paix de Karlowitz, le négociant français, privé de ses dignités et de la protection vénitienne, ne pouvait assurément plus demeurer longtemps dans l'Archipel, puisque le climat qui régnait ne lui était pas favorable et que l'Égée ne constituait plus un champ d'activité pour ses entreprises d'aventurier. Ce n'est pas un hasard, donc, si les frères Jean et Balthezard Dieudé se sont présentés, le 20 juin 1699, à la chancellerie du consulat français de Milos afin de signer la fermeture de leurs comptes.⁵² Pourtant, le chevalier Dieudé semble être demeuré sur l'île jusqu'en août de l'année suivante, puisqu'on possède un dernier témoignage de cette même chancellerie, daté du 5 août 1700. D'ailleurs, cet acte fait allusion à un voyage imminent de celui-ci vers Marseille.⁵³ Son retour dans sa patrie est confirmé d'autre part par des actes des années suivantes consignés dans le même registre consulaire, qui rapportent que le commerçant se trouvait à Marseille.⁵⁴ En 1706, on rapporte que les frères Dieudé, en collaboration avec un confrère (Guitton), avaient reçu l'autorisation de se livrer, sur leur vaisseau, au commerce des esclaves sur la côte occidentale de l'Afrique en direction de la

50 ANF, AE B¹ 862, «Mémoire concernant les îles de l'Archipel» de Digoine, à bord du *Marquis*, 21 juillet 1696, ff. 76^v-77^r.

51 ANF, AE B¹ 862, F. Goujon à L. Phélypeaux, chancelier de Pontchartrain, Milos, 25 mai 1698, f. 110^r.

52 CADN, Milo et l'Argentièr (consulat), v. 2, pp. 7-8.

53 *Ibid.*, pp. 48-49.

54 *Ibid.*, pp. 239 (29 décembre 1708), 282 (24 mars 1715).

Martinique et d'autres îles du Vent.⁵⁵

Pourtant, la collaboration de Dieudé avec les Vénitiens n'était pas encore parvenue à son terme. À peine quatre mois après la proclamation de la nouvelle guerre véneto-ottomane (9 décembre 1714), le commerçant s'était assuré des lettres de protection de Louis XIV pour retourner dans les îles de l'Égée «sur les instances que luy en ont fait les ministres de cette République pour y reprendre les fonctions de gouverneur et surintendant desd(ite)s isles de l'Archipel pour les Vénitiens».⁵⁶ La demande que Dieudé avait adressée à la Cour de France avait donc été présentée comme un désir du gouvernement de la Sérénissime. Néanmoins, les lettres de protection rapportent que l'autorisation royale avait été accordée pour que le chevalier contribue aux missions, au transport maritime et au commerce des ressortissants français «dans les isles de l'Archipel et autres lieux de son administration».⁵⁷ Et en fait, le marchand français suivit la flotte vénitienne dans l'Égée et collecta de nouveau des taxes, allant d'île en île sur une frégate de vingt-quatre canons arborant le pavillon de France, ce qui provoqua, au début de 1716, une protestation de l'ambassadeur de France à Constantinople qu'il adressa au régent, le duc Philippe d'Orléans. Plus précisément, Pierre Puchot, comte des Alleurs, signifia que l'usage du pavillon français par Dieudé allait sous peu provoquer des représailles ottomanes, au détriment des autres négociants français se trouvant sur le territoire du sultan.⁵⁸ Finalement le Conseil de Marine, par une lettre du 10 juin de la même année adressée à Dieudé, lui interdit d'utiliser le drapeau français tant qu'il se trouverait au service des Vénitiens.⁵⁹

En ce qui concerne l'action de Jean Dieudé dans l'Archipel au cours de la seconde guerre de Morée (1714–1718), aucun autre témoignage n'a été repéré. Ainsi, nous ne savons pas si, en dépit de la défense qu'il reçut d'utiliser le

55 Octave TEISSIER, *La Chambre de Commerce de Marseille...*, Marseille, Barlatier et Barthélémy, 1892, pp. 66-67; Gaston RAMBERT, *Histoire du commerce de Marseille*, t. 6, *De 1660 à 1789. Les Colonies*, Paris, Plon, 1959, pp. 152-154.

56 ANF, Marine, B⁷ 93, lettres de protection de Louis XIV pour le chevalier Dieudé, à Versailles, 10 avril 1715, ff. 232^v.

57 *Ibid.*, ff. 232^v-233^r.

58 ANF, Marine, B⁷ 93, Conseil de Marine à M. de Tourouvre, 10 juin 1716, f. 400^v; cf. Anne MÉZIN, *Correspondance consulaire de l'ambassadeur de France à Constantinople (1709-1790). Répertoire (AE/B/I/386-AE/B/I/448). Annexes*, Pierrefitte-sur-Seine, Archives nationales (France), 2018, p. 101.

59 ANF, Marine, B⁷ 93, Conseil de Marine à J. Dieudé, 10 juin 1716, ff. 400^v-401^r.

pavillon français, il a continué à collecter les taxes des îles jusqu'à la fin de la guerre. Néanmoins, si on pense que pendant la première guerre de Morée de telles interdictions n'avaient pas mis un terme à son activité, on peut raisonnablement supposer que la même chose a eu lieu au cours du second conflit. Quoi qu'il en soit, le fait que les Vénitiens avaient chargé de nouveau Dieudé de la perception des taxes atteste qu'ils avaient trouvé en la personne de ce commerçant un moyen efficace de faire fonctionner sans heurt le mécanisme de collecte des taxes; de plus, au moins au cours de la décennie 1690, ils avaient bénéficié de la politique de neutralité de la France, puisque Dieudé, à ce qu'il semble, n'avait jamais cessé à l'aide de divers subterfuges d'utiliser le pavillon français pour le transport d'argent et de denrées destinés à la flotte vénitienne. Parallèlement, les Vénitiens étaient débarrassés du même coup des dépenses qu'exigeait l'envoi d'une escale de la flotte naviguant entre les îles pour collecter les taxes, et ils n'avaient en outre aucune perte de revenus, car le marchand français versait la totalité des sommes perçues, recevant des insulaires son propre gain en commission et frais de transport. Par surcroît, les offices de *diretor* et de *governatore*, dont Dieudé était revêtu, comblaient le vide créé par l'absence d'autorité vénitienne siégeant dans l'Archipel (en dehors de Tinos, bien sûr); l'existence d'une autorité vénitienne, finalement, dont le siège était à Milos, était assurément nécessaire pour certifier, en théorie du moins, le rattachement des îles soumises aux taxes à la Sérénissime République et, en conséquence, pour justifier leur imposition. D'un autre côté, les activités commerciales de Dieudé et des marins qui collaboraient à ses entreprises nous montrent que les guerres vénéto-ottomanes avaient créé des occasions de profit pour des aventuriers, particulièrement des ressortissants français, car la politique de neutralité de leur État leur assurait une liberté de mouvements dans la zone des conflits de la Méditerranée orientale.

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«Confalone, di San Marco, custodito dalla fedeltà, e difeso dal valore de' Perastini»,
in Vincenzo Maria CORONELLI, *Repubblica di Venezia p. IV. Citta, Fortezze, ed altri
Luoghi principali dell'Albania, Epiro e Livadia, e particolarmente i posseduti da Veneti
descritti e delineati dal p. Coronelli*, Venice, 1688. Source: travelogues.com.

Personal and fiscal *angarie* in Peloponnesian fortification works during the Second Venetian Rule (1685–1715)

by EIRINI VRETTOU *

ABSTRACT: The present study aims to add new knowledge to the history of statute labour in military construction works in the Peloponnese, during the Second Venetian period (1685–1715). This fiscal policy, which took the form of personal service and cash levies, is in fact a very old practice dating back to ancient times. After the loss of Crete, the conquest of Morea was seen as the revival of the Venetian overseas empire. As the aim was, ultimately, the economic exploitation of the area, the Venetians sought to reorganise and strengthen it. The system of statute labour, otherwise known as corvée, public service or *angaria*, was introduced in the Peloponnesian peninsula in the same way that it had been previously established in all Venetian overseas possessions. Accompanied by all kinds of injustices, however, it created acute social problems that seriously hampered Venice's aspirations of the uninterrupted economic exploitation of its vast new possession.

KEYWORDS: PELOPONNESE, VENETIAN RULE, 1685–1715, FORTIFICATIONS, *ANGARIE*, CORINTH.

After the loss of Crete, the Peloponnese, a new possession of the *Serenissima* of considerable scale, became especially important in advancing Venice's interests in the Aegean. For this reason, its defence was a fundamental concern of the Senate. Highly qualified engineers were sent to the Peloponnese as a matter of utmost urgency in order to gauge its defensive capacity and reconstruct its defensive network, supplementing it with effective new fortifications.


In the first years of Venetian domination over their new possession, the

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Serenissima did not consider restoring or even putting to use all of the defensive fortifications of the Peloponnese. Such an expectation would not have been realistic. It would be both expensive, considering Venice's economic and military priorities, and unnecessary, given its defensive needs at the time. For these reasons, the Venetians contended with strengthening what they deemed were the most crucial defensive positions by funding conservation and restoration works. It is well known that the Peloponnese, in all its administrative divisions, boasted an impressive network of defensive structures: citadels, fortresses and castles built either by the Byzantines, the Franks, the Ottomans or even the Venetians themselves (Fig. 1). Some were even much older, built in the classical or Roman periods, and repaired by subsequent rulers.

The Venetians assessed which of these defensive systems could be of practical use according to their defence objectives and proceeded with all the maintenance and modernisation work they considered necessary and within budget. Their assessment was realistic and the plans drawn aimed at being effective, feasible and not financially draining. In fact, a lot of the existing fortresses retained their old form. This was especially the case for fortifications whose location rendered their modernisation counter-productive. Such defensive structures included city walls and castles built in inaccessible, primarily mountainous areas, where the transport and use of cannons by attackers would have been impossible, and where the difference in altitude between the attackers and the defenders would offer the latter a much greater advantage in terms of range. Similarly, certain coastal forts and even parts of fortification works were abandoned. Those structures whose adaptation was deemed unprofitable due to cost, location or diminishing strategic importance (usually in favour of another fort in the area) were also abandoned. To the contrary, in fortification systems and military constructions which made the cut, such as those of Corinth, Nafplio, Monemvasia, Zarnata, Kelefas, Methoni, Koroni, Arkadia, Old Navarino and Rio, the Venetians selectively carried out renovations of different scale. In some cases, alterations or reconstructions applied to the entire fortification, while in others to limited sections which were considered particularly vulnerable. Where deemed necessary, the Venetians would make improvements to the existing infrastructure by simply adding sections and individual elements.¹

1 Diana ZAFEIROPOULOU (Ed.), *Kάστρων Περίπλον = Castrorum Circumnavigation*, Athens,



1 Plans of the principal castles and fortresses in the Peloponnese (Morea) at the time of the Morean Wars. Source: Vincenzo CORONELLI, *Morea, Negroponte & adiacenze*, [Venice, ca. 1708].

The region of Corinthia, i.e. the then administrative district of Romania (*provincia di Romania, territorio di Corinto*), was the epicentre of Venetian defensive (re-)organisation. A number of important defensive fortifications already existed in the wider area (the forts of Acrocorinth, Hexamilion, Penteskoufion, Vassilikoi, St Basil, Aginorion, Angelokastro, St George, Polyfengos, Feneos,

Ministry of Culture, 2008, pp. 35–59; Ioanna STERIOTOU, «Ένας διάλογος σχετικός με την κατασκευή των φρουρίων (fortezze)», *Επιστημονική επετηρίς της Πολυτεχνικής Σχολής του ΑΠΘ, Τμήμα Αρχιτεκτόνων*, 6, 2 (1974), pp. 107–111.

Tarsos, Xylokastron).² In some of these, the Venetians carried out small-scale repair works. Their biggest concern, however, was the defensive line of fortifications that ran through the Acrocorinth, and which extended from the Lechaion along the Oneia Mountains. In this system, the Venetians carried out extensive repair and modification works that spanned over several years.³ Their aim was to adapt the existing fortifications to the principles of the contemporary “bastion system”, which had arisen as a response to the introduction and spread of the use of gunpowder from the mid-fifteenth century onwards. Its principles influenced the layout, design and construction of defensive structures of the period throughout Europe.⁴


A true-to-form complex system of bastions would be impossible to construct anywhere in the Peloponnese for a number of reasons, most of them practical. The monetary cost would be too high and the amount of time required for such extensive works to take place would be forbidding. What is more, there was a large number of pre-existing fortifications already in place, which in a sense dictated the shape of any possible outcome, while the geomorphological features of the Peloponnesian landscape were not always conducive to the design of such structures. All of the above contributed to the creation of a distinctly local variation of defensive fortifications in the Peloponnese, which while faithful to the general principles of the bastion defence system, exhibited many quirks introduced or maintained in order to adapt to conditions on the ground.⁵

2 Ioannis T. SFIKOPoulos, *Ta μεσαιωνικά κάστρα του Μορηά*, Athens, self-published, 1968, pp. 57–80.

3 Kevin ANDREWS, *Castles of the Morea*, Princeton NJ, The American School of Classical Studies at Athens, 2006, pp. 135–145.

4 For the adaptation of the bastion system and fortification works during the Second Venetian Rule, see ANDREWS, *Castles of the Morea*, cit., p. 13; Ioanna STERIOTOU, «Υλικό περιβάλλον και δημόσια έργα στον ελληνικό χώρο», in Chryssa MALTEZOU (Ed.), *Οψεις της ιστορίας του βενετοκρατούμενου Ελληνισμού. Αρχειακά τεκμήρια*, Athens, Hellenic Foundation for Culture, 1993, pp. 485–518; STERIOTOU, «Ενας διάλογος», cit.; Ioanna STERIOTOU, «Η εξέλιξη των “προμαχωνικού συστήματος” στις οχυρώσεις της Ελλάδας», in *Αντιδώρημα. Studies in honour of Giorgos P. Ekkekakis*, Rethymno, Graphotechniki Kritis, 2013, pp. 277–296; Pietro MARCHESI, *Fortezze veneziane 1508–1797*, Milano, Rusconi Immagine, 1984; ZAFEIROPOULOU (Ed.), *Κάστρων Περίπλονς*, cit., pp. 35–55; Sergio POLANO, *L’Architettura militare veneta del Cinquecento*, Centro Internazionale di Studi di Architettura “Andrea Palladio” di Vicenza, Milano, Electa, 1988.

5 ZAFEIROPOULOU (Ed.), *Κάστρων Περίπλονς*, cit., p. 43.



2 Map of Corinth area with floor plans of the Isthmus and the castle of Acrocorinth, framed by floor plans of the main fortresses and castles taken by Francesco Morosini during the Sixth Venetian–Ottoman War. Source: Vincenzo CORONELLI, *Morea, Negroponte & adiacenze*, [Venice, ca. 1708].

As hinted above, the Isthmus and the wider area of Corinth (Fig. 2) were of particular importance to the Venetians. This was true not only for the period of the Second Venetian rule but throughout time. Its fortification and defence were key and, consequently, some of the most skilled engineers of Venice were dispatched to the area: Duca Di Guadagne, Baron Di Stenu, Francesco Vuimes, Principe d’Arcourt, Spar and Milhau di Verneda to name but a few.⁶ All recognised the im-


6 See further Chryssa A. MALTEZOU, «Βενετσιάνικες εκθέσεις για την οχύρωση του Ισθμού της Κορίνθου στα τέλη του 17ου αιώνα», *Proceedings of the 1st International Conference on Peloponnesian Studies, Sparta, 7–14 September 1975*, Vol. 3, Athens, Society for Pelop-

portance of the area of the Isthmus and agreed that sealing it hermetically would make the Peloponnese inaccessible by land. Ultimately, however, the solutions that were proposed varied widely.

One of the proposals was to repair the Hexamilion wall (Figs. 3-5) or rebuild it from scratch. Undoubtedly, this two-storey wall,⁷ which the Venetians considered to be the border between their possessions and the territories of the Ottoman Empire, was one of the largest pre-existing fortifications. Its significance for the defence of the area was critical at the time.⁸ Due to the difficult financial position of the *Serenissima*, however, the Examillion wall did not become the main focus of Venetian defence expenditure in the Peloponnese. Instead, the new rulers of the land chose to avoid grandiose plans and proceed with proposals such as that of Stenau, who advocated the construction of a line of temporary fortifications extending from the port of Lechaion along the ridge of the Oneia Mountains.⁹ Indeed, this defensive line was reinforced with some temporary structures; however, this was not the best choice as was evident right from the outset. To begin with, the mountains of Xylokeriza did not constitute an insurmountable obstacle, either in volume or height, sufficient to prevent a possible invasion. Further, the

ponnesian Studies, 1976–1978, p. 270; Eric PINZELLI, «Les forteresses de Morée: projets de restaurations et de démantèlements durant la seconde période vénitienne (1687–1715)», *Thesaurismata*, 30 (2000), p. 387, fn. 21.

- 7 For the Justinian or Hexamilion wall, its history, architectural characteristics and chronology, see Timothy E. GREGORY, *Isthmia V: The Hexamilion and the Fortress*, Princeton, NJ, The American School of Classical Studies at Athens, 1993; IDEM, «The Late Roman Wall at Corinth», *Hesperia*, 48 (1979), pp. 264–280; Konstantina SKARMOUTSOU-DEMETOPOULOU, «Ιουστινιάνειο τείχος (Εξαμύλιο)», in *Αρχαιολογικές Έρευνες και Μεγάλα Δημόσια έργα, Αρχαιολογική Συνάντηση Εργασίας, Heptapyrgion Thessaloniki 18–20 September 2003*, Thessaloniki, 2003, pp. 138–140; EADEM, «Νεότερες ανασκαφικές έρευνες στο Ιουστινιάνειο τείχος στην Κόρινθο», in *Proceedings of the 1st Archaeological Meeting of South and Western Greece, Patra 9–12 June 1996*, Athens, 2006, pp. 389–394.
- 8 Angelos NEZERITES, *Λεξικόν της βυζαντινής Πελοποννήσου*, edited by Nikos NIKOLOUDES, Athens, M. & G. Zorzos, 1998, p. 140.
- 9 Eric PINZELLI, *Venise et la Morée: du triomphe à la désillusion (1684–1687): histoire*, Unpublished doctoral thesis, Université de Provence, 2003, p. 424. On the fortifications of the Corinth defensive line, see ANDREWS, *Castles of the Morea*, cit., p. 138; STERIOTOU, Ioanna, «Υλικό περιβάλλον», cit., p. 497; William R. CARAHER and Timothy E. GREGORY, «Fortifications of Mount Oneion, Corinthia», *Hesperia*, 75 (2006), pp. 327–356; Ioannis E. PEPPAS, *Μεσαιωνικές σελίδες της Κορινθίας και Μορέως*, Athens, self-published, 1993, pp. 157–158; Nikolaos A. LIANOS, «I progetti per la difesa dell'Istmo di Corinto durante il dominio veneto 1687–1715», *Thesaurismata*, 48 (2018), pp. 471–504.



3 Map of Corinth area where the fortification line of Hexamilion is also depicted.

Source: Vincenzo CORONELLI, *Repubblica di Venezia p. IV. Citta, Fortezze, ed altri Luoghi principali dell'Albania, Epiro e Livadia, e particolarmente i posseduti da Veneti descritti e delineati dal p. Coronelli*, Venice, 1688.

implemented works themselves proved to be very complex and extremely costly. It is not the purpose of this article to examine these fortifications in detail. In order to provide an idea of the requirements in terms of manpower, however, it can be briefly mentioned that this was a vertical line of defence (*linea delle fortificazioni in pianura*) with the main fortification situated on the coastal front, west of the port of Lechaion.¹⁰

10 Rhys CARPENTER and Antoine BON, *The Defenses of Acrocorinth and the Lower Town, Corinth*, Vol. 3, Pt 2, Princeton NJ, The American School of Classical Studies at Athens, 1936, pp. 128-281, esp. 153-155; PEPPAS, Μεσαιωνικές σελίδες, cit., pp. 157-158.

The Venetians initially thought that this solution would be a realistic pursuit, completed in a relatively short period of time with the “assistance” of a number of local peasants, who would be called upon to provide personal service in the form of statute labour or *angaria*. It was originally estimated that the works would require the labour of about 500 to 600 peasants. It is reported, however, that by the autumn of 1695, roughly 2,000 people had already been assembled for this purpose under the supervision of the *proveditor extraordinario* Giustin Da Riva.¹¹

It seems that the task of providing compulsory service in the Corinthian works burdened all Peloponnesian inhabitants regardless of their settlement’s geographical proximity to the construction sites. As Konstantinos Ntokos has pointed out, every villager was required to offer their services in *angaria* for a certain number of days each year. This meant that whenever occasion arose, a percentage of villagers were called upon to offer their prescribed days of forced labour. The distribution of the tasks was entrusted to the village *demogerons* and the *syndics* of the urban communities. The commanders of the militia (*ordinanze*) of each province, assisted by military detachments of dragoons, were responsible for rounding up the workers and dispatching them to Corinth.¹²

In 1698, the year in which Grimani assumed the duties of *proveditor general* in the Peloponnese, 4,000 peasants were charged with labouring on the Corinth works. If we take into account that the population of the whole of the Peloponnese amounted to 40–50 thousand families – the census of 1700 numbered 43,366 families¹³ – then we can conclude that out of every ten or so families one person was burdened with the annual *angaria*. Nevertheless, the duty of service in the fortifications of Corinth was only imposed on the rural population, whereas members of urban communities, residents of certain regions and settlements, and a variety of other categories of people, were exempted on the basis of origin or other criteria that will be examined in more detail below. As such, the ratio of recruited individuals to rural families must have been significantly higher at that time. Grimani saw fit to reduce the total number of enlisted persons from 4,000 to 2,400, while the following year he brought this number down to 800 and in

11 PINZELLI, *Venise et la Morée*, cit., p. 424.

12 Konstantinos NTOKOS, «Οι αστικές κοινότητες και οι αγγαρείες του Δημοσίου στη βενετοκρατούμενη Πελοπόννησο», *Εώα και Εσπέρια*, 4 (1999–2000), pp. 243–280.

13 Vassilis PANAGIOTOPoulos, *Πληθυσμός και οικισμοί της Πελοποννήσου, 13ος–18ος αιώνας*, Athens, Emporiki Bank, 1985, p. 170.

the final year of his term in office he only called upon roughly 400 villagers. In the spring of 1699, village mayors and the magistrates of urban communities distributed the *angaria* on a ratio of one person per 14 families. This rationing coincides with the year in which Grimani reduced the total number of conscripts from 4,000 to 2,400.¹⁴

In order to increase the revenues of the State, while at the same time relieving the peasants from the oppressive nature of the *angaria*, Grimani proceeded to convert it from an *angaria personale* to an *angaria reale*, i.e. demanding payment in lieu of labour. Initially, the measure was implemented for one year and was optional as an alternative for those who wished to avoid personal labour. In a letter he sent to Venice from Patras on 6 May 1698, it becomes clear that Grimani considered the corvée inadequate and ineffective in the case of the Corinth fortifications works. He had noted that the villagers were doing everything in their power to avoid conscription and, ultimately, less than half of them turned up at the site for work. The delays and other effects of this shortage of labour probably harmed the State in the process. Grimani felt that by converting this labour from personal service to a corvée levy would guarantee that the State would secure some benefits for the Corinthian works. The amount to be contributed by each peasant was set at 6 reals, which could be paid in two instalments to the Public Treasury (in this case, the Treasury of Achaia).¹⁵

As the *angaria* was imposed on a percentage among the villagers per month, the corresponding levy was also collected once a month. In the allocation table for the corvée for the four provinces of Achaia, drawn up on 14 May 1698, it is stated that «cioè estorsare in cassa publica reali sei per cadauno huomo al mese».¹⁶ Grimani estimated that, in this way, it would be possible to collect from all the provinces of Achaia a total of 3,600 *reali* per month. By order of the *proveditor generale* Molin, however, the entire Peloponnese was excluded from the Corinth corvée for four months each year. Consequently, as the *angaria* was in effect for only eight months of the year, the total revenue from the levy was estimated to be 28,800 reals. In order to address the abuses that were often observed in the distribution of the corvée, Grimani put the *syndics* and *demogerons* in charge of

14 NTOKOS, «Οι αστικές κοινότητες», cit.

15 ARCHIVIO DI STATO DI VENEZIA (hereafter: ASV), Provveditori da Terra e da Mar (hereafter: PTM), b. 571, filza 849, n° 7.

16 ASV, Grimani dai Servi (hereafter: GS), b. 31, fasc. 82, ff. 8r-8v.

making sure that all those responsible for the levy would not be exempted from it one way or another. For this reason, he called for the keeping of books. In the matter of ensuring the continuation of works in Corinth by supplying a constant stream of labourers, he proposed the deployment of infantry corps (*infanteria*), a practice used in other countries where soldiers were involved in similar works in times of peace, and volunteers in case army numbers were insufficient.¹⁷

The drudgery of statute labour in Corinth and the difficulties it entailed for the rural population were vividly described by the *proveditore* himself in his final report to Venice:

M'appigliai al partito di far intendere a sudditi, che chi amava esimersi per un'anno dai lavori di Corinto ne saria stato in pieno arbitrio quando havesse contate nella Camera della sua provincia reali sei, estrahendo da essa le copie di partita a chiara cauzione del pagamento. La libertà del progetto, l'aborrimento ch'hanno a quell'aria insalubre per le molte morti e malatie, il timore del severo castigo ch' havevano veduto praticarsi gli anni a dietro contro le fughe, l'evidenza del risparmio in sottrarsene dove una volta profondevano in occulte estrorsioni di trenta Reali per testa per esimersi il pregiuditio che rissentivano nell'abbandono delle loro Case, la necessità dell'operationi per la loro salvezza et infine la cortesia dell'accogliamento accompagnata da una dolce, ma insinuante efficacia di sì ben vive ragioni, promossero il pronto volontario concorso degli quattro territorii d'Achaja che in scrittura firmata da sindici delle Communità e da Primati delle ville ricercarono il gratioso indulto, e seguitatone poi l'esempio da tutte le altre provincie riscosse [...].¹⁸

According to this report, the substitution of manual labour with a monetary contribution was a measure that was welcomed with relief. The syndics of the communities and the mayors of the villages of the four provinces of Achaia were the first to declare in writing their intention to participate, with all the remaining provinces soon following suit.¹⁹ In March 1699, Grimani reported that from a total of 2,400 men who were called to offer public service to the ongoing works in Corinth (over eight months in a year), about 600 opted for *angarie personali*, that is, offered personal labour, while the remaining 1,800 chose to pay the sum

17 ASV, PTM, b. 571, filza 849, n° 7.

18 Spyridon LAMPROS, «Εκθέσεις των Βενετών προνοητών της Πελοποννήσου εκ των εν Βενετία Αρχείων εκδιδόμενων», *Δελτίον της Ιστορικής και Εθνολογικής Εταιρείας της Ελλάδος*, 5 (1900), pp. 460–461 (Relatione del nob Homo ser Francesco Grimani ritornato di Provveditor General dell'Armi in Morea).

19 Cf. NTOKOS, «Οι αστικές κοινότητες», cit., pp. 252–253.



4 View of the city of Corinth and the castle of Acrocorinth, the Venetian fleet in the Corinthian Gulf, the Turk's camp routed, and the way to the Isthmus and the Hexamilion walls. Source: Bernard RANDOLPH, *The present state of the Morea, called anciently Peloponnesus [...]*, London, William Notts, Thomas Basset & Thomas Bennet, 1689.

of 6 reals. Grimani estimated that by the following May, when the annual work cycle would be completed, the total amount to have found its way into the State's coffers would be approximately 86,400 reals.²⁰

The “Archivio privato Grimani dai Servi” (kept in the Venetian State Archives) preserves significant information on the nature of statute service in the fortifica-

20 ASV, PTM, b. 571, filza 849, n° 42.

tion works of Corinth for the years 1698 and 1699, thanks to the allocation tables it contains. These documents are very important, as they provide us with basic information on the number of villages and individuals that were liable to the system of *angarie* and, thus, obliged to contribute either in personal service or with the sum of 6 reals each month. Other extant allocation lists are scarce; however, they tend to provide additional information in the form of the number of families that were subject to the *angarie*. This allows us to speculate that the distribution of this burden among the inhabitants of each settlement was based on the total number of families residing in each one. In some cases, in fact, the allocation lists for the corvée were the same ones used for the *angaria* of the dragoons (*comparti*), which was calculated on a per *famiglie* basis.²¹

There is no doubt that the information contained in the allocation lists (*comparti*) of the Grimani archive is significant because it allows us to form a picture of the fiscal processes of the corvée levy. The fact that these lists have survived at all to this day is extremely fortunate. There are, however, significant gaps that preclude the formation of a complete picture. First of all, they do not extend for the whole duration of the fortification works, and second, they do not provide information for the entire territory of the Peloponnese for the same length of time. As a result, it is difficult to compare data from different territories and different time periods in order to arrive at detailed conclusions. For instance, while there are data concerning the imposition of *angarie* in the province of Achaia in the spring of 1698, in the wider region of Messenia in the spring of 1699, and in Laconia at the end of 1698 and the beginning of 1699, at the same time there is lack of information for the administrative district of Romania, where the option to trade statute labour with a fiscal levy was never introduced, possibly because of the province's geographical proximity to the construction site.²²

Circling back to the issue of *angarie* in the Corinth fortification works, in the spring of 1698, a total of 600 men from various provinces of the administrative district of Achaia were called upon to provide their services in the extensive works that were in progress at the time.²³ The "Grimani dai Servi" archival series contains the four allocation lists relating to the number of men recruited from the

21 ASV, GS, b. 31, fasc. 82, ff. 54r-56v and ff. 107r-108r.

22 ASV, PTM, b. 571, filza 849, n° 31.

23 ASV, GS, b. 31, filza 82, ff. 8r-v.

territorii of Patras, Gastouni, Kalavryta and Vostitsa. Under the instructions of the local syndics, the recruits presented themselves before the *proveditore generale* Francesco Grimani. More specifically, in a document dated 4 May 1698 it becomes clear that this *angaria* concerned 98 villages from the province of Patras, from which a total of 82 men were to be recruited. Since the option to transform this obligation from *personale* to *reale* was in effect, it was estimated that should each villager opt to pay the 6 reals for each month of personal service, this particular province would yield the State coffers the amount of 492 reals in total «per ogni mese», that is, in case all men chose this option.²⁴ If we refer to the census of 1700,²⁵ we find that the *angaria* affected 1,626 peasant families. Furthermore, if we subtract males aged 1–16 years old, those who lived in towns, and those who belonged to the age category of *vecchi*, i.e. were over 60 years old, it can be estimated that the number of men who were subjected to the corvée was roughly 1,782. These numbers are approximate, since the age limits for statute labour in the Peloponnese at the time are not entirely known. It has been speculated that men between 16 and 60 years of age were eligible for the corvée, as was the case in other areas under Venetian rule. The age of 50, however, has also been suggested as the upper limit of eligibility.²⁶ If this was the case, the number of villagers liable to serve would be reduced to 1,584 men.

Similarly, in a document of the same period (16 May 1698) for the area of Gastouni, the data shows that a total of 205 men from 163 villages were called every month.²⁷ Comparing this with the population data available from the Grimani census, it appears that the system of *angaria* burdened approximately 3,194 rural families. From a pool of 4,166 men aged 16–60 years old who lived in this administrative district, approximately 3,339 were subjected to *angaria*. All were inhabitants of rural areas, while city dwellers and monks were excluded. If we assume that 50 years was the age limit, we will have to deduct from this total another 400 or so men.²⁸

For the region of Kalavryta, the data shows that 288 people from 83 villages

24 *Ibid.*, b. 31, filza 82, ff. 12r-v.

25 PANAGIOTOULOS, *Πληθυσμός και οικισμοί*, cit., pp. 276-278.

26 Georgios V. NIKOLAOU, «Ειδήσεις για την επιβολή των αγγαρειών στην provincia di Lachonia κατά την περίοδο της Βενετοκρατίας», *Λακωνικά Σπουδαί*, 13 (1996), pp. 413-415.

27 ASV, GS, b. 31, fasc. 82, ff. 13r-14r.

28 PANAGIOTOULOS, *Πληθυσμός και οικισμοί*, cit., pp. 271-275.

were called to Corinth each month.²⁹ A total of 3,295 families were involved, and 3,894 men are estimated to have been recruited. If we accept the age of 50 as the uppermost limit of eligibility for the corvée, we will have to eliminate from the total 501 men.³⁰

The list concerning the allocation of people to the same *angaria* for the area of Vostitsa imparts that the calculation of the number of villagers to serve in Corinth was based on the number of families that lived in each settlement: «comparto per li huomini che servir devono nelli lavori di Corinto, cioè secondo il numero delle famiglie s'attrovano in cadauna delle infrascritte Ville e Boarie native e foresti». It states that a total of 1,500 families were involved, of which 1,334 were native,³¹ and that the number of people labouring each month was 25.³² These numbers are surprising because, according to the Grimani census of 1700, the families (*famiglie*) of the entire *territorio* of Vostitsa amounted to 879, including the 383 families of the town of Vostitsa which, of course, were exempt from the *angarie*. According to the same census, the number of persons aged 16–60 years old, who were eligible for the *angaria*, was about 664.³³

As already mentioned, Grimani reduced the number of recruits to 200 per year from each province, which amounted to a total of 800. On 4 November 1699, he reported that:

Affinche pur maggiormente si consolino i Sudditi con la benediction della pace, s'è col riflesso prudentissimo di S.E. creduto bene ordinare, che le provincie concorrino al travaglio dei lavori nella Linea di Corinto con soli ducento huomini per cadauna, due terzi meno degl'anni decorsi, quando ogn'una d'esse era tenuta d'intervenire col número di seicento; lasciandoli tuttavia in libertà ò di far'il mensual'esborso nelle Camere, ò di contribuir l'impiego delle persone.³⁴

In this way, by the end of Grimani's term of office and for the third year running, some 113,000 reals had found their way into the Venetian Treasury, not taking into account the benefits accrued from the personal labour of those who

29 ASV, GS, b. 31, fasc. 82, ff. 9r-v.

30 PANAGIOTOPoulos, *Πληθυσμός και οικισμοί*, cit., pp. 268-271.

31 ASV, GS, b. 31, fasc. 82, f. 10r.

32 *Ibid.*, b. 31, fasc. 82, ff. 8r-v.

33 PANAGIOTOPoulos, *Πληθυσμός και οικισμοί*, cit., p. 279.

34 ASV, PTM, b. 571, filza 849, n° 68.

did not wish or could not afford to pay.³⁵ Grimani used this money in order to hire masons from Roumeli who worked at low cost and with greater efficiency than not only the forced labourers, but even experienced craftsmen. By the end of his term of office, the Corinth fortifications were almost complete. Over and above this, however, the *Syndici Inquisitori* (whose term of office lasted until 1704), abolished the fiscal equivalent of the *angaria* once the final titles of land ownership were distributed to the inhabitants of the Peloponnese. Already, the performance of this measure had dropped to very low levels due to the financial difficulties faced by the peasants, who could not meet the payments. As such, a long list of debtors to the State had formed who owed sums from previous years.³⁶ In the autumn of 1701, Giacomo da Mosto noted that the revenues of the levies from 400 peasants across all the provinces of the Peloponnese totalled 18,200 reals,³⁷ while in his final report in 1708 Angelo Emo stated that even though the fortifications of Corinth may have strengthened the land borders of the Peloponnese, they had also weakened the hinterland by placing a heavy financial burden on the conscripted populations.³⁸

The language and expressions used in administrative documents testify to the extent of the burden that this system had placed on the rural populations of the Peloponnese. The Venetian governors themselves, in their correspondence and final reports, whenever referring to the corvée, did not hesitate to demonstrate emphatically the intolerable conditions created by this financial system, which was so profitable for the Venetian State. *Angaria* and all types of associated obligations are described as: *angaria molto gravosa*,³⁹ *pesantissimo aggravio*,⁴⁰ *obligo inofferibile*,⁴¹ *aggravio insensibile*,⁴² *incredibile angaria et aggravio*,⁴³ to name but a few of the gravest expressions found in the primary historical sources.

Based on the evidence, it is fair to argue that the inhabitants of rural settle-

35 NTOKOS, «Οι αστικές κοινότητες», cit., pp. 252-253.

36 *Ibid.*

37 ASV, PTM, b. 572, filza 851, n° 19.

38 LAMPROS, «Εκθέσεις των Βενετών προνοητών», cit., p. 651 (Relatione Grimani).

39 ASV, PTM, b. 574, filza 854, n° 12.

40 *Ibid.*, b. 574, filza 854, n° 9.

41 *Ibid.*, b. 572, filza 850, n° 94.

42 *Ibid.*, b. 575, filza 855, n° 12.

43 *Ibid.*, b. 572, filza 850, n° 95.

ments, with the exception of the priests and monks of the Orthodox and Latin Churches, the widows, and the destitute, were burdened in every possible way and to a degree that often exceeded their capabilities in order to serve the administrative and defensive needs of the state. As a result, they suffered losses over their already meagre income, property and valued livestock, and even jeopardised their safety and, on occasion, their very lives. The Venetian *provveditori* seem to have taken stock of the excessive strain such policies put on the local peasants, the so-called *poveri villici* of the documents.⁴⁴ Occasionally, they would express their thoughts on the types of *angaria* that were the most trying to the peasant populace at any given period.

Forced labour in construction works is undoubtedly among the harshest types of *angaria*. The corvée on the fortifications of Corinth was no exception, and its optional conversion to a fiscal levy, as mentioned above, was met with relief. Grimani's reports reveal the villagers' feelings of utter despair at the prospect of working in Corinth. In his final report, he referred to the intolerable and unsanitary conditions prevailing at the construction site, which had claimed many workers' lives.⁴⁵ Such references alongside mentions of the illnesses that plagued the labourers were quite frequent.⁴⁶ In his letter of 14 October 1700, Grimani stated: «Sino gl'ultimi decorsi giorni mi trattene à Corinto l'obbligo di supplir à quanto richiedevano le premure di quell'importantissimo luogo, nonostante alle risentite influenze dell'aria insalubre».⁴⁷ Although it would be reasonable to assume that the number of people who had lost their lives during forced labour on construction sites, galleys, salt works and shifts was considerable, reports of this kind are not typically found in the sources and, thus, any statement on mortality rates is mere conjecture.

As a result of the political and social conditions of the time, forced labour was often accompanied by a multitude of arbitrary acts of mistreatment against the peasants. The culprits were usually local officials or any other person with a connection or access to the Venetian administration. Peasants falling victim to the ruthless behaviour of third parties with any sort of authority over them was a common occurrence. Members of the urban communities, village prefects,

44 *Ibid.*, b. 573, filza 853, n° 19.

45 NTOKOS, «Οι αστικές κοινότητες», cit., p. 263.

46 ASV, PTM, b. 571, filza 849, n° 30, 42.

47 *Ibid.*, b. 572, filza 850, n° 103.



5 Today's map of the Isthmus of Corinth showing the Hexamilion location. Source: Wikimedia Commons.

soldiers scattered throughout the territory, the *meidani* charged with maintaining order, but also random charlatans and thugs would deceive villagers with bogus promises of exemptions from the corvée and other unsubstantiated benefits, while extracting extortionate amounts of money in return. All of the above contributed to the growing hardships of peasant life in Venetian Peloponnese.

Even prior to the institution of the fiscal corvée option, individuals called upon to offer personal labour in the fortification works of Corinth sought ways to extricate themselves from the obligation. Since the fiscal levy was not yet institu-

tionalised, their attempts were obviously in contravention of the law, a fact which left them exposed to the greed and predatory tendencies of village chiefs and other people with access to power. In 1691, during preparations for the dispatch of people and animals to Corinth, the authorities observed the illegal exchange of large sums of money between officials and villagers, who hoped that in this way they might escape this onerous task. In response, the *proeditore general* Antonio Zeno, issued an edict regulating the election process and duties of the *demongerons*, and stipulated that «the cursed initiative of collecting exorbitant sums of money, which had become so widespread that the poor were oppressed and destroyed on every occasion of public service, should be stopped». Moreover, he ordered the village mayors immediately «to re-collect without delay the sums collected and return them in full to those from whom they had been unjustly and illegally extracted». Despite his efforts, however, a similar illegal collection took place the following year and, as he mentions, he had to act again in 1692 so that a significant amount of money collected through fraudulent means during preparations for the corvée would be returned to its rightful owners.⁴⁸

The majority of appeals sent to the Venetian Senate by inhabitants of the Peloponnese concerned the issue of statute labour at the fortification works in Corinth prior to the introduction of its fiscal alternative. The content of the letters confirms – also from the point of view of the rural population – the issues that had been identified and frequently mentioned in the correspondence and reports of Venetian officials and governors of the Peloponnese. The main concerns raised in the appeals include:

- (a) The removal of peasants/farmers from their homes for a considerable amount of time, which often coincided with the sowing and harvesting seasons, forcing them to be away at a crucial, for their survival, time in the agricultural cycle.
- (b) The harsh living and working conditions on the construction site, especially during the winter when many of the men fell ill. Another clear reference is made to the death rate, which, in the circumstances, should not be considered a rare occurrence.⁴⁹

48 Ntokos, «Οι αστικές κοινότητες», cit., pp. 263–264.

49 Georgios V. NIKOLAOU, «Εκκλήσεις προς το γενικό προβλεπτή της Πελοποννήσου Francesco Grimani για την απαλλαγή από αγγαρείες (1698/99)», *Proceedings of the 5th In-*

Local officials and governors sought to improve the living conditions of the locals. It should be noted that Venice's priority was the economic exploitation of the Peloponnese and, consequently, the increase of its agricultural production, which was directly and exclusively dependent on the peasantry. Its subjection to statute labour, either in person or fiscally, prevented its human capital from performing at its best, even if it wanted to. Moreover, the Venetian rulers were essentially relying on the local population to meet vital defence needs through the system of *angarie*, at a time when the State's finances were in poor shape and the Ottoman threat was ever-present. Consequently, the commanders of the Peloponnese were aware that it was in their best interests to heed the complaints of the locals, at least to some extent, in order to be able to rely on the land's manpower. Moreover, they sought to set limits on arbitrary practices, as they had an effect not only on the local population, but above all on the Venetian State itself. Undesirable consequences of the oppression of the peasantry through fraud and abusive practices included the loss of agricultural labour, a decline in participation in the system of statute labour, as well as the loss of much-needed revenue for the Public Treasury.

In the case of the Peloponnese, as was earlier in Cyprus, Crete and the rest of the Venetian possessions in the Greek-speaking East, the constant demands of the State from the native populations forced the latter to abandon their homes and flee either outside the Peloponnese (to hostile areas under Ottoman rule)⁵⁰ or to mountainous and inaccessible places where it would be difficult, if not impossible, for them to be located by the authorities.⁵¹

This practice of fleeing the homeland was clearly harmful for the Venetian State, which faced frequent delays in the completion of its projects, while its defensive needs were hardly met in the most effective way. These repercussions were not lost on the inhabitants of the territory of Arcadia⁵² or the territory of Fanari, who used them as leverage to achieve their own goals by convincing the Venetian State to transform statute labour from personal to fiscal. They stressed

ternational Conference on Peloponnesian Studies, Argos–Nafplio, 6–10 September 1995, Vol. 4, Athens, Society for Peloponnesian Studies, 1998, p. 268.

50 ASV, PTM, b. 571, filza 849, n° 16.

51 *Ibid.*, b. 571, filza 849, n° 5.

52 NIKOLAOU, «Εκκλήσεις προς το γενικό προβλεπτή», cit., pp. 280–281.

that, in this way, it would be possible to raise the necessary funds to hire more qualified labourers.

As revealed by the sources, the fleeing of the peasants was a serious matter that the Venetian governors sought to limit. The measures that were adopted from time to time were arguably not directed at relieving the villagers from their excessive burdens or at combating the arbitrary acts committed against them. In fact, there is evidence that the Venetian State, at times, took measures against the peasants themselves. It was, therefore, decreed that the latter had no right to leave their place of residence without first obtaining special permission to do so, «per frenar in avenir il disordine, e pregiuditii, che rillevantissimi risultano al Publico interesse».⁵³

The progress of the fortification works in Corinth was not without complications. These grandiose and ambitious plans for the defensive protection of the region were draining the finances of the State. On top of that, the system of *angaria personale* proved to be quite ineffective. A large number of recruits absconded, and the cost of the subsistence and per diem of those who did eventually turn up, made the Government a loss. The option of exchanging the personal labour of the corvée with a monetary equivalent was initially piloted for a year. The *vecchiardi* accepted the proposal and the State hoped that all 600 of those called to work in Corinth (of whom, as Francesco Grimani observed, less than half presented themselves for manual labour) would meet their financial obligations to the State as they were now presented with a choice.⁵⁴ The *angarici* could provide statute labour or buy it out by paying six reals a month. The *vecchiardi* of each village were entrusted with monitoring the process, so that villagers who were not entitled to an exemption could not in any way be granted one. Only those employed in salt works, in cutting and transporting timber, and those who were members of community bodies were exempt from the measure. According to Francesco Grimani's calculations, the levy would yield 3,600 reals per month and 28,800 reals in total per year to the Venetian Treasury, which was a respectable sum of money to be used for the promotion of Venetian objectives in the Peloponnese. As regards the fortification works in Corinth, the hire of skilled masons from Roumeli proved more efficient in terms of output and expertise than the reluctant

53 ASV, PTM, b. 571, filza 849, n° 5.

54 *Ibid.*, b. 571, filza 849, n° 7.

peasants.⁵⁵

Despite any good intentions from the part of the Venetian overlords, the transformation of the system of *angarie* from personal to fiscal did not put an end to the injustices inflicted on the peasants. It has become evident that the local peasant population was unduly burdened by the imposition of this corvée levy, as a result of the following factors:

- (a) Accumulating financial demands: as types of statute labour, one after the other, were gradually transformed from *personale* to *reale*, those liable for the payments, and by extent economic activity in the Peloponnese at large, were adversely impacted. It is indicative of the situation that *proveditor* Emo had openly expressed his staunch opposition, clearly stating that the «damnable management» of the Venetian administration was one of the main reasons the land of the Peloponnese had fallen into economic disarray during his administration.⁵⁶
- (b) Arbitrariness: one of the gravest injustices with regard to the system of *angaria* in its fiscal form was the fact that it was arbitrarily imposed exclusively on the rural populations. That is to say, despite the fact that monetary levies theoretically applied to the so-called “urban” populations as well, i.e. both to members of rural communities as well as to the inhabitants of towns, in practice, this significant part of the population was arbitrarily and unfairly excluded. This was perhaps the most extensive and systematic injustice inflicted upon the socially and economically weaker members of local communities. *Proveditor generale* Sagredo, in a decree designed to improve the living conditions of the peasants, referred to «collusion» and «fraudulent tricks», which he identified as being perpetrated by magistrates in the process of allocating the *angarie* at the expense of those liable for performing them.⁵⁷
- (c) Unequal distribution of responsibilities: the problem was extremely widespread in the Peloponnese, especially given that the populations of urban communities, which were already considerable in number, were ever-increasing.⁵⁸

55 *Ibid.*

56 NTOKOS, «Οι αστικές κοινότητες», cit., p. 265.

57 *Ibid.*, p. 276.

58 *Ibid.*, p. 278; Alexis M. MALLIARIS, *H Πάτρα κατά τη βενετική περίοδο, 1687–1715: γη, πληθυσμοί, κοινωνία στην Β.Δ. Πελοπόννησο*, Venice, Hellenic Institute for Byzantine and

Emo stated that «ogni castello, quasi ogni terra trovò mezzi per erriggersi in Repubblica tutto consacrando alla propria ambizione i pochi e rozzi suoi habitatori». He highlighted that this phenomenon had reached extreme proportions in his time. The result was that the bulk of economic responsibilities to the *Serenissima* was disproportionately borne by the poorest classes living in the countryside.⁵⁹

(d) Social inequalities: a further thorn in this process was the additional exclusion from economic servitude of a significant part of the rural population, i.e. peasants who were attached to the estates of the *syndici* and others under their protection. This had created a particularly discriminatory situation in which people of the same social status and origin had different obligations towards the State. For Grimani, this partiality was the cause behind the significant erosion of population numbers in certain settlements and the parallel en masse emigration of peasants to other communities, where they would be afforded the protection of certain influential individuals, thus freeing themselves from their corvée obligations. The damages to the Venetian State were significant: (1) peasants remaining on public estates were excessively weighed down financially, which made it difficult for them to meet their debts to the State; (2) vital needs of the State in revenues and manual labour were not fully met through the system of *angarie*; (3) the public estates remained uncultivated and, consequently, largely under-exploited; (4) the unequal treatment of people of the same social class contributed to the creation of social inequalities within the body of the rural population.⁶⁰

At the same time, however, the Venetian governors of the Peloponnese knew full well that it was not in their interests to disrupt their relations with the “bourgeois”, who lived either in cities or in estates in the countryside. This was an aristocracy that the Venetians themselves had installed in the Peloponnese as a network of collaborators, in order to extend the reach of their power in the hinterland, and govern this vast new possession more effectively. As such, the members of this class were absolutely indispensable to the Venetians. Fear of displeasing them meant that, ultimately, the system of *angarie reale* in the Peloponnese

Post-Byzantine Studies in Venice, 2008, pp. 265-266.

59 NTOKOS, «Οι αστικές κοινότητες», cit., p. 278; MALLIARIS, *H Πάτρα*, cit., pp. 265-266.

60 NTOKOS, «Οι αστικές κοινότητες», cit., pp. 276-277; MALLIARIS, *H Πάτρα*, cit., p. 266.

would never be implemented fairly for all.

All of the above suggests that the *angarie* amounted to social discrimination in the minds of all subjects. The people who owed service were disadvantaged both socially and financially vis-a-vis the Venetian lords and their exempted peers. What is most striking is that this disparity was maintained even in the case of monetary levies, despite the fact that these applied mainly to members of society who were in a better financial position and could afford to pay the required sums. In the case of the Peloponnese, however, the bourgeoisie had made their position clear. They were willing to pay money for purposes reminiscent of *leitourgies* (honourary functions, such as paying for doctors and teachers in their communities), but under no circumstances would they agree to be subjected to the fiscal process of *angarie*.

The mass exodus of rural populations from their hearths was a highly undesirable outcome for the Venetian administration, which had sought to encourage the creation of new settlements and the growth of existing populations in the Peloponnese. Instead, the new territories were slowly becoming deserted. The few that remained, in their majority peasants, were not enough to cultivate the public lands. What is more, in the face of the Ottoman threat, even fewer had any incentive to fight for the *Serenissima*⁶¹.

The fact that the institution of the *angarie* was applied so extensively in the Peloponnese is a testament to how acute and immediate the needs of the new conqueror were. At the same time, the inability of the Venetian administration to streamline its plans for the economic exploitation of the hinterland and win the favour of its inhabitants in the process, corroborates its weakened position in the Eastern Mediterranean at large.

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
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⁶¹ Gerassimos D. PAGRATIS, «Politiche veneziane e società locali nel Regno di Morea», in Gherardo ORTALLI, Giuseppe GULLINO and Egidio IVETICH (Eds.), *L'inevitabile sogno di dominio: Francesco Morosini*, Venice, Istituto Veneto di Scienze, Lettere ed Arti, 2021, pp. 123-127.

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Ottoman insignia taken as a trophy after the fall of Koroni to the Venetians in 1685.
 Vincenzo CORONELLI, *Repubblica di Venezia p. IV. Citta, Fortezze, ed altri Luoghi principali dell'Albania, Epiro e Livadia, e particolarmente i posseduti da Veneti descritti e delineati dal p. Coronelli*, Venice, 1688. Source: travelogues.com.

An Overview of Naval Strategy during the 1714–1718 War between the Ottoman Empire and the Venetian Republic

by DIONYSIOS HATZOPoulos*

ABSTRACT: This article aims to bring forward a number of elements related to Ottoman and Venetian naval strategies during the War of 1714–1718. Commanding sturdy ships, and competent men, the Sultan's admirals set in motion a plan to expel Venice from its last possessions in the Greek world. Initially successful, their strategy failed at Corfu in 1716. It was tried anew, but inconclusively, in 1717, and in 1718. On the Venetian side, after a disastrous early stage, a new fighting spirit emerged among naval crews. Fighting throughout the Aegean, the Venetian navy strongly opposed the enemy naval strategy, thus preventing its implementation and preserving for Venice the Ionian Islands. However, the war was decided in the north by the Habsburg Imperial troops, under the command of Eugene of Savoy. In the new treaty, the one signed at Passarowitz on July 21, 1718, Venice, though sitting with the victors, was a defeated party.

KEYWORDS: 1714–1718 VENETIAN–OTTOMAN WAR, OTTOMAN EMPIRE, REPUBLIC OF VENICE, *STATO DA MAR*, NAVAL STRATEGY.

A Synopsis of mostly Naval Matters

In the years of discontent and chaos produced by the long European War of the Spanish Succession (1701–1714), and with Venice desperately trying to stay neutral and unsuccessfully protect its territories on the *terraferma* from the incursions of the warring parties, one event sparked euphoria and a sense of political and strategic security. That was the visit to the city, in the Summer

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of 1704, of the new Sultan's, Ahmed III (1703–1730), envoy Mustafa Aga. The Ottoman official, and a similar one sent to Vienna, carried the new Sultan's promise to respect and abide by the terms of the war of 1683–1699 ending treaty, signed on January 26, 1699, at Carlowitz, by the representatives of the Ottoman Empire and of the member states of the Holy League, Austria, Poland, Russia, and Venice.¹ While Austria, through its territorial gains, acquiring most of Hungary, Transylvania, Croatia, and Slovenia, became the dominant power in the region, Venice also fared equally well. Indeed, while during the war the Republic had failed, in July 1692, in an attempt to recapture Crete, lost to the Ottomans in 1669, by the Treaty of Carlowitz it was recognized as the master of the Peloponnese (the Morea), of the islands of Leucas (Santa Maura), in the Ionian Sea, and of Aegina, in the Saronic Gulf, and also of wide areas of Dalmatia, including Cattaro and its fjord-like bay. Thus, the territorial gains were essentially to be reconfirmed by the new Sultan's envoy. Accordingly, the distinguished visitor was greeted with all honors. He gave all required assurances and then departed.

The European war, which Venice tried to avoid, and indeed succeeded in avoiding, but at the cost of becoming diplomatically snubbed and left without allies in the moment of crisis, came to an end with the Treaty of Utrecht in April 1713. However, by then, things had changed in eastern and southern Europe. The ruler of Russia Peter the Great (1682–1696 with his half brother, Ivan V, and 1696–1725 as sole ruler), who had captured Azov, near the Don river, in 1696, acquiring next a number of sea ports on the northern shores of the Black Sea, his new possessions recognized as such by the Ottoman–Russian Treaty of Constantinople (Konstantiniyye, in its Ottoman name) in 1700, suffered a crushing defeat by the Ottoman Army, near the river Prut, on July 21, 1711. By the Treaty of Adrianople (Edirne) (June 27, 1713), which followed his defeat and the resumption of war, Peter relinquished the Black Sea Russian possessions, including Azov.

While avoiding a crisis with the Austrians, the victory over the Russians gave the Ottoman rulers the desire to recapture the lost territories on the Greek peninsula, namely the Peloponnese, and ideally the Venetian held Ionian Islands, especially Corfu, the gate to the Adriatic Sea. The party, which espoused the re-

1 Pietro GARZONI, *Istoria della Repubblica di Venezia. Ove insieme narrasi la Guerra per la Successione delle Spagne al Re Carlo II*, vol. II, Venice, 1716, pp. 394–395.

sumption of the war against Venice, centered around the Sultan's son-in-law, the Grand Vizier Silahdar Damad Ali Pasha (27 August 1713 – killed during the battle of Peterwardein on August 6, 1716). During a palace meeting of the imperial council (Divan-i-Humayun), in which, according to tradition and in the Sultan's presence, took part representatives of the two branches of Ottoman authorities (the political-military and the religious), the Grand Vizier argued convincingly, rejecting the objections of the supreme religious leader of the Ottomans, the Sheikh ul-Islam, Mirza Mehmed, in favor of an assault on the Venetian positions in the south of the Greek peninsula. His main arguments were based on the convincing Ottoman victory over Peter's army, in July 1711, the high moral of the troops, and, also, the desire of Vienna to stay out of another war, following the end of the exhaustive, for all parties involved, war of the Spanish succession. He carried the debate and the decision to go to war was taken. The necessary fatwa was issued by the Sheikh ul-Islam, and the Sultan's declaration of war acquired legal authority.² The new war, known as the Second Morean War (*la guerra di Morea* and sometimes *la guerra di Corfù*), was to be a brief land and sea violent encounter. Its conducting was dictated by the vicinity of the Peloponnese to mainland Greece, to which it was attached by the isthmus of Corinth, also bound by the Saronic in the east, and the gulf of Corinth in the west. Both land and sea operations were to be combined and coordinated, in a military textbook style assault on the enemy. Under the Supreme Command of the Grand Vizier, the huge land forces, about 100,000 men strong, were to feel the benefits of the Ottoman fleet's presence. They were to be reinforced by it, protected from the enemy's naval activity and supplied with ammunition, and all necessary equipment, if and when needed. The Army's big siege guns and mortars were to be transported by the Navy, while the Army's High Command was to be provided with information on the enemy's movements and on the strength of the defenses of the powerful coastal fortresses, soon to be besieged by the advancing troops. Also, the Navy

² On the functions of the Divan-i-Humayun, and its version of ayak divani, see *Ottoman Statecraft. The Book of Council for Vezirs and Governors of Sari Mehmed Pasha, the Defterdar*, Turkish Text with Introduction, Translation, and Notes, by Walter LIVINGSTON WRIGHT, JR, Westport, Connecticut, Greenwood Press, 1971, pp. 25-27; Dionysios HATZOPoulos, *La dernière guerre entre la république de Venise et l'empire ottomane (1714–1718)*, Montreal, Centre d'études helléniques, Collège Dawson, 1999, pp. 27-28, also published in Greek, *O τελευταίος βενετο-οθωμανικός πόλεμος, 1714–1718* [The last Venetian-Ottoman War, 1714–1718], Athens, 2002.

was expected to capture the last Venetian outposts in the Aegean archipelago, including those left in Crete, and, eventually in the Ionian Sea itself.

The Ottoman Navy of the end of the 17th century and of the beginning of the 18th was heavily influenced by the *kanunname* (directives) of 1701 of Hajji Husain, also known as Mezzomorto, formerly a privateer and then, starting in May 1695, Kapudan Pasha (Fig. 1). Having diagnosed the shortcomings of the naval branch of the Ottoman might and supported by the Divan and Sultan Mustafa II (1695–1703), himself a strong Navy supporter, he proceeded unhindered. Important issues in his *kanunname*, published shortly after his death, were the definition of the Navy as a fundamental instrument for the defense of the realm, and for this to be accomplished, as it should be, a task force of forty sailing ships would be required. Also, reorganizing hierarchy, besides the essentially political office of the Kapudan Pasha, who dealt with the administration and military issues of the Navy, who was responsible to the Grand Vizier and to the Sultan,³ and who was rarely a seaman, three new Admirals were to be appointed. They, eventually and, one might say, inevitably, became the true Commanders of the fleet. First would come the Kapudane-i-humayun, a real Grand Admiral of the fleet. Then, under the Kapudan Pasha's orders were to serve as Admirals the Kapudane-i-patrona and the Kapudane-i-riyale, formerly Commanders of the two wings of the galleys's Navy, who now took over High Command of the sailing ships. Competence and top skills were to be essential for all grades, while strict hierarchically ratified advancement in the ranks was clearly defined. The high positions, Admirals and ships's Commanders, needed the Grand Vizier's approval. Strict discipline was also to be imposed on the crews, and they were to be severely punished if they assaulted coastal villages, committed thievery, and other crimes.⁴ There is no doubt that the Sultan's Navy rested for long periods on strong human foundations, pro-

3 Idris BOSTAN, «Ottoman Maritime Arsenals and Shipbuilding Technologies in the 16th and 17th Centuries», *Moslem Heritage. Foundation for Science, Technology, and Civilisation*, January 28, 2007, p. 15. Mezzomorto's passing did not put an end to, nor delayed the development of the Ottoman navy. Also, the late Kapudan Pasha, a sailor's sailor, was allowed to wear a simple sailor's outfit, provoking ironic comments from those higher up in the Ottoman establishment. Cf. Guido CANDIANI, *I vascelli della Serenissima. Guerra, politica e costruzioni navali a Venezia in età moderna, 1650–1720*, Venice, Istituto Veneto di scienze, lettere ed arti, 2009, p. 478 and note 6.

4 Daniel PANZAC, *La marine ottomane. De l'apogée à la chute de l'empire (1572-1923)*, Paris, CNRS éditions, 2009, pp. 179-180.



And. Matth. Wolfgang del. in Algier et Sculp. Aug. Vinal.

*Sohnersan des Mezzomorto geweszen Day in Algier, ießünd
Capitan Bassa der Flotten des Gross Turcken.*

1 Hajji Husain, also known as Mezzomorto, as Kapudan Pasha; by Andreas Matthäus Wolfgang, late 17th century. Source: Wikimedia Commons.

vided by the skilled seafarers of the Mediterranean. They were either subjects of the Sultans, the absolute masters of a multinational Empire, or they came from other European countries and were attracted by high stakes, socioeconomic, religious or personal. They were employed in positions related to their skills, as numerous examples show. Those who served in the Navy, following conversion to Islam, if competent, could reach high positions.⁵ Naval excellence corresponded to what had happened on land, when the Ottoman lords wrested control of Anatolia and of its valuable human resources from the Eastern Roman Emperors. The adherence and inclusion of skilled local seamen to the new state entity contributed to the new rulers's sea mastership. The Ottoman Navy remained strong and master of the eastern Mediterranean for centuries. It introduced new technologies, adopted from its European competitors, including the Venetians, and adapted them to its specific needs and conditions. Indeed, as an example, to counter the Venetians, between 1650 and 1718 a Navy of sailing ships was built, with 15 sultanas (government warships) constructed in 1650–1651.⁶

To the Ottoman rulers the presence of Venice in the Aegean world was tantamount to an intrusion, an old notion espoused by the Eastern Roman Emperors. In the Ottoman times, Selim I (1512–1520) had expressed it forcefully, making clear that the whole Mediterranean, ought to belong to a single «sublime state».⁷ Despite sometimes protracted periods of peace and trade relations, the Ottoman Sultans, in epic struggles, fought the intruders for centuries, before finally confining them to the Ionian Islands.

As Daniel Panzac writes, on specific topics, concerning the human pool available to the sultans, the seafaring Christian populations of Rumelia and Anatolia were recruited to serve in the Navy.⁸ Also, able seamen came from the

5 Girolamo FERRARI, *Delle notizie storiche della Lega tra l'Imperatore Carlo VI e la Repubblica di Venezia contra il Gran Sultano Acmet III e de'loro Fatti d'armi. Dall'anno 1714 sino alla pace di Passarowitz*, Venice, 1723, p. 191, mentions an «Almirante de' Turchi Fiamengo [Flemish] rinegato chiamato Tre Mustacchi», distinguished in the naval clashes of the war of 1714–1718.

6 Guido CANDIANI, «A New Battle Fleet: the Evolution of the Ottoman Sailing Navy, 1650–1718, revealed through Venetian Sources», *The Mariner's Mirror*, 104, 1 (2018), pp. 18–26 – Published online: 29 January 2018; BOSTAN, «Ottoman Maritime Arsenals», cit., p. 16.

7 Maria Pia PEDANI, *The Ottoman-Venetian Border (15th–18th centuries)*, translated by Mariateresa Sala, Venice, Ca' Foscari, 2017, p. 91.

8 PANZAC, *La marine ottomane*, cit., pp. 34–35.

coastal areas around the Sea of Marmara and from the shores of the Aegean and its islands, with the local governors and the provincial kadis looking after the recruitment requirements of the naval authorities. On the opposing side, Venetian crews, strongly resembling the composition of those in the Ottoman Navy, were principally composed of Albanian and Greek seamen.⁹

Some time before the war of 1714–1718, prompted by the Grand Vizier's active involvement, work in the imperial arsenal accelerated. Intensive labor activity probably covered needed repairs, improvements, reactivation of existing naval units, and construction of new ships. New workshops were established. Already, in 1708, anchors started being manufactured there, while in 1709 followed the manufacture of sails.¹⁰ Furthermore, before the war many Greeks, skilled in ships's construction and repairs, worked feverishly in the capital's arsenal, and there is no doubt that, when the war started, the Ottoman State, contrary to Venice, had a Navy ready for action. It is suggested that between 22 and 27 ships had been built from 1700 to 1714. Among those, there was a three-decker with 110–120 guns, also two or three two-deckers with 70–80 guns, and a number of two-deckers with 50–70 guns. Early in the war the Navy had about 40 sailing ships (sultanas). It is evident that ships of intermediate size were preferred. They were better adapted to the geography and weather conditions of the Aegean. Furthermore, to deal with shipbuilding lumber supply problems the navy acquired about 20 fully armed merchant vessels.¹¹ Also, before the start of the war, huge quantities of biscuit for the crews were prepared in Thessalonica, Negropont (Chalkis), Volos, and Larissa, while about 15,000 Levents, ready to serve on the ships, were mobilized.¹²

The Ottoman Navy was an impressive weapon, and the competence and efficiency of its crews transformed it into a powerful instrument in the able hands of

9 PANZAC, *La marine ottomane*, cit., pp. 34–35, 197, and note 23; Ekkehard EICKHOFF, *Venezia, Vienna e i Turchi. 1645–1700: Bufera nel Sud-Est Europeo*, Milan, Rusconi, 1991, p. 467.

10 Akin SEFER, *The Arsenal of Ottoman Modernity: Workers, Industry, and the State in Late Ottoman Istanbul*, A dissertation presented to the Department of History, Northwestern University, May 2018, pp. 46, 47; FERRARI, *Delle notizie storiche*, cit., p. 27.

11 CANDIANI, «A New Battle Fleet», cit.; CANDIANI, *I vascelli della Serenissima*, cit., pp. 482, 484.

12 HATZOPoulos, *La dernière guerre*, cit., p.23; Giacomo DIEDO, *Storia della Repubblica di Venezia, dalla sua fondazione sino l'anno MDCCXLVII*, vol. IV, Venice, 1751, p. 74.

its Commanders, beginning with the Kapudan Pasha Djanum Khodja Mehmed,¹³ the three admirals, and the individual captains of the sailing ships. Mezzomorto's reforms, pursued after his death in 1701, combined with financial contributions in the form of taxes, and the continuous improvement of shipbuilding techniques in the arsenals of the Empire, built a strong naval arm. To the above positive factors should be added the dissolution of the Russian Navy and the acquisition of an unknown number of its ships in the Black Sea, in 1713, following the Treaty of Adrianople (Edirne) in the same year, thus eliminating worries about enemy naval presence in that area.

On March 10, 1715, the mighty fleet was inspected by the Sultan in the waters of the Sea of Marmara. Well supplied, manned by competent crewmen and Commanders, its destination, after sailing through the Aegean, was Negropont. There, it would wait for the approaching Grand Vizier's Army. In the Dardanelles it was joined by the North African and Egyptian units. Figures vary. According to Anderson, the fleet included 58 big sailing ships, 30 galleys, 70 galliots, 5 fireships and a large number of transport vessels. Nani Mocenigo gives about the same numbers: 58 sailing ships, including the North African and the Egyptian ones, 30 galleys, 60 galliots, 5 fireships, and many auxiliary vessels transporting equipment and even troops. The Venetian bailo at Constantinople, Andrea Memmo, held prisoner in Abydos, counted 36 big sailing ships, probably before joining their North-African and Egyptian allies. Candiani mentions about 40 sultanas, to which were added about 12 armed merchant vessels (40–60 guns each), a similar number of private ships from Barbary and 5 fireships. The sailing ships

13 The Kapudan Pasha, a competent and humane sailor, came from the fortress city of Coron in the Messenia district of the Peloponnese. According to FERRARI, *Delle notizie storiche*, cit., p. 27, Djanum Khodja was «nato Turco di Coron». Captured at Imbros as a young man, in the first Morean War (1684–1699), he served in the Venetian galleys for seven years until his ransom, thus becoming familiar with his future adversaries. In an Italian portrait engraving he is named as «Meemet Cicala General di Mare, del Gran Turco» (see Mario NANI MOSENIGO, *Storia della Marina Veneziana da Lepanto alla caduta della Repubblica*, Rome, Ministero della Marina, 1935, p. 321). Also, during the operation for the capture of Nafplion (Napoli di Romania) in the Argolid, with the fleet's assistance, captain of a ship of the line (from the sailing formation in navies of the time), a sultana named Canal Bianco, was a brother of the Kapudan Pasha, whose name is given as Zecelis (see Manuscript Code «Guerre tra i Veneziani ed i Turchi» in MONTREAL PRESBYTERIAN COLLEGE – Ms. MPC, ff.157r-159v, section referring to the captives taken by the Ottoman Army when Nafplion fell). Cf. HATZOPoulos, *La dernière guerre*, cit., pp. 53 n. 83, 75 n. 144.

were escorted by about 20 galleys, 31 galiots and 60 smaller ships. According to him, «this was the most powerful Turkish fleet in over a century». The same author mentions an anonymous Dutch source, according to which the Kapudan Pasha's fleet was composed of 36 sultanas, 10 armed merchant vessels, 12 sailing ships from North Africa, 5 fireships, 4 galiots, and 36 galleys. Panzac writes that at the beginning of the war the Ottoman fleet had 18 sailing ships. Among them three had between 60 and 70 guns, six 50 to 58 guns, seven 40 to 44, and two 34 to 38. During the first two years of the war the Ottoman Government undertook with ardor the construction of additional sailing vessels. During that period were built about ten big ships, among which were included a huge three-decks, armed with 112 cannons, and two with 88, the rest being of intermediate size.¹⁴

From the beginning the Ottoman Armada sailed through the Archipelago unobstructed and achieved full control of it. Strategically and traditionally, the Ottoman Navy operated as an independent unit, it did collaborate but did not subordinate itself to the Army, even when the latter was under the Command of the authoritarian Grand Vizier. To a degree this was due to its martial achievements in the Mediterranean and renown, acquired through its history. Its autonomy was also helped by the vicinity of its bases (at the capital, Gallipoli, and when necessary Negropont), where repairs and maintenance could be carried out, and the ships could be refurbished and resupplied, as opposed to its opponent's having to sail, for serious repairs, to its distant base (Venice). Inevitably, bases near the zones of operations were essential to the conduct of naval war. In 1715 the Navy

14 Roger Charles ANDERSON, *Naval Wars in the Levant. From the Battle of Lepanto to the Introduction of Steam (1559–1853)*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1952, p. 244; NANI MOCENIGO, *Storia della Marina Veneziana*, cit., p. 318. According to FERRARI, *Del le notizie storiche*, cit., pp. 40-41, the Navy, including sixty big sailing ships («sessanta grosse navi»), called on the island of Chios, where it was joined by the North African units («barbareschi»), with no Egyptian vessels mentioned. From there, it would sail to Negropont. On his part, abbé LAUGIER, *Histoire de la République de Venise, depuis sa fondation jusqu'à présent*, vol. IV, Paris, 1768, p. 290, gives 35 sultanas, 15 big North African sailing ships, and «une cinquantaine de petits bâtiments». Vincent MIGNOT, *Histoire de l'empire ottoman depuis son origine jusqu'à la paix de Belgrade en 1740*, vol. IV, Paris, 1771, p. 208, mentions 90 sultanas and 70 galleys, while he says (p. 209) that the Kapudan Pasha, Djanum Khodja Mehmed, was «un des meilleurs hommes de mer». Furthermore, of the above mentioned sultanas, six, whose names are known, were still in use twenty years later. CANDIANI, *I vascelli della Serenissima* cit., pp. 498, 499 note 107. Also, see PANZAC, *La marine ottomane*, cit., pp. 186, 193-194, who says that the Kapudan Pasha left the capital with 32 sailing ships (p. 185).

carried out its mission transporting and delivering, where they were needed, military supplies and heavy equipment, such as big guns and mortars, but also troops. It also captured the last outposts of Venetian presence in the Aegean and stood by and supported the huge land army, led by the Grand Vizier, while preparing for its assault against the Ionian Sea possessions of the enemy, and after this, maybe the east coast of the Adriatic Sea, sailing further north.

There is no doubt that the disasters which befell Venice in the first year of the war, in 1715, were due to a series of negative factors. First and foremost the diplomatic isolation of the Republic, due to its desperate, and finally successful, efforts to stay out of the European carnage, during the years of the war of the Spanish succession, and inevitably the political realities in Europe after the Treaty of Utrecht. Thus, with the exception of the Pope, Venice was left without allies to turn to, when it was needed, and the Republic was essentially begging for help, in order to preserve whatever could be saved among its possessions in the Levant.


Financially, the long years of the war for the conquest of the Peloponnese (the Morea) constituted for the Republic a heavy burden. Essentially, in its return to the East, Venice had ended up with a largely undeveloped large piece of real estate in the western periphery of the Ottoman Empire, which, as events were to prove soon, the previous owners did not intend to relinquish. As a matter of fact, the Peloponnese might have been peripheral or far from the center of the Empire, but it was also a strategically indispensable piece of land, a wedge between the heart of the Empire and its North African dependencies, the big island of Crete, and even the sea lanes to Alexandria, in Egypt. Indeed, as with Venetian Crete, situated between Ottoman Europe and Ottoman North Africa, which had for a long time been a Venetian irritant between the Ottoman Aegean Sea, Libya, and Alexandria, the Peloponnese was, by its geography, a western bastion of the Ottoman world, ready to shut access to the eastern Mediterranean, if and when needed. Its occupation by a Western power would be challenging for the Ottoman Empire, and would pose a serious threat. Indeed, two great naval engagements had been fought along this western imperial border: Preveza (1538) and Lepanto (1571). Furthermore, the violent events in the Aegean, during the Cretan war, when the naval reaction of Venice and the epic clashes in the Dardanelles, in the 1650's, pointed to clear threats to imperial maritime communications, especially at times of war, posed by land held by the enemy, dictated the strategic elimina-

tion of all remaining Venetian holdings in the region.

To hold the territorial gains, and defend them from the sooner or later to be launched onslaught, the Republic needed money, men, and ships, of which it had very little and very few. This was the reason Mustafa Aga, the Sultan's envoy to Venice in 1703, was greeted with relief and even enthusiasm when he reiterated his master's desire to abide by the terms of the Treaty of Carlowitz. Four centuries of Venetian presence in Crete, with deep roots planted in the island, important commercial interests, a strong military presence, powerful fortresses, and an active naval presence, and powerful reaction to the Ottoman threat, did not prevent the capture of the island by the Sultan's Army, even after a long war and mighty military encounters. One can debate whether any one in authority in Venice had any illusions on the possibility of preserving the Peloponnese. Unless indirect help was provided, as had been the case in the previous war, when the great battles were fought in the Danube front, and Venice stood alongside the victors, something which, as everyone knew, and was afraid to admit, was not forthcoming this time.

The new acquisition, the Peloponnese, was poor in natural resources, without significant urban centers, with the possible exception of Nafplion. It possessed a poor network of roads, and was demographically weak, with less than 100,000 inhabitants. Furthermore, its coastal areas were exposed to the raids of pirates, while robbery was not absent in the mountainous interior. Under the reality of its strained finances, Venice did all that could have been done. In order to deal with the local conditions and problems and try to improve the situation, more or less, decent men were appointed in positions of authority. Money was spent but, first of all, priorities had to be set, and this meant the improvement, the repair, and the construction of defensive works, embodying the best precepts of the art of fortifications, in an age marked by Vauban's genius. Certainly, under the new reality which was dictated by the finances of the Republic and by the geography of the region, plans for the defense of Venetian Peloponnese were drawn and proposed. One of them was Domenico Mocenigo's report, of November 12, 1691, while the war was still going on. Mocenigo, whose Naval Command went back to the Cretan war, was Captain General between the late Spring of 1690 and September 1692. Through practical experience, field inspections, contacts with interested officers and anyone who was familiar with the issues of defense of the new possession, he formulated, even before the end of the war, a plan for its

protection. Due to its proximity to the Greek mainland, the Peloponnese was fully exposed to an Ottoman attack from the north. The plan to expand the Venetian holdings, in order to protect the new acquisition, included Athens and Attica, then Euboea, while envisaging to connect those areas with the coastal zone from the isthmus of Corinth, along the north coast of the similarly named gulf, with linchpins at Nafpaktos (Lepanto), Messolonghi, Xiromero, Vonitza, Preveza, then Corfu and all the way north, along the coastal Dalmatian possessions of the Republic. The failure of the Euboea and Athens operations, during which disaster hit the Acropolis of Athens and the temple of Parthenon, on September 26, 1687 (Fig. 2), put an end to the plan. Realistically, Mocenigo lowered expectations and, in order to deal with the eventual return of the Ottoman Army, urged resistance behind the walls of a number of selected local fortresses. These would be Patras, Old and New Navarino, Modon, Coron, Zarnata, Kelepha (Chielefa), Monemvasia (Malvasia), Nafplion, and the Acrocorinth. As long as the Republic had a strong presence at sea, Monemvasia and Nafplion's three fortresses could be held (*«Malvasia e i tre castelli di Napoli, si conserveranno tanto tempo, quanto la Repubblica sarà superior in mare»*). Acrocorinth's problem, probably due to its relative distance from the sea and from incoming supplies, would be famine. The remaining fortresses were doomed. Otherwise, if defended, their anticipated capture by the enemy would mean a total loss of their guns, their ammunition, and their garrisons. Furthermore, as he wrote, a force of 20,000 infantrymen and 4,000 horsemen would be needed, and could even challenge the enemy under the Command of an experienced, valorous, and prudent General, essentially a Morosini-like leader. As he made it clear, an army and fortresses can protect a country, however with this difference, that a strong army, even without the support of fortresses, can still defend a country, but fortresses without an army are useless, especially when facing a strong and obstinate enemy (*«Esserciti e fortezze assicurano gli stati con questa differenza, che gl'esserciti anche senza fortezze bastano à difenderli, ma le fortezze senza gl'esserciti non sono sufficienti, massime quando s'ha da fare con un nemico ostinato e prepotente»*). The Republic did not entirely reject Mocenigo's report. It adopted and adapted parts of it. Thus, all fortresses were to be held. Furthermore, Nafplion, the capital of the Regno, despite Venice's financial strains, would acquire powerful fortifications, with, inevitably, huge amounts of money being thrown in (Fig. 3). As for the strong army, when the crunch came, in the Summer of 1715, there were in the fortress-



2 View of the Acropolis of Athens at the moment of the 1687 bombardment. Drawing by the engineer captain Filippo Besseti di Verneda. Source: Léon Emmanuel S.J. DE LABORDE, Marquis, *Athènes aux XVe, XVIe et XVIIe siècles*, Paris, Jules Renouard, 1854.

es of the territory about 4,500 demoralized mercenaries to defend them, led, in most cases, by equally demoralized Commanders, and no Venetian Navy in sight. Mocenigo's report was reproduced a few years later, when Daniel Dolfin proposed in March 1711, following his in situ inspection, the abandonment of all fortresses, except Acrocorinth, Rio (Dardanello di Patrasso), Modon, Monemvasia, and naturally the capital, Nafplion, which was now transformed into one of the strongest fortresses in Europe, in the early 18th century. Fundamentally, fortress defense was a standard strategy in Venice's wars against its mighty adversary.

However, the navy's participation varied. When and where it was involved, the Republic's fighting capacities increased and the war could last a long time. Such was the case of the Cretan war, when in the 1650's the lines of communications of the Ottoman troops fighting in Crete, and their provisioning of supplies were seriously threatened by the Venetian Navy's blockade of the Dardanelles and Lazzaro Mocenigo's bold, but failed, attempt to break through and sail to Constantinople.¹⁵ When and where the Navy stayed out, for various reasons, fighting came to an end early, and disastrously for Venice, as was the case with Cyprus, soon to be repeated (in 1715) in the Peloponnese. Finally, Venetian victories, leading to the signing of peace treaties, were achieved in collaboration with strong allies.¹⁶


Indicative of the Venetian authorities' financial problems was the fact that construction of new shipping was lagging. Indeed, between the signing of the Treaty of Carlowitz and the year 1714 only five sailing ships of the first rate were launched: the Colomba d' Oro, on April 23, 1699, the Grande Alessandro, on August 18, 1709, the Corona, on November 25, 1711, the Costanza, on November 19, 1714, and the Madonna della Salute, on January 23, 1714. The five first rate ships were followed on February 27, 1714, by the second rate San Francesco and by the first rate Terror, launched on March 1, 1715 with an additional small number of vessels using oars. However, when the war started the Venetian arsenal was activated and a steady number of sailing ships started coming out. Thus, as an example, Madonna dell'Arsenale was launched in late January–early February 1716, while Leon Trionfante, which became a model for first rate ships, followed on March 7, of the same year.¹⁷ Even so, Lodovico Flangini, the new Capitano Ordinario delle Navi, presented a picture in which the Venetian Navy was still in a problematic position.

Indeed, following the «fattali disgratie della Morea», as Flangini wrote in his

15 Alberto TENENTI, *Venezia e il senso del mare. Storia di un prisma culturale dal XIII al XVIII secolo*, Milan, Guerini e associati, 1999, p. 595.

16 On Mocenigo's report see Dionysios HATZOPoulos, «Capturing and Defending the Peloponnese. Domenico Mocenigo's Report of November 12, 1691», *Thesaurismata*, 37 (2007), pp. 327-342. On Dolfin's report see HATZOPoulos, *La dernière guerre*, cit., p. 17.

17 Cesare Augusto LEVI, *Navi da guerra costruite nell'arsenale di Venezia dal 1664 al 1896*, Venice, 1896, p. 28; Mario NANI MOCENIGO, *L'arsenale di Venezia*, Venice, Filippi, 1995, p. 102. According to Mocenigo, between 1715 and 1718, the arsenal of Venice built 12 sailing ships of first rate, 10 of second, and 2 frigates. CANDIANI, *I vascelli della Serenissima*, cit., p. 509.



3 «Napoli di Romania e Monte-Palamida, Colle Proposte del Giancix». Source: Vincenzo CORONELLI, *Morea, Negroponte & adiacenze*, [Venice, ca. 1708]. Antonio Giancix's – a military engineer in the service of Venice – ambitious project for the fortification of Palamidi was applied by the French military engineer Pierre de la Salle (1711–1714). In 1715 the fortress was captured by the Ottomans.

detailed Senate report of February 5, 1716, a few months before the siege of Corfu, the situation in the Navy was still problematic. According to him – for he was in a position to know – the navy disposed of twenty-four sailing ships («navi»), eleven of the first rate, seven of the second, and six of the third. He went on examining the ships, one after the other, pointing to their decay and what had to be done with them. Accordingly, it was necessary to speed up and increase the strength of the Navy, by accelerating the construction, in the arsenal of Venice, of new, more powerful and robust ships, and thus rebuilding «the front wall of the fatherland» («l'antemurale della patria»). Also, a problem that had to be dealt with, as soon as possible, was the dearth of crews, whose absence hindered the movement of the ships. Even superior officers were missing from the big sailing vessels. In the first rates served only four, while in the second served only three. These were scarce and insufficient numbers, given that if one of those officers was hit in battle there wouldn't be anyone to replace him. Under the circumstances, it was not that easy to find crews and, also, the Navy had to deal with the problem of desertions and infirmities. One way to attract people would be to raise wages and

offer benefits, such as being taken good medical care, when wounded, and also receive compensation, when needed, similar to the one received by soldiers.¹⁸

The war was declared on December 9, 1714, and the Senate named to the post of Capitano Generale da Mar Daniel Dolfin, a nephew of the author of the report of March 1711. At the same time great diplomatic efforts were undertaken in order to acquire the assistance of the Pope, of Tuscany, of Portugal, and of the Order of the Knights of Malta.

The naval squadron which sailed toward the battle areas was composed of eight sailing ships and of eleven galleys. The Ionian Islands provided some reinforcements, such as Zakynthos (Zante), which armed two galleys and two galliots. The allied units at this stage included four pontifical galleys, five galleys armed by the knights of Malta, and later, on July 23rd, two Tuscan galleys, with rather incompetent crews, as it was said at the time. In early July 1715, near Cephalonia, under the Command of Daniel Dolfin, the Venetian fleet, with the allied units added, had increased in numbers. Now, it was composed of 22 sailing

18 ARCHIVIO DI STATO DI VENEZIA (hereafter: ASV), Provveditori da Terra e da mar e altre cariche (hereafter: PTM), filza 1339, February 5, 1716: «Compresa dall'alto discernimento del Eccentissimo Senato la decadenza di tanti navi e la necessità di premere e sollecitare le nuove fabbriche nel Arsenale per rimettere e rinvigorire l'Armata con legni più poderosi, robusti, e render con ciò più forte l'antemurale della patria. [...] Ciò che dilania il mio cuore si è il vedere le navi di Vostra Serenità così destitute di marinieri, che sono nella maggior parte incapaci di mettersi alla vella. [...] Alle navi del primo rango non sono destinati da Vostre Eccelenze che quattro ufficiali superiori [...] et alle navi del secondo rango tre soli. [...] Le fughe e l'infirmità hano ridotto in stato si miserabile le navi di Vostra Serenità e come si quelle, che queste hano le loro caggioni, così io mi conosco in debito di rapresentarle con il dovuto candore à Vostre Eccelenze, come degne del loro sapientissimo esame, onde si doni qualche rimedio al disordine troppo perniciosamente avanzato». On the same issue see individual cases cited by NANI MOCENIGO, *Storia della Marina Veneziana*, cit., p. 317, n. 1: according to a report, written by the Capitano Straordinario delle Navi and dated December 18, 1714, the ships Aquila Valiera, Ercole, and Valore Incoronato are in bad condition and should stay in Venice to be used «alla difesa del Golfo»; p. 323, on Daniel Dolfin's inaction, largely due to lack of preparation of the navy and deficiencies of crews and materiel; p. 324, destruction of a ship due to careless handling of explosives: «[...] il 12 gennaio 1716 si incendiò il vascello Regina del Mare per incuria nella conservazione delle polveri»; p. 327, according to Andrea Corner's Summer 1716 report from Corfu: «27 navi in gran parte deboli». As mentioned by CANDIANI, *I vascelli della Serenissima*, cit., pp. 514, 516, the scarcity of naval crews forced the new fleet commander Andrea Pisani to initially equip only 19 ships, but thanks to increased enrolment of men from the Ionian Islands and new arrivals of crewmen from Venice, he was able, in early June 1716, to have ready for action 25 ships, in acceptable condition («in condizioni accettabili»).

ships, 33 galleys, 2 galliasses, and 10 galliots.¹⁹ During the Summer of 1715 the allied naval crews and their Commanders remained inactive, witnessing the depressive reality of the rapid total collapse of Venetian presence east of the Ionian Sea.

The Ottoman Navy, under efficient command, imposed its presence in the Aegean, while assisting the land troops, under the Grand Vizier, in the reconquest of the Peloponnese. On land, the fortress of Acrocorinth was taken by the Ottoman Army on the 2nd of July. The siege of Nafplion began on the 12th of July, and the Grand Vizier's soldiers broke the city's defenses on the 20th. The huge and expensive fortifications did not help much. The siege of Modon began on the 12th of August and ended on the 17th, with its surrender. Coron, Navarino, Kelepha, Zarnata, were abandoned. Rion, on the western end of the gulf of Corinth, surrendered on the 14th of August. On September 7th the Venetian rectors of powerful Monemvasia accepted the terms of surrender. In the previous war, Monemvasia, defended by the Ottoman Army, had sustained a long blockade and siege, from September 1687 to August 1690. In the Ionian Sea, the island of Leucas (Santa Maura) was abandoned, before any serious fight. In about three months Venice was thrown out of the Aegean and of the Peloponnese. It still possessed the Ionian Islands, but Leucas was gone.

At sea, on June 5, 1715, the Ottoman fleet reached the island of Tinos. 27 hours later, after the Kapudan Pasha's promised immunity, the island surrendered without a fight. Aegina and Cythera followed soon. The fortress of Suda, near Chanea, surrendered on the 23rd of September, on the 7th of October came the turn of Spinalonga. Thus ended the long Venetian presence on the island of Crete, a presence going back to the early years of the 13th century and the aftermath of the Fourth Crusade.

With the Venetian Navy out of sight the Kapudan Pasha and his competent captains had executed a masterful naval campaign. The fleet had accomplished its tasks, had transported heavy military equipment, ammunition, troops to combat areas, important prisoners, garrisons of surrendered places to still Venetian held fortresses, according to terms, and, most importantly, by its simple presence it had chased the Venetian fleet and its incompetent Commander out of the Archipelago. Accordingly, the Ottoman Navy made the Grand Vizier's Army its

19 NANI MOCENIGO, *Storia della Marina Veneziana*, cit., p. 318.



4 During the last Venetian–Ottoman War (1714–1718), the Venetian fleet and army, under the command of the *Capitano Generale da Mar* Andrea Pisani (left) and the Field Marshall Johann Mathias von der Schulenburg (right) respectively, captured the castle and town of Preveza on October 22, 1717. They were also the senior Venetian commanders during the Ottoman Siege of Corfu (1716). Source: Wikimedia Commons.

objective, seeing it as a second line and supporting it, while, simultaneously, acquiring control of maritime communications.²⁰ By all accounts the handling of the operations of 1715 by the Ottoman naval leadership was a textbook perfect exercise, where sailors, in positions of Command and otherwise, using efficiently the ships at their disposal, had prevailed over a demoralized and invisible enemy. On the Venetian side it was a real disaster. Daniel Dolfin represented the spirit of defeatism, which prevailed in Venice before the war. Most definitely, he had nothing of Lazzaro Mocenigo's spirit. With his incompetent handling, blaming every-


²⁰ Thus, it abided by Julian Stafford CORBETT's, *Some Principles of Maritime Strategy*, London, Longmans, Green & Co., 1911, pp. 94, 280, 282, theories on naval strategy, enunciated almost two centuries later.



5 View of the city of Corfu and its fortifications on the arrival of Andrea Pisani, *Capitano Generale da Mar*, in 1715, by an unknown painter. Source: Wikimedia Commons.

one for his failure, he, inevitably, left everyone stupefied, including his supporters in the Senate, who simply contended that his behavior reflected the prevailing spirit in Venice, of denying the eventuality of a new war with the Sultan. Instead of daring, Dolfin spent most of his time sailing around the Ionian Islands, and one wonders what would he have done had the enemy reached him there. He finally entered the Aegean safely, past the season, in 1715, when the enemy had sailed away and the Ottoman fleet was approaching Constantinople in triumph. Dolfin could not stay in his position. Upon his return to Corfu, he was dismissed by the Senate, and replaced by the Provveditore Generale delle Isole Ionie, Andrea Pisani (Figs. 4 and 5).

The events of 1716 were the logical and expected consequence of those of 1715. What was now left was expelling Venice from all Greek lands, and even from its positions in Dalmatia. The turn of the Ionian Islands had come. The expected fall of the stronghold of Corfu, the front door of the Republic in the



6 Sketch of the confrontation of the Ottoman (left) and Venetian (right) fleets in the Corfu Channel during the Ottoman Siege (1716). H.C. BRÖCKELL, Marburg Archives.

Source: Wikimedia Commons.

Adriatic, would be followed by the occupation of the remaining Ionian Islands, and, according to the worst scenario, the road to Venice would be open, with Italy's coast on the Adriatic also exposed.²¹ However, in 1716 things changed. The sudden military collapse of Venice and the disappearance of all Venetian possessions in the Peloponnese and in the Aegean provoked a shock in Vienna, which led to the resumption of the war between the two Empires: the Ottomans and the Hapsburgs. The new war, a serendipitous event, saved Venice, and in particular besieged Corfu, from additional disasters, which were also staved off by a new fighting spirit inspired by new, competent, and brave Commanders, worthy opponents of the Kapudan Pasha and of his Captains. However, unfortunately for


21 On the 1716 siege of Corfu see: HATZOPoulos, *La dernière guerre*, cit., pp. 119-146.

Djanum Khodja, he was accused that he didn't do what was expected of him during the siege of Corfu, and also during the encounters with the Venetian fleet near the island. As a result of the accusations, he was removed from his Command and even imprisoned briefly. He was succeeded by Ibrahim Pasha of Aleppo, who held the position during the clashes with the Venetian fleet in 1717 and 1718. Djanum Khodja recovered his position briefly in 1730 and then again from 1732 to 1736.

The year 1717, followed in part by 1718, were the years of Venice's naval counter-attack, or rather attempt at counter-attack, and epic clashes in the Aegean, and, finally, the implementation of a naval strategy, in a sense meaning the pursuit of a goal. The whole exercise was based on past experience. Following the victories of Eugene of Savoy at Peterwardein (August 5, 1716), and, one year later, at Belgrade (the city surrendered on August 22, 1717), the effort could be interpreted as an attempt by the Republic to recapture lost territories. However, the Republic's means were limited and essentially it did not possess an armed force large enough to embark on large scale operations. Even so, enterprises of the kind, based on available land forces and means, of which efficient use could be made by skilled Commanders (Johann Mathias von der Schulenburg [Figs. 4 and 7], Commander of the Corfu garrison during the siege of 1716, being one), were



7 Commemorative medal for the last Venetian–Ottoman War (1714–1718) and the Siege of Corfu (1716), with reference to Count Schulenburg; by A. R. Werner, 1716. Copper alloy. Courtesy of the National Historical Museum, Athens (cat. n. 4751).



successfully launched along the coastal areas of western Greece and of Albania, capturing a small number of places, including the island of Leucas, and even making an attempt on Modon. However, everything depended on the Imperials who, as was soon demonstrated, with their northern Italian possessions exposed to French mischief, they had no intention of prolonging the war in the Danube. Furthermore, in Venice the enormous cost of supporting and equipping the Navy and the Army, even a small one, had reached, near the end of the war, the sum of 2,700.000 ducats, putting in a serious risk the financial stability of the Republic.²²

The naval operations of 1717 and 1718 were marked by extreme violence and persistence to achieve the strategic goals set by each rival. While the Ottoman Navy preserved, with the exception of the Kapudan Pasha, its battle tested leadership, the Venetians put forward some of the most daring naval Commanders of the time. The Ottoman Navy aimed at the preservation of the territorial gains obtained in the first year of the war and, depending on developments in the Danube front, at a replay of the Corfu episode of 1716, including an attempt on the other Ionian Islands. On the other hand, if the Republic's Navy could return and operate in the Archipelago, all Ottoman possessions could be exposed to raids and instability. Also, by being challenged in the Aegean, the Ottomans would be kept far from the Ionian Islands, their sea lanes could be endangered, maybe even the ones to Alexandria, local maritime trade and commerce could collapse, insecurity could prevail, and, under a daring naval leadership Venice could even threaten the Dardanelles and sever communications with the island world of the Aegean, first and foremost Crete, which still attracted the revanchist minds among Venice's

²² *Ibid.*, p. 213.

leaders. On the Republic's side, what was clearly brought forward was the intention of shutting the Ottomans in the Dardanelles. If this were achieved, then the Archipelago would be open to intervention and perhaps conquest here and there, while the Ionian Islands would remain safe and distant. Beyond this, landings could be planned, also attacks against coastal fortresses in the Peloponnese, and ideally the capture of at least one of them, perhaps Modon, which would become a convenient anchorage. Of course, what was imperatively needed for success was the continuation of the war in the Danube, more defeats of the enemy, more of its troops withdrawn from the south, in order to reinforce the under heavy pressure units fighting in the north, essentially a replay of the events, which led to victory and the occupation of the Peloponnese in the previous war. The victories of 1716 and 1717, and the annihilation of huge numbers of Ottoman soldiers, including many of their Commanders, imposed the continuation of the war.

Another issue taken under consideration was the Ottoman Government's efforts to deal with the heavy fiscal burden upon the imperial treasury, after years of keeping a huge Army and a powerful Navy mobilized and supplied with new recruits and vessels to fill the gaps, and materiel to replace what had been spent. Also, the Sultan's prestige suffered, and in the European provinces, where most of the population was Christian, this may have had a negative impact and perhaps lead to revolts. The Republic did not want the war to end before it had achieved its aims and that was demonstrated when, in Passarowitz, its representative Carlo Ruzzini asked for the return of the Peloponnese and all the other places lost during the war, that is Tinos, Cythera, Suda, and Spinalonga, and this despite the acceptance of the principle of *uti possedetis* by the belligerents, including the reluctant Venetians, who based on this also asked, besides the above, for Butrinto, Leucas, Preveza, Vonitza, and the region of Xiromero, on the Ionian coast of mainland Greece. If the Ottoman Government refused to return the Peloponnese, then in exchange («contraccambio») it should cede Albanian territory in the region of lake Scutari, and north of that the places of Antivari and Dulcigno.²³ Under Andrea Pisani's orders, in 1717 Lodovico Flangini was named Capitano Straordinario delle Navi (Extraordinary Commander-in-Chief), with Marcantonio Diedo in the post of Capitano Ordinario, and Francesco Correr as Almirante. All four were appointed by the Senate. Unfortunately, the recently appointed new

23 *Ibid.*, pp. 211, 217.

fleet commanders were soon faced with the navy's perennial problem: scarcity of human resources. It seems that only half of the men needed were available. Thus, until new recruitments filled the gaps, the navy had to delay the 1717 offensive in the Aegean and, there again, the Ionian islanders, recruited by the hundreds, alleviated the crisis.²⁴

Flangini was in Command of 29 sailing ships, including an auxiliary one, all spread in three divisions: red, blue, and yellow. To them were attached two corvettes, two smaller vessels («pincos»), and four fireships. Having left Corfu on the 10th of May, the fleet reached the island of Imbros, in the northern Aegean, on June 5th, it sailed near the island and anchored there on the 8th. On the 10th of June the Ottoman fleet sailed out of the Dardanelles. Under Ibrahim Pasha's Command it had 38 sailing ships and 6 galliots. From that moment on entered the scene one of the protagonists of the dramatic events in the northern Aegean: the wind and its capricious behavior. Initially, it favored the Ottoman ships, then the Venetian ones, then back to the Ottoman and back again to the Venetian, and so on and so forth.²⁵ As a result, the two navies, steered haphazardly by the winds, operated in a large area covering the space between the island of Imbros and Mount Athos, and then south towards Skyros and Aghios Stratis. In the interval, when they approached each other, they clashed viciously, usually sailing in parallel lines, causing on each other heavy material damage and death (Fig. 8). Still worse for the Venetian Command, Flangini was hit by a stray bullet on the left side of his neck. Unconscious, he had to be brought on land in bad shape, giving the impression to those around him that he was already dead.²⁶ Although he was in bad shape and deteriorating, he was carried to the patrona Madonna dell'Arsenale, where he lived, through sheer willpower, until the 23rd of June when,

24 NANI MOCENIGO, *Storia della Marina Veneziana*, cit., p. 331; Mario NANI MOCENIGO, «Lodovico Flangini», *Rivista di Venezia. A cura del Comune*, XI, 5 (May 1932), p. 213; CANDIANI, *I vascelli della Serenissima* cit., pp. 527, 537.

25 As FERRARI, *Delle notizie storiche*, cit., writes (p. 192), the ships were pushed by the various changing winds («spinte le armate per que' mari ora da un vento, ora dall'altro»), while pointing that he who enjoys favorable wind is half victorious («è cosa di fatto, che chi ha il sopravvento, ha conseguito mezza vittoria»).

26 From Lodovico Flangini's final report: «[...] circa le hore 18 gravissima offesa da schioperata nemica nel collo al lato sinistro, da cui obligato à cadere in terra, mancatomi nello stesso tempo ogni senso, non mi distinguevo trà vivi, anzi non vi fù alcuno degl'istanti, che non mi giudicasse morto [...]», ASV, PTM, filza 1339, June 21, 1717.



8 The Battle of Imbros (1717); by Giovanni Raggio, between 1733 and 1741.
Source: Wikimedia Commons.



9 The last moments of Lodovico Flangini (June 23, 1717), *Capitano Straordinario delle Navi* of the Venetian fleet, mortally wounded during the Battle of Imbros. Drawing by Giuseppe Gatteri, 1850. Source: Wikimedia Commons.

carried on deck to survey the action, he expired, lamented by all who were under his command (Fig. 9). He was succeeded by Marcantonio Diedo.

The second big naval engagement was fought in the gulf of Laconia. It was a violent affair in which participated, with equal violence, nature's elements. The brief clash was interrupted by a storm which dispersed the ships, at least of Venice and of its allies, between Cythera and the east coast of Sicily. On the 2nd of July, 1717, seven Portuguese sailing ships, with two fireships, two sailing ships from Malta, along with a Venetian ship, and a number of auxiliaries joined Diedo's ships at Cape Tainaron (Matapan), in the south of the Peloponnese (Fig. 10). In the afternoon of the same day Pisani joined the fleet with his galleys. There were now 34 Venetian and allied sailing ships. The fleet sailed into the gulf of Laconia and anchored about thirty miles north of the cape. Not far were anchored Pisani's



10 Portrait of King John V of Portugal alluding to the Battle of Cape Tainaron (Matapan) [1717]; by Giorgio Domenico Duprà, 1719. Source: Wikimedia Commons.

galleys, whose task, for now, was to secure the water supply of the crews of the fleet. This covered the days of 15th, 16th, 17th, and early 18th of July. Then, early in the morning of the 19th the crews saw the enemy approaching: 52 sailing vessels and 4 galleys. The fight started on the same day and was carried in the gulf of Laconia, between the two arms of mountainous land, mount Taygetos in

the southeast, with the peninsula of Mani, and mount Parnon in the northeast. The bloody action went on for a whole day, with the ships carried around by the wind, which kept on changing direction and favoring one or the other of the two opponents. The ferocious naval engagement probably provided a splendid show to the mountain village's population, watching from a natural amphitheater the drama unfolding in front of them, with the elements becoming stronger and more vicious to the point of turning into a storm. Heavy damage was inflicted on the big ships of both enemies, with the allies losing a transport ship and a fireship. On the 20th the Ottoman ships were sailing in the vicinity of Cythera, while the allies were still in the gulf. On the 21st, with both fleets in the gulf, preparing for new action, but far from each other, and the weather deteriorating rapidly and turning into a vicious storm, the council of the captains (*consulta*) voted for the Navy to get out of the gulf and sail towards its Ionian Islands anchorages. In stormy seas, violent winds continuously changing direction, and the ships being battered by high waves, on the 3rd of August the fleet, in disarray, ended up in the east coast of Sicily. One by one, or in squadrons, the vessels reached Corfu, the galleys arrived in the island on the 16th of August. On August 27th, the fleet, with 27 sailing ships, including the two from Malta, the Portuguese having left for home, sailed in a southern direction. At Zakynthos information was received that the enemy was in the waters of Modon, preparing to attack the Ionian Islands of Zakynthos and Cephalonia. The news pointed to a solid strategic plan on the Ottoman fleet's side. Also, in the Ottoman camp circulated the rumor that following its defeat the Venetian fleet had been destroyed by the storm, and the islands were now undefended. However, Venetian anxieties ended there, because soon arrived the latest news from the Danube, about the great victory of Eugene of Savoy at Belgrade, and the capture of that city by his army. Thus, once more, events in the north contributed to the protection of what was left of Venetian possessions.

There wouldn't be another naval engagement in 1717. Fall was approaching and the Ottoman Navy returned to Constantinople, where the Kapudan Pasha was dismissed for failing to destroy the enemy's naval arm.

In the Fall of 1717, following the victories in the Danube and profiting from the demoralization of the Ottoman troops an operation was launched against the fortresses of Preveza and Vonitza, not far from the first, on the Ionian seaboard of Greece. The operation, well prepared, was successful and the two places surrendered on October 23rd and November 2nd, respectively.

The final encounter of the two navies, in 1718, was the most violent. News reached the Venetian fleet's High Command that the enemy's ships were sailing in the southern Aegean. The Ottoman warships had to be kept out of the Ionian Sea by all available means. Thus, on June 10th Diedo issued his order of battle and soon after, the council of the ships's captains decided, without further delay, to sail towards Andros. The fleet left Zakynthos in the morning of June 29th and began sailing along the west coast of the Peloponnese. Again, according to the latest information, the Ottoman fleet, under its new Kapudan Pasha, Suleyman Khodja, had reached the waters around Cythera. The Venetian ships bypassed Modon and entered the gulf of Messenia, where not far from Coron, on July 2nd, 3rd, and 4th, squads of crewmen, under armed protection, carried water supplies to the ships. On the 7th, the fleet abandoned Coron and sailed, in a northeastern direction, in search of the Ottoman ships. On July 20th, the two fleets were separated by a distance of only two miles. They were again in the gulf of Laconia, the Ottomans close to the small island of Elaphonissos, just north of Cythera, with Diedo's units closing slowly. There were 36 Ottoman sailing vessels to Venice's 26. The battle began in the afternoon of the same day, July 20th, west of Elaphonissos, while in the Venetian battle line ships were still sailing into battle position. From the beginning the clash was extremely violent, destructive to the ships and highly murderous to humans. When night came a number of Venetian units had suffered serious damage and had lost many men. The Kapudan Pasha and his captains could boast of an early victory. On the morrow, July the 21st, the date of the signature of the Treaty of Passarowitz, the two navies, in full view of each other, were slowly pushed by the sea current towards Cythera. Tense gun-fight on both sides marked the day. More material damage and human losses, but not as serious as the first day, were added to those having already been inflicted, and when night came both fleets began distancing themselves slowly from the mortal entanglement.

During the night, pushed by the wind distance between the two fleets increased slowly, but steadily. Both groups moved towards Cape Tainaron. Every now and then, the wind changed direction and favored either of the opponents. In the morning of the 22nd, the Ottoman ships, pushed by the wind, were able to come close to the Venetian and violent action began. Now, the ships were fighting in an utterly haphazard way. The planned and expected battle lines had collapsed, and the vessels exchanged fire moving in dense smoke, in a confused mass, try-

ing, at the same time, to avoid the threatening enemy fireships. Again, the wind pushed them slowly back, towards Elaphonissos and Cythera. Both opponents suffered heavy material damage, while heavily damaged ships, covered by other vessels, were pulled out of action.

Before nightfall, the Kapudan Pasha signaled the disentanglement of his ships. The Ottoman Armada started sailing away from the battle area, and during the night it was able to distance itself from the enemy. Next morning the distance between the two fleets increased and kept increasing. The Venetians didn't go after the enemy; they had also suffered heavy material damage and high human losses. On the 24th and 25th the Ottoman ships continued their northeastern course. More and more distance was added between the two fleets. The Venetian vessels, still battered by strong winds, arrived at Zakynthos on the 13th of August. The next day, their Commanders received news of the signature of the Treaty of Passarowitz. That was the end of hostilities, the war was finally over.²⁷

In Search of Naval Strategy

Strategy, political or military, the latter in its naval expression, incorporates the principles of a state's doctrine. A doctrine, in both its military and political expressions, covers the whole specter of a state's being and contains the elements which promote and protect its existence. Strategy, as a subordinate element, may also be political or military and aims at the achievement of goals set by doctrine. To achieve these goals, strategy invents and applies well rehearsed and effective methods. If all proceeds well, then doctrine, through sound strategy, has achieved its goals, and the state profits. Briefly, a state sets a doctrine, invents a strategy, to satisfy the requirements of doctrine, and sets in motion the necessary methods. All three elements have to be flexible, and respond to changing circumstances. Flexibility protects from failure and promotes chances of success. On the issue of naval strategy, the student of this particular subject first needs to define the constituent element of it, that is its goal. Undoubtedly, the fundamental goal of naval strategy is the acquisition and preservation of command of the sea in a particular geographic area, combined with the elimination of enemy reaction. This

27 On the 1717 and 1718 naval clashes in the gulf of Laconia and near Cythera, see HATZOPOULOS, *La dernière guerre*, cit., pp. 171-178, 199-204.

goal may be reached through ways adapted to geography and climate, including weather conditions and, especially, – for warships of the times when sails were used – the bearing of winds blowing in the area of operations. Then, the student has to examine the means for the achievement of the above, including quality, number and type of ships involved, closeness of repair and maintenance naval stations, availability of necessary war materiel, such as number and type of naval guns, including sufficient quantities and types of ammunition. Also needed are equipment and instruments for on board repairs, and, of course, successful recruitment and training of naval crews possessing various skills, as well as of competent Commanders, including High Command, composed of men who, besides being ready for vigorous action, would also be able to draw effective naval operations scenarios and, if possible, guess correctly the enemy's destination, strength, and disposition of ships. Naturally, this process is closely related to conditions and circumstances influencing the actions and reactions of the opposing parties. On naval strategy, the Navy acts as an instrument contributing to the implementation of methods which lead to sought after goals, thus, abiding by and satisfying defined and agreed upon naval strategy, and finally state doctrine. Of course, all three elements have to be combined. As indeed has been proposed, «if there is no doctrine, strategy cannot be translated into tactical actions».²⁸

On Venice's side its authorities had to deal with the traumatic loss of Crete in 1669, following four centuries of occupation and absorption of the big island, and also the economic loss inflicted on the Republic's finances, first by the protracted military operations and then by the damage inflicted upon its economy and geostrategic interests. The loss of the big island also meant the loss of repair and maintenance naval stations right in the Aegean Sea, and, inevitably, the disappearance of a pool of human resources. Indeed, long years of fight, huge losses, both material and human, caused irreparable damage. However, as a member of a mighty alliance, the Republic counter-attacked and at the end of the 17th century, in 1699, found itself in possession of a huge piece of land, the Peloponnese, just northwest of Crete. Its efforts to improve economic conditions and plant strong roots in the new territory would inevitably take years and the Republic did not have time. Strategically, in case of a new war, the new territory, adjacent to main-

28 Vice Admiral Luigi DONOLO, Italian Navy – James J. TRITTEN, *The History of Italian Naval Doctrine*, Naval Doctrine Command, Norfolk, Virginia, 1 June, 1995, p. 3.

land Greece, was fully exposed to the enemy. Thus, during the few years of its stay Venice channeled its energies to the task of building and repairing powerful fortifications, a previously tried defensive tactic, with various rates of success. Indeed, the Republic's wars with its great adversary had, for most of the time, been fought around fortresses. Cyprus, with Nicosia and Famagusta, is an example and, of course Crete and the epic siege of the great fortress of Candia (today's Heraklion) is the most notorious. The wars ended only when those fortresses were captured and a peace treaty was signed, until, of course, the next war and the next sieges. However, there was another important element, defining the outcome of those struggles: naval action. Unavoidably, this was imposed by the region's geography which defined, to a large extent, the history of the relations, violent or not, of the two Mediterranean actors, and, inevitably, from very early on their antagonism became marked by a strong naval element. In the war of 1714–1718 Venice had to protect the repaired and newly constructed, with huge expense, Peloponnesian strongholds. Being, however, unable to prevent the land approach of the huge army led by the Grand Vizier, it might be said that the Republic's naval force should at least have tried to impede, or seriously obstruct, all naval assistance, allowing only one arm of the enemy's might to function. The method had been tried at Candia for many years. At least, in the Peloponnese, in the case of strongly fortified Nafplion, it could have been attempted. How successful might the effort have been it is not known. Of course, the issue rests upon the question of whether a Venetian naval strategy, corresponding to a doctrine, existed or not at that time. In the case of the Republic's eastern possessions, before and during the first year of the war, both doctrine and subsequent strategy are lost in fog. Huge investments in fortifications, but no sufficient and competent human investment for their protection, is the rule. Inevitably, the answer to the existence of naval strategy ought to be negative, at least for the first year of the war. Indeed, for that time, it can be said that there was no Venetian Navy. The years 1717 and 1718 were a different story. Those were the years of Venetian naval reaction, but it was too late, and the war ended before any results were produced. Indeed, in 1715 and 1716, the Ottoman fleet, clearly following well defined doctrine and strategy, was moving at will and later, having pushed the Venetian fleet out of the Northern Aegean, was even preparing a new attempt, for 1717 and 1718, to capture the southern Ionian Islands, but in 1718 strong Venetian reaction and then Passarowitz put an end to all naval action.

Corbett put an emphasis on the issue of command of the sea, meaning control of maritime communications and not, necessarily, conquering of the sea, something physically impossible. He advanced the notion that naval warfare had as a main object the acquisition of command of the sea, while at the same time preventing the enemy from acquiring it. Acquiring and securing command of it depends on the outcome of a naval battle or the success of naval blockade. To obtain the best result and secure the desired goal the method needed consisted of the tactic of concentration or grouping of forces. Thus, a powerful strike could be launched upon the enemy.²⁹ These arguments were successfully set in motion by the Ottoman Navy, which also succeeded in obtaining control of the sea simultaneously with the Ottoman Army obtaining control of the land. It is evident that two negative elements undermined Venetian resolution and caused the loss of command at sea, in the sense of total collapse of communications with its remaining Aegean possessions. Those were the poor condition of the Navy, reflecting the prevailing mood among a number of influential members of the Venetian body politic, and its timorous command, reaching the level of cowardice, in the person of Daniel Dolfin. Thus, to paraphrase Corbett and put Venice instead of England: «if Venice were to lose command of the sea, it would be all over with her»³⁰ was not far from the truth. On land, things were not much different and thus the Ottoman Army, in full coordination with the Navy, prevailed easily. In the past Venetian Naval Strategy was aimed at keeping the enemy's Navy locked in the Dardanelles and thus protect the Aegean possessions of the Republic, simultaneously preventing the naval arm of the enemy from reinforcing troops operating on land. This time the old tactic was forgotten. Besides, there was nothing left to protect in the Aegean.

As with past wars between the two, the Ottoman Navy was ready to fight in order to avoid being blockaded in the straits. In the first and most critical year of the war the two eternal adversaries found themselves in different situations. It was indeed a one sided war, with Venice bound to disappear from the regional scene almost within three months. Indeed, the Ottoman Army and Navy carried a two prong attack first on land, all the way down to the Peloponnese, and then through the Aegean Sea capturing the last Venetian possessions. In the following

29 CORBETT, *Some Principles of Maritime Strategy*, cit., pp. 91, 94, 128, 163.

30 England, in *Ibid.*, text, p. 92.

year (1716), again in a combined Army and Navy operation, Corfu was besieged (Fig. 6). However, the expansion of the war in the Danube front in the same year, and Prince Eugene's victories, saved the strategic island for Venice and a new siege was not repeated for the remainder of the war. The years 1717 and 1718 were more traditional in sea activity, but were characterized by dearth of land operations in the region. As in the past, again the Venetian Navy, now stronger – soon to be reinforced by allied units –, attempted to bottle up the Ottomans in the Dardanelles. By successfully shutting up or forcing battle, which would have to be won, with a Navy now about equal in size to the enemy's, at least in firepower, a reversal of the strategic situation in the Aegean could be expected. The question was why now? Wasn't it too late? In the past, in order to preserve possessions in the Archipelago or protect sea lanes leading to the Aegean possessions, that was the way to act. Now, conditions had changed and all Venetian Archipelago holdings had been lost. The idea of preparing the ground for landings here and there, maybe on the Peloponnese or, again, on Crete, and starting all over again the 1680's and the 1690's had to be dropped for lack of means and especially of a land army. However, Venice still held valuable land assets in the Ionian Sea, which had to be defended. Their defense began in the Dardanelles. With the winds imposing, to a large extent, the movements of the opposing fleets, dissolving the concentration of units and upsetting their plans, the Ottoman fleet came out successfully, clashed valiantly with the Venetian ships, and during the fight among the many dead on both sides was counted Lodovico Flangini. Slowly, but steadily, the Ottoman ships made headway and in that same Summer of 1717 they were fighting the Venetians further south, in the gulf of Laconia. By now, it had become clear that the Kapudan Pasha intended to sail westward and assault the islands of Zakynthos and Cephalonia, while transporting from the Peloponnese a landing force. The enemy had to be stopped at all costs, which indeed happened.³¹ The next Summer, 1718, violent and particularly murderous fighting occurred again in the area of the gulf of Laconia. With the Venetian sailors being able to repel the assault on the Ionian Islands, and ready to continue fighting, news of the Treaty of Passarowitz reached the parties and the war ended.

Due to the initiative being held by the Ottoman fleet, and the lack of Venetian reaction in the early stages of the war, instructions could be issued and commu-

31 FERRARI, *Delle notizie storiche*, cit., p. 204.

nicated by the Ottoman Supreme Command, aiming at simultaneous operations, without adapting them to the enemy's inexistent reaction. In pursuing its objectives the fleet had freedom of action, and could adapt to necessities and changing conditions. With the Navy transporting heavy equipment and troops to the Army operating in the Peloponnese, other naval units could operate elsewhere. Inevitably, the early successes caused hardship to the Venetian crews, prone to discouragement and desertions. For the Ottoman Naval Command it was a question of trying to hurt the enemy's will to resist. This explains the enthusiasm shown by the Venetians, beyond the usual official ceremonies, for the arrival of the big Portuguese ships and those of the other allies. In the second stage of the war the two opponents were almost equal in war materiel and human resources.

From the beginning, the war was fought on the Ottoman side based on coordination of land and sea forces, with the latter also controlling and protecting sea communications and emerging as a very important element for the realization of the goals set by the Ottoman Supreme Military Command. The Navy acted in close coordination with the Army, seeing it exactly as a second line. The strategy followed by the Ottomans, in 1715 was based on weak enemy reaction and heavy strikes upon him. Following that year and the withdrawal of the Grand Vizier's troops from the Peloponnese, the two adversaries found themselves almost equal at sea. What mattered now were their plans and the methods for their achievement, which influenced the general conduct of the war at sea and the continuity of their actions. The attempt to keep the Ottoman Navy locked in the straits, in order to protect the Ionian Islands, failed. Indeed, in 1717 the Kapudan Pasha's ships sortied but, one year later the two fleets were still fighting in the Aegean, now along the coast of southeastern Peloponnese. The Ottoman Naval Command still intended to assault the Ionian Islands and also transport troops to them from the Peloponnese. It was however, late in the Summer, and in the final action of the war, in August 1718, that the Ottoman fleet was repulsed by the Venetian Navy. Thus, the new aggressive Venetian Naval Strategy produced results. Its main characteristic was, first and foremost, an offensive orientation, set in motion by a combat minded leadership, which also inspired the fleet's crews and raised the spirits of the men. What followed was the reinforcement of the fleet with allied units, especially the Portuguese big warships, in order to upset the Ottoman advantage in the number of units. Also important was the addition of fireships, which, if not materially effective, at least they caused anxiety among the enemy.

Captains, who had an additional element to worry about. Meanwhile, in Venice the arsenal's shipyards were actively pursuing construction of new ships.

More than one hundred and fifty years later, the great priest of naval strategy Alfred Thayer Mahan (1840–1914) examined in his opus the encounters in the Atlantic and Indian oceans of Europe's sea protagonists, England, France, Holland, and to a lesser extent Spain. He might as well have examined the two Aegean adversaries, who had been at odds for a much longer time than Mahan's actors. However, in the late 19th century Venice did not exist as an independent state, but instead was seen as a cultural icon, thanks in part to John Raskin's three volumes on *The Stones of Venice* (1851–1853), and becoming a prized tourist destination, while the decaying Ottoman Empire was known as the sick man of Europe. But even so, the two old enemies fall largely within Mahan's prerequisites, something which essentially points to the universality of the precepts diagnosed by the keen American naval academic. Indeed, geographically, a concentration of forces was dictated upon both adversaries. The war had to be fought in the Aegean, a restrained sea space, dotted with islands. Certainly, it was not the wide Atlantic. This, inevitably favored a concentration of forces on both sides in a small area, a more or less limited dispersal of units and better communications under normal sailing, and also better coordinated handling of the movements of individual units by the High Command, when and if needed. However, on the negative side, when, during battle season, the vicious summer winds of the Aegean blew, all plans and calculations simply went amiss. With a strength of 7 or 8 on the Beaufort scale, the Etesians (*meltemia*) imposed nature's will on man's actions and behavior.

Mahan recognized that «circumstances have caused the Mediterranean to play a greater part in the history of the world, both in a commercial and a military point of view, than any other sheet of water of the same size. Nation after nation has striven to control it, and the strife still goes on». Almost all elements, cited by the American author were encountered there, and the Aegean seaboard of the Ottoman Empire may be seen as a frontier opening to the outside world, while Venice was unable to maintain its positions, although it had come to the Aegean long before its antagonist. Of course, on a more practical and positive scale, in the case of both powers the existence of great shipping meant extended employment, crews were recruited from all around the Mediterranean, and great numbers



11 Corfu, view of the port of Gouvia and the Venetian shipyards. Source: André GRASSET DE SAINT-SAUVEUR, *Voyage historique, littéraire et pittoresque dans les îles et possessions ci-devant vénitiennes du Levant [...]*, Paris, chez Tavernier, [1800].

of people were involved in the construction, repair, and maintenance of ships.³² Finally, what emerged from the violence at sea, during the 1714–1718 war, was the fact that the Navy was the most important element, far more important than fortresses, for the defense and survival of Venice, something also demonstrated in previous conflicts. When it was neglected and kept aside, the first year of the war ended in disaster, and one can only imagine what might have happened had the Republic not mobilized its one and only available weapon of defense and

³² Alfred Thayer MAHAN, *The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660–1783*, 12th edition, Boston, Little, Brown and Co., 1890, pp. 29–31, 33, 35, 46. For example, during the siege of Corfu by the Ottomans in 1716, the Venetians built a shipyard at Gouvia to service their ships (Figs. 11 and 12); it was part of a network of Venetian arsenals and naval stations in the Hellenic territories.

counter-attack. After all, from time immemorial the sea has imposed upon those who sail on it its own terms and rules. Human strategy is adapted to the capricious watery element. One has to abide by it, learn from it, adapt to it, respect it, and know how to handle its component winds, storms, currents, and distances. This experience has to be combined with familiarity, demonstrated by ships's crews, with human inventions, from the lone sail of times past to the complexity of the ships of our times.

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12 Corfu, today's view of the Venetian shipyards at Gouvia. Photo by the editor.




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


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Documents



FORTIFICATIONS OF FAMAGUSTA



1 Diagram of the fortifications of Famagusta, by Xwejnusgozo.

Source: Wikimedia Commons.

The Final Report of Lorenzo Bembo, Venetian *capitano* of Famagusta (November 21, 1567):

A Primary Source on the Status and Preparations for Defense
in Cyprus before the Outbreak of the Venetian–Ottoman War
(1570–1571)

by STATHIS BIRTACHAS (ED.)^{*}

Introduction

In the Venetian state, all outgoing officials were first obliged to give an oral account of their activities before the doge or the Senate and then (from the second decade of the 16th century onwards) to submit a hand-written report to the metropolitan authorities.¹ Here is published the final report to the Senate of Lorenzo Bembo, *capitano* of Famagusta, who served during the last decade of the Venetian rule on Cyprus.

Apart from the administrative and judicial authority in Famagusta and the districts of Mesaoria and Carpas, in times of peace, the *capitano* of Famagusta (the city was essentially a military base) was also the general commander of the Venetian army on Cyprus. In times of war and emergency due to impending external threats or military invasion and pirate raids, another official, the *provveditore generale*, took over the command of all military forces on the island, replacing the *capitano* of Famagusta. However, during the last decade of the Venetian rule on the island (1560–1570/1), *provveditori generali* were appointed on a regular

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1 Stathis BIRTACHAS, *Venetian Cyprus (1489–1571). Reports by the Dominion's Supreme Administrative Officials*, Thessaloniki, Epikentro Publishers, 2020, pp. 41–42, 425–426.

basis (approximately every two years)² and the two officials cooperated with each other, as well as with other military experts sent to Cyprus to prepare it for war.³

This document is an important primary source from the Venetian State Archives that provides information regarding mainly: a) the status and preparations for defense in Cyprus – and in Famagusta in particular, the principal fortress of the island (Figs. 1-3) – before the outbreak of the Venetian–Ottoman War (1570–1571); and b) the movements of the Ottoman surveillance galleys from Rhodes, Alexandria and Archipelago in the Cypriot area and the policies of the local Venetian authorities towards them, as well as the circulation of information about the enemy by informants and amateur spies at that time.

In his final report (November 21, 1567), Lorenzo Bembo refers first of all to the exact dates on which he took office and handed over command to the next *capitano*: he arrived in Famagusta to take up his duties on August 15, 1565, replacing his predecessor Nicolò Gabriel, while his successor, Marco Michiel, arrived in Famagusta on September 14, 1567.⁴

Due to the lack of men in the ranks of Venetian supreme officials (see below), Bembo and Antonio Bragadin, at that time *provveditore generale* of the island, undertook the management of grain production, including the task of securing the quantities necessary for the annual stock as well as the provisions for the fortress of Famagusta in case of war. Bembo lists the ways of managing the product, the measures for its renewal, the currently stored quantities and the policies for

2 For a list of them, see BIRTACHAS, *Venetian Cyprus (1489–1571)*, cit., p. 397.

3 On them, see, e.g., the essay of Chrysovalantis PAPADAMOU, «The Multifaceted Role of the Cypriot Élite in the Defense of Cyprus before and during the Venetian–Ottoman War (1570–1571)», published in the present special issue. See also below, note 5.

4 Bembo was elected on January 14, 1565 (1564 *more veneto* [date based on the Venetian calendar]). His term of office would formally end on August 14, 1567. ARCHIVIO DI STATO DI VENEZIA (ASV), Segretario alle Voci, Elezioni del Maggior Consiglio, reg. 4, fols. 184v-185r (*olim* 179v-180r). Later on (August 20, 1568), he was elected as *provveditore generale* of the island. He died in Cyprus before the outbreak of the War (on December 30, 1569). BIBLIOTECA NAZIONALE MARCIANA DI VENEZIA (BNMV), Marc. It. VII, 198 (=8383), fol. 233r; LOUIS DE MAS LATRIE, *Histoire de l'île de Chypre sous le règne des princes de la maison de Lusignan*, Vol. 3, Paris, Imprimerie Nationale, 1855 (repr.: Famagusta, Les Editions l'Oiseau, 1970), p. 852; Aikaterini ARISTEIDOU, Ανέκδοτα έγγραφα της κυπριακής ιστορίας από το Κρατικό Αρχείο της Βενετίας, Vol. 1: (1474–1508), Nicosia, Cyprus Research Centre, 1990, p. 176; BIRTACHAS, *Venetian Cyprus (1489–1571)*, cit., pp. 394 and note 41, 397 and note 17.

stocks in general. He says that the *Rettori* of Nicosia should be pressured to send to Famagusta the total of grain quantities prescribed by law.

Further on, the author refers to the shortage afflicting the island, attributed, on the one hand, to the prolonged drought and, on the other, to the reckless expansion of cotton cultivation that displaced the cultivation of grain. Afterwards, he denounces the practice of landowners and leaseholders who purchase from other producers the quantities that they are obliged to deliver for the annual grain stock (*tansa*), also contributing to rising prices. The author suggests the return to the cultivation of grain in the lands that were initially intended for this purpose. For a series of important reasons, he also proposes that producers should deliver grain for *tansa* in September and not in October, as is the present custom.

As to the timber and firewood supply of Famagusta, the author suggests ways to increase it. Olive oil and vinegar, products stored and maintained in an appropriate manner, are abundant. There is no water problem in times of peace. In times of war, though, the sources of water will come into the hands of the enemy. The author proposes a system of management for the water from the wells in the city.

Provisions to meet the needs of the artillery are appropriate, thanks to the action taken by Bembo himself and the *provveditore generale*. There is a detailed description of their locations, storage and maintenance.

Fortification works in Famagusta develop rapidly and in line with the requirements of the *Serenissima*. A series of works, some of which had begun before Bembo took office, are completed. The author gives a detailed description: at the new bastion (*baluardo*), in two curtain walls (*cortine*) and other points of the walls, earthworks and levelling off the ground in problematic areas of the fortress, widening of the fosse, levelling of the so-called Hebrew Heights or Mountains (*Alture* or *Monti degli Ebrei*), etc. Bembo points out the fact that funds had been saved for the implementation of these projects as well as the important help provided by some military experts and officers.

Due to the lack of suitable accommodation for the soldiers and their presently unhealthy living conditions, it is imperative to continue the construction of new lodgings especially for them: (123 lodgments have been constructed, and during Bembo's term 18 more were built, not including the 25 old ones in the *Castello* of the city). During their construction, the *capitano* ensured cost-cutting by reducing the remuneration of the workers.

When Giulio Savorgnan arrived (May 10, 1567) – undertaking the supervision of the fortification works on the island (*governatore generale del Regno di Cipro*)⁵ in view of the danger of an Ottoman attack – Bembo and the *provveditore generale* were informed regarding the plans of the Senate for the construction of new walls around the capital, Nicosia, the reinforcement of the obsolete fortress of Kyrenia, and the completion of the fortification works in Famagusta. About the works in Nicosia, which began on June 1, 1567, Bembo refers to the views of the *provveditore generale* and Savorgnan, because, due to serious reasons, he has been unable to visit the city and supervise them. As to Famagusta, the two officials mentioned above have visited the city, as also did colonel Leonardo Roncone, *governatore* of the civil militia (*cernide, ordinanze*). All of them, along with *capitano* Bembo and the *governatore* of Famagusta's infantry (*governatore delle fanterie*), Scipion Piasenzo, have inspected the walls and have drafted a memorandum of 17 points detailing the required repair and reinforcement works that ought to be completed until March 1568. Consequently, Bembo cites the content of this memorandum. Apart from the works involved, he considers it essential to include some other works as well, to be carried out with few expenses in a short period. Additionally, Bembo lists in a detailed way the works that he himself managed to complete until his departure with the help of soldiers and personal service of the peasants in the area (in the form of statute labor or *angaria*).⁶ Nevertheless, because of the great distance of Cyprus from the metropolis or the nearer possession of Crete (about 2,000 and 600 miles respectively, according to the author) and its vicinity to enemy territory such as Caramania and Syria (some locations on the island are only six hours from the opposite Ottoman coast, according to the author), in his opinion it is essential to also ensure the transfer of

5 On this important military engineer of the Venetian state, as well as on the activity of him, his brother, Ascanio, and other military experts before the outbreak of the War of Cyprus, see mainly Gilles GRIVAUD, *Venice and the Defence of the Regno di Cipro. Giulio Savorgnan's Unpublished Cyprus Correspondence, including Ascanio Savorgnan's Descrittione delle cose di Cipro from the Collections of the Bank of Cyprus Cultural Foundation*, translated by G. Cunningham, Nicosia, Bank of Cyprus Cultural Foundation, 2016. Review of this book is included in the present special issue.

6 On the enforcement of the statute labor in military construction works in the Venetian state, and in the Peloponnese in particular, between the First and the Second Morean Wars, see the essay of Eirini VRETTOU, «Personal and fiscal *angarie* in Peloponnesian fortification works during the Second Venetian Rule (1685–1715)», published in the present special issue.

adequate and capable military forces and the required ammunition and provisions. Concerning the fortress of Kyrenia, finally, there is nothing to be said, since the relevant works have not even begun yet.

As the metropolitan authorities have already been informed, the garrison of infantrymen in Famagusta is not sufficient to cover the required services: with the exception of the sick, there are 400 soldiers instead of the 600 that are needed. The author asks for the reinforcement of the garrison with capable and disciplined men, just as the ones already serving in the city. He also notes some allegations of speculations by the *capitani* of the infantry against their soldiers during the procedures for replacing and equipping them, and he suggests measures to combat this practice and also to solve the problems in securing provisions of food and freight for the soldiers during their initial journey to the possession. Throughout Bembo's term, the construction of a military hospital with 40 beds was completed. This hospital started functioning and providing medical care not only to soldiers but also to distressed citizens in general.

Regarding the various military units on the island: a) The author notes the scarcity of expert and experienced bombardiers. b) He lists the numerous and serious disadvantages (among which lack of obedience to Venice or exemption from patrolling the coasts), in times of peace as well as in times of war, of the current force of civil militia (*cernide, ordinarze*), made up of 5,000 "free" peasants (farmers-land tenants, *francomati*), and proposes its abolition. On the other hand, he emphasizes that after the completion of the fortification works, in case of war there will be a need for 5,000-6,000 infantrymen in Nicosia, 1,000 in Kyrenia and 3,000-4,000 in Famagusta. Part of the expenses for them could be covered thanks to the abolition of the civil militia. c) The light cavalry of the *stradioti* has been reorganized through purges and now is in an excellent condition,⁷ thanks to the care taken by the *provveditore generale* Francesco Barbaro. One the other hand, the decree of the *Serenissima* to abolish the force of 200 mounted arquebusiers (*archibusieri a cavallo*), who were exclusively employed in agriculture, has

⁷ On the peculiarity of these units in the Venetian Maritime State, see Stathis BIRTACHAS, «*Stradioti, Cappelletti, Compagnie or Milizie Greche*: ‘Greek’ Mounted and Foot Troops in the Venetian State (Fifteenth to Eighteenth Centuries)», in Georgios THEOTOKIS and Aysel YILDIZ (Eds.), *A Military History of the Mediterranean Sea: Aspects of War, Diplomacy and Military Elites*, Leiden, Brill, 2018, pp. 325-346, esp. 331-335.

been implemented. d) The so-called *provisionati a cavallo*⁸ must be chosen to be competent and worthy, possessing – like those of the feudal cavalry – good quality horses and not practicing professions (as those of the merchant, lawyer, etc.) which prevent them from carrying out their duties.

Moreover, the two galleys that arrived at the island bringing the previously mentioned Giulio Savorgnan showed that these vessels are quite useful in times of peace: during their stay on the island no Ottoman ships appeared, while their crew contributed to the completion of fortification works and other tasks under way. These galleys would have been even more useful in times of war, carrying ammunition as well as participating in warfare with their canons and in other ways.

Disorderly conditions due to grain shortages and the ensuing unrest in Nicosia were handled efficiently thanks to action by the *provveditore generale* Barbaro. Yet, the peaceful climate and social equilibrium could be upset by the presence of the Orthodox bishop of the city, who is quarrelsome and disobedient to the Latin archbishop. The author proposes his transfer to Venice. In contrast, the relations between the primates of the two churches in Famagusta are excellent.

The *Reggimento* of Nicosia is under severe strain due to the successive deaths of its members, a fact that resulted in additional duties for the *capitano* of Famagusta, Bembo (for example, see above the issue of grain stocks). Specifically, there were the deaths of Pandolfo Guoro, *luogotenente*;⁹ Antonio Bragadin, *provveditore generale*; Benedetto Contarini, counsellor; as well as that of Andrea Lando, *camerlengo* and deputy vice counsellor. Subsequently, supreme local administration was limited to Giacomo Ghisi, counsellor, who took over as a vice *luogotenente*, and Giovanni Battista Mocenigo, who served as a vice

8 60 or a little more economically weak aristocrats (non-fief holders), obliged to perform military service on horseback in return of an annual state subsidy. Stathis BIRTACHAS, *Society, Culture and Government in the Venetian Maritime State: The Case of Cyprus* [Κοινωνία, πολιτισμός και διακυβέρνηση στο βενετικό Κράτος της Θάλασσας: Το παράδειγμα της Κύπρου], Thessaloniki, Vanias Publishers, 2011, pp. 49-50; Benjamin ARBEL, «Η Κύπρος ωπό ενετική κυριαρχία», in Theodoros PAPADOPOULOS (Ed.), *Iστορία της Κύπρου*, Vol. 4, *Μεσαιωνικόν βασίλειον-Ενετοκρατία*, Nicosia, Archbishop Makarios III Foundation / Office for Cyprus History, 1995, pp. 476-477. Cf. Gilles GRIVAUD and Aspasia PAPADAKI, “L’institution de la *mostra generale* de la cavalerie féodale en Crète et en Chypre vénitiennes durant le XVIIe siècle”, *Studi Veneziani*, n.s., 12 (1986), pp. 165-199: *passim* and esp. pp. 165-166 note 7, 189-199 “Annexe C”.

9 Before his departure for Cyprus, *luogotenente* Marino Gradenigo, who had been elected in 1565, had also died. ARISTEIDOU, *Ανέκδοτα έγγραφα της κυπριακής ιστορίας*, cit., p. 164.

counsellor. Later on, in August 1567, the next *luogotenente*, Nicolò Querini, also died in Cyprus.

Around 70,000 serfs (*parici*) on the island live in conditions of dire poverty and hardship, and, consequently, nobody could be certain of their obedience in case of danger or war; the case of the “free” farmers-land tenants (*francomati*) must also be taken into account, since their position is hardly better.¹⁰

For reasons of hygiene, drainage works in Costanza, a swampy area adjacent to the city of Famagusta, began under the supervision of the engineer Felice Brunello, who was sent from Venice for this purpose.

The decree of December 23, 1564, integrated to the written commission (*commissione*) of Bembo, regarding the equal distribution of revenue from fines to construction works for the administration building and to the public treasury, it cannot be implemented in the case of Famagusta. The practices there are quite different from the Italian ones: due to the poverty of the Community of Famagusta and with the agreement of Venice, the said funds are spent for salaries of people holding a series of offices that provide charitable services, welfare projects, beneficences and city landscaping, as well as to religious institutions. The resolution of this issue through a new decree is pending. Then, follows a detailed list of the current distribution of revenue from fines in Famagusta.

The last part of the report comprises a detailed description of an event that took place in early September 1567 and is related to the arrival of 13 Ottoman surveillance galleys in Cyprus (4 from Rhodes, 5 from Alexandria and 4 from the

10 To get a better idea of this problem and the danger that the Venetian rulers was facing, in 1569 the *parici* amounted to 70,000, the *francomati* to 70,000 and the urban population of the island to only 40,000. BIRTACHAS, *Venetian Cyprus (1489–1571)*, cit., p. 365; Benjamin ARBEL, «Cypriot Population under Venetian Rule (1473–1571). A Demographic study», *Mελέται και Υπομνήματα*, 1 (1984), table VII. See also below, attached document No 2. To this, it should be added the discontent of the popular social strata (*popolo*) and their consequent riots that broke out in Nicosia due to the wheat famine that affected the island at that time (the problem is mentioned in Lorenzo Bembo’s report). For further information on this issue, see Stathis BIRTACHAS, «Produzione di cereali e crisi alimentare e sociale a Cipro veneziana (1560–70): la testimonianza dei pubblici rappresentanti nelle loro relazioni finali», in Bruno CREVATO-SELVAGGI (Ed.), *Atti del VIII Convegno internazionale Venezia e il suo Stato da mar. Alimentazione, cibo, gastronomia nello Stato da mar / Proceedings of the 8th International Congress Venice and its Stato da Mar. Food and Gastronomy in the Venetian Stato da Mar (Venezia / Venice, 13–15 febbraio / February 2020)*, Rome, Società Dalmata di Storia Patria, 2022, pp. 281–297.

Archipelago). The gifts and monies offered by Bembo to the two military officers who accompanied the galleys (*capitani della guardia*) for their immediate and safe removal are briefly described as well as the compliments exchanged between the two parties. The Ottomans sent some men to the city to buy food and provisions. They were impressed, as were their commanding officers, by the abundance of provisions and the strong defensive system of Famagusta – according to them, stronger than that of Malta or Rhodes (Fig. 4). The author also mentions their fear of the light cavalry units of the *stradioti* who guarded the adjacent shores. Four slaves of the visitors escaped to the city; three of them were found and returned. One of the two Ottoman *capitani* sent a letter thanking Venetian authorities and asking them to find and return the fourth one to Alexandria (see attached document No 1, translated by Bembo in Italian). The author also refers to the news and rumors from various people and sources regarding the large-scale war preparations of the Ottomans for the conquest of Cyprus. Finally, beside the aforementioned Ottoman letter of appreciation, there is a document dated September 6, 1567, which refers to the information that Antonio dal Beretin, one of the *capitani* in the garrison of infantrymen in Famagusta, acquired from a trusted man from Rhodes (see attached document No 2). According to the informant, the Venetians should not trust lower-class Cypriots because of the oppression they suffer. The Ottomans, well informed of this favorable stance of the Cypriots towards them in case of a regime change, are preparing a quite large military operation in order to attack Cyprus next year.¹¹

In summary, the document published here provides a vivid picture of the defensive system on Cyprus three years before the outbreak of the Venetian–Ottoman war of 1570–1571, with emphasis on the fortification plans and works

11 On this issue and the stance of the Cypriot population during the Venetian–Ottoman War of 1570–1571, see, e.g., Gilles GRIVAUD, «Une société en guerre: Chypre face à la conquête ottomane», in Angel NICOLAOU-KONNARI (Ed.), *H Γαληνοτάτη και η Ευγενεστάτη: H Βενετία στην Κύπρο και η Κύπρος στη Βενετία / La Serenissima and La Nobilissima: Venice in Cyprus and Cyprus in Venice*, Nicosia, Bank of Cyprus Cultural Foundation, 2009, pp. 194–203; IDEM, «Η κατάκτηση της Κύπρου από τους Οθωμανούς», in Theodoros PAPADOPOULOS (Ed.), *Iστορία της Κύπρου*, Vol. 6: *Τοντοκρατία*, Nicosia, Archbishop Makarios III Foundation / Office for Cyprus History, 2011, pp. 1–182: *passim*, esp. pp. 34, 38, 40, 57–58, 59 and note 53, 61, 62–63, 64–65 and note 68, 67, 78, 83, 86, 93. Cf. Benjamin ARBEL, «Résistance ou collaboration? Les Chypriotes sous la domination vénitienne», in Michel BALARD (Ed.), *État et colonisation au Moyen Âge et à la Renaissance*, Lione, La Manufacture, 1989, pp. 131–143.

that were being carried out in the fortresses of the main cities, the military officers and engineers who supervised them, the supply of food and ammunition to the fortress of Famagusta – the most important fortress on the island –, the management of natural resources in view of the war and the possible dangers it entailed for the defenders of Famagusta, as well as the construction of lodging and a hospital for the soldiers of the garrison of the city. The author of the report, a high rank military official, also notes the number of soldiers needed to defend each of the island's fortresses and stresses the need for the timely dispatch to Cyprus of expertise and adequate military forces. Moreover, Lorenzo Bembo depicts the climate of tension, both internal and external, that prevailed in the most far-off Venetian possession, highlighting, on the one hand, the social unrest due to the miserable living conditions of the lower social strata and the wheat famine at that time, and, on the other, the threat of Ottoman surveillance vessels in the south-eastern Mediterranean. Finally, he presents some aspects of the secret war between the two rivals in the region, namely the activity of informants and amateur spies.¹²

12 On the espionage in the Venetian state and the Ottoman Empire, see mainly the following studies, with bibliography: Paolo PRETO, *I servizi segreti di Venezia. Spionaggio e contraspionaggio ai tempi della Serenissima*, Milano, Il Saggiatore, 2016; Ioanna IORDANOU, *Venice's Secret Service: Organizing Intelligence in the Renaissance*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2019; Emrah Safa GÜRKAN, *Espionage in the 16th century Mediterranean: Secret Diplomacy, Mediterranean go-betweens and the Ottoman-Habsburg Rivalry*, PhD diss., Georgetown University, 2012; IDEM, «L'Idra del Sultano: Lo spionaggio ottomano nel Cinquecento», *Mediterranea: Ricerche Storiche*, 38 (December 2016), pp. 447-476; IDEM, «Laying Hands on Arcana Imperii: Venetian Baili as Spymasters in Sixteenth-Century Istanbul», in Paul MADDRELL, Christopher MORAN, Mark STOUT, and Ioanna IORDANOU (Eds.), *Spy Chiefs*, Vol. 2: *Intelligence leaders in Europe, the Middle East, and Asia*, Washington, D.C., Georgetown University Press, 2017, pp. 67-96; IDEM, «Dishonorable Ambassadors: Spies and Secret Diplomacy in Ottoman Istanbul», *Archivum Ottomanicum*, 35 (2018), pp. 47-61; IDEM, «I baili veneziani e la diplomazia d'informazione fra Venezia e Istanbul», *Thesaurismata*, 46 (2018), pp. 101-116; IDEM, «Between connectivity and isolation: insularity and flow of information in Sixteenth-century Mediterranean», in Gerassimos D. PAGRATIS (Ed.), *Πόλεμος, Κράτος και Κοινωνία στο Ιόνιο Πέλαγος (τέλη 14ου–αρχές 19ου αιώνα)*, Athens, Ionian Society for Historian Studies – Erodotos Publishers, 2018, pp. 45-78; IDEM, «*Hile ü Hu'da*: Deception, Dissimulation and Manipulation of Information in Sixteenth Century Ottoman Empire», *Acta Orientalia Academiae Scientiarum Hung.*, 72, 4 (2019), pp. 437-454. On the Greeks as informants and spies in the service of all rival forces in Sixteenth-century Mediterranean, see also Kostas G. TSIKNAKIS, «The Greeks and the Secret War among Venice, Spain and the Ottoman Empire: the Plans for the Occupation of Nafplio on the Eve of the Fourth Venetian-Ottoman War

Lorenzo Bembo's final report

METHOD OF THE EDITION: Following the diplomatic method of editing documents and in the spirit of the most discrete intervention on the part of the editor, abbreviations are tacitly expanded according to the indications of the document and not to the rules of modern Italian, since the language in the text is in a transitional stage between medieval and modern Italian, in combination with Venetian idioms. Original spelling is maintained, and author's misspellings and variations are observed. Consequently, word division follows the original: words joined together are not separated nor joined in the case of compound words so as to comply with the rules of modern Italian. On the other hand, in some cases accents and punctuation are modified in order to overcome hurdles in comprehension. Finally, the initials of the main names are tacitly capitalized, as in names of people, places and the supreme administrative bodies of Venice (Senato, Consiglio dei Dieci), as well as more standardized expressions connoting the Venetian Republic (Serenissimo Principe, Serenissima Signoria, Illustrissima Signoria, Vostra Serenità, Vostra Sublimità, Illustrissimo Dominio) or the sultan of the Ottoman Empire (Signor [Turco], Gran Signor). Nevertheless, the capitalization of the initials of words other than the above names and expressions are quite limited.

Transcription symbols:

- || new folio tag
- \abc/ superscript letters
- {abc} words repeated unintentionally

ARCHIVIO DI STATO DI VENEZIA (ASV), Collegio (Secreta), Relazioni di ambasciatori, rettori e altre cariche, b. 84, fasc. 197, fols. 1r-20v (later numbering by the archivist), November 21, 1567. There are also two documents attached to the report: No 1, fols. 20v-21v, dated September 6, 1567; and No 2, fol. 21v, without a date. First published in Stathis BIRTACHAS, *Venetian Cyprus (1489–1571). Reports by the Dominion's Supreme Administrative Officials*, Thessaloniki, Epikentro Publishers, 2020, pp. 338-361.

1r

1567 a 21 di novembre vacante ducatu.
 Presentata per el clarissimo messer Lorenzo Bembo,
 ritornato capitaneo di Famagosta.

Relatione di me Lorenzo Bembo,
 già capitaneo del Regno di Cipro.

2r

|| Serenissimo Principe et Illustrissima Signoria

Per osservar il solito et laudevole costume dell reggimenti di referir nel ritorno et di presentar anco la relatione in scrittura, io Lorenzo Bembo, servitor di Vostra Serenità ritornato da Famagosta, le dirò reverentemente tutto quello che mi par degno di sua intelligentia delle cose del Regno di Cipro et particolarmente della città di Famagosta, benché con diverse lettere a sui tempi dinotai molti particolari secondo i propositi et bisogni occorrenti. Havend'io adunque fatta la mia entrata a 15 di agosto del 1565 et dato cambio al clarissimo messer Nicolò Gabriel, et ritrovato all' hora il clarissimo messer Antonio Bragadin meritissimo proveditor general, hora di felice memoria, qual era molto affettionato all'honor et al beneficio di Vostra Sublimità. Alqual et a me insieme fu da lei dato il carrico dell'administratione d'i frumenti per il deposito et munitione di quella fortezza, laqual munitione, essendo la più importante materia di tutte l' altre per la conservatione di quel Regno, mi fu anco più a core d'ogni altro negotio. Et però havend'io subito voluto diligentemente inquirir et veder lo stato di all' hora di essa munitione di frumenti, trovai che vi erano le fosse dell vecchi moggia 35 millia in circa et in tredeci magazeni moggia 42 milla in circa, che in tutto sono moggia 77 millia. Ma perché (come fu scritto per lettere de 23 agosto del '65) essi magazeni non eran fodrati di tavole, onde per la humidità de i muri et per il caldo si guastò quell'anno bona parte di essi frumenti, quali toccati dal mirto erano stati infossati; de' quali certa poca summa, che fu del tutto guasta, si convenne gettar via, ma quelli che si puotero usar per animali fur venduti a quel più che si puoté per minor danno di Vostra Sublimità, et la maggior parte fu venduta a diversi pretii per uso di quelli habitanti.

2v

Ma dapoi con le tavole, che mandò Vostra Serenità a mia ricchiesta, si è || comminciato a fodrar li due magazeni maggiori, nellquali con maggior securità di durata sono stati posti delli frumenti nuovi, et così se ne metter nell'avenire. Vero è che molto meglio et per più longo tempo si conservano nelle fosse, lequal capiscono la summa di moggia 64 millia, comprese le due che io comprai di tenuta di moggia 10 millia et tre altre fatte far di tenuta di moggia 18 millia, lequal tutte l'anno passato con l'aiuto di Dio et diligenza del clarissimo Reggimento sono state empite a conto del deposito delli moggia centomillia, il qual però non si è possuto all' hora del tutto fornir, anzi è convenuto spesso intaccarlo per le carestie corse per li bisogni della città di Nicosia et per li rispetti ben noti a Vostra Sublimità, di che particolarmente fu scritto per tante mano di lettere. Ma l'anno presente, che la divina gratia ha consolato quel Regno di ricolti fertilissimi di orzo et di frumento, spero in Dio et nella diligentia di quelli clarissimi Rettori et del clarissimo proveditor che quest'anno si potrà adempire esso deposito per bona munitione di quella fortezza tanto importante; perilche havendomi li presenti clarissimi Rettori drizzati alcuni mandati per parte delli assignamenti di quest'anno, et io havendo operato in quelli ultimi giorni del mio reggimento di farne condur a conto di essi mandati quella maggior quantità ch'èstata possibile a mia gratificatione, però che li appaltatori per legge hanno termine fino all'ottobrio di farli condurre, li restanti mandati ho lasciati al clarissimo successor, ilqual non mancarà della medesma diligenza et di far istanza al clarissimo Reggimento di Nicosia per haver li restanti assignamenti. Et sappia Vostra Sublimità che al partir mio ho lasciato in essa città di Famagosta nelle fosse frumento moggia 64.500 et nelli magazeni moggia 8.500, siché sono in tutto moggia 73 millia. Et quando sarà introdutta tutta la quantità di esso deposito alla summa di moggia 100 millia, che sarà oltra l'ordinaria limitatione delli moggia 40 millia

3r all'anno et dell'i 25 millia tanse de particolari, se avenisse che'l detto frumento || molto tempo invecchiasse, sempre è il modo di preservarlo con rinovarlo di anno in anno et con far biscotti per munitione. Delqual se soprabundasse in quantità, si potrebbe darne alle navi con avvantaggio et mandarne in armata, si come si faceva prima et anco in Candia se bisognasse, come già scrissi per lettere de 23 dicembre 1567, però che sarebbe quasi più secura munitione che li frumenti essendo in pan fatto, nelche restano superate tutte le difficultà: d'acqua, di legna, di molini e di forni. De quali molini, non essendone più de quatordeci, la città patisse molto, et tanto più al tempo che si convien herbar li cavalli, però che difficilmente si può trovar cavalli che suppliscano al servitio, massime l'anno passato che fu gran penuria di orzi. Et medesimamente li forni sono in poco numero, siché a pena ponno sopplir al bisogno ordinario della città, onde sarebbe di grande aiuto qualche numero di molle, come già scrissi a Vostra Sublimità per lettere de 18 dicembre del '65, per non esserne se non sedeci. Et nel già detto proposito di munitione et di biade, èstata ottima et santa deliberatione quella di Vostra Sublimità con l'illusterrimo Consiglio di X di non permetter ad alcuno tratta di biade fuor del Regno, perché con tal provisione, preservandosi quelle nell'isola, potrà in ogni occasione, che Dio ci guardi, giovar molto l'abundantia, sì come potrebbe far effetto contrario la penuria, come prudentissimamente ha considerato Vostra Sublimità. Laqual per soa clementia ha mandato a Famagosta un sussidio così buono della stara sei millia di megio a tempo così oportuno, con l'ordine de introdur seminatione che s'habbi a rinovar di anno in anno, nelche essendo già fatta esperienza, si trova riuscir bene et produr gran quantità, massime in quelli bailaggi c'hanno beneficio dell'acque; benché essendo quel megio vecchio, par che non produchi tanto bene, come farebbe se fosse novo, ma si potrà a sempre contracambiarlo con frumento over orzo.

3v || Et sa bene Vostra Sublimità che la carestia in quel Regno è causata sì perché il paese suol patir di seccure, come per le gran semine di tanti gottoni che si fanno ne i lochi a punto appropriati alli frumenti, che sono terreni beverativi, i quali mai fallano di produr bene. Et per causa di tali gottoni è introdotto nelle condittioni dell'i appalti che quelli che non seminano tanti frumenti che siano a bastanza et che potrebon seminare, sono però obligati a risponder alla Real certa limitatione di frumento, i quali comprano da altri, periche quelli c'hanno li frumenti da vender, li tengono et sostentano per venderli a detti appaltatori, ilche è cagione di tener alti li precii. Però mi parerebbe esser bene che con qualche destrezza et prudentia si dovesse introdurre che li bailaggi havessero a seminar sempre una limitation honesta di frumenti nella buoni terreni beverativi, sì come prima si faceva, et ciò a fine che l'isola sempre possa abundar di frumenti et non si reduca nella strettezza ch'è avenuta al mio tempo, della qual sono poi causati li travagli ben noti a Vostra Serenità. Et anco ricordarei modestamente che il termine assignato fin all'ottobrio, per ordini di Vostra Sublimità, al condur dentro la limitation ordinaria et tanse de particolari, de caetero fusse ristretto per tutto settembre per molti convenienti rispetti, et massime perche all' hora li frumenti si attrovano sopra le are in esser, et da lì in poi vengono traddotti per pagar debiti et per altri effetti, siché poi con maggior difficultà si ponno havere nel publico; oltra che fino al settembre sono suti et si ponno infossare con securità di lunga durata, sì come si ha veduta altre fiate la esperienza, et de lì in poi correndo rilego delle pioggie, anco infossati corrono risego di guastarsi presto. Et sarebbe anco bene che Vostra Sublimità, se così le paresse, con sue lettere maggiormente eccitasse l'animo dell'i clarissimi Rettori a mandar in Famagosta la integra quantità di frumenti del deposito et ogni altra sorte secondo la legge et la deliberatione di lei, essendo Famagosta la principal fortezza di quel Regno, come è ben noto a Vostra Serenità.

4r || Vi è poi conveniente munitione di legna, laqual munition però in caso di bisogno si potrebbe subito accrescer con tagliar alcuni frasconi, detti tamarisi, che sono in bona quantità intorno alle zenzive della Costanza, liquali si riservano a tal fine et anco per far cabioni, trincee et altre cose necessarie. Et quando anco maggiormente stringesse il bisogno, si servirebbe la città dell'alberi dell'iardini, quali per necessità in caso di guerra si converriano tagliare, per esser vicini alla città.

Ogli et aceti ve ne sono convenevolmente et riposti in buoni lochi per conservatione di quelli, revisti et refinati in uno tempo, si come spero che sarà fatto anco successivamente dalli mei successori.

Et perché ben sa Vostra Serenità di quanta importantia sia l'acqua ad una fortezza, allaqual tra le cose principali si dee haver riguardo per la conservatione della gente et della città, essendo l'acqua uno delli quattro elementi che ci ha dati Iddio per sostenimento della vita nostra; però mi pare degna materia di ricordar a Vostra Sublimità come se bene vi sia quell'acqua sortiva, che nasce al luoco di San Zorzi alli iardini fuor della città circa mezzo miglio, laqual per via d'acquedutti è condotta su la piazza di quella città in una bella fontana, che serve generalmente a tutta la città per opera degna del clarissimo messer Piero Navager, siché in tempo di pace la città gode grandissimo beneficio. Nondimeno in tempo di guerra, perché sarebbe da nemici occupata la radice di detta acqua, saria per consequente priva la città, onde bisongheria adoperar li pozzi, delliquali, essendone molti in diversi lochi di bone acque, sarebbono bastanti a servire, ma per beneficio c' hora si sente dell'acqua predetta della fontana di piazza, par che alcuni pozzi sian lassati mancar della perfettion dell'acqua non venendo esercitati, et massime quel grande dell'Andruzzi, qual mai || non manca. Però Vostra Sublimità con la Sua molta prudentia delibererà quanto di ciò le parerà meglio convenirci.

4v

Quanto poi a tutte l'altre munitioni, di artelaria d'ogni sorte vi è honesto numero, lequali in mio tempo sempre sono state tenute in aconcio et ben governate, et logate sotto la solita sua loza in corte di palazzo dove io feci far la terrazza, come già scrissi a Vostra Serenità per lettere de 2 agosto 1566; eccettuate quelle c'ho fatte metter alli sui lochi, et del beloardo et della muraglia sotto li suoi coperti et al ponton del porto empiuto novamente, acciò stiano preparate alli rispetti, et così di balle et polvere vi si attrova conveniente quantità, la qual polvere è stata refinata, come die essere. Li corsaletti et le arme che sono in copia, come si contien nell'inventario del sopramasser, sono anco ben governate et spesso rivedute da un maestro corazzier, qual è salariato per tal conto. Et commesse al governo del sopramasser, riposte le più moderne nelle sale nuove in corte del palazzo, fabricate in tempo del clarissimo messer Domenego Trivanet et successivamente del clarissimo messer Pandolfo Guoro, ambi di bona memoria, et poste in dette sale dal clarissimo messer Nicolò Gabriel mio precessor, con quel bell'ordine che si può desiderar, dove si conservano con honor et riputatione di Vostra Sublimità et laude loro. Ma le altre più antiche, che non han possuto capir le sale nuove, sono rimaste nel solito luoco terreno et governate al meglio che si può, ma per esser al scuro patiscono dalla polvere et dal rugine, pur essendo state spesso vedute da me et anco dal clarissimo proveditor quando si ha ritrovato in questa città, non se le ha mancato d'ogni buon governo. Et perché anco si attrovano molte coracine deffatte et ruvinate, che non potrebbono servir al bisogno, et altre cose, sarebbe bene che fussero mandate in questa città, perché de li si perdono.

5r

|| Circa la fabrica del beloardo, delqual già era fatta una parte quando io entrai nel reggimento, io secondo l'ordine che mi diede Vostra Serenità con la prontezza del clarissimo Reggimento di Nicosia, che mai è mancato di somministrar i danari secondo la parte a i tempi debiti, feci subito continuare et finir quello che mancava, havendo medesimamente fatto finir le due cortine congiunte con esso beloardo ch'erano fino al cordone, cioè finindo tutti li parapetti, piazze di sopra et di sotto nella sua perfettione. Feci far ancora li due volti ch'entrano dentro la case matte et le scalle di esso beloardo, per lequal si ascende alla summittà di quello, et empie di terreno finindo li spalti, piazza et cortine et bombardiere di

esso belardo fin là che dovea esser finito. Et perché di fore su la campagna, all'incontro di esso belardo, vi era terreno in diversi lochi in monti, che fu già per la cavatione delle fosse, gettato sopra la contrascarpa, il qual terreno, essendo contrario alla securità della fortezza, feci levare et spianar di fore alla contrascarpa, avalizando la spianata nel modo che si dovea per bona securità, sì come di ciò scrissi per lettere de 24 di aprile prossimo passato et come era la sua mente et dell'illustre signor Giulio Savorgnan. Ilqual terreno fu levato avanti il ricever delle lettere di Vostra Sublimità et della scrittura di esso signor Giulio, et con avantageo della spesa di soldi dui al giorno et conservatione della vita di tanti poveri affamati al tempo di quella gran penuria, quali voluntariamente si profersero di lavorar per soldi sei al giorno, se ben per l'ordinario erano otto, ilche ha importato ducati 25 al giorno di avanzo, che in tutta la Quaresima puoté importar ducati mille in circa. Et fu anco levata et condotta entro la città una gran quantità di terreno et di sassi che erano intorno alle fosse del belardo, et medesimamente havendosi ta- || gliata la rocca per slargar la fossa in larghezza di passa tre, principiando dall'orrecchion del belardo verso marina fino al torrion detto il Mozzo, quelli sassi et terreno fur condotti dentro la città, ma quel terreno che fu cavato dalle fosse, principiando dalla mità del fronte del belardo verso tramontana in cima alla rocca, dove ha di andar la strada coperta fino al predetto torrion Mozzo, fu posto dove faceva il bisogno in beneficio della fortezza, et fu del tutto finito il corpo del belardo; valendomi in quello anco del giuditio del magnifico governator Piasenzo, qual è di molta esperienza, et dell'opera del strenuo capitaneo Marco da Venetia, qual sempre è stato assiduo di assistere personalmente su l'opera, usando diligentia et solicitudine così per sollicitar li operarii, come per avantageo del danaro publico. Ma dapoi che s'ebbe le lettere et l'ordine di Vostra Sublimità de di 2 marzo 1567 con la scrittura et disegno del sopradetto magnifico signor Giulio Savorgnan, havendo partecipata intelligentia il clarissimo Barbaro, proveditor general, et io, et unitamente veduto et considerato esso belardo di dentro et di fore con l'assistenza del clarissimmo colateral et dell'i magnifici governadori delle fantarie et ordinanze, tutti d'esperienza et di valor, et fatta quella deliberatione che fu scritta a Vostra Serenità per lettere nostre de di 24 aprile 1567.

6r

|| Tra le fabriches di Vostra Serenità in Famagosta non è manco necessaria, utile et laudevole quella che si continua delle case per alloggiamenti de' poveri sodati, si perché con difficultà si ponno ritrovar in quella città tanti lochi a fitto, che possano sopplire al numero degli soldati, massime quando ve ne sono in gran numero. Liquali alloggiamenti della città, essendo anco per la maggior parte a pe piano et ristretti, convengono i poveri soldati per la povertà loro patir molto, dormendo in terra, sì anco perché quelli più poveri, a quali tocca degli alloggiamenti predetti, scansano il fitto. Et di tempo in tempo, secondo se ne fabricherano in maggior numero, si accomoderà anco maggior numero de soldati. Et per intelligentia di Vostra Serenità fin hora si attrovano di essi alloggiamenti fatti al numero di 123, cioè 88 a pe pian et 25 in soler, et altri 18 fatti in mio tempo, con due case in soler per stantia di due capitanei.

Et appresso di esse case si potrebbono ridurre per habitationi de soldati ancor quelle 25 vecchie di Castello, dellequal già fur levati per ordine di Vostra Sublimità li soldati vecchi dal Castello, a fine ch'esse case non vadino in ruina, possessendo usarle in beneficio di detti poveri soldati; nellequal si potrebbe logar degli soldati che vengono straordinariamente et che stanno sei mesi et poi si parteno, et per maggior securità del detto Castello et non facendo le dette case andarebbono in ruina, ma però sono state governate al meglio che si ha possuto dal magnifico messer Andrea Dolfini castellano, gentilhommo d'ogni bona qualità.

Era solito per avanti pagar gli operarii delle fabriches il sabbato dapoi disuar per tutta la settimana, onde si perdeva mezza giornata per settimana. Io per avantageo et beneficio del publico ho voluto lasciarli lavorar tutto il giorno intiero del sabbato, facendoli il || pagamento la domenica di mattina, talché, avanzando detta mezza giornata ogni settimana, importano all'anno ducati cinquecento di avanzati. Et la spesa che prima si faceva nelli alloggiamenti de soldati di pagar alli marangoni bisanti 35 per uno, per metter la travamenta

6v

et far i balconi et le porte di ciascun alloggiamento, hora io l'ho ridotta a bisanti nuove solamente per ciascun marangone.

All'arrivo dell'illustre signor Giulio Savorgnan, destinato da Vostra Serenità governator general di quel Regno, qual venne con le due galere Priola et Suriana et giunse alli 10 di maggio, il clarissimo proveditor general et io recevessimo reverentemente le lettere di Vostra Sublimità de 21 di marzo prossimo passato, con la scrittura dell'illustre Palavicino general; dallequal lettere inteso l'ordine di Vostra Serenità per parte presa nell'eccellentissimo Senato circa il far la nova fortezza nella città di Nicosia, fortificando Cerines et non lasciando anco quanto ricercava il bisogno di Famagosta, acciò che in un tempo medesimo fussero tutte esse fortezze fornite per quelli convenienti rispetti che mossero Vostra Serenità. Di quella di Nicosia non mi estenderò in referir i particolari, appertenendo tal'officio al clarissimo proveditor general et a quel clarissimo Reggimento et al predetto signor Giulio. Ma dico solamente che sue magnificente clarissime con ogni diligentia et valor il primo del mese di zugno prossimo passato fecero principiar la fabrica della fortificatione di quella città, ridotta in undeci beloardi. Ma io non ho possuto personalmente veder la detta fortezza, come era il mio desiderio || di andarvi et di vederla minutamente. Delche Vostra Sublimità mi haverà per escuso, per li giusti impedimenti che mi successero nel fine del reggimento, che fu la venuta improvvisa a Famagosta di 13 galere turchesche delle guardie d'Alessandria et d'Arcipelago, dellequal narrerò al suo loco; et perché pochi giorni dapoi arrivò il clarissimo successor mio, onde mi convenne rimaner in Famagosta quel giorno per haver le fede et quanto era bisogno per la mia speditione. Et nelli istessi giorni dovendo partir la nave Dolfina vecchia che mi aspettava, qual già molti giorni avanti era andata a Limissò, fui astretto il giorno dietro subito ch'io fui spedito da Famagosta andar a nave, condotto dalle due galie per maggior prestezza, laqual nave si levò il giorno seguente di modo che Vostra Serenità intende, che non mi avanciarono hore non che giorni di poter satisfar al predetto mio desiderio, ch'era grandissimo, di andar prima a Nicosia a veder la già detta fortezza.

Poi quanto a Famagosta, essendo venuti in essa città il clarissimo proveditor general et detto illustre signor Giulio col magnifico domino Lunardo Roncon, governator delle cernede, a dì 28 di maggio, et havendo anche noi conferito insieme col magnifico domino Scipion Piasenzo, governator delle fantarie di Famagosta, persona di esperienza et di valor, et havendo ben veduta et considerata la fortezza di dentro et di fuore et per ogni parte, fu deliberato tra tutti noi di rassettar essa fortezza in molti lochi che si potessero finir per marzo prossimo venturo, secondo l'ordine di Vostra Serenità, con la solicitudine del magnifico mio || successor; ilche Vostra Serenità intenderà più particolarmente dalla scrittura che fu fatta da noi circa la predetta deliberatione infrascritta, sperando che tutto quello ch'è stato deliberato sarà finito a tempo et si potrà star con buon animo havendo buon numero di soldati. Et dapoi che fu fatta essa deliberatione, essendo rimasto il carrico sopra di me di procurar l'opera di esse fabriches, io con ogni possibil industria et forzo di contadini di queste due contrate ho operato quanto è stato possibile in quel poco tempo che mi restò fino al partir mio, di modo che fu in detto mio tempo finito di empir il ponton, qual è alla bocca del porto, et postoli sei pezzi di artelaria, qual è bellissima cosa di veder et molto al proposito, perché difende tutta quella parte del porto fino al turron dell'arsenal, ch'è verso li giardini et difende anco tutta la parte da mar verso la Misericordia. Et son finite anco due canoniere del turron dell'arsenal fatte alla moderna, et abbassata la piazza del detto turron, et finito quasi di empir il detto turron ch'era vuodo, et è finito il cavalier dell'arsenal detto Martinengo, et tagliato bona parte della contrascarpa et quelli angoli ch'erano alla detta parte dell'arsenal, et portata gran quantità di terreno dentro la città, et finiti alcuni terrapieni in detta banda. Et hora si seguirà secondo li ordini della seguente scrittura, con la diligentia del magnifico mio successor. Sono ancora finite due canoniere al cavalier della porta da Limissò che defendono le fosse da una parte et l'altra, massime una che tira fino al beloardo novo, et anco abbassata la piazza, et anco finito quasi il cavalier del Morato, ilqual fino a sei giornate dovea esser del

8r tutto finito. Fu ancora finita || un'altra canoniera al torrion d'i Carmini, che defende tutta quella parte del beloardo novo, qual è molto al proposito. Et feci anco in quei pochi giorni dalle zurme delle galie nettar tutta la fossa da quella parte del beloardo verso marina, siché non le manca/va se non opera di una giornata a finir di nettarla. Il resto secondo essa scrittura sarà continuato del predetto mio successor, alqual ho lasciata gran quantità di calcine et molte fornaci ch'io feci fare.

Et benché per la difesa et conservatione di quel Regno Vostra Serenità habbi fatta et faccia et sia per fare spese notabili per le già dette fortezze, accioché mediante quelle si possi in ogni occasione contendere contra il nemico, nondimeno a giuditio mio crederei che molto più si operasse con l'armata di Vostra Serenità a divertire, andando a danni del nemico quando occoresse il bisogno, che Dio no'l voglia. Et così sempre ho giudicato che sia la mente di Vostra Sublimità, massime non possendosi prohibir al nemico di non sbarcar gente in terra et di patronirsi della campagna, et ciò tanto più quanto che'l nemico harrebbe tutte le sue commodità per la vicinità del suo paese, alqual in alcuni luochi può passar in sei hore; et all'opposito la molta discommodità dell'isola, tanto lontana da Vostra Serenità di doa millia miglia et da Candia miglia seicento, ch'è luoco più propinquu d'ogni altro a Cipro. Dalqual luoco, se ben dal settembre in poi si potesse dar alcun soccorso a Famagosta, però non si potrebbe in alcun tempo a Nicosia, ch'è in mezzo all'isola fra terra, et per tal causa è bisogno, anzi necessario, prevenirli a tempo di gran numero di boni soldati et in ciascun tempo di valorosi capitanei, et fornita a pieno di vittuaglie et munitioni || et di tutto quello che le potrà far bisogno, et tanto maggiormente havendo in consideratione li rispetti d'i popoli ben noti a Vostra Serenità.

8v Di Cerines, non essendo fin hora principiata cosa alcuna, non mi occorre dir altro, sapendo che di tutto sarà referito a Vostra Sublimità dal clarissimo proveditor con sue lettere, et che anco sua magnificentia clarissima al solito della sua diligentia commincierà presto a prevederli in accommodar meglio quella fortezza di quel c' hora si ritrova.

Tenor della scrittura et deliberatione

Havendo considerato in esecution delle lettere dell'Illustrissimo Dominio il modo che si die riconciar la fortezza di Famagosta per il presente bisogno, dovendo esser fatte le sottoscritte provisioni per tutto marzo prossimo venturo del '68, come nelle lettere de 7 marzo ne vien commesso, habbiamo giudicato et deliberato ut infra tutti d'accordo, liquali si sottoscriveranno da esser osservada nell'avenire.

Primo Abbassar la piazza del turron dell'arsenal, tanto che li homini che starano alla canoniera che guarda verso il Castello siano coperti dalle Alture delli Hebrei, sì che le balle delle canonade habbino a passarli un piede sopra la testa, facendo la canoniera che non tire fuor della fossa.

2° Tagliar il terreno et slargar la fossa fra'l torrion dell'arsenal et il turron del Camposanto, et portar il terreno dentro vicino, dove fa maggior bisogno.

3° Finir il cavalier del Martinengo al Camposanto, non alzando la piazza più di quello che è al presente il parapetto grosso piedi 30, facendo || una camisa al detto parapetto di tuffi sottilissima, più alta un pié della cortina, qual parapetto habbia da esser due piedi e mezzo per tirar in barba, dalla parte verso il turron dell'Andruci sia alto piedi sei per esser coperto dalle Alture delli Hebrei, incamisandolo di dentro di plite.

4° Alla porta di Limissò unir il revelino col cavalier con un muretto tale che sustenti il terreno, qual terreno dentro va alto tanto quanto la piazza del revelino et il cavalier, et quelli due muretti che si han da far da novo alti tanto quanto li parapetti del revelino, alqual parapetto bisogna stroppar tutte le canoniere di sopra, che dette canoniere non traga niente fuor della fossa in fin alli ultimi turzioncini.

5° Nel cavalier sopra la porta da Limissò far abbassar la piazza, tanto che la restasse

- più bassa del suo parapetto sei piedi per quelle due canoniere, qual poleno tirar per la fossa da tutte due le bande. Il resto del detto cavalier non far abbassar le piazze per poter trar in barba di sopra via per tutta la campagna.
- 6° Finir il cavalier del Morato con quell'ordine dell'altro, ma li parapetti tutti bassi per trar in barba et la sua piazza sei piedi più alta della muraglia.
- 7° Cavar una canoniera al turron delli Carmini, che non tiri fuor della fossa, non intaccando la cortina della reculata.
- 8° Levar a un il muro del turron vecchio, che è congiunto col beloardo verso i Carmini per farli piazza a quel fianchetto, accommodando la canoniera.
- 9° Abbassar la piazza di tutto il beloardo, tanto che si sia coperto et che di altezza sia sei piedi, lassandoli il parapetto col muro, tanto che sia 32 piedi.
- 9v || 10° Che tutte le cortine nuove si possano trar in barba et che siano fatte due canoniere nella gola del beloardo.
- 11° Il cavalier del Mozzo finirlo come sono li altri.
- 12° Alla canoniera, alla cortina vicina al Mozzo verso il beloardo nuovo, cavarla tanto bassa che la intacchi dui piedi nella rocca di fuora via et stroppar quella di sopra fatta secondo l'arricordo dell'eccellenzissimo signor Sforza.
- 13° Il cavalier d'i Mastici accettarlo come li altri, facendo la mezza luna come nella scrittura.
- 14° Il cavalier del Diamante finirlo come li altri.
- 15° Continuar di rovinar la torre et finir d'empir il ponton come ha da star.
- 16° Abbassar tutte le contrascarpe nel modo di quella ch'èsta fatta ultimamente per mezzo i Carmini, lassando la banchetta dieci piedi larga et il terreno di fuora via cinque piedi più alto.
- 17° Nettar il resto della fossa che manca.

Oltra tutte le qual deliberationi, mia opinion sarebbe che anco fusse fatto un cavalier in Zudeca et un'altro alli Carmini, et che fusse finito di empir tutti quelli turroncini, ilche sarebbe con poca spesa et con breve intervallo di tempo.

- 10r || Si ha ancora ad un'istesso tempo esequito l'ordine di Vostra Sublimità di empir di terreno lo sperone nel Castello, havendo per commune deliberatione del clarissimo proveditor et mia et col parer dell'illustre signor Giulio et delli magnifici governatori fatta ruinar certa torre antica fino al parapetto, qual era in capo del detto sperone, perché impediva l'opera et la rendeva mal secura. Et anco per far una sola spesa con ogni matura consideratione, ne è parso per securezza della città far spianar lo scoglio, qual era per mezzo la città di terreno alto vicino al porto, sopra ilqual il nemico harrebbe havuta commodità di piantar l'artelaria et offender la città verso l'arsenal. Et l'istesso terreno habbiamo fatto condur in Castello, et empiuto il detto sperone, havendoli fatto metter sei pezzi di artelaria, che sono i medesimi già decchiariti, dove è fatta mentione del ponton alla bocca del porto.

Et perché fuor della porta da terra, poco lontani dalla città, si attrovano alcune mote sassose, chiamate Monti delli Hebrei, lequal si devranno spianar per avalizar meglio la spianata in beneficio della città, et essendo anche bene di trovar il modo di sparagnar la spesa, mi è sovenuto di ricordar reverentemente a Vostra Serenità se così per sua prudentia le paresse in proposito, ch'ella per sua deliberatione desse ordine che tutti che volessero fabricar in Famagosta non potessero tagliar in altri luochi per cavar pietre che nelli predetti Monti delli Hebrei, la onde in poco tempo sarebbono spianati da persone private senza spesa di Vostra Sublimità et con loro commodo et beneficio.

- 10v Ricordai già reverentemente a Vostra Sublimità per lettere de di 6 dicembre 1565 et de 8 aprile 1566, et hora come cosa importante non restarò di referire come la custodia ordinaria di Famagosta, che soleva esser di 500 || soldati, a questi tempi sarebbe di poco numero, né sarebbono a sufficienza di poter sopplir alle fattioni et guardie ordinarie, per

11r

esservi aggiunto un corpo di guarda al beloardo et un'altra in Castello, secondo l'ordine di Vostra Sublimità et lettere de di 20 ottobrio 1560. Et anco si tiene due altri corpi di guarda, uno all'arsenal, dove si ha fatto un ponte levador per condur terreno di fora et ruvinar alcuni cantoni della contrascarpa per la fossa, et si ha aperto un'altro loco della muraglia dalla parte che si ha da far le canoniere et tagliar la rocca della fossa et sfargarla, si come è deliberato. Oltra che tra li ragazzi et quelli che si amalano non restano in numero a pena di quattro cento, però è necessario accrescer detta guarda ordinaria fino al numero di 600 per li detti rispetti et per ogni altro riguardo, havendo massime in consideratione che in ogni tempo si ritrova nel porto di Famagosta qualche navilio turchesco con turchi et gente di nation diversa, come suriani, cofti et armeni, per esser vicini alla Soria, dellequal nationi bona parte habita in Famagosta. Et accioché tale accrescimento di numero de' soldati si havesse a far con quella minor spesa che fosse possibile, si potrebbe scansar la spesa di un capitaneo et de sui officiali, distribuendo li cento soldati che si havessero di accrescer una parte nella compagnia del magnifico governator et l'altra in quelle dell'i capitanei, come per le predette lettere ricordai a Vostra Sublimità. Et sopra tutto modestamente raccorderei quel che più fiate ho scritto, che li soldati che saranno mandati fussero soldati boni et di tal sorte che si possi prometter di loro buon servitio nelle fattioni et nelle occasioni; perché venendo soldati inesperti non si potria sperar quel frutto che si desidera, et anco che li capitanei conduttori di quelli siano di valor et di esperienza, si come sono quelli || c' hora si ritrovano alla custodia di quella città, quali sono stati obedienti et pronti al servitio di Vostra Sublimità et amorevoli verso il magnifico governator Piasenzo con molta destrezza, perilche quella città in mio tempo è stata in continua tranquilità. Et io per non mancar di recognoscer il buon servitio, non restarò di dire questo particolar del strenuo capitaneo Marco da Venetia, ilqual assiduamente et di continuo ha atteso personalmente alle fabriche, et spetialmente a quella del beloardo, senza sparago della sua vita, come già ho predetto. Et in questo proposito non resterò di ricordar reverentemente a Vostra Sublimità che dell'i soldati straordinarii già mandati alcuni hanno havuta contentione con qualch'un d'i lor capitanei per differenza delle lor paghe, perché (come dicono li soldati) all'hor che vennero a mancar alcuni soldati alla presenza degli signori Savii di Terraferma, par che i capi loro, rimettendo altri soldati ne i luochi di quelli che mancarono, habbino voluto che detti soldati rimessi confessino davanti i rasonati di haver havuti i danari da i lor capitanei in cambio di quelli che mancarono; perilche sono stati scritti sopra i roli detti soldati rimessi, se ben con verità non habbino havuto li predetti danari. Onde sono nasciute poi differentie et gravami, et il medesimo aviene degli capi soldi, però ricordarei che de caetero non fusse notato alcun soldato rimesso se prima non si vedesse esborsar i danari davanti un clarissimo Savio di Terraferma. Et perché anco da alcuni capitanei vengono date arme alli soldati, come sarebbe arcobuso, fornimenti et celadon per lire vintiuna con danno et gravezza degli soldati, se ben costino a pena la mità; et con tal interesse gli danno anco i corsaletti, onde poi ne seguita che li detti poveri soldati rimanghino mise- || rabili et esterminati; però ricordarei per bene delle cose publice che Vostra Serenità nell'avvenire gli facesse dar le arme, da esser scontate in tante paghe come paresse a Vostra Sublimità, ilche sarebbe di gran sollevamento a lor soldati et con beneficio di lei. Alliquali soldati, giunti che furno in Famagosta, mi convenne far dar alla maggior parte da mangiar in credenza a soldi quattro al giorno per uno fino alle paghe, che certo è un stupor di tanta loro miseria. Et nel venir in Cipro con le navi, se ben hanno per clementia di Vostra Serenità la paga donata, governandosi male molti la giovano o consumano malamente et patiscono di fame, siché per farsi la spesa convengono far poi stocchi et inconvenienti con ruina loro. Però anche di ciò ricordarei che saria bene de caetero consignar la paga donata alli patroni di nave che li condurranno, con ordine di far la spesa alli detti soldati compartimentamente, si come fanno alle zurne di nave, ilche risultarebbe a commodo, contento et beneficio di lor soldati et senza danno degli patroni, quali pur convengono sovenir di qualcosa detti soldati quando gli manca da viver, et per ciò sarebbe anco di satisfattione et contento di essi patroni.

11v

Et per intelligentia di Vostra Serenità, essendo già stato fatto in tempo delli miei precessori un principio di hospitale con quattro over cinque letti, et havendo io fatto proceder nell'opera et finita, et fattogli far buon numero di lettieri et letti al numero di quaranta in circa, senza però alcun interesse della Serenità Vostra né della città, feci ridur in esso hospitale tutti quelli soldati miserabili che presero infirmità et che non hebbro il modo di mantenersi con molta loro sollevatione et salute. Et così nell'avenire sarà refugio così dell'i soldati che per tempo si amalerano come de altri poveri della città, laqual di quello ne sente gran contentezza, et così anco || il reverendo vescovo Ragazzoni che sempre tenne grande inclinatione a tal opera, et così messer Agustino suo figliolo, ilqual di mio ordine con molta diligentia si espone di soprastrar et di solicitar (come ha fatto) assiduamente essa fabrica.

12r

Circa li bombardieri, come scrissi per le ultime lettere, non essendo qualch'uno di quelli che sono al presente troppo atto al servitio, così per poca esperienza come per difetti loro, et anco havendo alcuni già finito il suo tempo delli cinque anni secondo la legge, raccorderei che ne fosse mandato alcuno ben ammaestrato et pratico appresso quelli che son stati mandati ultimamente per sopplir al bisogno quando occorresse l'occasione, però che a giuditio mio quelli pochi che sono in Famagosta periti nell'arte non potrebbono sopplire a tempi d'occasione.

12v

Delli soldati delle ordinanze di Cipro scrissi il parer mio con lettere de ultimo ottobrio 1566, ma essendo materia degna di molta consideratione mi pare conveniente di anco referirla. Et però secondo la mia opinione et di molti c'han pratica di governo, direi che meglio sarebbe di cassarli, perciò che a tempo di pace si prova evidentemente il danno che si riceve, non solamente nelli danari che paga Vostra Serenità a mantenirle, alla summa di ducati diecemillia et più, ma ancora perché la maggior parte di quelli non lavora più i terreni, come faceva, parendoli dishonore, né possendo esser citati né adoperati alle fattioni delle guardie del Regno, né all'opera delle Saline tanto importante per esser soldati. Il publico patisse molto incommodo et interesse, et a tempi di sospetti o di guerra non sarebbono bastanti quelli cinque millia soldati con la poca cavallaria che vi è a contrastar et prohibir al nemico che'l non potesse sbarcar gente su l'isola in || qual luoco gli piacesse, oltra che stando detti soldati sparsi per diversi casali del Regno, stando cinque o sei per casal, non si ponno unir et ridur insieme in manco termine di due o tre giorni, et spetialmente tre compagnie, cioè di Chitria et di Lacademia che habitano molti miglia fra terra; perilche né anco ponno obstar alli corsari, i quali per l'ordinario non si lasciano veder se non all'improvviso, perché cercano di robbare in nascosto. Et se pur si potesse prometter di loro alcun servitio per molte considerationi et rispetti che si taceno, non si die prestarli tutta quella intiera fede che si conviene in homini fedeli, ma più tosto si potrebbe dubitar di loro. Et perciò sarebbe utile deliberatione liberarsene da quella spesa, con spender poi quelli danari in altro servitio che ritornasse in maggior beneficio et securità di quel Regno. Et al presente fortificando Nicosia et Cerines non si potrà mantener la campagna; et tante fortezze di Nicosia con undeci beloardi et tanto circuito li bisogneranno al meno in Nicosia cinque over sei millia fanti, a Cerines mille et a Famagosta tre o quattro millia in tempo di guerra, et di pace un buon presidio per molti rispetti noti a Vostra Serenità. Però si potrebbe sparagnar la spesa in quel Regno delle predette ordinanze.

13r

Ma la cavalleria de stradeoti, che per lunga esperienza si sono esercitati nell'arte militar et che dependono da progenitori fedelissimi, è ben tanto più utile et necessaria quando sia mantenuta di buoni cavalli, come è al presente per opera del clarissimo Barbaro proveditor general, che gli ha tutti refinati et \ha/ regolata bene detta stratia. Et per mia opinione, secondo io già scrissi a Vostra Sublimità per lettere de ultimo ottobre 1566, crederei che detti stradeoti senza li corsaletti || fossero molto più agili et destri nelli servitii et occasioni, massime cavalcando selle fatte alla turchesca, con lanza, spada e targa. Ma perché di ciò fu varia opinione degli clarissimi proveditori, che se uno voleva che detti stradeoti portassero corsaletti, essi convenivano comprarli con loro interesse e danno. Altri

proveditori poi per diverso parer gli levavano essi corsaletti, talché detti poveri stradeoti sentivano danno maggiore in revenderli, et per ciò sono alcuni che stanno sopra questo traffico di comprarli da loro stradeoti per due et tre ducati l'uno, poi quando viene la regolazione li vendono per ducati sette. Però è bisogno in questa materia una ferma deliberatione per ordine di Vostra Serenità. Li quali stradeoti dal clarissimo Barbaro proveditor sono stati sollevati et sgravati da altri interessi et spese, come ancor io havea principiato in quello ch'io già dinotai reverentemente a Vostra Sublimità per le lettere preditte. Et perché li ducento archibusieri a cavallo fur cassi per ordine et lettere di Vostra Serenità, ciò è riuscito bene con sparago della spesa et con beneficio di quel Regno, per ciò che per la maggior parte si sono applicati all'agricoltura, i quali sono per il più contadini.

Raccorderei anco modestamente per seccurezza maggior delle cose di Vostra Serenità che fusse advertito circa li provisionati a cavallo, che toccano in quel Regno stipendio, che non fussero mercatanti, avocati o d'altra professione che potesse impedire il servizio di Vostra Serenità a tempi delle occasioni; ma che fosse fatta elettione di homini habili et sufficienti, da quali si potesse sperar in ogni tempo di valersene di ogni buon servizio in honor di Vostra Sublimità; et medesimamente che fussero resignati buoni cavalli alli magnifici feudatari et bollati, a fine che fossero sempre conosciuti per cavalli di rispetto et non comprati over cambiati, come spesso suol occorrer barati et alienatione di quelli con pregiudicio delle cose publice.

13v || Arrivarono al porto di Famagosta a 10 di maggio le due galere mandate da Vostra Serenità, sopracomiti li magnifici messer Vicenzo Maria d'i Prioli et messer Anzolo Surian, quali condussero l'illustre signor conte Giulio Savorgnan per governator general in quel Regno. Dellequal due galere in vero si tenea gran bisogno, si come da gli effetti si ha veduto, percioché oltra la custodia ordinaria si è sentito beneficio, che dapoi l'arrivo di quelle non sono apparse fuste in quel Regno, come solevano inanzi spesse fiate. Si ha sentito ancora commodità grande dalle zurme nell'opera di quelle fabriches, essendo homini di gran fattione et aiuto in molti servitii, come di condur legne, acqua, vittuaglie et altre cose a commodo della città, di modo ch'esse galie in tempo di pace sono di molta utilità, con contento universal di Famagosta et di tutto il Regno. Et molto più commode et necessarie sarebbono in tempo di guerra, che Dio no'l voglia, per condur legna di munitione, vittuaglie et altre robbe, et per poterle mandar in Candia et ad altri lochi, dove occorresse il bisogno secondo le occasioni, possessendo anco prevaler delle sue artelarie e d'altro et delle zurme per guastadori et per condur l'artelarie et per le fabriches et per diversi serviti. Et di più, che molto si potrebbe valersene delle persone de i magnifici sopracomiti di assistere alle porte et di far altri boni effetti, essendo massime li prenominati magnifici sopracomiti pronti in honor di Vostra Sublimità, come fu anco sempre il magnifico messer Piero Zane precessor di quelli, i quali non mancarono nelle occasioni di andar attorno l'isola, dove ha ricercato il bisogno, con beneficio di quel Regno havendo due bone galere et bene all'ordine.

14r || Le cose di Nicosia, che già fur travagliate per alcuni moti, come già fu notificato a Vostra Sublimità, benché per la Iddio gratia et per la prudentia et valor del clarissimo Barbaro provveditor general et di quel clarissimo Reggimento sian state all' hora ridotte in quiete, dapoi che fu fatta quella exemplar dimostratione con satisfattione di molti et conforme alla intentione c'hebbi sempre di quel fatto. Non di meno non si può del tutto assicurarsi che nell'intrinseco di qualch'uno non vi sia qualche mala opinione, ilche credo causar in parte dal vescovo greco di quella città, il qual (come già scrissi altre fiate) per non voler riconoscer superiorità dall'illustrissimo monsignor arcivescovo, ch'è tanto qualificato et riputato in quel Regno, ricusava darli obedientia et usava termini non convenienti con ramarico delli clarissimi Rettori; ilche a giudicio mio può haver fomento dalla sua avaritia et da qualche favor secreto qual ha il detto vescovo. Et però ricorderei anco al presente che molto più stabilita et secura sarebbe la union et la pace di quella città rimovendo de li il predetto vescovo greco et facendolo venir a Venetia. Et sia ringratia la bontà divina, che mai io non ho sentito simil disturbo in Famagosta per alcuna competentia che già mai fosse

stata tra'l reverendissimo monsignor vescovo Ragazzoni et il vescovo greco di quella città, liquali sempre sono stati concordi et uniti, havendo il detto vescovo greco osservata sempre l'ordinaria obediencia et recognitione verso il predetto nostro vescovo Ragazzoni; le cui qualità et opere per edificatione del culto divino sono riconosciute in quella città gratissime, et per ciò è amato et reverito, onde in mio tempo tra greci et soldati et altri vi è stata sempre union et amorevolezza.

14v || Fu da considerar molto nel tempo del mio reggimento la carestia generale di tutte le cose et li moti del popolo di Nicosia, come è predetto. Ma soprattutto mi diede grandissimo ramarico l'occasione avenuta della morte di tanti clarissimi Rettori, luoghi tenenti, proveditor Bragadin, consiglier Contarini et camerlengo Lando, siché all'ora quel clarissimo Reggimento restrinse nel solo governo del clarissimo Ghisi vice luogotenente et del magnifico Mocenigo vice consiglier. Onde (come sa Vostra Serenità) mi sopravvennero molti affari et di biade et di altri negotii importanti di quel Rengo, sì come già fu dinotato a Vostra Serenità. Et bisognando all'ora in tanti travagli operar personalmente per le necessarie provisioni di biade per Nicosia et anco per la fortezza di Famagosta et di tutto il Regno, non senza qualche incommodo della mia salute, et convenandomi anco attender con maggior diligentia alla conservatione di me stesso, poi che riposava sopra di me un tanto peso prevedendo alli disordini c'harrebbono possuto succeder in quel Regno, quando anco in me fosse accaduto quel ch'è successo di loro clarissimi Rettori. Ilqual pensiero in vero mi tenne molto travagliato per zelo di quel Regno felicissimo in beneficio et honor della Serenità Vostra. Nondimeno favorito et aiutato della bontà divina, successero le cose molto meglio di quel ch'io pensava, fin che arrivarono il clarissimo Querini luogotenente et il clarissimo Barbaro proveditor general; benché finalmente ancor esso clarissimo luogotenente Querini per gravissima infirmità di flusso habbi convenuto morire in quella città. Et perché simili infortunii potrebbono pur occorrer in Cipro anco nelli tempi venturi qualche fiata, essendo gli huomini mortali, parmi cosa ben conveniente et importante di farne molta consideratione et gagliarda provisione, secondo il prudentissimo giuditio di Vostra Sublimità, per il predetti rispetti et altri a lei ben noti per la somma sua prudentia.

15r || È nota a Vostra Sublimità la miserabil condittione di quelli poveri contadini dell'i casali di Cipro, detti parici, che sono per antica constitutione di quel Regno quasi a similitudine de schiavi, perché si ponno vender et comprar et disponer della loro libertà ad arbitrio delli loro patroni, et i figliuoli che nascono restano medesimamente parici. Et quando sono soggetti al servitio loro hanno per le Assise, over ordini antichi dell'isola, obligatione limitata di servir due giornate alla settimana nelli terreni delli patroni, detti della despotia, con recognitione di soldi tre per giornata, talché in loro dispositione non rimangono se non quattro giornate per settimana di poter attender a suoi negotii. Et di tali homini parici, essendone in gran numero di 70 millia in circa, ch'è la maggior parte delli distrittuali, sostenendo essi tal servitù (benché sia antichissima) par che sempre si dolgano et ramarichino, perilche non si potrebbe haver da loro in caso di bisogno quella secura confidenza, che si desidera nel modo che si tiene tra popoli liberi, sì come sono in Italia. Et li francomati sono poco meglio, per li gran struscii che li vengono fatti, i quali per tutto il Regno si ritrovano in estrema povertà. Et di ciò non dirò altro, rimettendo questa consideratione nel prudentissimo giuditio di Vostra Serenità.

Si mosse Vostra Serenità per affettione et beneficio di quel Regno et particolarmente di Famagosta di far seccar l'acqua della Costanza vicina ad essa città, per reparar o divertir che più non ritorni, acciò meglio habbi a restar purificato l'aere. Et per ciò ella ha mandato Felice Brunello inzegnero con lettere de 12 zugno 1566 con l'ordine contenuto in quelle. Laqual opera quando sarà fatta apporterà infinito beneficio et piacere a tutto quel Regno, ma specialmente a Famagosta che li è vicina, sì come già ricordai reverentemente a Vostra Sublimità per mie lettere de di 2 di agosto 1566. Il qual inzegnero ha || già comminciato a far certo edificio avanti il partir mio, et spera di continuar et di operar bene secondo la soa intentione.

Scritti due fiate reverentemente a Vostra Sublimità in tempo del mio reggimento, per lettere de di 15 ottobrio 1565 et 27 di dicembre 1566, la difficultà che occorreva tra la dispositione di una parte de di 23 dicembre 1564, registrata nella mia commissione, che vuole che li danari delle condannason sian spesi la mità in fabrice di palazzo et che l'altra habbi a restar nella Camera fiscal, et tra la consuetudine in contrario delli obblighi ordinarii c'hanno dette condannason di pagar diversi salariati et a satisfar livelli, elemosine et altro per ordini di Vostra Sublimità. Ma per non haver havuta risposta né risolutione, et essendo negotio d'importantia, mi par degno di relatione. Et perciò dico esser diverso l'uso di quel reggimento di Famagosta circa dette condannason a quello delli altri d'Italia, però che quelle condannason di Famagosta non soleno entrar nella Real Camera, né anco hanno havuto obbligo per fabrica di palazzo, ma sono state sempre destinate al beneficio universal di quella città et fortezza. Et per ciò sono stati introdotti dalli reggimenti diversi officii et opere utilissime et necessarie al beneficio publico di quella città, havendo assignati salarii a quelli c'hanno li carrichi di tali officii, perciò che quella spettabile Communità è povera et non ha alcuna entrata. Liquali officii sono tali, videlicet: un medico per medicar li poveri soldati amalati; un scrivan deputato alle cose della sanità; un esattor delle condannason; un avocato de pregioneri et persone miserabili; un giardiner che manda l'acqua alla fontana di piazza et ha obbligo continuo a sue spese di condur essa acqua in Famagosta, qual acqua è tanto ||

16r necessaria alla Università, come è decchiarito nel suo capitolo; et altri officii et cose simili, delliquali officii et salarii alcuni sono confirmati da Vostra Serenità et alcuni non. Ma oltra li predetti salarii vi sono alcune obligationi de livelli di case et luochi comprati per ordini di Vostra Serenità, sopra liquali son state fabricate case per alloggiamenti de' soldati. Vi è anco una elemosina ordinaria di ducati 60 all'anno, concessa da Vostra Sublimità all'hospedal, et un'altra alla pietà, sì come particolarmente ella intenderà nel conto seguente. Perilche se'l si dovesse principiar a metter in execution l'ordine della parte preditta, bisognarebbe per consequente annullar tutti li officii, salarii, livelli et elemosine con incommodo della città, et privarla della fontana, destrugger le case già fabricate con tanta spesa et far altri effetti c'hanno dell'impossibile. Et le condannason a pena ponno sopplire al predetto obbligo. Et perché per la distantia lunga del paese non si poteva sopraseder tanto di tempo che si potesse haver la risposta, convenni con bona gratia di Vostra Sublimità (sì come le scrisse) continuar nella solita et antica osservanza. Ma perché de caetero i capitanei non restino ambigui, crederei esser bene c'havessero da Vostra Serenità decchiaratione et ordine risoluto circa la predetta materia.

Conto et decchiaratione delli predetti salarii et altro		
Menego tu Antonio, qual ha il carico di dar l'acqua alla fontana, ha ducati 60		600
all'anno, val bisanti		
L'eccellente messer Domenego Barberiano, fisico de soldati, ha ducati 36		360
all'anno, val bisanti		
Messer Constantin Stradioto, avocato de presonieri, ha ducati 30 all'anno, val		300
bisanti		
16v Monasterio di San Simeon, per livello di case tolte per habitation de soldati, ha		96
ogni anno bisanti		
Chiesa di San Zorzi, per certe case ruinategli per ampliar l'hospedal, ha ogni anno		92
bisanti		
Il scrivan della porta da Limissò, per tener conto delle biade che intrano, ha		120
all'anno bisanti		
Il guardian della sanità, bisanti		120
Il scrivan della sanità, bisanti		160
Monasterio di San Francesco, per certo luoco et per un magazen nelqual si tien		20
sali, bisanti		
Maestro Zuanne, corazzer publico, per fitto della sua habitatione, all'anno bisanti		60

Il deputato a scovar la piazza, il palazzo et la loggia, ogni anno bisanti	60
L'esattor ha cinque per cento di quanto si scode	
La pietà ha la decima di tutte le condannason et die divider con l'hospedal	
Messer Giacomo Greco, massaro di Cancellaria, deputato al governo de i libri, ha	
ogni anno bisanti	120
Ultimamente la Serenissima Signoria a supplicatione dell'orator ha concesso	
ducati 60 all'anno all'hospedal, val bisanti	600

- 17r || Benché Vostra Serenità, per lettere nostre commune dell'i clarissimi Rettori, proveditor et mie de di 8 di settembre, spedite con la nave DolFINA, patron messer Alvise Finardi, sia stata particolarmente avisata, non resterà ancor io di referir in conformità, essendo materia ardua et importante. Alli 2 di settembre dalle guardie che per li ordini nostri stavano vigilanti fur scoperte tredeci galere turchesche appresso l'isola; di che essendo stati avisati et participata intelligentia con li clarissimi Rettori et proveditor general, io subito feci preparar il presente et li refreshamenti secondo l'ordinario per mandarli alli capitanei di esse galie subito che fossero aggiunti a Famagosta, accioché partissero immediate et non seguisse alcun disturbo. Et così la mattina seguente, che fu a 3 di settembre, essendosi approssimate dette tredeci galere a Famagosta et havendosi inteso esserne quattro di Rhodi, cinque di Alessandria et quattro della guarda dell'Arcipelago, ma con due fanò soli discoperti et con due capitanei, l'uno della guarda d'Alessandria, nominato Chidir Chielepi Curtugli, l'altro dell'Arcipelago, nominato Chaia Celepi, capitaneo di Sofrassari, mancando quel della guarda di Rhodi, qual è fratello di quel d'Alessandria, nel cui loco vi era un suo fiol, patron di una galea di quelle di Alessandria. Et per quel che si puoté sottragere et per quanto i capitanei si sono lasciati intender, la causa della lor venuta era per ritrovar un caramussolin turchesco, il qual già condusse in quel Regno quattro o cinque fiate frumenti, come di quelli già dinotai per diverse mano di lettere, con dir che, essendo detto caramussolin di un bassà, gli lo volevano condurre. Ma non vi era all' hora a queste marine il detto caramussolino, né è credibile che per così lieve cagione venissero tante galere; però po- || trebbe esser stata altra causa che le ha mosse a venire, la qual non si sa. Et havendo io (com'ho detto) preparato il presente, che fu di otto vesti di seda, a quattro per capitaneo secondo l'ordinario, con li refreshamenti che secondo la stagione fu honorato per la summa di ducati 25 in circa, compresi alcuni zucheri et castrati, non havendo io voluto mancar di spender qualche poco di più per la occasione del tempo presente, mandai quello con quattro barche et con quattro honorati cittadini a presentar alli detti due capitanei dividendo con equal portione. Il qual dono fu da loro ricevuto allegramente, dimostrando di riconoscerlo per grato et di rimaner contenti, havendosi il capitaneo della guarda d'Alessandria proferto di remurchar et di accarezzar i nostri navili et facendo lieta accoglienza alli nontii che andarono. Perilche da poi mi parve in recognitione del suo buon animo di mandar secretamente in particolar a lui capitaneo della guarda di Alessandria, qual doverà esser più domestico et familiar di venir in quelli mari di Cipro, un'altra veste di Damasco doretto, ilqual l'accettò con tanta allegrezza et contento d'animo, che tra le altre benigne parole have a dir di voler scriver a Constantinopoli della molta cortesia che si usa in Cipro verso i turchi et che sono bene accarezzati, dicendo anco voglio adesso {adesso} farmi tagliar la veste, acciò che'l vostro capitaneo della città conosci quanto mi sia stata grata la sua cortesia. Et essendo venuto poi al palazzo il fiol del magnifico capitaneo della guarda di Rhodi et nepote di quel di Alessandria, che spesso suol esser sostituto nel luoco del padre, havendo seco li due secretarii de gli altri due capitanei, oltra qualche gentilezza et l'accoglienza c'hebbe esso fiol di cose mie a sua ricchiesta et gratificatione per la reputatione che tiene appresso turchi, mi parve presentar anco casacche di carisea alli || detti due secretarii. Liquali tutti effetti, essendo stati consideratamente operati, sì perché restassero ben satisfatti, come a fine che si levassero di subito per li già detti rispetti, et anco per dubio che non fossero di sospetto. Non dimeno il predetto capitaneo della guarda di Alessandria, havendo ricercato in gratia che
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fussero lasciati venir entro la città qualch'un de suoi per spender et fornirsi di vittuaglie et di pani da vestir et d'altre robbe, havendone grandissimo bisogno, et anco per far acqua, affirmando di haver havuta la pratica in ogni luoco per la sanità, ma però ricerando et pregando che si operasse che alli turchi non fosse dato vin da bere. Onde, non possendosi far dimeno, li fu concessa tal gratia. Però essendo entrati alcuni di essi turchi nella città per dette cause, et dato l'ordine che non gli fusse dato vino, ma rispettati con ogni riguardo, essi senza alcun strepito li fornirono di vittuaglie et di robbe da vestir, pagate cortesemente, et tolsero dell'acqua, havendo lasciati nella città de suoi danari oltra mille ducati con satisfattione di ogn'uno, di che tanto maggiormente rimasero satisfatti i lor capitanei, i quali restarono maravigliati di tanta vittuaglia che è in Famagosta, masime di pan fresco, havendo essi fornite le galere. Alli quali essendo fuggiti con suo gran dispiacer quattro schiavi in più fiate tra'l giorno et la notte, christiani renegati già più di 15 et 20 anni, uno dequali gli era carissimo et schiavo particolar di esso capitaneo di Alessandria datogli già cinque anni sotto la sua protettione da un bassà. Et essend'io stato ricchiesto a farli trovar et mandarglili, dicendo che altrimenti non partirebbono, però considerando io l'occorrentia del tempo et la importantia del fatto, bisognò provever quel giorno et la notte con proclami gagliardi et con far cercar con diligentia sì et talmente che ne fur ritrovati tre in due fiate ascosti nella città in diversi luochi, ma || l'altro non si puoté haver per esser uscito fuor della città. Però havendosi mandati in due fiate al capitaneo della guarda di Alessandria li tre schiavi ritrovati, con referirli l'ordine dato di far cercar l'altro ch'era uscito, rimasero ben contenti et satisfatti senza far offesa alli detti schiavi fuggiti. Et questo perché havendo io mandato a chiamar il fiol del capitaneo da Rhodi suo nepote accarezzato da me, come ho predetto, pregandolo che mi volesse conceder una gratia, esso mi rispose che mi concederebbe ogni gratia dalla sua fede in fuora. Per ilche lo pregai che intercedesse perdonio da suo barba alli schiavi fuggiti, escusandoli ch'erano restati in terra per imbriaghezzo, et così egli mi promesse di operar, sì come in effetto fece, havendo ottenuta la remissione con contentezza di lor schiavi, dui dequali erano christiani ponentini renegati et uno da Venetia, ma quel che non si ha ritrovato è christian genoese. Partendosi poi essi capitanei la notte alle 6 hore per Caramania al luogo de Limuri, havendosi tratenuti dui giorni, con ringratiar dell'i favori usatigli, et in fine nel partir loro havendo mandato una lettera o sigilletto, la cui tradduzione è nella presente. Et ancor che le qualità dell'i predetti capitanei turchi possino esser note a Vostra Sublimità, non voglio restar di dirle secondo la relatione havuta dalli nostri che li sono stati a parlar, che sono homini accorti et prudenti et che mostrano esperienza delle cose da mar et da terra, benché non sian più stati in queste parti. Liquali si lasciarono intender come dui giorni avanti che partissero da Rhodi hebbbero lettere da magnifico bassà da Constantinopoli, che da poi fatta una volta dovessero andar con le lor galere a Constantinopoli per mettersi all'ordine, perché'l Signor faceva gran preparamenti et grossissima armata che non fu mai più la maggiore, et che si diceva che detta armata dovea mandarsi a || Malta, over in un'altro loco che non volsero nominar. Et il capitaneo dell'Arcipelago in certo suo ragionamento disse che Famagosta era molto forte da mar e da terra per quanto poteva veder, ilche lui non harrebbe pensato. Et all'hora un turco disse: 'che ha da far questa città con Malta?' Et che'l capitaneo rispose: 'se Malta ne ha fatti morir tanti, che farebbe Famagosta!' Poi alcuni schiavi renegati, che desiderano tornar alla fede, han detto secretamente alli nostri che l'armata non si fa per altro se non per andar alla impresa di Cipro l'anno venturo, per lettere c'hanno havute essi capitanei; et che in Rhodi et nelle lor galie publicamente si ragionava di questo. Et hanno anco referito il medesimo quelli turchi renegati ch'entrarono in Famagosta per comprar la robba. Et alcuni galeoti, che sono per la maggior parte di quelli che fur schiavi sopra di esse galie ch'erano al Zerbi, han detto che questo Gran Signor prima che succedesse nel Regno ha giurato, che havendo egli a succedere nel suo imperio farebbe la prima impresa in Cipro, et poi fatto che fu Signor ha confirmato il medesimo pur con giuramento. Et havendo io interrogato uno di quelli schiavi fuggiti, cioè quel da Venetia, ha detto che'l Turco prepara di mandar fuore quattrocento vele

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per l'anno venturo et che fa far settanta palandarie per traghettar cavalli da Caramania et da Tripoli in Cipro. Poi venne a posta a trovarmi un schiavo renegato, dicendo che sperando egli di ritornar christiano per zelo della fede, et per discarrico della sua conscientia mi confirmava che'l Turco faceva grandissima preparation per mar et per terra per la impresa di

19v Cipro; et che per la pratica, ch'egli ha imparata a Malta et in altri lochi, mi ricordava || che'l si facesse spianar li giardini, torre, casamenti et ogni frasca che si trovasse di fore, acciò che'l nemico non si potesse prevaler, fornindosi d'ogni sorte di munitione et stando ben provisti. Et di più mi disse che ragionando di Famagosta i loro capitanei ad un turco che disse che Famagosta è altra cosa, che non era Malta, rispose un d'essi capitanei: 'sì, ma venendo a Famagosta noi siamo in casa nostra'. Onde esso schiavo fu da me ringratiatto molto della sua buona dispositione. Et alcuni di quelli turchi, che vennero dentro la città, presero stupor dell'artelaria che videro in corte del palazzo al coperto et hanno detto esserne maggior numero in Famagosta, in un luoco solo, che non era in tutta Malta; maravigliandosi anco che vi sono molti soldati in tempo di pace, liquali all' hora erano posti in ordinanza et tenuti quelle due notti vigilantissimi con squaraguaita personale di me capitaneo, havendomi bisognato tutta notte esser oculato alle provisioni necessarie. Ma in fatto detti capitanei si mostraron modesti, havendo havuto a dir che se ben non puotero a sopplimento fornirsi d'acqua della città, però volevano toccar al Carpasso per timor c'haveano delli stradeoti, acciò che non intravenisce qualche error. Ilche particolarmente ha referito il capitaneo della guarda d'Alessandria, qual in certo proposito disse che Famagosta è molto più forte che non è Rhodi. Et per relatione delli nostri, c'hanno vedute esse 13 galere, quelle sono di trista qualità, mal fornite di scapoli et di artelaria, et non sono preste al remo se non le due delli due capitanei et due altre solamente, et sono per la maggior parte a un remo per banco a quattr'homini per remo. Et havendo esse galere incontrati tre navilii di Famagosta che venivano dal Carpasso a detta città carrichi || di frumento, essi capitanei li licentiarono dicendogli: 'andate di longo che se bene noi tenimo bisogno di pane', havendone quelli signori usata cortesia, 'non volemo impedirvi', et si profersero a loro se gli faceva bisogno. Et mentre ch'esse galere stetero sorte fuor del porto appresso alla torre dell'Occa, al quanto discoste dalla città, feci star di continuo, così il giorno come la notte, fuor della città un capitaneo de stradeoti con cinquanta stradeoti a cavallo della sua compagnia ben all'ordine, per star vigilante et provisto che alcuno di esse galere non smontasse in terra et che altri delli nostri non andassero a quelle. Avenne che fu veduta di notte una barca di esse galere accostarsi appresso a terra, ma poi havendo essa barca veduta la guarda delli stradeoti ritornò. Dapoi s'intese da quelli schiavi renegati che la detta barca tutta quella notte andava in quella parte scandagliando il fondo. Liquali capitanei havendo a tutte le marine dell'isola scoperte compagnie de stradeoti presero gran meraviglia. Et havend'io considerata la corrispondenza di quei riporti con li avisi pochi giorni avanti havuti da Constantinopoli per lettere del clarissimo bailo de 16 di luglio, dinotando d'haver scritto in conformità alla Serenità Vostra, benché dica che per fondamento di ragione non sia da prestare piena fede, nondimeno advertendo prudentissimamente che si dovesse star oculati et previsti. Et di ciò havendo participata intelligentia con li clarissimi Rettori, se bene di giorno in giorno io stava in aspettatione del magnifico mio successor, ilqual fece la entrata a 14 di settembre, non volsi mancar in quelli pochi giorni di continuar nell'opera delle fabriches designate per deliberatione commune del clarissimo proveditor general, mia et del signor Giulio Savorgnan; nellequal con l'aiuto di Dio si è procedutto tanto avanti, ch'io spero mediante la diligenza || di esso magnifico mio successor che per marzo prossimo saran del tutto finite, secondo che fu deliberato.

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Et oltra l'opera di esse fabrice, sì come io pensava il giorno e la notte in materia così ardua per servitio di Vostra Serenità, così per giornata con le mie lettere ho voluto proponer et ricordar a quelli clarissimi signori particolarmente tutti li bisogni così per bona munitione di quella città, fortezza principale di tutto li Regno, come per altre circonstantie grate a quei popoli et pertinenti alla difesa et conservatione di quella città et di tutto il Regno, dicendo l'opinion mia etiam dell'universale, benché il clarissimo messer Francesco Barbaro, meritissimo proveditor di quel Regno, con la sua molta esperienza et valor haverà meglio di me considerato et proveduto oportunamente; et così anco quei clarissimi Rettori, i quali sono di bona mente et voler di operar quanto gli sia possibile, perché in vero quando ricerca il tempo et la occasione si deve anco esponer la vita propria per zelo della sua patria. Et havendo io in quelli ultimi giorni trovata aperta in molti lochi la porporella drio'l Castello, la feci acconciare, facendone aggiunger una parte fino alla bocca del porto per securità di quello.

Attached document No 1

1567 a di 6 settembre

Comparse davanti il clarissimo messer Lorenzo Bembo, dignissimo capitaneo del Regno di Cipro, in camera della sua ressidentia il strenuo capitaneo Antonio dal Beretin, esponendo et referindo che nelli giorni che si attrovarono le tredeci galere turchesche con li due capitanei di Alessandria et d'Arcipelago, essendo esso capitaneo Antonio all' hora di guarda alla porta da Limissò, venne a trovarlo alla detta porta uno zaratino renegato, nominato Sisco Memin, || comito di una galia di Rhodi, patron Morato Rais raguseo, renegato del loco da isola de Mezzo del territorio di Raguse, dicendogli da parte di esso Morato che, per l'amicitia ch'era stata longamente tra lui et detto capitaneo Antonio, li mandava a dir secretamente che non si dovesse fidar di greci, volendo inferir de i popoli; perciochē haveano scritto a turchi ch'essi si darebbono più tosto al diavolo che star sotto la soggettione che stanno, perché non hanno pan da mangiar et sono assassinati et strusciati, et che per ciò il Gran Signor Turco preparava grossissima armata, la più grossa che fusse mai, per venir questo anno che vien in Cipro, sì come venirà di certezza. Et che se ben turchi sogliono dir cose assai, questa fiata esso diceva con certezza che questa armata sarà la maggior che fusse mai et c'ha da venir in quest'isola, acciò ch'esso capitaneo Antonio lo facesse saper a sui signori. Onde detto capitaneo Antonio lo ringratìo dicendogli c'havesse a ringratiar molto a suo nome il detto Morato. 'Et vi dirò' (disse esso capitaneo Antonio) 'l'amicitia ch'era tra lui et me. Io essendo già schiavo di Cortugoli in Rhodi, ch'era all' hora capitaneo della guarda si come è al presente, che fu dall'anno 1560 fino al 1563, et continuando io in questa prigionia feci amicitia col predetto Morato Rais, qual era patron di una delle galie della guarda. Et talmente accrebbe l'amicitia, che spessissime fiate esso mi faceva mangiar et bever con lui, et operò talmente in favor mio appresso il detto capitaneo della guarda, che fu causa ch'io fui riscattato et fatto libero della mia servitù. Il qual Morato ha fatto sempre profession in secreto di christiano, invocando il nome di Christo et della nostra Donna, lachrimando et benedicendo li christiani, et qualche fiata tenendo nelle calce qualche paternostro et dicendolo secretamente. Et fin hora conserva et tiene l'amicitia con me, mandandomi più fiate a pregare || che io l'andassi a visitar, ma io non andai per rispetto ch'io era di guarda, et così mi mandai ad escusar con mandarli un poco di refreshamenti in segno d'amicitia. Et perché fin hora io son stato in guarda, non ho possuto venir a referir, ma son venuto hora subito ch'io son uscito'.

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Attached document No 2

Tradduzione della lettera, over sigilletto, mandato dalli dui capitanei delle galie turchesche
della guarda d'Alessandria et d'Arcipelago.

Honoratissimi signori del Regno di Cipro della nation del Messia, le nove amorevolezze,
salutation. Il presente è dapoi la contenta partita c'havete usato et mostrato la vera
amichevolezza verso di noi. Vi havemo pregato per il nostro schiavo fuggito che lo debbiate
trovar et mandarlo in Alessandria del Cairo. Però che ne fareste cosa grata hora vi pregamo
che siate contenti metter ogni vostra diligentia a trovarlo et mandarlo dove saran le galie in
queste parti, et se non {se no} sarà mandarlo et consignarlo con qualche navilio nella
predetta città del Cairo, et così mi tengo certo che lo farete. Però che havemo conosciuto il
buon animo vostro et ancor noi in quelle parti esplicaremo la bontà vostra, non mi accade
più oltra attediarvi et pregarvi sopra questa materia, perché speremo in Dio di rendervi il
merito. Altro per hora non mi accade notificarvi, a voi si raccomandiamo.


L'humil Chasar, capitaneo di Alessandria del Cairo



2 Famagusta, today's view of the Land Gate / Ravelin. Source:
https://medium.com/@UNDP_CY/celebrating-famagusta-on-world-heritage-day-4dcadba29139.



3 Famagusta, today's view of the Martinengo Bastion. Source: https://medium.com/@UNDP_CY/celebrating-famagusta-on-world-heritage-day-4dcadba29139.




4 The fortified cities of Cagliari, Malta, Rhodes and Famagusta; by Georg BRAUN and Frans HOGENBERG, *Civitates Orbis Terrarum*, Cologne, 1612.



5 Cyprus surrounded by Ottoman warships; by Balthasar Ienichen, Nuremberg 1571. This map informed the public in Europe about the progress of the War of Cyprus (1570–1571). According to the information provided in the bottom right corner of the map, at the time of its publication Famagusta was under Ottoman siege. Source: Jules RENOUVIER, *Des types et des manières des maîtres graveurs pour servir à l'histoire de la gravure en Italie, en Allemagne, dans le Pays-Bas et en France, Vol. 3: XVI^e et XVII^e siècles*, Montpellier, Hoehm, Imprimeur de l'Académie, 1855.

OU L'ART DE LA GUERRE. 43



Plan de Candie, from Alain Manesson Mallet (1630–1706): *Les Travaux de Mars ou l'Art de la Guerre divisé en trois parties ... : avec un ample détail de la milice des Turcs, tant pour l'attaque que pour la dēfence : ouvrage enrichi de plus de quatre cens planches gravées en taille-douce*, Amsterdam, 1684


Recensioni



YIANNIS MAVROMATIS, EIRINI LYDAKI AND EIRINI PAPADAKI (EDS.),

Κρητικός Πόλεμος (1645–1669): Άγνωστες πτυχές [= The Cretan War (1645–1669): Unknown Aspects]

Heraklion, Vikelaia Municipal Library, 2021, pp. 380.



The rivalry between Venice and the Ottoman Empire constitutes indubitably a most significant section of southeastern Mediterranean history.

From the 15th to the early 18th century the two opposing forces were engaged in seven wars which ended with the final victory of the Ottoman state. This victory, however, was not an easy one, since the Venetian ‘lion’ did not cease to spread its wings across the Mediterranean forcing the Ottomans to pay a significant death toll in their efforts to expand their plans of conquest.

In the aforementioned series of those Venetian–Ottoman wars, it was the Fifth (1645–1669) that proved excessively harsh and long in duration, also known as

‘the Cretan War’, since the great island was to become the target of the Ottoman Porte following the loss of Euboea/Negroponte (1470) and Cyprus (1571), which signaled the abatement in the dynamics of the *Serenissima*’s possessions network. The bibliographical references dealing with the Cretan War are countless, yet this volume consists of a major contribution summing up and analyzing various facets of society, economy and political-military matters, primarily based on the pertinent use of archival material. It appears as the collective labors on the part of professors at universities and researchers, through twenty-one studies derived from papers presented during a relevant international congress held at Heraklion (1–3 November 2019). The editorial task was undertaken by Yiannis Mavromatis, Eirini Lydaki and Eirini Papadaki, while the volume is dedicated to the memory of Stylianos Alexiou, Nikolaos Panagiotakis, Nikos Giannadakis and Andreas Savvakis.

The first two studies provide a survey of historical texts as well as of their historiographical approach and research perspectives. In particular, Yiannis Mavromatis offers a general conspectus of 17th-century Greek historical texts, while Anastassia Papadia-Lala attempts to present the Cretan War through various historiographical approaches thus, manifesting its relevant research potential. In the third paper, Chryssa Maltezou presents the Republic’s defeat as it was handled on the part of Venice which was an issue of major importance for the *Serenissima*, as the reverberation of Crete’s loss on Venetian society was a serious one; thus, the wound caused by the unfortunate outcome of the war on the Republic’s collective memory had somehow to be smoothed. In the fourth essay, Ioanna Steriotou analyzes the facet of the war dealing with fortifications and defensive capabilities on the part of the Venetian administration regarding the most important military mechanics and their *modus operandi* during the period of the war.

Essays five and six by Kostas Tsiknakis and Angeliki Panopoulou respectively deal with topics of social and economic history. A particularly interesting issue related to research for Venetian domination – and Latinocracy in general – is the stance of the Greek populations towards their foreign rulers. In our present case, the Greeks participated actively in the fight against the Ottomans contributing an essential assistance in Venice’s long-term struggle against the Porte. However, this fight was dependent on a large scale in the effectiveness of the Republic’s supplying network, as described by Angeliki Panopoulou, who furnishes details

on the operation of that system. Essay seven by Nuri Adieke and Neyiir Berktaç treat the issue of the extent to which Venetians and Ottomans could exploit the economic and demographical conditions on the island during the war, while A. Nücket Adiyeke and Neyyir Berktaç present to us another type of the ‘war’: that is, the struggle with epidemics and natural phenomena, which added yet another problem to the Ottoman aggressors in their attempt to capture Crete. The ninth essay by Manolis Drakakis discusses the testaments compiled by the notary Mateo Pacidhio in the long course of the siege, providing another aspect of this confrontation, as the island’s defenders, not only Greeks but foreigners as well, dictated their final wills: they manifest the cares of everyday people not only for earthly life but also for the one lying beyond – thus the historian is in a position to study the agonies and reactions of locals and foreigners in the crucial phases of the war.

Study ten by Maria Patramani is of a prosopographical nature and examines the life of the aristocrat Michiel Muatso, who ended up as a refugee in Venetian Cythera/Cerigo, while Tatiana Markaki in essay eleven deals with the role of women in everyday life during the Cretan War through notarial documents. Kostas Lambrinos in study twelve tackles social history as well, looking, once again through archival material, at social workings effected in the city of Chania during its Ottoman siege and manifesting the ways in which social mobility was promoted on the Venetian side. On the other hand, essays thirteen and fourteen are of an ecclesiastical and religious nature. Aspasia Papadaki researches aspects of worship and religious life in Chandax city during the war, while Demetrios Tsougarakis and Helen Angelomatis-Tsougarakis inform us on the attitude of the local clergy during the Cretan War – the latter showing a bilateral nature between those who supported the Venetians and those who believed that it would be to their advantage to side with the Ottomans. In study fifteen Sotiris Koutmanis attempts yet another demographic and social approach, discussing the topic of Cretan refugees who eventually found shelter in Venice herself, thus strengthening the city’s Greek community. The reverberations of the Cretan War in Padova through the work of Carlo de Dottori entitled “*Cretae oppugnatio*” forms the subject of essay sixteen by Stefano Trovato, who attempts to shed light on the impression of the war in the Veneto regions, while in essay seventeen Marinos Sarigiannis envisages the Ottoman conquest of the island from a different perspective, as Crete (Ikritish in Arabic; Girid in Ottoman texts) would become a crucial Ottoman

base of trade and economy within the larger eastern Mediterranean basin.

The four last papers are equally interesting as the Cretan War passes through another filter, i.e., that of literary influence and adaptation. Tasoula Markomihelaki deals with the poem entitled “Plunder of Paroikia of Paros (1668)”, which functions as a literary source. Eirini Papadaki, on the other hand, presents us the “Chronicle of the Cretan War” by Martio Stefanoni, who was an eyewitness – which consists of a rare, important case. Eirini Lydaki, too, analyzes the literary aspects of the war, which worked as a source of inspiration for several authors. Finally, Alfred Vincent unravels yet another important literary facet connected with the Cretan War, that is the way in which the latter is narrated in the South Slavonic epic songs, which reverberate the instance of the seizure of two women belonging to the Sultan’s harem by the Hospitaller Knights of Saint John.

Some of the included studies contain interesting photographs, maps and helpful old editions on their contents, while, as a general observation, this is a most notable and carefully prepared volume, the originality of which is further enhanced by the high scholarly quality of its contributors. It will be most welcome not only to the specialized researcher but also to the undergraduate student, as well as to the lay reader. Its pages provide a multi-faceted picture, a conspectus of the Cretan War, which was included among the most crucial events in the history of the Eastern Mediterranean.

PHOTEINE V. PERRA


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GHERARDO ORTALLI, GIUSEPPE GULLINO ED EGIDIO IVETIC (CUR.),

*L'ineстиgibile sogno del dominio.
Francesco Morosini.*

*Atti del Convegno promosso
dall'Istituto Veneto di Scienze, Lettere ed Arti
(Venezia, 26–27 febbraio 2019)*

Venezia, Istituto Veneto di Scienze, Lettere ed Arti, 2021, pp. 310.



Sono trascorsi oramai trecentoventisette anni dalla morte di Francesco Morosini, uomo politico e militare di grande prestigio al servizio della Repubblica di Venezia. Eppure, nel tratteggio di un personaggio complesso, sfaccettato e a volte difficilmente interpretabile secondo i canoni odierni di confronto, lo studio del Morosini riporta alla luce molti elementi attuali.

Non in questa sede si tratterà di discutere la figura del Morosini quale condottiero e personaggio, studi ampiamente disponibili in svariate biografie più o meno

recenti, quanto di analizzare il contributo del convegno organizzato in onore del quattrocentesimo anniversario della sua nascita dall’Istituto Veneto di Scienze, Lettere ed Arti nel febbraio 2019, convegno al quale ho avuto l’onore di partecipare come relatore in merito al processo che vide il Nostro essere accusato di tradimento e peculato successivi alla resa dell’isola di Candia al termine del lungo conflitto veneto-turco.

Durante le giornate dell’incontro, organizzato dall’Istituto si sono affrontati temi collaterali al Morosini ma al tempo stesso fondanti e indispensabili a comprendere i *pattern* geopolitico, sociale, militare, economico ed evenemenziale nei quali il condottiero visse.

Gli atti seguenti alle ricerche in merito furono presentati da autori e studiosi di storia veneziana ai quali seguì un breve ma quanto mai attuale intervento da parte del Generale di Brigata della Guardia di Finanza Giuseppe Arbore circa la sfida rappresentata dalla condizione odierna del Mar Mediterraneo.

Dalle giornate di presentazione è stato poi redatto e stampato un volume collettivo che viene qui descritto: esso si presenta come un’antologia eterogenea ma al tempo stesso particolareggiata di ciò che caratterizzò sia la figura morosiniana sia taluni aspetti geopolitici e storici della regione Greco-Balcanica oltre che ovviamente della regione Nord Adriatica; in ordine di apparizione contribuirono Giuseppe Gullino (Professore già ordinario di Storia Moderna nell’Università di Padova), Piero Del Negro (Professore emerito di Storia militare nell’Università di Padova), Gino Benzoni (Professore già ordinario di Storia della storiografia nell’Università Ca’ Foscari di Venezia), Luciano Pezzolo (Professore ordinario di Storia moderna nell’Università Ca’ Foscari di Venezia), Gilberto Pizzamiglio (Professore già ordinario di Letteratura italiana nell’Università Ca’ Foscari di Venezia), Irene Favaretto (Professoressa già ordinaria di Storia dell’archeologia nell’Università di Padova), Marino Zorzi (già direttore della Biblioteca Nazionale Marciana), Piero Falchetta (curatore della Biblioteca Nazionale Marciana), Egidio Ivetic (Professore associato di Storia moderna nell’Università di Padova), Vera Costantini (Professoressa associata di Armenistica, Caucasiologia, Mongolistica e Turcologia nell’Università Ca’ Foscari di Venezia), Sergio Perini (socio della Deputazione di Storia Patria per le Venezie) e Gerassimos Pagratis (Professore ordinario di Storia e Civiltà italiana nell’Università Nazionale e Capodistriaca di Atene). Il volume è appunto concluso dall’intervento del Generale Arbore sopra menzionato.

Le giornate di incontri si aprirono con l'introduzione di Giuseppe Gullino che, dopo aver brevemente anticipato i temi che si sarebbero in seguito trattati, iniziò discutendo della figura del Morosini quale si inserì nel panorama della Serenissima del periodo.

Trovo qui necessario indicare una premessa: come noto la Dominante, per sua stessa natura concettuale e governativa tendeva a disconoscere la retorica legata al culto della personalità (p. 2), aspetto ampiamente dimostrato dalla propria forma di governo collegiale e tipicamente “a specchi”, nella quale diversi organi istituzionali e funzionari avevano, in parte, altresì il compito di vigilare sull’operato e la discrezionalità dei propri paralleli burocratici. Ma come si inserì una figura forte e al limite della tracotanza quale fu quella di Morosini in tale peculiarità e durante il turbolento secolo che vide la Serenissima ridimensionata rispetto ai propri sogni di riconquista? La Guerra di Candia prima e quella di Morea poi non potevano che richiedere la presenza di figure autoritarie quali un Mocenigo, un Capello o appunto un Morosini.

Gullino¹ si sofferma con intensità su quel “filo rosso” che ha da sempre legato l’ambiente alto Adriatico, in particolar modo Venezia, al mondo greco (p. 5); non dimentichiamoci che la Serenissima intratteneva già con la realtà Bizantina intensi rapporti di incontro e scontro, culminati nel saccheggio della quarta Crociata nel 1204; rapporti che proseguiranno dopo il 1453 e la caduta dell’Impero Bizantino con il Sultanato Turco.

Notiamo quindi la forte connotazione levantina delle imprese morosiniane sin dalla giovinezza quale Capitano di sopracomito, passando naturalmente per la funzione di Provveditore Generale delle Armi a Candia e in seguito Capitano Generale da Mar prima durante l’assedio di Creta e diversi anni dopo nella Guerra di Morea. Proprio in qualità nel suo quarto incarico (fatto mai avvenuto ulteriormente nella storia della Serenissima) di Capitano Generale in Morea (e contemporaneamente in veste di Doge) Francesco Morosini morirà nel 1694; si può quindi concludere che eventi straordinari come furono quelli appena elencati non solo servirono da presupposto ma divennero addirittura la fonte ultima ad una figura come quella del Morosini.

Proprio sul ruolo di Capitano Generale da Mar si sofferma Piero Del Negro²;

1 «Per la Patria e per la Gloria. Morosini il Peloponnesiaco», pp. 3-18.

2 «Francesco Morosini Capitano Generale da Mar», pp. 19-38.

rispetto alla credenza diffusa e a volte perfino indicata in lavori a carattere storio-grafico tale ruolo, sebbene di ampie prospettive pratiche e decisionali, non prevedeva carta bianca in merito a ogni decisione militare, strategica, organizzativa o tattica (p. 23).

Scopriamo, infatti, come anche il Morosini dovesse riferire specificatamente a Venezia ogni decisione presa sul campo e giustificiarla in relazione agli obiettivi prefissati dalla Dominante, visto anche la non florida situazione finanziaria ormai sostenuta dalla Serenissima nel XVII secolo e la vastità del teatro operativo contro il Turco; di altra misura ma sempre indicativo appare inoltre il fatto di come il Morosini si consultasse giornalmente con i propri comandanti terrestri sia durante la guerra di Candia che durante quella di Morea (si veda il Königsmark, tenuto in gran conto dal Nostro durante gli anni dell’assedio a Creta), e che anzi molto spesso si risolvesse alle loro decisioni strategiche.

Indicativo ci appare inoltre il fragile rapporto intrattenuto tra i comandanti e gli ufficiali veneziani e le truppe straniere a loro assoldate (levantini, tedeschi, inglesi, francesi, albanesi), le quali minacciavano di sciogliersi qualora, come spesso avvenne, la paga non fosse arrivata puntuale o il vitto fosse stato considerato scadente. Anche verso gli “oltremarini”, dei quali Morosini aveva massima cura considerando essi come i migliori soldati al suo servizio (p. 25), il Capitano Generale da Mar poco poteva in fatto di disciplina e attinenza puntuale agli ordini.

Ciò non sorprende considerando anche che solamente nel 1684 nacque il primo reggimento veneziano di fatto “statale” (il Veneto Real) composto cioè unicamente da soldati di professione arruolati nei territori della Serenissima; in fatto di uniformi, regole di ingaggio, retribuzioni, composizione dei gruppi, attrezzatura ed armamento possiamo riconoscere in questo un fatto costante della realtà militare veneziana quasi fino alla sua scomparsa nel 1797. In definitiva, secondo Del Negro, «si deve concludere che [il controllo] sugli avvenimenti del Capitano Generale da Mar era un pio desiderio e che spesso Morosini era costretto ad avanzare su una lastra sottile di ghiaccio, che rischiava di incrinarsi e di spezzarsi da un momento all’altro» (p. 27).

Vera Costantini³ offre una prospettiva non comune della guerra di Candia e

3 «Prospettive ottomane su Venezia e il Mediterraneo centro-orientale all’epoca di Francesco Morosini», pp. 39-50.

dei suoi successivi sviluppi, ossia un’interpretazione di alcune missive ottomane che ci comunicano la visione e le reazioni del Sultano e del suo circolo d’élite al corso degli avvenimenti.

Scopriamo quindi come, ad un’iniziale preoccupazione per le finanze pericolosamente fragili in vista di quello che si dimostrerà essere un assedio decennale, seguì una più decisa reazione da parte del potere ottomano nei confronti della resistenza veneziana; difatti, ad cauto ottimismo prospettato dall’ambasciatore veneto a Costantinopoli, Giovanni Capello, in merito alle finanze turche che non avrebbero permesso una duratura guerra d’assedio, seguirono invece le sprezzanti risposte del Visir Ahmed Pascià al Capello che nel 1653 chiedeva la pace al turco dietro pagamento di un forte compenso (p. 41).

Dalle missive scambiate tra la corte ottomana e il Sultano Maometto IV traspare invece una forte apprensione dopo la vittoria navale veneziana ai Dardanelli nel 1656; la successiva riorganizzazione delle finanze di stato intrapresa dal primo ministro ottomano plenipotenziario, Mehmed Köprülü Pascià, contribuirà a portare alla definita resa di Candia e la ripresa dell’espansionismo turco ad ovest e settentrione. Bisognerà aspettare il fallito assedio di Vienna del 1683 per vedere fermata l’onda ottomana nell’Europa centrale.

Dallo studio di Vera Costantini e dalle lettere analizzate appare infine come, nel breve periodo di pace tra la guerra di Candia e quella successiva di Morea i rapporti commerciali e diplomatici tra la Sublime Porta e la Serenissima fossero ricominciati floridamente, con Venezia che veniva ancora una volta a consolidarsi come la “Porta d’Oriente”, patria di un Levante non solo rappresentato ma anche vissuto (p. 47).

Il contributo di Egidio Ivetic⁴ appare invece quanto mai fondamentale nell’affermazione della realtà geopolitica dei Balcani durante la guerra di Morea: oggi come allora la regione balcanica appariva come difficilmente inquadrabile dal punto di vista di realtà unitaria. Sebbene fossero considerati un “avamposto ottomano” già dalla caduta dell’Impero Bizantino i Balcani riescono, durante tutta la loro storia, a costituirsì come una sorta di “ponte tibetano” tra l’Europa e la realtà turca, un momento più vicino all’una e uno all’altra (p. 52).

Se da una parte vi era la frontiera ungherese (quella settentrionale), alla quale

4 «Guerra e definizione dei Balcani nel 1684–1699», pp. 51-64.

gli ottomani furono costretti ad arretrare dopo il 1683, dall'altra i Balcani restarono per i veneziani la terra dalla quale partivano spedizioni di razzia, di assalto e area di incertezza nel continuativo rapporto di incontro-scontro con la più vasta area asiatica ottomana. Possiamo quindi considerare a tutti gli effetti il territorio della Serenissima, con le sue propaggini in Istria e Dalmazia, come la frontiera meridionale e marittima delle ambizioni turche, sebbene con la Dominante in ciò favorita difensivamente dalla confortante presenza del Mar Adriatico (p. 54).

Questo fu però particolarmente vero fino alle fasi iniziali della Guerra di Morea: dopo la perdita veneziana di Candia ma anche la successiva sconfitta Ottomana alle porte di Vienna e la precipitosa ritirata dei turchi incalzati dalla Lega Santa la Serenissima iniziò le operazioni nei Balcani scostandosi dalla solita posizione attendista e difensivista tenuta fino a quel momento sulle zone costiere per spingersi ardитamente verso l'interno, con l'intento futuro di mantenere quanto conquistato (p. 54). Ciò, unito alla discesa Asburgica dal nord, contribuì a creare per la successiva età contemporanea i presupposti per il mantenimento di tale caratteristica dei Balcani concepiti come un territorio eterogeneo e sempre in bilico tra la fermezza di un'Europa settentrionale e il fascino del vicino oriente, prima Ottomano poi propriamente turco dal 1924.

Dopo il fallimento di lungo termine della Lega Santa con la pace di Carlowitz (1699), i Balcani torneranno, in buona misura, sotto la dominazione diretta della Sublime Porta; essi tuttavia, usando un termine culinario “avevano assaggiato il sapore d'Europa”, un sapore che non avrebbero mai dimenticato restando tuttavia, anche al giorno d'oggi, attratti dagli echi del Levante.

Il saggio successivo di Luciano Pezzolo⁵ getta nuova luce sugli aspetti più prettamente economici e finanziari della Guerra di Candia: obiettivo è sostenere come, nonostante le spese sostenute dalla Serenissima fossero state pesanti in termini di peso sul bilancio, tassazione e indebitamento statali, esse non furono così debilitanti e durature rispetto a quanto comunemente creduto finora. Analizzando le forme di tassazione, la cessione di credito, le emissioni di buoni o gli investimenti a carattere governativo, territoriale e di cariche pubbliche è possibile notare come già prima della Guerra di Candia quasi la metà delle spese di bilancio statale fossero dedicate alla difesa interna ed esterna e al mantenimento della stabilità confinaria (p. 66); ciò non deve sorprendere considerando la natura geopolitica e

⁵ («Una finanza in guerra, 1645–1669», pp. 65-112

la natura concettuale della Serenissima.

Espresso il costo globale della Guerra di Candia in tre milioni di ducati, come si avvenne a recuperare le somme necessarie per il proseguimento del conflitto in un periodo certamente non florido per le casse statali veneziane? È possibile a tal proposito elencare diverse forme di reperimento, che per questioni di brevità mi limiterò qui ad elencare, ossia:

a) Contributi diretti dei sudditi, donazioni che ottennero risultati di rilievo in termini di parziali raccolti, specialmente durante i primi anni di conflitto (p. 70).

b) Aumento della tassazione diretta, tramite l'incremento di imposte, dazi doganali su beni non di prima necessità (anche se tali aumenti andarono, almeno in un primo momento, ad incidere pesantemente sulla vita quotidiana dei sudditi) e gravezze. La cosiddetta *tansa* venne introdotta nel 1645 salvo poi divenire parte della tassazione diretta successiva, pur trasformandosi via via da imposta a prestito forzoso (p. 75). Da notare inoltre il leggero amento della tassazione anche su beni e rendite ecclesiastiche, aumento tuttavia ben lontano da quello imposto da Venezia durante il periodo dell'interdetto.

c) Indebitamento diretto ed indiretto: nel primo caso si ricorreva a prestiti internazionali con interessi di restituzione di varia natura e tempistica, nel secondo lo stato veneziano emetteva dei certificati statali che, dietro pagamento di una cifra iniziale al governo, permettevano l'emissione di una rendita o si sarebbero risolti in un successivo rimborso al privato maggiorato degli interessi (p. 98).

d) Vendita di cariche nobiliari (la carica di patrizio per l'ingresso in Maggior Consiglio) o di posizioni pubbliche, oltre che di beni e terreni statali messi all'asta; durante la guerra di Candia si cooptarono diverse nuove famiglie patrizie che dietro corrispettivo di un'ingente somma avrebbero potuto elevarsi al rango di patrizio. Se l'introduzione di nuovi membri nobiliari non fu uno strumento spesso utilizzato nella storia della Serenissima (sempre osteggiato dalle famiglie patrizie di vecchia data che temevano di perdere il loro ruolo di preminenza determinato dalla loro antichità d'ingresso in Maggior Consiglio), la vendita di cariche pubbliche fu invece prassi assai comune nel XVI e XVII secolo (p. 106).

e) Istituzione di lotterie e scambi di valute presso le fiere dei cambi: se nel primo caso si ricorreva ad uno strumento già noto dal periodo rinascimentale, nel secondo si provò a ottenere introiti monetari scambiando la valuta veneziana su piazze quale quella di Bisenzone (solo per citare la più famosa del periodo in Italia); questo metodo si rivelò tuttavia di scarsa capacità effettiva data la svalutazione che il ducato veneziano stava vivendo nella prima metà del Seicento, che complice la non più florida situazione della Serenissima viaggiava su tassi di scambio di molto inferiori rispetto ai decenni precedenti (p. 98).

In definitiva, come conclude Pezzolo, l'aggravio fiscale fu relativamente pesante anche dopo il ritorno della pace e la maggior parte dei capitali reperiti, seppur nella pletora dei metodi appena elencati, provenivano in buona misura da

forme di indebitamento a breve, medio e lungo termine della componente statale sia verso l'interno (cessione di credito o elargizione di rendite vitalizie a privati) sia verso l'esterno (allargamento o apertura del credito ad investitori stranieri) (p. 107); sebbene diversificato e a tratti intenso, il periodo di forte richiesta di capitali da impiegare senza indugio alcuno nella prosecuzione della guerra non incise così pesantemente nel proseguo della storia veneziana, segno che nonostante i tempi difficili e la svalutazione della moneta statale l'economia e soprattutto il governo della Serenissima erano ancora considerate caratterizzate da stabilità e vi era ancora fiducia nel prestito di somme a medio e lungo termine, sia da parte di investitori interni (compagnie mercantili o privati) sia da quelli esterni (governi e compagni stranieri).

La domanda che si pose Gerassimos Pagratis nello studio poi presentato in conferenza⁶) fu la seguente: come incise la dominazione veneziana a seguito della vittoriosa guerra di Morea contro i turchi e prima del ritorno di questi ultimi nel 1714? La risposta, sebbene appaia all'apparenza di complessa indicazione, in realtà riflette molto chiaramente la tendenza veneziana a una riorganizzazione tendenzialmente neutralistica dei territori conquistati (o riconquistati), tendenza che è possibile notare chiaramente anche in quel dominio di terraferma che i veneziani intrattennero nelle province venete, lombarde e friulane.

Se dal punto di vista amministrativo e sociale la Morea fu suddivisa in ventiquattro territori e quattro province con capitale Nauplia (anche chiamata all'epoca Napoli di Romania, dove il Morosini morì) da quello puramente sociale i veneziani cercarono di porsi come liberatori ritornati a spezzare il giogo ottomano su territori e popolazioni cristiane; tuttavia in un'ottica politica di lungo respiro essi fallirono completamente nel cercare di imporre quella “venezianità” che le gerarchie della Serenissima speravano di instaurare in Grecia, consapevoli appunto di quel duraturo rapporto concettuale fino a quel momento intessuto con la realtà ellenica (p. 120).

Di fatto, dal punto di vista concettuale i veneziani non fecero altro che confermare *in toto* le prerogative e i privilegi di una minoritaria fetta di popolazione urbana mantenendo invece l'inferiore status quo di pastori e pescatori, ossia la componente popolare più povera ma anche numericamente più numerosa della Morea (p. 121).

6 «Politiche veneziane e società locali nel Regno di Morea», pp. 113-128.

Anche in ambito legislativo e soprattutto di intesa religiosa i risultati furono deludenti: pur emettendo un aggiornato codice legislativo in linea con quello presente negli altri territori della Dominante ed instaurando consigli di comunità per interpellare e affrontare le problematiche locali l'adesione della popolazione ad usi, costumi e norme veneziane fu solo parziale; dal punto di vista religioso invece i fatti appaiono ancora più emblematici: privilegiando l'immigrazione a carattere veneziano e devolvendo cariche e ruoli di rilievo a politici veneti (quindi di estrazione cattolica) i quali dovevano riferirsi a una realtà principalmente ortodossa, i nuovi dominatori finirono per perdere l'appoggio della popolazione cristiana, già tiepida al momento del loro arrivo considerati i precedenti e discreti margini di tolleranza religiosa ed economica vissuti sotto il regno ottomano. In definitiva nel momento del bisogno, ossia all'apertura del nuovo conflitto venezio-turco nel 1714, furono ben pochi i poteri locali che si schierarono apertamente da parte veneziana preconfigurando e facilitando così il ritorno di quel potere sì di stirpe musulmana, ma con un'impronta di governo ben più chiara e tollerante (p. 123).

Sergio Perini⁷ si concentra su un tema coeve a quello affrontato dal Pagratis, ossia i provvedimenti a carattere militare ed economico intrapresi dai veneziani durante i pochi anni della loro presenza in Morea.

È possibile innanzitutto notare come si preferì, dati i costi ingenti di una fortificazione profonda di un territorio non urbanisticamente denso e popolato, privilegiare l'aumento delle difese della fascia costiera e l'instaurarsi di poche piazzeforti continentali ben identificate (pp. 132-133).

Si avviò al tempo stesso l'esperimento della coercizione obbligatoria, con alterne fortune, in relazione al progetto di creare compagini territoriali locali fedeli alla Serenissima e impiegabili in operazioni di polizia e difesa dei confini da pirati e predoni.

La militarizzazione della società locale era ostacolata anche dalla scarsa densità abitativa e dalla scarsissima presenza di cavalli, che dovevano quasi tutti essere importati dal Regno di Napoli a caro prezzo (p. 134); a ciò si aggiungeva un'efficacia tassativa difficoltosa e intermittente, condita da onnipresenti ritardi e inadempienze.

⁷ «I provvedimenti veneziani in Morea (1687-1714)», pp. 129-148.

Anche dal punto di vista puramente economico la situazione non era tra le più floride: come già accennato la maggior parte della popolazione viveva dei proventi di pastorizia e pesca costiera, attività peraltro ben lontane da un’organizzazione di tipo razionale ed intensivo e quindi volto a qualcosa di più della mera sussistenza locale.

Limitate e sporadiche le altre attività del primario quali agricoltura, viticoltura e olivicoltura; molto scarso e primitivo lo sfruttamento delle risorse naturali come miniere e giacimenti o fondi boschivi e saline, sebbene questi ultimi due fossero molto abbondanti sul territorio (pp. 138-139).

Nel tentativo di porre una soluzione ai problemi appena evidenziati i provvedimenti veneziani confluirono in due direzioni ben distinte, quali il ripopolamento grazie alla creazione di nuove colonie e l’aumento della componente agri colturale del territorio: se, come abbiamo appena visto, il primo intervento provocò sì un leggero aumento demografico ma a prezzo della perdita dell’appoggio locale al dominio veneziano, il secondo si risolse in una destabilizzante sovrapproduzione di cereali, che finirono venduti sulle piazze estere con quasi nessuna convenienza per i produttori locali (p. 138).

Anche la speranza di rivitalizzare il commercio Levantino grazie agli sbocchi greci si risolse in una cocente delusione: pochi, mal serviti ed attrezzati i porti moreoti che non invogliavano certo i mercanti stranieri a fermarsi per trattative commerciali, anche in luce della scarsa disponibilità e qualità dei prodotti locali esportabili (p. 147). Se a ciò aggiungiamo la nota avidità con la quale i commercianti veneziani si relazionavano con le loro controparti greche ci viene tratteggiato un quadro della situazione locale quanto mai desolante. Concludendo, Perini nota come, pur a fronte di una notevole e dispendiosa cura da parte del governo Serenissimo (anche in embrionali istituti di educazione, assistenziali e perfino postali) verso i territori ellenici, i risultati ottenuti al 1714 apparivano decisamente deludenti.

Cambiamo completamente registro e andiamo ad analizzare brevemente il contributo di Piero Falchetta⁸, dedicato alla rappresentazione grafica di località legate alla vita di Morosini: Valona (1638), Milo (1645), Canea e Retimo (1646), Cesme (1657 e 1659), Focea Vecchia (1649), Naxos (1651), Volos

8 «Il capitano illustrato», pp. 149-180.

(1655), Calamata (1659 e 1685), Skiathos (1660), Corone (1685) (pp. 151-159). Particolare attenzione è dedicata infine a illustrazioni e disegni che raffigurano il momento dell’esplosione del Partenone il 26 settembre 1687 (pp. 160-161).

Gilberto Pizzamiglio⁹ si sofferma invece su un interessantissimo aspetto della guerra di Creta (anche da me affrontato durante il mio lavoro su Morosini in relazione sul processo da lui subito), ossia quello dei manifestini e delle satire anonime contro il Nostro e dei cosiddetti «testamenti spirituali» della città di Candia.

Le “pasquinate” riportate e giunte fino a noi, che purtroppo per questione di sintesi non mi è possibile includere in questo scritto (pp. 182 e segg.), sono probabilmente copie di quelle originali affisse in giro per Venezia e ci offrono una visione ben lontana dall’iconografia solenne e quasi sempre favorevole al Morosini di solito riportata in cronache e biografie; in uno di questi scritti anonimi a carattere popolare il condottiero viene, infatti, definito «traditor della Patria» (pp. 182-183) per aver ceduto l’isola di Candia al turco oltretutto senza una preventiva approvazione del Senato.

Di diversa natura e tenore sono invece i «testamenti spirituali» della città, documenti stilisticamente molto particolari nei quali l’autore, sempre anonimo, scrive come se fosse la personificazione della città stessa ed essa, prima di venire consegnata all’invasore ottomano, dedica un lascito immaginario di parti (definite «caratti») ai più valorosi difensori che combatterono per lei non dimenticandosi tuttavia di accusare coloro il cui comportamento o inettitudine permisero la vittoria del conquistatore straniero (pp. 186-189). Scopriamo, infatti, tutta una serie di note che conferiscono a questo o a quel personaggio una lode o un biasimo.

Nel secondo «testamento» qui riportato non compare con certezza la figura del Morosini dato che, come spesso capitava, si tendeva a confondere i diversi omonimi presenti simultaneamente in un dato teatro d’operazioni.

Molto interessante notare come Candia stessa (tramite l’autore), sebbene anche in questo documento accusasse taluni protagonisti di non averla saputa difendere a dovere, in conclusione di scritto addiviene a una generale assoluzione quasi che lo scrivente fosse consapevole dell’enorme disparità di mezzi messi in campo dai veneziani per difendere l’isola in confronto alla gargantuesca potenza ottomana (p. 192).

9 «Manifestini e satire anonime attorno alla guerra di Candia», pp. 181-196.

Irene Favaretto («Le «antiche vestigia di celebri ed erudite memorie...»: Francesco Morosini e le spoliazioni del Partenone», pp. 197-210) elabora uno spaccato di carattere artistico e si sofferma sull'analisi del furto (perché altro non fu) di vestigia, icone, marmi incompiuti e addirittura intere parti di bassorilievo e statue seguito alla distruzione accidentale del Partenone nel 1687, giunto praticamente intatto fino a quella data.

Propedeutica all'analisi successiva, Favaretto descrive brevemente una lista di cronache, illustrazioni e annotazioni artistiche che del tempio fecero turisti e visitatori a partire dal XIV secolo fino al momento drammatico dello scoppio e del successivo incendio; elenca quindi una serie di opere trafugate e da lì in seguito disperse per mezzo continente europeo (e non solo), oggi parte di collezioni private, di musei oppure ammirabili a Venezia; di queste ultime sono da indicare sicuramente i leoni marmorei che lo stesso Morosini volle riportare nella capitale e tuttora conservati in città (pp. 206-207).

Lo scempio e il furto di opere d'arte provenienti dal Partenone e dall'Acropoli non si fermò purtroppo con la guerra di Morea come testimonia il saccheggio avvenuto non più tardi del 1824, in pieno romanticismo, ad opera dell'ambasciatore inglese Thomas Bruce Duca d'Elgin, che con la scusa di eseguire rilievi artistici trafugò beni di immenso valore dalla zona dell'Acropoli (p. 202); tuttavia, come nota la studiosa, vi fu un piccolo lato positivo a seguito del periodo di furti: l'instantarsi nel resto d'Europa di una profonda ondata di neoclassicismo e amore per i tesori e l'età classica greca che, su contributo delle opere trafugate e poi inviate in Italia, Germania, Austria, Svezia, Francia e Regno Unito nel corso del XVIII e XIX secolo, investì l'ambiente culturale internazionale ed innalzò Atene a uno dei simboli fondanti della civiltà occidentale (p. 206).

Collegandoci all'aspetto appena considerato ma focalizzando la nostra attenzione sui tesori e i beni portati in patria veneziana dal Morosini stesso e quindi entrati a far parte delle collezioni di famiglia quale fu la sorte dei suddetti oggetti e come questi si legarono agli eredi del grande condottiero?

Risponde a questa domanda Marino Zorzi con il suo contributo («Gli eredi di Francesco Morosini. La sorte dei beni e delle raccolte del doge», pp. 211-232). Sebbene il Nostro non ebbe eredi diretti (non si sposò mai e non ebbe figli), alla sua morte non mancarono certo i destinatari dei suoi beni; in base alle volontà testamentarie venivano, infatti, beneficiati nipoti, cognate e cognati, membri di

altri rami collaterali dei Morosini ma anche istituti pii e servitori (pp. 211-212).

Zorzi segue quindi brevemente le vicende dei parenti più prossimi del Morosini tratteggiandone le brillanti carriere politiche o militari fino a giungere al 1797, “annus horribilis” per la Serenissima: due anni più tardi ritroviamo Elisabetta Morosini, nata nel 1778, la quale si congiunse in sposa a Vienna all'austriaco conte di Gatterburg Paolo Antonio. La neoeletta dominazione asburgica teneva in gran considerazione la nobiltà veneziana e questo matrimonio può apparire come un’abile mossa politica dei Morosini per legare il proprio nome di antica data patrizia ai nuovi signori del Veneto (p. 217). Se fino a quel momento i beni ereditari del nostro Francesco Morosini erano rimasti essenzialmente legati a un particolare ramo della famiglia (i Morosini di Santo Stefano, rione del quale era originario il condottiero), con il ripristino da parte asburgica dei fedecommissi dopo il 1801 si fecero avanti anche i cugini Morosini di San Zan Lateran (p. 219), di fatto obbligando i beni ereditari a separarsi in diverse direzioni. A Elisabetta Morosini restava ciononostante la componente ereditaria maggiore, come erede principale dei lasciti risalenti a oltre un secolo prima.

La convivenza con il conte di Gatterburg non durò molto a lungo: dopo il 1806 Elisabetta viveva già lontana da suo marito, essendo ritornata a Venezia con la madre. La morte della secondogenita Marietta nel 1816 sembra provocare il definitivo ritiro a vita privata della contessa Morosini, mentre la dipartita del seppur lontano marito nel 1828 lascia la vedova con la madre anziana (morta nello stesso anno) e la primogenita Loredana (p. 223).

Loredana non si sposerà mai; la ritroviamo intenta a curare la memoria del Peloponnesiaco e le sue proprietà immobiliari a Venezia ed in terraferma, vaste ma oramai vuote. Morirà nel 1884 senza lasciare un testamento completo (ne redasse uno nel 1866, tuttavia incompiuto per la maggior parte dei beni non citati), fatto il quale obbligò il patrimonio del Nostro a dividersi ulteriormente tra i lontani eredi a Venezia, nel resto d’Italia, in Austria.

Parte dei beni verranno donati dai destinatari al Comune di Venezia, molti altri furono messi all’asta nel 1894; ad oggi si trovano ancora frammezzati in diverse nazioni (p. 229).

Il contributo di Gino Benzoni («Tra regno perduto e regno recuperato: la sindrome della corona», pp. 233-256) chiarisce quella che lui definisce «la sindrome della corona» veneziana. Potremmo forse definire un anno in cui la potenza la-

gunare raggiunse la vetta della sua predominanza nel teatro europeo, ossia quel 1204 che la vide avvantaggiarsi a scapito dell’Impero Bizantino; tuttavia non è altrettanto semplice indicare un preciso momento dal quale la Serenissima iniziò il suo lento declino. Come ci indica Benzoni, tuttavia, due circostanze furono particolarmente dolorose sia per le aspirazioni espansionistiche levantine della Dominante sia per la sua concezione di «governo perfetto»: la perdita di Cipro nel corso del XVI secolo (1571) e quella di Candia nel 1669 (pp. 237 e segg.).

Da notare tuttavia che, come indica lo stesso Benzoni, «se i regni si perdono, i titoli restano» (p. 240); questa è la filosofia alla base della immutata natura della reggenza veneta su quelle terre che, cadute momentaneamente in mano al turco, venete restano. Attenzione però: in questa sovrastimata importanza di titoli su territori oramai perduti e il pavoneggiamiento che creò non poche vicissitudini in termini di precedenze ambasciatoriali e politiche, vi è da riconoscere il segnale della forte debolezza oramai diffusa nella concezione statale veneziana; già la battaglia di Agnadello del 1509 aveva posto un brusco, e definitivo, freno alle ambizioni espansionistiche della Dominante sulla terra ferma italiana.

La perdita di Candia del 1669, seppur al termine di un sanguinoso e decennale assedio e che permise a Venezia di mantenere il controllo di alcune piazzeforti costiere, fu vissuta come una tragedia immane non solo per la decurtazione territoriale ma di fatto anche come un aggravamento di tale «sindrome della corona»: la dissipata sovranità su Cipro, fino a quel momento «in sosta» a Candia e in attesa di essere riconsegnata agli antichi fasti, vedeva ora aggiungersi proprio l’isola cretese come secondo territorio sovrano sottratto.

Come fare allora? La reputazione, l’onore, il vanto della Repubblica deve (temporaneamente) ritirarsi nuovamente, in quel Golfo Adriatico che suonava oramai quasi come il giardino di casa (p. 242).

Ecco che quindi la rinnovata guerra di Morea, con i suoi baldanzosi successi iniziali contro il turco, altro non era che l’agognato ritorno dei veneziani nelle terre la cui sovranità (perlomeno concettuale) non era mai venuta meno; e poco importa se, all’atto pratico, il ritorno a Cipro e a Candia appaiono per il momento impraticabili.

Nel 1684 sembra quindi che la «sindrome della corona» abbia una cura e la si stia attuando: il Morosini appare quasi come il bravo dottore che somministra una medicina sì amara ma necessaria alla guarigione dell’onore vituperato.

I sogni di gloria rinnovata, l'ultimo canto della fenice dopo la sua ultima riapparizione, si esaurirono come sappiamo nel 1714 con la definitiva perdita della Morea e l'imposizione del conclusivo assetto difensivista veneziano fino alla caduta della Repubblica. Un lato positivo però vi è: la «sindrome», spauracchio di diplomatici e governanti, viene metabolizzata, sfumata oramai in un'ottica di auto-glorificazione a posteriori nell'ultimo secolo di vita della Dominante (p. 251); la Venezia del Casanova e dei caffè nel Settecento è una nobile decaduta e sbefeggiata, ma una nobile ancora vivace e culturalmente centrale nella vita europea.

Prima di trarre alcune conclusioni generali sui contributi analizzati includo la descrizione dell'ultimo intervento presente, uno spaccato interpretativo sulla natura attuale del mar Mediterraneo come indicato da Giuseppe Arbore («L'attualità geostrategica e i relativi compiti di sicurezza nel Mediterraneo», pp. 257-273).

Com'è noto, l'area comunemente definita come mar Mediterraneo appare in realtà molto diversificata e critica dal punto di vista della stabilità geopolitica: la presenza di nazioni e popoli intrinsecamente molto differenti storicamente e socialmente ha contribuito a creare di secolo in secolo fattori di attrito prodotti da diverse motivazioni (sovrapopolazione con successivi flussi migratori da Sud a Nord ma anche viceversa, carenza di risorse idriche e agricole, mancanza di sicurezza per il commercio locale e le attività economiche marittime, conflitti per l'accaparramento di risorse energetiche ecc.) (pp. 258-259).

Dal punto di vista puramente italiano le sfide che si pongono nella gestione e nella salvaguardia dei confini marittimi nazionali si possono raggruppare in quattro macro temi: il contrasto al traffico illegale di sostanze stupefacenti, di armi, di rifiuti e la sicurezza dei migranti in mare (p. 262).

Ci si sofferma in particolar modo sull'ultimo punto elencato, andando ad indicare le operazioni e le modalità con le quali lo Stato italiano ha finora cercato di contrastare il traffico di esseri umani nel Mediterraneo, elevando al contempo la salvaguardia degli emigrati in difficoltà, vedasi l'operazione «Mare Nostrum» (pp. 269-273).

Eccoci quindi giunti alla conclusione; come indicato inizialmente durante l'esposizione degli atti del convegno presentati dai vari relatori ho cercato di sottolineare al contempo le dinamiche, sotteste o esplicite, alla base degli avvenimenti descritti. I contributi hanno spaziato in ottiche di studio molto diverse fra loro, dalla storia militare all'urbanistica, dall'economia e finanza all'epigrafia di taglio

artistico. In quest'ottica Francesco Morosini si completa in quanto figura storica tramite l'analisi e la descrizione degli aspetti a lui relazionati, non necessariamente in modo diretto, o paralleli.

Credo si possa affermare che il Nostro si pose come uno dei massimi esponenti militari e politici della storia del periodo; al di là delle sue incredibili imprese belliche, come politico seppe ritagliarsi e allargare passo dopo passo uno spazio di prerogative personali incredibili, ottenute attraverso un *mix* di riscontri militari vittoriosi, una solida famiglia patrizia alle spalle e soprattutto un'abilità e un'a-stuzia comunicativa sempre in equilibrio tra aspirazioni individuali e la necessaria prudenza per raggiungerle.

Dal punto di vista veneziano, la Serenissima nel corso di tutto il XVII secolo puntò alla creazione di immagini, simboli, elementi comunicativi tesi a sottolineare l'eroicità delle proprie truppe e soprattutto dei propri comandanti impegnati in una missione bellica gargantuesca a vantaggio dell'intera Europa cristiana, secondo la falsariga delle antiche crociate. Questo ci risulta ancora più indicativo se consideriamo una realtà come quella veneziana che come premesso fino ad allora aveva stentato ad elevare singoli personaggi ad emblemi di valore imperituro e gloria immemore; ciò era motivabile dal fatto che la dimensione lagunare fosse contraria agli individualismi privati in quanto, a livello statale, si era consapevoli che con una tale politica onorifica nei confronti dei suoi condottieri non si potevano non creare fortissime rivalità tra gli stessi suoi comandanti, come avvenne ad esempio nel caso dei contrasti avvenuti tra il Morosini e il Mocenigo durante la Guerra di Candia; abbiamo tuttavia appena notato come per tutto il secolo la creazione di figure eroiche e l'ingigantimento dei successi militari ottenuti dalla Serenissima fossero divenuti oramai quasi indispensabili in un'ottica di credibilità ed in un prospetto temporale nel quale l'onore statale era stato più e più volte vituperato.

Se poniamo l'accento sul protagonista indiscusso di questo studio, lo stesso Morosini non fece mai nulla per limitare la sua vanagloria: insensibile alle critiche, negli ultimi decenni della sua vita modificò pesantemente lo stemma di famiglia (con un decreto unico nella storia veneziana), continuò a presenziare a banchetti e feste pompose e fece ultimare la riedificazione del palazzo di famiglia (oltre ad ampliare le altre proprietà private a Santo Stefano, San Vidal e San Clemente).

Conoscendo l'indole del personaggio (abilissimo sui mari e in politica ma che appunto tendeva quasi a sfociare nella vanagloria), al momento della sua elezione al dogato si nominarono due consiglieri con il compito di sorvegliarne l'operato; il fatto poi che alla morte del condottiero, nel 1694, venisse approvata una legge che rendeva altamente improbabile (se non virtualmente impossibile) il ripetersi di simili circostanze ci aiuta a capire quanto il Morosini, seppur glorificato per le sue vittorie militari, venisse al contempo temuto e disprezzato dalla nobiltà patrizia più intransigente.

In definitiva, come risulta dal titolo del volume collettivo qui presentato («L'inestuibile sogno del dominio»), possiamo definire il Nostro l'ultimo grande campione della Serenissima, capace per un breve periodo di tempo di rivitalizzare le ambizioni, come visto mai sopite, di un ritorno in grande stile di quel dominio levantino da cui Venezia aveva tratto le sue origini commerciali e le sue fortune. Temuto dai nemici turchi e anche da una parte dei propri compatrioti, innalzato alla Gloria o sbeffeggiato anonimamente, saccheggiatore di beni artistici ma al tempo stesso protagonista della riscoperta europea di quella “greicità” classica, Morosini appare una figura storica quanto mai attuale, della quale si è già parlato molto ma su cui, ne sono sicuro, ci si continuerà a soffermare nei futuri studi storiografici. I testi che compongono il volume sono saggi di grande validità scientifica che gettano nuova luce e offrono nuovi approcci storiografici sull'argomento in questione. Si tratta veramente di un libro estremamente utile per gli studiosi della storia politica e militare veneziana e degli scontri fra la Serenissima e l'Impero Ottomano durante il periodo morosiniano.

DAVIDE VILLA

Century of the Soldier No.55

WARS AND SOLDIERS IN THE EARLY REIGN OF LOUIS XIV VOLUME 3
THE ARMIES OF THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE 1645-1718



WARS AND SOLDIERS IN THE EARLY REIGN OF LOUIS XIV

Volume 3 - The Armies of the Ottoman Empire 1645-1718

BRUNO MUGNAI




Century
of the
Soldier
1618-1721

No.55

NIKOS E. KARAPIDAKIS AND ALIKI D. NIKIFOROU (Eds.),

**Οθωμανική Αυτοκρατορία και Βενετία:
Η πολιορκία της Κέρκυρας από τους Οθωμανούς το 1716.
Πρακτικά επιστημονικού συνεδρίου,
Κέρκυρα, 21–23 Οκτωβρίου 2016
[= *The Ottoman Empire and Venice:
The Ottoman siege of Corfu in 1716. Proceedings
of the international scientific congress,
Corfu, 21–23 October 2016*]**

Corfu, Municipality of Corfu – Regional Union of Municipalities of Ionian Islands, 2019, pp. 525.



This volume includes the proceedings of an international scientific congress dedicated to the Ottoman Siege of Corfu in 1716. It is the common effort of researchers from Greece, Italy and Germany, with Nikos Kara-

pidakis, Professor of Western Medieval History at the Ionian University, History Department, and Aliki Nikiforou, former Associate Professor of Cultural Heritage Management at the Ionian University, Department of Archives, Library Science and Museology, as editors. Both are significant scholars of the history of Corfu under Venetian rule.

The volume includes the following essays.

Daphne Lappa («Seamen and Mercenaries on Corfu at the turn of the 18th century», pp. 33-42) explores the population structure in the city of Corfu and traces the foreigners who arrived because of war during the two decades between the Morean War and the seventh Venetian–Ottoman War (1693–1714). The essay focuses on a group of ‘foreigners’ who reached the city of Corfu as men of war, mariners, soldiers and craftsmen who worked for the military machine in general (served in the Venetian guard and the forces of mercenaries’ companies or in the navy, mainly in the *armata sottile*, i.e. in galleys and galleasses). The author emphasizes that in the documents of the time there is a clear distinction between the native and the ‘foreigner’ under examination. Nevertheless, the non-Corfiot men of war were integrated into local society through marriage with Corfiot women.

Sophia Laiou («Η περιγραφή μιας αποτυχημένης στρατιωτικής επιχείρησης. Ο Οθωμανός χρονικογράφος Raşid Efendi και η πολιορκία της Κέρκυρας το 1716»¹, pp. 43-51) refers to the only Ottoman source that described the Siege of the fortress of Corfu by the Ottoman forces in July–August of 1716, i.e. that of the official Ottoman chronicler Raşid Efendi. Efendi presented the efforts of the Ottoman forces to conquer the island and analyzed their weaknesses. Laiou suggests that Efendi’s narration can be considered as a realistic registration of the Siege from the Ottoman’s point of view, and attempts to compare it with the contemporary Western sources.

Roberto Vaccher’s essay [«La difesa veneziana di Corfù (1716): Aspetti logistici»², pp. 53-80] deals with the problem of distance and the ways in which it affected communications and supplies. How many provisions reached Corfu in time? Were they enough? The author focuses on analyzing the mechanisms and the operating of the Venetian logistic machine, which can be done thanks to the

1 English title: «The description of a failed military operation. The Ottoman chronicler Raşid Efendi and the siege of Corfu in 1716».

2 English title: «The Venetian defense of Corfu (1716): Logistic aspects».

study of Venetian archival sources.

Gabriele Medolago's essay («Dalla terraferma Veneta alle Guerre del Mediterraneo: Bergamo ed i Bergamaschi nei conflitti fra Veneziani e Turchi»³, pp. 81-123) deals with all that the Ottoman–Venetian wars, and the Siege of Corfu in particular, have entailed for Venetian Bergamo, and with the way in which its inhabitants have joined these conflicts. Medolago's research is based on a series of unpublished documents from Bergamasque or Venetian public and private archives, as well as on published narrative texts and visual sources. Specific issues under consideration are the following: the contribution of the inhabitants of Bergamo to the conflicts through money and assistance; financial issues; the social, economic and religious consequences of these events; the opinion on the Ottoman problem; the prayers and ceremonies linked to war; the establishment of artillery factories which were necessary to Venetians.

Romina Tsakiri («Αναμένοντας την πολιορκία: Οι εκκλήσεις των βενετών αξιωματούχων για την προετοιμασία της πόλης της Κέρκυρας (1714–1716)»⁴, pp. 125-165) deals with the war preparations: examines the reports and appeals of the Venetian military officials to the *Serenissima*'s Senate on the eve of the war, from March 1714 onwards, which provide important evidence of the horrible state of the defensive works, but also the shortages and poor or incomplete disuse craftsmanship in the two fortresses (the Old and the New one) and the fortified town of Corfu. The author points out that, despite the approval of the measures deemed necessary by the officials, a series of reasons led to the delay of the works and the delivery of the necessary supplies. Only after the arrival (in February 1716) of Venice's Field Marshal Johann Matthias von der Schulenburg on the island, the defense of Corfu was organized in a systematic way.

Evi Karamoutsou («Ο ρόλος της εβραϊκής κοινότητας της Κέρκυρας στην πολιορκία του 1716»⁵, pp. 167-176) presents a series of testimonies favorable to the role of Jews during the Siege of Corfu: of the Venetian Overseers, of the Field Marshal Schulenburg, of the Captain and Superintendent of the Artillery Antorio

3 From the Venetian *terraferma* to the Mediterranean Wars: Bergamo and the Bergamasques in the conflicts between the Venetians and the Turks».

4 English title: «Anticipating the siege: The appeals of the Venetian officials for the preparation of the city of Corfu (1714-1716)».

5 English title: «The role of the Jewish community of Corfu in the siege of 1716».

Sora, of the Procurator Antonio Loredan, of the Archbishop of Corfu Augusto Zacco etc. Indeed, according to them, the Jewish people demonstrated loyalty to the Venetian authorities' orders, fought bravery sharing the suffering and the sacrifices of the city's Christians and offering the greatest of service. Karamoutsou claims that these attestations, received by those who played a leading role in the siege, used in the following years by the Corfiot Jews whenever need called for it.

Nikos Skoutelis («Από την μελέτη στην εφαρμογή. Η επιστασία των έργων στις εξωτερικές οχυρώσεις της Κέρκυρας 1719–1727»⁶, pp. 179-192) refers to the supervision by different engineers of all construction works in order to integrate the hills of Avramis and Sotiras in the defense system of the city of Corfu in a period after its Siege (1719–1727), in relation to the relevant Schulenburg' ideas.

Elisabetta Molteni's essay («La città-fortezza sotto assedio. Schulenburg e la fortificazione di Corfù nella prima metà del Settecento»⁷, pp. 193-220) describes the state of the fortifications during the Siege of 1716, the strategies of defense planned and executed by Schulenburg, and the works predisposed in preparation for the attack from both land and sea in the few months preceding the Siege. Furthermore, it examines the phases of the siege and the positions deemed favorable for the attack on the fortress and used with this aim by the Ottoman forces. Finally, it presents the plans for strengthening and updating of the defenses of Corfu, based on the experience of the war, that implemented in the 1720's and later in the 1750's.

Guido Zucconi's essay («Dopo Schulenburg: Aspetti dell'edilizia civile e problemi di riassetto urbano»⁸, pp. 221-227) does not deal with the Siege of Corfu and the last Venetian–Ottoman War. It concerns the design and implementation of a series of civil constructions during the last eighty years of the Venetian rule, but also after that.

Some decades before the German Unification and specifically in 1825,

6 English title: «From the project to the implementation. The supervision of the works in the external fortifications of Corfu 1719-1727».

7 English title: «The city-fortress under siege. Schulenburg and the fortification of Corfu in the first half of the eighteenth century».

8 English title: «After Schulenburg: Aspects of civil construction and urban reorganization problems».

Karl August Varnhaggen von Ense published a volume entitled *Biographische Denkmäler [= Biographical Monuments]*. Among the three biographies included in this volume, the author gives a literary biography of Johann Matthias von der Schulenburg. Hans-Bernhard Schlumm («Johann Matthias von der Schulenburg – Ή λογοτεχνική περιγραφή ενός ήρωα»⁹, pp. 231-238) comments on it and points out that through it Varnhaggen intended to show that heroes like Schulenburg would have achieved higher goals within a German national state.

Heiner Krellig's essay («After 1716: Strategies of fame and signs of gratitude in the republic of Venice», pp. 239-280) explores the personal and state strategies of commemoration of the Siege of Corfu, based on published and unpublished sources, on the monument dedicated to Schulenburg, placed near the entrance of the Old Fortress of Corfu, the lamp donated by the Venetian Senate for the Church of Saint Spiridon of Corfu, and the Santuario della Madonna dell'Apparizione of Pellestrina.

Claudia Salmini («Le aventure dell'archivio Schulenburg»¹⁰, pp. 283-299) presents the adventurous history of Schulenburg's papers, now preserved in the State Archives of Venice. This collection does not consist of personal documents. On the contrary, its material (maps, drawings, descriptions of cities, harbors, fortifications, memories and manuscripts of a military and political character etc.) testifies to the Venetian war campaigns under Schulenburg's command, and provides accurate and confidential information relating to the territories involved in those campaigns.

Nikos Kokkomelis («Ηρωας ή μεγάλος ἄνδρας; Ο κατά Βολταίρο Johann Matthias von der Schulenburg»¹¹, pp. 301-313) comments on a letter from Voltaire to Schulenburg (15 September 1740). Through that the French philosopher asked the latter to send him a summary of the conflicts, in which he had participated against King Charles I of Sweden, and in the same time he expressed his admiration for the German military officer's achievements. Moreover, through this epistle Voltaire set out his views on the virtues that a great man should have.

Francesco Vecchiato («Werner von der Schulenburg, autore del romanzo stori-

9 English title: «Johann Matthias von der Schulenburg – The literary description of a hero».

10 English title: «The adventures of the Schulenburg's archive».

11 English title: «A hero or a great man? Johann Matthias von der Schulenburg from Voltaire's point of view».

co *Der König von Korfu*¹², pp. 315-328) analyzes a historical novel by Werner von der Schulenburg, a nineteenth century scholar, dedicated to his ancestor and Venice's Field Marshal Johann Matthias von der Schulenburg.

Katerina B. Korrè («Η ιστορική μνήμη μεταξύ αφήγησης και αφηγήματος: Τα βενετικά στρατιωτικά ημερολόγια της πολιορκίας της Κέρκυρας»¹³, pp. 331-358) investigates a variety of Venetian publications regarding the Siege of Corfu that aimed at a wide readership and became very popular: “flying sheets” (“fogli volanti”), military chronicles and diaries, as well as “*actuelles militaires*”, i.e. accounts coming from the battlefield accompanied by plans depicting the Siege, fortifications, defensive plans etc.

By revising the relationship between the painter Antonio Guardi, born in Vienna but established in Venice from 1730s onwards, and the *Serenissima*'s Field Marshal Schulenburg, one of the most important Guardi's clients, Miltos Karkazis («Ο στρατάρχης Schulenburg και ο ζωγράφος Antonio Guardi»¹⁴, pp. 361-369) attempts to clarify aspects of Guardi's art of portraiture, as well as other types of paintings from 1729 up to 1747.

Camillo Tonini («Un inedito dipinto della collezione di Teodoro Correr con la battaglia navale dell’Otto Luglio 1716 nelle acque di Corfù e altre memorie dell’assedio»¹⁵, pp. 371-379) presents a number of visual and other type of sources from Venice relating to the Siege of Corfu (paintings, engravings, medals, historical maps, technical reports and journal handwritten during the Siege), emphasizing at an unpublished painting of the naval battle of July 8, 1716, belonged to the collection of Teodoro Correr (Venice, Museo Civico Correr).

Maria Rosa de Luca's essay («1716 in tempore belli. Il confronto fra oriente e occidente attraverso i “Trionfi” di Guiditta»¹⁶, pp. 381-390) aims to analyze in a systematic way the famous oratorio by Antonio Vivaldi *Juditha triumphans*

12 English title: «Werner von der Schulenburg, author of the historical novel *Der König von Korfu* [=The King of Corfu]».

13 English title: «The historical memory between narration and narrative: The Venetian military calendars of the siege of Corfu».

14 English title: «The Field Marshal Schulenburg and the painter Antonio Guardi».

15 English title: «An unpublished painting from the collection of Teodoro Correr with the naval battle of July 8, 1716 in the waters of Corfu and other memories of the siege».

16 English title: «1716 in tempore belli. The confrontation between East and West through Juditha's “Triumphs”».

devicta Holofernus barbarie, an allegorical description of the Venetian defense of Corfu and the Christians' victory over the Ottomans in the same year of the oratorio's premiere (1716).

Aliki Nikiforou («Η πολιτική θεολογία της οθωμανικής πολιορκίας του 1716»¹⁷, pp. 391-432) focuses on the political theology in the Siege of Corfu, given that both mortal and divine forces –Schulenburg and Eugene of Savoy on the one hand, miraculous interventions of Saint Spyridon, patron saint of Corfu, and Virgin Mary on the other– involved in the defense and salvation of the island from the attack of the Ottoman forces. In this case, the Republic of Venice incorporated into its political theology the aforementioned traditions, both Orthodox and Catholic, but also the Olympian Gods in the context of the 18th century reviving of the ancient Greek and Roman traditions.

Nikos E. Karapidakis («Η πολιορκία της Κέρκυρας από τους Οθωμανούς το 1716. Ιστοριογραφικά προβλήματα και ιστοριογραφικές προοπτικές»¹⁸, pp. 433-438) draws some significant conclusions of the conference dedicated to the Ottoman Siege of Corfu in 1716 and points out the contribution of the conference to the relevant historiography.

Ultimately, the volume includes a series of visual sources (see “Illustrations” on pp. 439-519) and abstracts of all the essays in English.

In conclusion, the essays of this collective volume give new evidence and enrich our knowledge about the two opposing parties, Venice and the Ottoman Empire, on the eve and during the Siege of Corfu (1716–1718): the war preparations; the various military officers, their personalities and projects; the shortcomings and the disadvantages of the two armies and fleets; the reports of the protagonists and the participants about the war events; the involvement and contribution of various social groups of the island in military operations; the assessments for the causes of the victory of the one side and the defeat of the other; the consequences of the war and its impact on Venice and Europe. Some of the essays, drawing on data from military engineers' and other experts' reports, point out that Venice implemented its vast experience on the art of warfare, and in particular on

17 English title: «The political theology of the Ottoman siege of 1716».

18 English title: «The siege of Corfu by the Ottomans in 1716. Historiographical problems and historiographical perspectives».


the technique of fortification from the War of Candia onwards, as well as the new theory on this field, main characteristics of which were the outer fortifications and the underground tunnels, i.e. the transfer of war outside the city walls. The new military works of the period decisively influenced the urban landscape of the city of Corfu. In addition, the volume provides important information about the central figure of the Siege, the *Serenissima*'s Field Marshal Johann Matthias von der Schulenburg, and, especially, about the history of his archive, the memory strategies he adopted, and the representations of his history through art, literature and philosophy. Finally, expressions of the events of the Siege of Corfu through art, along with their reception by historiography, religion and politics are studied by the contributors in a systematic way. This is, therefore, the most complete collection of studies to date regarding the Siege of Corfu that offers new historiographical approaches, based in great part on primary sources.

STATHIS BIRTACHAS

STEFANOS KAKLAMANIS (ED.),

*O Κρητικός Πόλεμος (1645–1669).
Όψεις του πολέμου στον χώρο και τον χρόνο /
Aspects of war in space and time
[= Κρητικά Χρονικά / Cretica Chronica, 39 (2019)]*

Heraklion, Crete, Society of Cretan Historical Studies, 2019, pp. 572.



Issue 39 of the scientific journal *Cretica Chronica* is dedicated to the Cretan War, also known as the War of Candia or the Fifth Ottoman–Venetian War, which took place between the Republic of Venice and the Ottoman Empire from 1645 to 1669 and culminated in the complete conquest of the island on behalf of the latter. The special issue has been edited by Stefanos Kaklamanis, Professor of Modern Greek Philology at the National and Kapodistrian University of Athens, Department of Philology, and is the common effort of significant schol-

ars serving the relevant research in Greece. The editor has studied for a long time the literature and history of Crete under Venetian rule and has also edited another collective volume with the same theme, entitled *O Κρητικός Πόλεμος. Από την ιστορία στη λογοτεχνία*¹ (Heraklion, Society of Cretan Historical Studies, 2008, pp. 242).

The novelty of this collective work lies in the fact that it does not focus exclusively on military operations in Crete, the Aegean Sea and the Dalmatian coast. On the contrary, war is approached not only as a theme of traditional military and political history, but also as a significant social and cultural phenomenon. Accordingly, this is not the case of a plain narrative consisting of facts, state designs and preparations, typologies and means of warfare, but an overall outlook of all aspects of life and human activities in relation to war. In this context and on the basis of literary and historiographical texts of the time, as well as archival sources, but also using various interpretive tools, the authors attempt to highlight new aspects of the war in space and time. They mainly investigate the activity of personalities who took part in sea or land operations, managed their consequences and the problems that plagued the local societies or even far from the fronts of the war, took up the role of the “war correspondent”, aspired to animate and comfort the affected population groups, to promote the point of view and the rights of one or the other enemy or even to mobilize and involve in the War of the Christian forces against Islam and the Ottoman Empire the Catholic and Protestant public opinion of Western European countries and, of course, England, France and the Netherlands, which at that time competed for the geopolitical and commercial control of the eastern Mediterranean. In addition, the attitude of the mentioned European forces towards the two warring parties is also investigated, as well as issues relating to the history of emotions and the reception of the Cretan War and the Ottoman–Venetian Wars in general by the Greek national historiography of the 19th century.

Specifically, the special issue includes the following essays.

Basil Gounaris's essay («Καλοί χριστιανοί αλλά απρόθυμοι σύμμαχοι: η αγγλική πολιτική κατά τον Κρητικό Πόλεμο»², pp. 15-27) is based on an earlier

1 English title: *The Cretan War. From history to literature*.

2 English title: «Good Christians but reluctant allies: English politics during the Cretan War».

monograph he wrote entitled *See how Gods Favour Sacrilege. English Views and Politics on Candia under Siege, 1645–1669* (Athens, National Hellenic Research Foundation / Section of Neohellenic Research, 2012). According to the author, the Cretan War between the Republic of Venice and the Ottoman Empire was much more than a chapter in European war history: it served as an inspiration and challenge for Western Europe. Trapped between their own old wars and the new commercial priorities, Catholics and Protestants alike had to decide anew how to handle Islam: as crusaders or as merchants? Gounaris explores the complex relationship among London, Venice and Istanbul during a critical period not only in Venetian, but also in English history. The *Serenissima* was dragged in the politics of the English Civil War in an ill-destined venture to play puritan piety against the spirit of capitalism. The author follows this story step by step, concluding that in the 1660s the Christian zeal of the restored English monarch, the English public's sympathy for the Venetian cause, and his dislike for the “others”, the non-Christian Ottomans, outweighed the need to prioritize English commercial interests, which required maintaining good relations with the latter.

The next essay is on the same wavelength. Konstantinos Theodoridis («Η Ολλανδία και ο Κρητικός Πόλεμος»³, pp. 29-45) examines the attitude of the Netherlands during the War. In this case, too, despite the anti-Ottoman position of Dutch public opinion and the traditional good relations between the Venetians and the Dutch, due to their commercial interests in the Mediterranean, the latter considered it imperative to maintain good relations with the Ottoman Empire. In this context, any official action to provide military and any other kind of material assistance to the *Serenissima* during the War was excluded. Nevertheless, the Dutch government has tacitly and repeatedly facilitated the purchase of ammunition and the recruitment of mercenaries by Venetian envoys. In addition, the role of the Dutch press in disseminating information in Europe about the Cretan War – a popular topic of reading and discussion in the “public sphere” of the Netherlands – and mainly in propagating news from the Venetian point of view on the conflict between Christianity and Islam, is investigated. In the appendix the author quotes in translation some news about the siege of Candia, published in the *Herald of Haarlem* in the summer of 1669.

Vasileios Syros («Οθωμανική πολιτική σκέψη και αρχαία ελληνική ιατρική

3 English title: «The Netherlands and the Cretan War».

την παραμονή και την επαύριο του Κρητικού Πολέμου»⁴, pp. 47-68) approaches the Cretan War in the light of the Ottoman political thought, which was developed from the mid-16th century onwards and recognized the beginning of a decline of the Ottoman Empire after the death of Suleiman I. This perception is reflected in an extensive body of historiographical and political texts of the late 16th and the whole 17th century. The author attempts a thorough examination of the Ottoman views on the economic, political, and military crisis of the Empire, focusing on the adoption, appropriation and application of Galen's medical theory.

Stefanos Kaklamanis («Με τους Οθωμανούς και τους ιησουνίτες ante portas: ο Γεράσιμος Βλάχος στα χρόνια του Κρητικού Πολέμου»⁵, pp. 69-162) deals with some treatises of the Cretan philosopher, theologian and philologist Gerasimos Vlachos (Candia 1605/7–Venice 1685), composed in the years of the Cretan War. In particular, he analyzes three of his lesser-known antirrhetic texts: the short treatise (*consulta*) entitled «Σκοτοδίνη των μη ορθώς φρονούντων»⁶, written to refute certain positions of a dogmatic nature of the Jesuit missionaries operating in Santorini in 1647–1648 (see the critical edition of the treatise in annex); the treatise «Κατά Ιουδαίων»⁷, written in 1670, at a time when a messianic movement, that upset the Jewish communities of Europe and the Ottoman Empire, was in full swing; and the treatise «Περί της θρησκείας του Μωάμεθ και κατά των Τούρκων»⁸, written a year after the occupation of Candia by the Ottomans to refute the “errors” of the Muslim religion.

Dimitris Paradoulakis («Απηχήσεις του Κρητικού Πολέμου στο πρώιμο κήρυγμα του Γεράσιμου Βλάχου. Ο κώδικας BAR ms. gr. 889 της Ρουμανικής Ακαδημίας»⁹, pp. 163-215) deals with the same personality: the ecclesiastical scholar Gerasimos Vlachos. Following the study of Ovidiu Olar “The Sons of Lucifer and the Children of Neptune: the Anti-Ottoman and Anti-Islamic

4 English title: «Ottoman political thought and ancient Greek medicine on the eve and in the aftermath of the Cretan War».

5 English title: «With the Ottomans and the Jesuits ante portas: Gerasimos Vlachos in the years of the Cretan War».

6 English title: «Darkness of those who do not believe in the right way».

7 English title: «Against the Jews».

8 English title: «On the Religion of Muhammad and against the Turks».

9 English title: «Echoes of the Cretan War in the early sermons of Gerasimos Vlachos. The codex BAR ms. gr. 889 of the Library of the Romanian Academy in Bucharest».

Polemical Works of Gerasimos Vlachos”, *ARCÆVS: Studies in the History of Religions* XIX–XX (2016), pp. 249–274, and on the basis of the above mentioned code belonging to the Library of the Romanian Academy in Bucharest, the author outlines the character of Vlachos as a preacher in Candia of the early war period (1649–1650). According to Paradoulakis, the impact of the War on the thought of the Cretan scholar is obvious and is reflected on the one hand in his concern for the Ottoman invasion and on the other hand in his anxiety for the preservation of the Venetian rule. The concept of sin is promoted by Vlachos as the dominant cause for the suffering caused by war and for the flock’s moral decay. In the appendix the author publishes the manuscript under examination.

Eirini Gergatsouli («Θεοδώρου Μοντσελέζε Ανδραγαθία του Λαζάρου Μοτσενίγου (1657)»¹⁰, pp. 217–356) presents and republishes a historical narrative in verse by the Zantiot writer Theodoros Montselese entitled *Ανδραγαθία του Λαζάρου Μοτσενίγου*¹¹ (inside front cover: *Narration. The destruction of the Turkish Armada*). The work was printed for the first and last time in 1657 in Venice by the printing house of the Giuliani family, specialized in publishing Greek books. The main character is the Venetian *capitano generale da mar* Lazzaro Mocenigo (1624–1657), whose achievements are narrated. Specifically, the text deals with the naval battle of June 26, 1656 in the Strait of Dardanelles, and other historical facts and figures about the naval operations of the Venetian fleet against the Ottoman in the Aegean Sea during the Cretan War covering one year. The narration is embellished with animated descriptions, lyrical passages with very frequent invocations to the divine, laments of cities and other literary motifs.

Elias Kolovos («Στα μετόπισθεν των πολιορκητών του Χάνδακα: η «πολεμική ανταπόκριση» του Εβλιά Τσελεμπή»¹², pp. 357–379) focuses on a well-known personality, Evliya Çelebi, who took part in the last phase of the Cretan War, namely the three-year siege of Candia by the army of the Grand Vizier Köprülüzade Fazıl Ahmed Pasha (1667–1669). Çelebi is known as a “traveller of the world”, as he describes himself in his voluminous travelogue (*Seyahatnâme*), where he

10 English title: «*Lazzaro Mocenigo's bravery* by Theodoros Montselese (1657)».

11 English title: *Lazzaro Mocenigo's bravery*.

12 English title: «In the rear of the besiegers of Candia: Evliya Çelebi as a “war correspondent”».

recorded his travels in the Ottoman Empire and its neighboring countries. In this work, he described in a particular way the siege of Candia from the rear where he was. In the narrative of *Celebi*, which according to Kolovos has parallels with the Greek and Italian narratives, coexists the emergence of the heroism of his fellow-believers, on whose side he moved, with the depiction of the suffering and horror caused by the War: it refers, for example, to a “mine of corpses” under the ramparts of the fortress of Candia. In this way, the text of *Celebi*, who acts as a “war correspondent” of that time, eventually acquires a character of a mixed heroic and anti-heroic narrative from the victors’ of the Cretan War point of view, especially of the soldiers and those who remained in the rear.

Anastasia Stouraiti («Η γυναίκα του Χάνδακα: τερατογονία, φύλο και έντυπες ειδήσεις στον απόηχο του Κρητικού Πολέμου»¹³, pp. 381-407) studies the history of emotions of the Ottoman conquest of Crete from the point of view of the Italian media. In particular, in her analysis uses the strange and the marvel (see, for example, the monster of Candia on p. 402) as heuristic tools to explore the symbolic position of Crete in the imaginary geographies of the Levant and the cultural mediation of the occupation of the island by the Ottomans. According to the author, the strange and unusual stories generally articulate real and complex historical relations, which in the present case concern the relations between rulers and ruled, Venetians and Ottomans, among Catholics, Orthodox and Muslims, as well as between women and men. Accordingly, wonder was a central concept that defined these correlations in the realm of representation, offering the Italian reading public a vehicle for emotional engagement with the distant “others”. The essay also highlights the importance of image and iconographic news as historical sources for the history of emotions of the Cretan War.

On the basis of published and unpublished archival documents, Panajota Tzivara («Σπουδές και πτυχία στα χρόνια του πολέμου και της προσφυγιάς: οι Κρήτες φοιτητές στο Πανεπιστήμιο της Πάδοβας»¹⁴, pp. 409-466) outlines the presence and activity of Cretan students at the University of Padua during the Cretan War and after that until the end of the 17th century. The author shows that

13 English title: «The woman of Candia: teratogenesis, gender and printed news in the wake of the Cretan War».

14 English title: «Studies and degrees in the years of war and refugeeship: Cretan students at the University of Padua».

their attendance was not decreased either during the war or after the final loss of their homeland. During the period under review, the majority of these students were refugees settled on the Ionian Islands and in the Venetian capital. The suffering caused by the War in the lives of the Cretan students was often used as an argument in their applications in order to achieve the privileged treatment provided by the Venetian laws and regulations of the University. Their participation in the administrative bodies of the Greek *nazione*, as well as their involvement in the administration of the University faculties, was also important. Finally, the author discusses issues of memory and identity of the Cretan students.

George Koutzakiotis («Εκκληση ενός Κρητικού σπουδαστή των μέσων του 17ου αιώνα για την απελευθέρωση της “Ελλάδας”»¹⁵, pp. 467-482) analyzes the publication of a Greek encomium and epigram, published in 1652 in the first volume of the four-volume edition of the German Jesuit Athanasius Kircher, *Oedipus Aegyptiacus*, dedicated to the Holy Roman Emperor Ferdinand III. The text, entitled «Aliud Elogium», «Επίγραμμα εις τὸν Σεβασμιότατον Φερδινάνδον»¹⁶, was written by the seventeen-year-old student at the Greek College of St. Athanasius in Rome Georgios Mousalos from Candia. Through this, he addressed, not personally and individually, but on behalf of the Greek scholars (the so-called “wise Greece”), an appeal to the emperor for the liberation of the territories under Ottoman rule inhabited by Greek-speaking Christians. The time of the appeal was extremely critical: Mousalos’s birthplace was under siege (since 1648), a great part of the Venetian *Regno di Candia* had already been conquered by the Ottomans, the Aegean Sea had been turned into a scene of war between Christians and Muslims, and the author saw the danger of not being able to return to his homeland after finishing his studies, as he intended according to a notarial deed pointed out by Koutzakiotis. The organization of a “crusade-like” campaign on the part of Christian states against the Ottomans, indeed, expressed Rome’s expectations, whose forces had been fighting on the side of Venice since the beginning of the war; but the Habsburgs did not want to wage a war against the Ottomans. Therefore, the text of Mousalos is chronologically the last of the hitherto known appeals addressed by Greeks from the 15th century onwards to

15 English title: «Appeal of a Cretan student of the mid 17th century for the liberation of “Greece”».

16 English title: «Epigram to His Majesty Ferdinand».

the German emperor for the liberation of their homeland. Koutzakiotis quotes the text of Mousalos in the annex.

Spyros Karydis («Κρήτες κληρικοί στην Κέρκυρα “μετά την άλωσιν της θλιβεράς Κρήτης”»¹⁷, pp. 483-526) studies the arrivals of Cretan refugees in Corfu after the Cretan War and in particular the group of clergymen. He examines issues of their identity, reception and integration into the local society; and their activity as priests in churches of the city of Corfu and its suburbs, as usufructuaries of public ecclesiastical institutions, as founders of temples and monasteries, as well as teachers. According to the author, the integration of these refugees was rapid, given that the political, social and cultural data of Corfu did not differ substantially from those of Crete: the political administration, the social structure, the ecclesiastical administration, the parish organization, the institution of religious associations and so on, were generally common. Karydis also examines the descendants of the above-mentioned refugees, i.e. the clerics who were born and raised in Corfu at a depth of about eighty years. Finally, based on the study of a large number of archival sources, he points out the need to re-investigate the real dimensions of the influence of the Cretan refugees in Corfu after 1669 and to get to know better the space before and after the settlement of the latter in the island.


Ioannis Koubourlis («Ιστοριογραφικές προσλήψεις του Κρητικού Πολέμου και γενικά των βενετοτουρκικών συγκρούσεων: από τους φιλέλληνες ιστοριογάφους της δεκαετίας του 1820 στον Κωνσταντίνο Παπαρρηγόπουλο»¹⁸, pp. 527-572) examines an issue faced by the Greek national historiography: the treatment of the Venetian–Ottoman wars. Were these wars part of the Greek national history insofar as they took place in seas and territories where “Greek populations” lived and worked? Should the Greek historians include them in the field of their research? Were the Naval Battle of Lepanto and the Cretan War, for instance, events that deserved their attention? The author explores the way in which these dilemmas were first handled by scholars who wrote texts of historiographical interest in the context of the philhellenic movement during the years of the Greek Revolution (1821) and immediately after the formation of the Greek state,

17 English title: «Cretan clerics in Corfu “after the fall of miserable Crete”».

18 English title: «Historiographical receptions of the Cretan War and the Venetian-Turkish armed conflicts in general: from the Philhellenes historians of the 1820s to Konstantinos Paparrigopoulos».

and subsequently by the main representatives of the Greek historicism Spyridon Zampelios and Konstantinos Paparrigopoulos, inspired by the aforementioned foreign scholars. The author concludes that events such as the Naval Battle of Lepanto or the Cretan War may not be “national milestones” for the Greeks, as are, for example, the Naval Battle of Salamis or the Balkan Wars; show us, however, that silences in “national history” can “equally shout” that their study is very important at least for understanding the process of composing the national narrative. In other words, the historiographical evaluation of such events, what “national history” says and does not say about them, works like the construction of a national monument to the fallen unknown soldiers: it reminds the nation that its past includes many antiheroes and even more “unknown heroes” next to the heroes that make up the national pantheon.

In conclusion, the essays comprised in the volume are scientifically sound and contribute to the history of the Greek territories under Venetian and Ottoman rule, and especially of the Venetian–Ottoman wars that took place during the early modern era, with emphasis on the Cretan War (1645–1669). They are either original contributions, based largely on primary sources, or attempts to re-read and re-interpret already known historical processes and phenomena. The volume combines the classical and the modern viewpoint and approaches to historiography. Despite the diversity of the essays and the variety of historiographical viewpoints and trends adopted by the authors, the volume functions as a synthesis and acquires narrative unity. The result of this collaboration is a volume that is invaluable to the specialised researchers of the Cretan War, as it highlights aspects of the related literary and historiographical production, the Ottoman views, the policies of the European forces and the position of the Catholic and Protestant public opinion in the West, the history of emotions, the reception of the Cretan War by the Greek national historiography of the 19th century, as well as its impact on the society of Crete and other Greek territories under Venetian rule.




Frontispiece of Vincenzo Maria CORONELLI, *Memorie Iсториографiche della Morea* [...], Venice, 1687. Source: travelogues.com.

SPYROS KARYDIS AND PANAJOTA TZIVARA,

**Σταγόνες μνήμης στη θάλασσα των αρχείων.
Τεκμήρια Κρητών προσφύγων από το κερκυραϊκό
Αρχείο (1647–1747)**

[= *Drops of memory in the ocean of the archives.*
*Evidence of Cretan refugees from the Archives of Corfu
(1647–1747)*]

Corfu, The Corfu Reading Society, 2019, pp. 552.



The authors of the book, Spyros Karydis and Panayota Tzivara, are mature researchers of the archives of Corfu and Venice, first-rate scholars of the social and cultural history of Venetian Corfu in early modern times, and they have published many other books and essays on this field.

The publication of the present book coincides with the completion of 350 years since the end of the Cretan War (1645–1669), the final surrender of Crete

to the Ottomans and the relocation of thousands of its inhabitants, mainly from the urban centers of the island, to the Venetian capital, the Venetian *Terraferma* or other possessions of the *Serenissima* in the Levant. The authors follow the archival traces of the Cretan refugees in Corfu in the development of a century, from 1647 to 1747, through the documents kept in the General State Archives of Greece / Archive of the Prefecture of Corfu, which record the following: the social groups in which the refugees were distinguished, various issues concerning their daily life, their organization, their social relations, their gradual assimilation, their integration into the workforce and the professional associations, their activity in the economy and trade, their presence in the service sector, their cultural, educational and religious activities, and, ultimately, their impact on the formation of cultural identity of their place of establishment. The same documents also capture the feelings, the pain, the difficulties of adapting to the new homeland, but also the hopes for a return to the motherland.

The volume is divided into two parts. In the first part, a percentage of all the above issues are studied, in an attempt to systematize the available archival material, without seeking to infer specific answers, since the relative research, before drawing definitive conclusions about the Cretan refugee wave, is still long. In particular, seven sections address issues related to the arrival of refugees and their settlement, the procedures for identification or proof of their personal data by the registry office (origin, age and religious identity), their distinction from the second or third generation Cretans permanently settled in Corfu, their social and economic stratification, their organization and the process of their integration or assimilation, their activity in the economic and commercial sector, their religious, educational and other activities. In separate sections, are presented in detail five people who stood out, each one for different reasons, in the Cretan community of Corfu, as well as the material and intangible assets that refugees brought to their new homeland: memories and souvenirs, useful objects, jewelry, religious icons and secular paintings.

In the second part of the book, selected documents are published, indicative of the abundance of sources kept in the Corfu Archive, divided into the following sections: registry (birth, baptism, age), deeds of last will (wills and codicils), inventories, miscellanea. In the first section, 33 documents are published, covering the period from 1670 to 1692, which include certificates, attestations and testimonies concerning the time of birth or baptism, age and life in general of 33

people, men and women, born in Crete or Corfu from 1652 to 1683. The second section includes wills and codicils covering the period from 1664 to 1747. These are 81 documents concerning 64 people, arranged alphabetically according to their surname, and represent, as far as possible, each refugee group. In the third section, five inventories are published, namely records of movable assets, of four people who stood out, each one for different reasons, in the Cretan community of Corfu. Finally, in the fourth section, documents were collected that deal with a wide variety of topics, such as e.g. testimonies for the participation in the struggle of Venice against the Ottomans, applications for professional rehabilitation and financial support, authorizations, as well as permits for the construction of temples and monasteries, etc. The volume also includes a glossary of terms, a general index and a summary in Italian.

The book is an important contribution to the study of the social consequences of the Venetian–Ottoman wars and the Cretan War in particular. Although there are several fragmentary essays regarding the refugee flows that followed the military conflicts between the two parties, monographs based on extensive corpora of primary sources, which could give us an overall image of the issue, are still lacking. For the refugees of the War of Cyprus (1570–1571), for example, the post-doctoral researcher of the Aristotle University of Thessaloniki (Department of Italian Language and Literature) Chrysovalantis Papadamou supported in 2019 a doctoral dissertation at the University of Cyprus on “Cypriot Refugees in Venice after the War of Cyprus (1570–1571). Reorganization of life, social and cultural integration (1570–1650)”, based on primary sources mainly from archives and libraries of Venice (Archivio di Stato, Archivio storico del Patriarcato, Archive of the Hellenic Institute of Byzantine and Post-byzantine Studies, Biblioteca Nazionale Marciana and the Library of Museo Civico Correr). We look forward to the publication of this work. The book by Karydis and Tzivara now adds a new chapter to the study of the above historical phenomenon closely linked to the war, presenting the refugee wave that followed the Cretan War and headed to the most important Venetian possession in the Ionian Sea. The authors raise a number of issues, including the need for a re-evaluation by modern historiography of the profound influence of Cretan refugees’ settlement on the formation of cultural identity of Corfu and the Ionian islands during 17th and 18th centuries. Lastly, the book provides the history of emotions.




Grenadiers of the Müller Regiment in the service of the Venetian Republic attack an Ottoman fort, 1717. A. von Escher, Vinkhuijzen Collection, New York Public Library.

DIMOSTHENIS DONOS,

**22 Οκτωβρίου 1717:
η λησμονημένη αρχή μιας νέας εποχής.
Τριακόσια χρόνια από τη δεύτερη βενετική κατάκτηση
της Πρέβεζας**

**[= October 22, 1717: The forgotten beginning of a new era.
300 years since the second Venetian conquest of Preveza]**

Preveza, Actia Nicopolis Foundation – Cultural Association “Preveza”, 2017, pp. 70.



Dimosthenis Donos is the author of many essays related to the history of Preveza during the early modern period and especially during the Venetian rule of the city. In this context, he studied at length the military operations and the pirate raids in this Hellenic region. In the present short book, he examines in detail the second Venetian conquest of Preveza.

As the author notes in the introduction, Preveza was involved in four of the seven Venetian–Ottoman Wars. The constant interest of both sides for the city was due to its geostrategic position at the mouth of the Ambracian Gulf. An important moment in the history of the city was the first Venetian occupation of the castle of Bouka and the city of Preveza (September 29, 1684) and its annexation to the Republic of Venice for about seventeen years.

During the last Venetian–Ottoman War (1714–1718), the Venetian fleet and army, under the command of the *Capitano Generale da Mar* Andrea Pisani and the Field Marshal Johann Matthias von der Schulenburg respectively, captured the castle and town of Preveza on October 22, 1717, after a failed attempt the previous year. A few days later (November 2, 1717) they captured the nearby town of Vonitsa.

The author, based on published and unpublished archival and cartographic evidence from Venice, Corfu and Marburg, provides an account of the main historical and military facts of the campaign and discusses the reception of the Venetian victory by the European public opinion and the press. Furthermore, he outlines the main economic, social, and institutional changes that occurred in Preveza after its passage to the Venetian rule until the fall of the *Serenissima* in 1797. He also stresses the persistent Venetian influence that shaped the public centre of the town and addresses the impact of war and border-mentality on its cultural physiognomy. Finally, he investigates the reception of the Venetian conquest and domination in Preveza by the local historiography.


In the appendix, the author presents a variety of visual sources: images, military maps and drawings of the Venetian operations in the area of Preveza, plans of the castle of the city and urban fabric, publications in the European press, etc. In this way, he gives the reader a comprehensive analysis and a clear image of this episode of the last Venetian–Ottoman War. Donos' treatise is largely based on primary sources, is scientifically sound, and contributes to the study of the military, political and social history of this frontier zone between Venetian and Ottoman territory in the 18th century.

FR. MARKOS FOSKOLOS (ED.),

*Από την Τήνο του βενετού δόγη στην Τήνο
της Υψηλής Πύλης.*

*300 χρόνια από την παράδοση του Κάστρου της Τήνου
[= From Tinos of the Venetian doge to Tinos of the Sublime
Porte. 300 years since the surrender of the Castle of Tinos]*

Tinos, Municipality of Tinos, 2017, pp. 468.



This book explores the history of the island of Tinos during the early modern period and is the common effort of significant researchers in the field from Greece, with the addition of the Italian byzantinist's Antonio Carile essay, entitled «Το όνειρο του Ναβουχοδονόσορ και η αλληλοδιαδοχή των αυτοκρατοριών στην ιστορία της σωτηρίας»¹. It has been edited by the Tinian

¹ English title: «The dream of Nebuchadnezzar and the succession of empires in the his-

scholar Fr. Markos Foskolos. The editor has studied for a long time the history of Tinos under the Ghisi's dynasty, but also during the Venetian and Ottoman rules on the basis of primary archival sources from Rome and Venice.

This collective volume contains a series of essays investigating various aspects of the war and mainly its consequences (political, social, economic) during the *Serenissima*'s domination on the island, and more specifically from the Fourth Venetian–Ottoman War (1570–1573) onwards, and its passage to the Ottoman rule after the Second Morean War (1714–1718) and the signing of the Treaty of Passarowitz. In particular, the volume includes the following essays directly or indirectly related to the war (the remaining essays have not highlighted in this book review).

Kostas Tsiknakis («Η Τήνος μετά τον τέταρτο Βενετοτουρκικό πόλεμο»², pp. 55-86) investigates the situation on Tinos after the catastrophic three-year military operations of the Fourth Venetian–Ottoman War (1570–1573), during which the problems in the East were exacerbated. At first, the author offers a bibliographical sketch on the suffering endured Tinos during the War. Next, he examines on the one hand a signed protest of some inhabitants of the island addressed to the Venetian metropolitan authorities (1576); and on the other hand: a) a request of the local Community's commissioners of the same period to the *provveditore generale* and *inquisitore* (namely, travelling inspector or inquisitor) Giacomo Foscarini, and (b) the relevant provisions of that official (1577). These documents reflect the problems in the relationship between rulers and ruled; the dysfunctions in the State apparatus, in the military organization and the defense system of the possession, the abuses of the local administrative and military officials, and their various abuses against the local population; the illicit everyday reality and the need to restore law and order, as well as a series of proposals for relevant provisions; and some demands relating to the estates of those Tinians who migrated to other areas due to the war tensions and the consequent economic hardship on the island. Finally, the issue of the slaves' refuge on Tinos, coming from various parts of the Ottoman Empire, is raised.

George Tolias («Το Αιγαίο του Francesco Lupazzolo και η ανασυγκρότηση

tory of salvation».

2 English title: «Tinos after the Fourth Venetian-Ottoman war».

τού Λεβάντε κατά τον 17ο αιώνα»³, pp. 165-186) examines the life and activity of a known person to researchers in recent years, namely Francesco Lupazzolo. He also presents an image of the Aegean islands shortly before the start of the Cretan War on the basis of a map and two *isolarii* [cartographic encyclopedias of islands] (1638), compiled by Lupazzolo, which are of great economic, ethnographic and religious interest. The latter was a typical example of a Franco-Levantine adventurer, who for about eighty years played an active role in Western penetration strategies on the shores and islands of the Aegean: he was a member of the first Apostolic Visitation to the Aegean islands; an agent of the Sacra Congregatio de Propaganda Fide, with close links to the Jesuits (from Constantinople to Tinos); a liaison to Venice's secret service during the Cretan War (acting as an intermediary between the Republic of Saint Mark and the Venetian patricians imprisoned in Constantinople); and after the War, consul of Venice in Smyrna during the last years of his long life (he lived over a hundred years). According to Tolias, during the Morean War (1684–1699) Lupazzolo moved from Chios to Tinos, from where he informed the Venetian authorities about the movements of the Ottoman fleet in the Aegean. In Smyrna, he secured significant financial because of his protection offered to immigrants from Venetian Tinos, who left the island and settled in Smyrna permanently or occasionally due to the economic hardship that followed the Cretan War. From them he received a golden *scudo* per year. The Tinian community of Smyrna numbered 1,200 members, authentic Tinians or others who pretended to be Tinians in order to avoid Ottoman taxation.

Chryssa Maltezou deals with this very topic in her essay («*Sudditi veneti σε τουρκικό έδαφος: Τήνιοι στη Σμύρνη μετά τον Κρητικό πόλεμο*»⁴, pp. 187-196), i.e. the migration of Tinians to Smyrna after the Cretan War. Initially, the author describes in detail the situation of Tinos and the role that the island played during the Cretan War: it was a supply base, but also a base for the Venetian fleet's operations, and suffered multiple Ottoman attacks. Particular reference is made to two raids that took place in the summer of 1654 and had a devastating effect on the economy of the island. To these should be added the raids of pirates and corsairs, whose action was intense in the Aegean not only during that time, but

3 English title: «The Aegean Sea of Francesco Lupazzolo and the reconstruction of the Levant in the 17th century».

4 English title: «Venetian subjects in Turkish territory: Tinians in Smyrna after the Cretan War».

also later during the two Morean Wars. Although the Ottoman invasions were not aimed at conquering Tinos, but at demonstrating power and terrorizing the local society, their negative effects on the local rural economy and the threat of famine caused the aforementioned migratory flow from Tinos to the opposite Ottoman territories and Smyrna in particular. Maltezou investigates the immigrants' efforts to be treated by the Ottoman authorities as Venetian subjects in order to avoid taxation; and the policy of Venice and the Venetian consul in the city towards them. It should be noted here that in 1700, shortly before the surrender of Tinos to the Ottomans (1715), the number of Tinian migrants in Smyrna was amounted to 2,000.

Andreas Mazarakis essay («Νομισματικές μαρτυρίες: Τήνος 1700–1701, 1710–1713»⁵, pp. 197-210) highlights the fact that in the early 18th century, shortly before the surrender of Tinos to the Ottomans (1715), the penetration of the Ottoman monetary economy in Tinos was already clearly apparent, given the high volume of trades imported from the Ottoman Empire and the role of the island on the transit in the Ottoman trade with the other Aegean islands.

After the conquest of Constantinople by the Ottomans (1453), many Latin families migrated to the Aegean islands. Over time, however, especially from 1537 onwards when the islands were occupied one after the other by the Ottomans, some of these families follow the opposite path. Rinaldo Marmara («Οι Τήνιοι της Κωνσταντινούπολης: Η Σπουδαιότητα των εκκλησιαστικών αρχείων»⁶, pp. 211-217) examines the settlement of Latin families from Tinos in the Ottoman capital during the 18th and 19th centuries, a consequence of the Ottoman conquest of the island. The author highlights the importance of some primary sources, in particular those from the Vatican Apostolic Archives and the Archive of the Apostolic Vicariate of Constantinople, to understand the extent of this migratory flow.

Fr. Markos Foskolos («Η παράδοση της Τήνου στους Οθωμανούς (5–7 Ιουνίου 1715)»⁷, pp. 221-253) explores the conditions of the final expulsion of Venice from the Aegean Sea after the conquest of Tinos by the Ottoman fleet in

5 English title: «Numismatic evidence: Tinos 1700-1701, 1710-1713».

6 English title: «The Tinians of Constantinople: The importance of the ecclesiastical archives».

7 English title: «The surrender of Tinos to the Ottomans (June 5-7, 1715)».

June 1715. Firstly, the author refers to the tacit transformation of Tinos from the period of the Cretan War onwards into a refuge of pirates and corsairs, a base of raids organized by them, but also a place of storage of their booty, a fact that served the Venetian interests. In this context, the Venetian *rettori* of the island sought to balance between the instructions given them from metropolitan authorities for overgrowing the pirates' activity and the fictitious cooperation they were obliged to maintain with the Ottoman fleet in order to prevent invasions and looting. Secondly, he points out that the events of 1715 regarding Tinos did not highly occupy the Greek and European bibliography. Instead, researchers focused on the conquest of Morea and other military and diplomatic events of the last Venetian–Ottoman War. He also examines the information, regarding the surrender of Tinos by the Venetians to the Ottomans, found in works of the local historiography, as well as the primary sources on which they are based. Thirdly, he describes in detail the military operations and the invasion of the island by the Ottomans, the siege of its Castle, the tactics of the attackers and the attempt of resistance by the insufficient Venetian guard (assisted by a militia body), the meager ammunition and food supplies, and, ultimately, the negotiations and the terms of the surrender of the island to the conquerors. These included, on the one hand, the departure of the Venetians and the Venetian garrison for other Venetian possessions; and, on the other, the non-looting of the island by the Ottoman army and guarantees of safety to its inhabitants for their life, property and religion. Foskolos concludes with a reference to the explosion and destruction of the Castle, the houses and the other buildings of the medieval capital of Tinos, a fact that marked the consolidation of the Ottoman rule.

After a brief introduction to the military and diplomatic phases of the last Venetian–Ottoman War and the conquest of Tinos by military forces landed on the island by the Admiral of the Ottoman fleet Canim Hoca Mehmed Pasha – also known as Canum Hoca in European sources – in June 1715, Elias Kolovos («Το μπεράτι για το φορολογικό καθεστώς της Τήνου μετά από την οθωμανική κατάκτηση (1719)»⁸, pp. 273-282) mentions the two-year exemption from the capital tax granted by Canim Hoca to the Tinians. Subsequently, he scrutinizes the non-tax capacity of the latter after the passage of the above two years, a fact

⁸ English title: «The Berat [berath] on the tax regime of Tinos after the Ottoman conquest (1719)».

attributed to the departure of a large number of wealthy families from the island after the Ottoman conquest to either Italian territories or the Castle of Naxos. Regarding this issue, on the basis of two Ottoman archival documents of the year 1719, he considers the concession of a *berat* by the Ottoman authorities at the request of Tinos envoys for the reduction of the annual tax and the privilege of the tax collection by part of the Tinian community.


In conclusion, Tinos was the only Venetian possession left in the Archipelago from the second half of the 16th century onwards. The above presented essays of the volume compose a panorama of the role of Tinos in the armed conflicts between the Venetian Republic and the Ottoman Empire (from the Third Venetian–Ottoman War [1537–1540] to the Second Morean War [1714–1718]), as well as their consequences on the local society and economy. In some of them, the authors studied the raids and the activity of pirates and corsairs, the migration of the Tinians, as well as the changes that marked the area due to the passage of Tinos from the Venetian to the Ottoman rule. A special place was reserved for the Ottoman invasion and conquest of the island (1715). These essays are scientifically sound original contributions, based on primary sources.

STATTHIS BIRTACHAS

GILLES GRIVAUD (Ed.), WITH THE COLLABORATION OF EVANGELIA SKOUFARI,

*Venice and the Defence of the Regno di Cipro.
Giulio Savorgnan's Unpublished Cyprus Correspondence
(1557–1570), including Ascanio Savorgnan's Descrittione
delle cose di Cipro from the Collections of the Bank
of Cyprus Cultural Foundation*

Translated from the French by Joe Cunningham,
Nicosia, The Bank of Cyprus Cultural Foundation, 2016, pp. 684.



The author of the book, Gilles Grivaud, is a Professor of Medieval History at the Université de Rouen Normandie. He has systematically dealt with the social, economic and military history of Cyprus under its various Latin overlords (Franks and Venetians) and has published a large number of relative studies. Especially noteworthy are his important publications regarding the military organization of Cyprus. They deal with the ways in which the feu-

dal cavalry and the mercenary bands of stradioti light cavalry were organized and managed, the dispatch of Venetian engineers and military experts to the island in order to inspect and improve its defenses, and the overall military preparations of Venice aimed at facing the imminent Ottoman invasion. The events of the War of Cyprus (1570–1571) are analyzed in detail in an extensive chapter that he wrote for the *Iστορία της Κύπρου* [History of Cyprus], Vol. 6, a collective work which has come out as part of the publications of the Archbishop Makarios III Foundation.¹ The study in question enumerates, in chronological order, the military preparations of both Venetians and Ottomans, the military tactics and operations after the Ottoman forces had landed in the Saline of Larnaca (1570), the sieges of Nicosia and Famagusta, and the impact of the War on the two warring parties and on the local population.

The book presented here lies within the scope of the author's research into the defense organization of Cyprus during the final decades of Venetian rule. It focuses on the edition of the letters written by two important Venetian military experts, the brothers Ascanio and Giulio Savorgnan, who were sent to the island to inspect its defense organization and propose solutions either to improve existing fortifications or to construct new ones. At the same time, the author examines a series of letters written by other individuals who were also involved in this process. In addition, the book gives an appraisal of Giulio's moral, intellectual and technical education in order to shed light on some of the principles he used in his work in Cyprus, particularly in Nicosia. The analysis of the correspondence he sent from Cyprus, and the references in later writing, allow a better appreciation of Giulio's personality and character traits, which is essential to fully understanding his contribution to late-Renaissance military architecture.

Originally, the study was based on a manuscript kept in the Archive of the Bank of Cyprus Cultural Foundation (BCCF B-197) which describes the situation that prevailed in Cyprus shortly before the invasion of the Ottoman forces (1570). The manuscript contains the report of Ascanio Savorgnan, who visited the island in 1562 along with his brother, Giulio. After the two experts conducted an on-the-spot investigation of the military organization of Cyprus, Ascanio drafted the report in question. He was the younger brother of Giulio, the military engineer who

1 Gilles GRIVAUD, «Η κατάκτηση της Κύπρου από τους Οθωμανούς», in Theodoros PAPADOPOULOS (Ed.), *Iστορία της Κύπρου*, Vol. 6, *Τουρκοκρατία*, Nicosia, Archbishop Makarios III Foundation / Office for Cyprus History, 2011, pp. 1-182.

planned the star-shaped enceinte of Nicosia.

The aim of Grivaud is to bring to light, through the publication and analysis of the letters of the two military experts, the organization of the defenses of the Venetian possession of Cyprus prior to the War of 1570–1571, their proposals on how better to fortify the island, the relative decisions of the Venetian administration, the military preparations and, finally, the evolution of the fortification of Nicosia under the guidance of Giulio Savorgnan during the period 1567–1570.

The introduction of the book contains a detailed presentation of the Savorgnan family history. They were part of the Friulian aristocracy from the High Middle Ages right up to the Napoleonic era and, after 1385, they developed close ties to the Republic of St Mark. It was then that Federico Savorgnan sought to insinuate himself into the Venetian patriciate, but failed to receive the title of Venetian nobility. Nevertheless, his family's position in Friuli became stronger – even more so when the region came under the control of the Serenissima (1420). Apparently, the efforts to integrate the family into the social elite of Venice went on, since Federico's son, Francesco, married Agnese, sister of Nicolò Marcello, who elected doge in 1473. However, as no children were born from this marriage, it did not lead to the Savorgnans being accepted into Venice's patrician circles.

Throughout the fifteenth century, on several occasions Venice utilized the services of the Savorgnan family, appointing some of its members in military positions: in 1487, when Nicolò Savorgnan del Torre was appointed captain of the militia (cernide); after that, the latter's son, Antonio, took care of recruiting and paying soldiers' wages during the war against the League of Cambrai (1508–1511) etc.

Extensive reference is made to the history of the family during the sixteenth century. Girolamo Savorgnan, father of the two military experts at the center of Grivaud's research interest, and his offsprings are selected for special mention. In 1508, Girolamo participated in the operations to push back the offensive of Emperor Maximilian I in the Cadore Valley, paving the way for new Venetian conquests in eastern Friuli, and for this the Signoria rewarded him with an annuity, the rank of collateral-general and the castle of Belgrado that had been taken from the enemy. In the following year, the Venetian Senate appointed him ambassador to Switzerland in order to recruit mercenaries there; furthermore, he was awarded with the title of supernumerary senator, an act that sparked off a negative reaction among the Venetian patriciate. However, his most important contribution to the organization of the military forces of Venice took place during the war of 1514. It

was then that Girolamo, who was with the military forces under his command in Osoppo, kept the troops of the Holy Roman Empire pinned down for six weeks, giving Venice the opportunity to recapture Udine and reoccupy nearly all of Friuli. This decisive resistance at Osoppo was a confirmation of Girolamo's skills as a military tactician and he was regarded as a loyal defender of Venice and its interests, which rewarded him with significant amounts of money.

As regards the family circumstances of Girolamo, the latter concluded three marriages within a short period of time (1493–1508) and fathered 12 children, nine of whom died young. In 1509 he concluded his fourth and final marriage, to the Venetian patrician lady Orsina di Girolamo Canal, with whom he fathered another 12 children, among them Ascanio and Giulio. Girolamo eventually died on March 30, 1529 in Venice.

Several of his sons filled military posts, thus following in their father's footsteps. Girolamo steered his sons towards a military career, in accordance with a seigneurial tradition that respected and aspired to the prestige of military leadership, which was even more pertinent to the Savorgnans, given that their family estates were located in a border area where armed combat was an essential duty. During their childhood, therefore, the boys were trained extensively in combat techniques, military tactics, offensive and defensive strategy. Giulio, Mario, Marcantonio and Ascanio joined the armies of Venice, while others offered their services to the duke of Ferrara and the king of France, such as Germanico and Ascanio as condottieri, taking advantage of the opportunities now presented by the Italian Wars, which enabled aristocratic elites to gain new titles in sphere outside Venetian politics.

As for Giulio Savorgnan, he was born in Osoppo on November 11, 1510. At an early age he served in the military forces of the Serenissima against the Holy Roman Empire in the Lombardy Wars, led by the duke of Urbino, Francesco Maria della Rovere, and allied with the French. He was also present during the capture of Lodi and Cremona (1526), and took part in various battles from Lombardy to Tuscany and Rome. Furthermore, the Venetian government posted him to its military forces in Friuli, where he remained until 1539. Then, for six years Giulio was posted to Dalmatia, where he was occupied with the fortification works conducted in Zara. Taking advantage of the experience he acquired while working on fortifications, in 1549 he oversaw the organization of the defenses of Peschiera, on Lake Garda. Subsequently, he was appointed governor in Corfu from 1551 to

1553, and he lived in Friuli until 1562, undertaking various assignments in Padua and Bergamo. In the summer of 1562, he received orders from the Senate to go to Cyprus and inspect its defenses. When this mission was accomplished, he settled on Crete for four years (1562–1566), then on Dalmatia (1566–1567) and finally returned to Cyprus, where he stayed from June 1567 to the summer of 1569 in order to oversee work on the island's fortifications in the face of an imminent Ottoman invasion.

In the case of Cyprus, for the first time Giulio was awarded by the Venetian Senate the privilege of absolute freedom in making decisions and acting upon them. In 1570 he was appointed governor-general of Dalmatia and in 1571 he was elevated to the rank of governor of the Venice Lido soldiers where he contributed to the organization of the defenses of the Venetian Lagoon. He reached the highest point of his military career in 1587, when he was appointed superintendent-general of Venice's artillery and fortress. He worked as consultant on defensive architecture and he contributed to the design of a project which he wished to work on for a long time, the Palmanova fortress (1593). Giulio became an expert on fortifications, and his opinion was sought on projects all across the Terraferma: in Padua (1548), in Peschiera (1549, 1557), in Verona (1557) and in Bergamo (1561); then, apart from the Italian Peninsula, in Zara (1547, 1566), on Corfu (1557, 1566), on Candia (1557, 1565, 1566) and on Cyprus (1557, 1558, 1562). His military career came to an end with his death at the age of 85 (July 15, 1595). After his death, the government honored him with an official funeral in the Santi Giovanni e Paolo church in Venice.

Ascanio Savorgnan was the seventh child of Girolamo and was born around 1520. Very little is known regarding his education. However, he probably received a combination of education in literature and in martial arts. In 1549, Ascanio developed close links to Ercole II of Este, duke of Ferrara, resulting in him joining the military forces of Ferrara, where he served alongside his brother, Germanico. In 1557 he entered the French court and fought in the French ranks against the Holy Roman Empire. Later, in 1560, he settled in Venice and two years later he went to Cyprus with his brother Giulio for the purpose of checking the organization of its defenses. After the War of Cyprus (1570–1571), Ascanio lived the life of a courtier and, at the age of 58, he married Bianca Giustinian (October 15, 1580), daughter of Giovani Battista, the Venetian procurator of St Mark. This marriage offered him the opportunity to attach himself to a powerful patrician family and

to rise socially in the Venetian metropolis. Ascanio eventually died on the night of October 2, 1581, when his nephew, Germanico, savagely assassinated his uncle in the parlor of the Santi Cosma and Damiano monastery, in Giudecca in Venice, while the latter was visiting his sister, Felicita, a nun.

The first part of the book presents three letters by Giulio Savorgnan that pertain to the defense of Cyprus and were written between 1557 and 1558. The fourth and final letter of this part expounds the views of Venetian officials Sforza Pallavicino (condottiere and governator-general of the Venetian armies), Girolamo Martinengo (condottiere) and Astore Baglioni (condottiere) on the fortification of Cyprus. All three military experts agree that, due to the military supremacy of the Ottoman Empire, an assault on Cyprus would be difficult to deter. Therefore, the necessary decisions should be reached for construction work on fortifications to begin in various cities with a view to protecting them and ensuring the security of the local population.

The second part presents the exploratory mission of Giulio Savorgnan to Cyprus between June 9 and September 29, 1562. As it has already been noted, in the summer of 1562, having received orders from the Venetian Senate, Giulio and Ascanio Savorgnan went to Cyprus to inspect the kingdom's defenses. An analysis of the letters and reports sent from Cyprus by Giulio in 1562 demonstrate his capacity to fulfill as precisely as possible the series of duties he had been given. Giulio met Venice's expectations providing exact measurements of the enceintes and moats, and giving detailed reflections on the nature of the ground and the coastline. With regard to the fortification of Famagusta, he believed that, for an imminent attack to be pushed back, a significant amount of fortification work had to be done on the fortress, which also meant spending large sums of money. After his sojourn in Famagusta (July 22 – August 9, 1562), Giulio went to Kyrenia, where, on August 15, he penned three letters concerning the city's fortification project. These epistles were sent to the doge Girolamo Priuli (1559–1567), to Sforza Pallavicino and to the provveditori alle fortezze. Giulio claimed that the castle of Kyrenia could be used to build a new enceinte with a rectangular perimeter, around four kilometers long, and equipped with six bastions. At the same time, he proposed to the provveditori alle fortezze the further fortification of the city of Paphos.

The third part of the work includes the publication of the original report of Ascanio Savorgnan (*Descrittione delle cose di Cipro*), compiled during the summer of 1562, as well as photographic evidence documenting the entire archive depos-

ited in the Bank of Cyprus Cultural Foundation. In 1562, Ascanio followed his brother Giulio on the mission entrusted to the latter by Venice, to inspect the island's fortifications. It was most probably Giulio who took the initiative of bringing his younger brother with him on his expedition. Maybe he wanted Ascanio to gain further experience in the field of fortification or to have his sibling with him as an advisor on technical problems related to military architecture. Ascanio wrote two dispatches: the first, dated June 25, 1562 in Famagusta, concerns the state of the latter town's *enceinte*, while the second, written on August 8, 1562 in Kyrenia, deals with the castle overlooking the harbor. He proposed the fortification of two or three sites, where local geomorphological conditions would favor the construction of defenses within a short period of time and at a reasonable cost. He then recommended stockpiling as many crops as possible at these sites and destroying whatever cannot be transported, in addition to rendering the water reserves unusable. Ascanio also added a description of the island, referring to its regional environment and the physical particularities of its eleven administrative districts. Ascanio considered seven potential sites and intended to examine their respective qualities in order to decide which was best suited to a fortification project. In addition, Ascanio made references to the island's population, at the same time posing the question of whether they should possibly be equipped with weapons – a policy which he himself thought to be unwise.

Three copies of the aforementioned report of Ascanio were produced within a short period of time. The first was produced in Venice by Giovanni Rossi/o who made emendations to Ascanio's text; the copy in question was delivered (on May 16, 1564) to Giudobaldo II Della Rovere, one of the Signoria's leading military chiefs and son of Francesco Maria, the duke of Urbino. The second copy was completed a month later, on June 8, and delivered to Gabriele Capodilista, a member of the Paduan aristocracy. On July 25 of the same year, the last copy was sent to Francesco de' Medici, the grand duke of Tuscany. No further copies of Ascanio's report were produced until the beginning of the War of Cyprus (1570). However, several copies of the report were printed after the War, due to its large impact. The copy preserved in the Bank of Cyprus Cultural Foundation (catalogue n. B-197) is one of the series of copies Francesco Marcaldi implemented during the autumn of 1573 (November 20). The dedicatory letter is addressed to Cosmo Cini, an unknown figure from a family of wool merchants living in Pisa. Cosmo was the son of Giovan Battista Cini, a man of letters who was part of the entourage of Cosi-

mo de' Medici. The final and most extensive part of the work contains an edition of 58 letters written by Giulio Savorgnan. They were sent to notable personages of Venice, as well as to various authorities and officials of its state apparatus, and deal with the construction of fortifications that took place during the period when Giulio was in Cyprus (1567–1570). Furthermore, it analyzes 37 letters written by other individuals, such as Sforza Pallavicino, commander in chief of Venice's army, the doge Girolamo Priuli, Marco Michiel, captain of Famagusta, Francesco Barbaro, Proveditor-General, Giacomo de Nores, count of Tripoli, Eugenio Singlitico, count of Rochas, the archbishop of Cyprus Filippo Mocenigo etc. These letters highlight: the state of the defense organization of Cyprus prior to the Ottoman attack, the views held by military experts with regard to fortifying the island and their relevant proposals to the administration, as well as the positions of the island's upper class who fervently supported the view that the fortifications of Nicosia should be strengthened – an opinion which was diametrically opposed to those of Giulio Savorgnan and the other Venetian military experts. Finally, the author publishes the decrees of the Venetian administration pertaining to the evolution of the defense organization of Cyprus.

In conclusion, Gilles Grivaud's book is a significant contribution to the study of the military history of the later Venetian period in Cyprus and, more specifically, of the fortifications that were planned and constructed on the island during the final decade before the War of Cyprus (1570–1571) by Giulio Savorgnan, the Venetian state's military engineer who had a lead role in this effort. The author not only did he provide a critical edition and commentary of important unpublished documents on the subject, but he also placed them within the wider context of the defensive works and practices of the Republic of St Mark in the Venetian hinterland and the Mediterranean basin. Particular emphasis was placed on the evolution of the fortifications of Nicosia, constructed in the period 1567–1570 under the guidance of Giulio Savorgnan, as well as on the involvement of other military officials, the Cypriot aristocracy and the Venetian authorities, both local and metropolitan. In addition, the publication comes with an updated bibliography and a wide variety of photographic material.

KOSTAS G. TSIKNAKIS (ED.),


Η απήχηση της Ναυμαχίας της Ναυπάκτου στον ευρωπαϊκό κόσμο.

Πρακτικά της επιστημονικής συνάντησης

(Ναύπακτος, 13 Οκτωβρίου 2012)

[= The impact of the naval Battle of Lepanto on the European world. Proceedings of the scientific meeting (Nafpaktos, 13 October 2012)]

Athens and Venice, Hellenic Institute of Byzantine and Post-Byzantine Studies
in Venice – Demetrios and Aegli Botsaris Foundation, 2013, pp. 258.



This volume includes the proceedings of a scientific meeting on the impact on the European world of the naval battle of Lepanto that took place on October 7, 1571, near Echinades islands (Curzolari in the Venetian dialect), a group of islands in the Ionian Sea, off the coast of Acarnania, between

the fleets of the Holy League, a coalition of Catholic states arranged by Pope Pius V, and of the Ottoman Empire. It is the common effort of significant researchers from Greece, Italy and Spain, with Kostas Tsiknakis as editor. Tsiknakis, Functional Researcher (A) at the National Hellenic Research Foundation / Institute of Historical Research, is the author of many essays regarding the Venetian–Ottoman wars, the participation of the Greeks in them, as well as the revolutionary movements that manifested in the Hellenic territories during these wars.

In her opening speech (pp. 13-14), Chryssa Maltezou, former Director of the Hellenic Institute of Byzantine and Post-Byzantine Studies in Venice, and an Academy of Athens Member today, notes the following. After the naval battle of Lepanto, the sultan reportedly told the Venetian ambassador in Constantinople: «Destroying our fleet in Lepanto, you Christians only managed to uproot a single hair of our beards, while we, detaching Cyprus from your rule, cut off an arm». Indeed, the victory of the allied Christian forces against the invincible Ottoman fleet was a short-lived episode, and its protagonists, especially the Venetian Republic, failed to redeem it militarily and politically to the expected degree. Nevertheless, on a symbolic level the military victory of Christianity against Islam was of great importance and was celebrated with great pomp in Europe. According to Fernand Braudel, this is the military event of the 16th century with the greatest impact in the Mediterranean, a huge flame that we still see shining, despite the distance of centuries that separates us.

The volume includes the following studies.

Ioannis Hassiotis («Ιδεολογικές επιβιώσεις της ναυμαχίας της Ναυπάκτου στον ισπανικό κόσμο»¹, pp. 17-51), a diligent researcher of the Spanish archives with a great contribution to the study of the Greek's role at the age of the naval battle of Lepanto, as well as their connections with the Spanish and Venetian information networks of the time, examines the historical processes by which Lepanto, mythologized or demythologized, was used in the political symbolism of Spain from the day after the naval battle to the present day. The choice of the Spanish case is due to the fact that Lepanto occupies a special place in the ideological trends that have taken place in the Spanish world, and often in the wider Spanish-speaking world. According to the author, in Italy, too, each province also claimed its share of the glory of the naval battle; but, of course, until

¹ English title: «Ideological endurance of the naval battle of Lepanto in the Spanish world».

the Risorgimento its ideological uses had, in contrast to Spain, a less Italian and more local character. The same is concern Venice – which, of course, presented the most productive and brilliant depiction of the naval battle, especially in literature and art; but also the Holy See, the case of which stands out because of its supranational priorities.

Kostas Tsiknakis («Η ναυμαχία της Ναυπάκτου και οι επαναστατικές κινήσεις στον ελληνικό χώρο»², pp. 53-89) investigates the revolutionary movements in the Hellenic territories under Ottoman rule, which had already begun to break out before the naval battle of Lepanto. The victory of the Christian forces, however, triggered – in most cases at the instigation of Venice – a revolutionary wave that spread to a great part of the Hellenic regions (from Morea, Central Greece and Thessaly to the Northern Epirus and Macedonia, in the Aegean islands from Imbros to the Dodecanese, as well as on the coasts of Asia Minor). The limited support by the Venetians, however, but also the general procrastination of the Christian forces were destructive for the insurgents: it is estimated that the victims of the Ottoman repression amounted to about 30,000 souls, while the number of captives remains unclear. In addition, the Ottomans reorganized their armed forces, significantly strengthening the garrisons in their possessions and taking administrative measures in Morea, which had been the epicenter of the uprising. The anti-Venetian climate, which began to grow after the described developments, benefited the Spanish rivals, who sent spies to some of the above areas in order to promote their interests in the East.

Gino Benzoni («E dopo? Tra mitizzazione e disincanto»³, pp. 91-109) makes an overall assessment of the Fourth Venetian–Ottoman War (1570–1573) from the Venetian point of view. According to him, it should be noted the conscious adoption of a double register by the Venetians: that of glorification of the Lepanto's triumph, of its memorization as eternal, of its mythization; and, at the same time, that of the disenchanted consideration in terms of the final balance. In other words, we could talk about a joyful pride for the battle of Lepanto and the defeat of the enemy, immediately targeted in Venice and from Venice by jokes, sneers, parodies etc.; and, simultaneously, about the attention to the disappointing prog-

2 English title: «The naval battle of Lepanto and the revolutionary movements in the Hellenic territories».

3 English title: «And then? Between mythicization and disenchantment».

ress of the war, the failure to continue the pressing offensive, the shortcomings of the command, the overwhelming stagnation of operations, the dissensions on the same operational theater, the unresolved differences between the Christian allies and the jam that these caused. The Venetian–Ottoman peace is signed under very harsh conditions for the *Serenissima*: definitive loss of Cyprus; payment, within three years, of 300 thousand ducats as compensation for the war expenses incurred by the Sublime Porte; increase to 1,500 ducats of the annual tax for maintaining the possession of Zakynthos (Zante); restoration, in Dalmatia and Albania, of the pre-conflict borders with consequent revocation of the Venetian advancements during the war. In the final analysis, the Venetians appeared to have been crushed by the Ottomans, whom they had defeated at Lepanto.

According to Eusebi Ayensa («The naval battle of Nafpaktos (1571) and its significance in the history and literature of Catalonia», pp. 111-122), we need do acknowledge that the involvement of Catalonia in the planning as well as the control of the Christian fleet during the naval battle of Lepanto was undoubtedly crucial. Actually, several of the galleys that fought were Catalan, commanded by Catalan admirals. For this reason, in the Catalan historiography of the Romantic period the Christian victory in Lepanto depicted as the last major achievement of the Catalans in the East, after the legendary campaign of the Almogavars in the Duchies of Athens and Neopatras in the Hellenic territories (14th century). The author focuses on the most significant Catalan official who participated in the battle of Lepanto: Luis de Requesens. Due to the young age of John of Austria, the latter became the true leader of the fleet (although officially Requesens was ranked as second in command). Ayensa's research is based on a thorough examination of Requesens' personal archive, kept in the National Archive of Catalonia at the city of Sant Cugat des Vallès. Furthermore, the author highlights some Catalan literary texts on the battle of Lepanto, with emphasis to the extensive epic poem *Lepant*, by Joan Pujol (Barcelona 1573).

The religious, military and maritime Order of Santo Stefano (St. Stephen) was established in Pisa by Duke Cosimo I de' Medici with the aim to protect the trade on the Tuscan coast and to defend the Tuscany against the naval attacks of the Ottomans and the North African corsairs. In this context, the administration of Tuscany had decided to put its twelve galleys, five of which belonging to the Knights of Santo Stefano, under the Pope's order in the naval battle of Lepanto. The Knights stationed as fighting men not only on the Order's own vessels, but

also on the other seven Tuscan galleys. Christine Pennison («The Grand duchy of Tuscany's contribution to the battle of Lepanto and, in particular, that of the Order of the Knights of St. Stephen. A preliminary survey of sources in the archive of the Order», pp. 123-136) presents in detail their contribution to the battle, based on a series of sources from the Order's archive (Archivio di Stato di Pisa, *Ordine dei Cavalieri di S. Stefano*).

The oracular, prophetic and prognostic literature was very popular in the West and in the East at the time of the naval battle of Lepanto. Antonio Rigo («Profetizzare Lepanto»⁴, pp. 139-156) explores Greek texts of this genre. In particular, analyzes the relevant works of Zacharias Skordylis and Georgios Klontzas.

As mentioned earlier, Venice presented the most productive and brilliant depiction of the naval battle of Lepanto in literature and art. Indeed, this historical event was celebrated in a climate of triumph with large processions, liturgies and folk festivals, was a source of inspiration for Venetian creators and left its mark on many literary and dramatic genres: plays, poems, lyric songs, etc. usually dedicated to officials of the Venetian fleet. Gogo Varzelioti («Δραματουργικά και λογοτεχνικά κείμενα στον απόνχο της ναυμαχίας της Ναυπάκτου. Η περίπτωση του Antonio Molino»⁵, pp. 157-165) presents the case of the well-known playwright Antonio Molino, also known as Burchiella, who wrote works belonging to a short-lived literary genre, the “military comedy” (*commedia stradiotesca*). His lyrics are written in a mixed literary idiom (i.e. in a hybrid literary language, created by the introduction of Greek words or phrases in the Venetian dialect) and narrate the adventures of Manoli Blessi, *stradioto* in the service of the *Serenissima*, who fights in the context of the Venetian–Ottoman warfare. The author points out those works of Molino that refer to the naval battle of Lepanto.

Maria Kazanaki-Lappa («Το Κουμπατιμέντο Κουρτζουλαρίου. Οι απεικονίσεις της ναυμαχίας της Ναυπάκτου στη μεταβυζαντινή ζωγραφική»⁶, pp. 167-186) investigates the depiction of the naval battle of Lepanto in the work of two painters

4 English title: «Prophesize Lepanto».

5 English title: «Dramaturgical and literary works in the aftermath of the Battle of Lepanto. The case of Antonio Molino».

6 English title: «*The Battle of Curzolari [= Echinades] islands*. The depictions of the naval battle of Lepanto in post-Byzantine painting».

from Crete: Michail Damaskenos and Georgios Klontzas. According to the author, the examined icons reflect the ideological positions of Venice and express the general belief that the fact of the collapse of the invincible Ottoman fleet was a proof of divine favor and encouragement for the fulfillment of the Christians' expectations. From the part of the art history, they reflect the renewal efforts of Damaskenos and Klontzas for the merging of the Byzantine tradition with the art of the Renaissance and Mannerism, in the most interesting moment of the phenomenon we call today the Cretan Renaissance.

Panayotis Ioannou's essay [«Η ναυμαχία της Ναυπάκτου στα έργα των ζωγράφων Αντώνιου Βασιλάκη (l'Aliense), Βελισσάριου Κορένσιου (Belisario Corenzi) και Δομήνικου Θεοτοκόπουλου (El Greco)»⁷, pp. 187-210] focuses on works by three emblematic Greek painters, who were active in the Italian and / or Iberian Peninsula during the time of the military operations in Lepanto and immediately after the naval battle, when a large number of orders on the subject of the naval battle were carried out. From these orders a varied iconography was formed, which contributed to the consolidation and comprehension of the mythology of Lepanto and which concerned issues related to the preparation and conclusion of the Holy League, the naval battle itself (the formation of the fleets, their conflict, the phases of the battle), the protagonists, the allies and the heroes (but also the enemies), as well as the glorification of victory, its remembrance and the worship associated with it.

The enthusiasm for the victory of the Holy League in Lepanto led to the composition, immediately after the naval battle, of a large number of poems and other compositions, songs, honorary speeches, exhortations, prayers and psalms to honor the contributors to the Christian victory. A few of them were works by first-rate poets. Most of them were printed in Venice, usually not in the best printing houses, and the rest mainly in Italy. They circulated as individual pamphlets, which, in addition to texts, often included woodcuts or simpler decorations. Charis Calliga («Εντυπα φυλλάδια με ποιήματα για τη ναυμαχία της Ναυπάκτου στις συλλογές της Γενναδείου Βιβλιοθήκης»⁸, pp. 211-224) presents pamphlets

7 English title: «The Battle of Lepanto in the work of the painters Antonio Vassilacchi (l'Aliense), Belisario Corenzi and Domenikos Theotokopoulos (El Greco)».

8 English title: «Printed pamphlets with poems about the Battle of Lepanto in the collections of the Gennadius Library».

of this genre, which he found in the Gennadius Library of the American School of Classical Studies at Athens.

Finally, in the appendix of the volume Despoina Vlassi [«Περιγραφή της ναυμαχίας της Ναυπάκτου από τον Βενετό Girolamo Diedo (31 Δεκεμβρίου 1571)»⁹, pp. 227-258] republishes an extensive report written by the counsellor of Girolamo Diedo, on the orders of the Venetian bailo of Corfu Francesco Corner, and was addressed to the Venetian bailo in Constantinople. This report is a historical testimony, from the Venetian point of view, of the events that took place from the arrival of the Christian fleet in Corfu to its victory over the Ottoman fleet.

In conclusion, this collective volume presents a variety of perspectives and themes regarding the contribution of the Christian forces in the naval battle of Lepanto, as well as the impact of their victory on the Western European societies of the time, but also on historiography, literature and art to the present day. The essays of the authors are scientifically sound, and are either original contributions, based largely on primary sources, or attempts to re-read and re-interpret already known historical processes and phenomena.

STATHIS BIRTACHAS

9 English title: «Description of the naval battle of Lepanto by the Venetian Girolamo Diedo (December 31, 1571)».




Sir Kenelm Digby (1603–1665), an English diplomat, writer, thinker and privateer (or state-sponsored pirate). Source: Wikimedia Commons.

BASIL C. GOUNARIS,

*‘See how the Gods Favour Sacrilege’.
English Views and Politics on Candia under Siege
(1645–1669)*

Athens, Institute of History Research / NHRF, Department of Neohellenic Research, 2012, pp. 136.



The author of the book, Basil C. Gounaris, is a Professor of Modern History at the Aristotle University of Thessaloniki, Department of History and Archaeology. His research interests include British policy in the South-eastern Mediterranean from the 17th to the 19th century. A mature researcher of the British historical archives, Gounaris attempts a new approach to the Cretan War (1645–1669), an issue that is long-examined by a number of scholars in various disciplines. Indeed, leaving aside the military operations and the relative literary and historiographical production, as well as the study of the relationship between the two warring powers, Venice and the Ottoman Empire,

or the effects of war on local societies, the book fills an existing research gap: the study of the English views on the Cretan War, based mainly on evidence derived from British diplomatic records.

Thus, the author focuses on the political, economic and diplomatic history of the English monarchy, as well as on its relationship with the Venetian Republic and the Ottoman Empire during the Cretan War. He analyses the wider political, economic, social, ideological, and religious background of the involved parties, including the way European thought, public opinion and the diplomacy of the era perceived the Ottoman/Islamic image. He emphasizes the fundamental importance of the mercantile and economic conditions prevailing in the Eastern Mediterranean at that time in shaping the policies of the European powers.

The book consists of six chapters. The first chapter («*Currants and Malmsey*») presents the trade relations between Venice and England during the first decades of the 17th century. The main product that interested the English market was the famous wine of Crete (Malmsey). At the same time, the raisin trade in the Ionian Islands was booming. This commercial activity proved particularly lucrative for the Levant Company, which managed to gain a significant share of the Eastern trade market from the Venetian merchants. The contribution of England to the transport and circulation of these goods in the Mediterranean was also decisive to the detriment of Venetian interests. As for the reception of the Venetians by the English public opinion, it was undoubtedly positive. The *Serenissima* was, in fact, treated with admiration by the English, as it sought to reduce Spanish predominance in the Italian peninsula, and was generally welcomed in Protestant Europe because of its opposition to the Holy See during the Interdict controversy (1605–1607). The translations of Paolo Sarpi's works into English increased Venetian prestige dramatically. Furthermore, the majority of English society considered Venice as the stronghold of Europe in the struggle against the Ottomans. Nevertheless, due to the English activity in the Eastern Mediterranean (for the most part under Ottoman rule), many English merchants formed relations with the Ottomans Empire and traded favorably with them. According to the author, the possibility of making high profits and the multiculturalism of the Mediterranean fascinated and frightened these English merchants at the same time.

The second chapter («*Venice between King and Parliament*») examines the diplomatic relations between Venice, on the one hand, and the monarch and the

Parliament of England, on the other; relations that had a determinant influence on economic transactions and trade agreements during the English Civil War (1642–1651) and the early years of the Cretan War. In particular, in 1642 the Levant Company Directors sought to persuade Parliament to vote in favor of ceasing raisin imports from the Ionian Sea, as the embargo would force Venice to reduce tariffs and benefit the English economy. If Venice did not bow to pressure, English traders would turn to the Ottoman Peloponnese, which at the time had begun to produce and export raisins. When the resolution was passed by the British Parliament, the Venetian ambassador in London, Giovanni Giustiniani, reacted by trying to convince those involved that England itself would suffer, as its trade with the East would be drastically reduced. Moreover, he turned to the rising Member of Parliament and Trade Commissioner Sir Henry Vane and tried to persuade him to cancel the above Parliamentary procedures. All these efforts were fruitless. Venice's sole hope was the king's veto. The Company Directors, however, wishing to avert any possibility of a veto, determined that the ordinance would be in force for only three years. This was accomplished due to the vulnerability of the central government at that time amidst the turmoil of the English Civil War. Notwithstanding, raisin imports from Venetian territory continued in Royal Bristol in 1643. As noted by Gounaris, despite Venice's support for the English monarch after the Royalists defeat at the Battle of Marston Moore, with the outbreak of the Cretan War (1645) his concern was to secure English ships against Ottoman aggression. He also raised the Ottomans' concerns about a potential partnership between Venice and the English Parliament, promoting the role and the activity of the Company as a clandestine supplier of the *Serenissima*. The king's aim was to further tax the Company's merchants operating in the Ottoman Empire and influencing the revolting Parliament. At the same time, the Parliament rejected Venice's request for the provision of troops and ships. Ultimately, English politics refrained from a direct involvement in the Cretan War, even when Chania and Rethymno were occupied by the Ottomans.

In the third chapter («For Christianity, trade and liberty»), the analysis shifts to the turbulent decade of the “English Republic”, when Oliver Cromwell (1653–1658) and his son Richard (1658–1659) were in power. At the time, the *Serenissima* was trying to promote an anachronistic argument to rally European forces, and of course to draw England into the common struggle against the “infidel” Ottomans: religious identities as a cause of rivalry. However, conditions in Europe after

the Thirty Years' War, the First Anglo-Dutch War (1652–1654) and the Anglo-Spanish War (1654–1660), gave prominence to a kind of English diplomacy, based primarily on its economic interests, which dictated the adoption of a neutral stance on the Eastern Mediterranean front. Although English diplomacy expressed its favor and kinship towards Venice at the first opportunity, both the Company's merchants and the English administration furtively negotiated with the Ottomans. The British were therefore primarily interested in securing their highly lucrative trading activities and free navigation – without the harassment of pirates – in the already war-torn waters of the Eastern Mediterranean. The author points out that of course, for their part, the Venetians always hoped for a diplomatic incident to arise as a consequence of the activity of the Algerian and Tunisian pirates – tacitly tolerated by the Ottomans – to the detriment of English interests in the region, a fact that would force the English to join in the conflict against the Ottomans.

The fourth chapter («A royal arbitration of peace») focuses on the complex and changing diplomatic relations of the tripartite group of England, the Venetian Republic and the Ottoman Empire, during the period of the restoration of the English monarchy. As mentioned above, although England was sympathetic to Venice, it was not in position to disrupt the policy of neutrality and to openly express a favorable attitude towards it and actively assist it. England's main concern was to protect the English merchant ships from Venetian intrusion (inspections), on the one hand, and from the pirate raids. Consequently, English diplomacy reached an agreement with both powers. The replacement of the English Ambassador at the Sublime Porte Sir Thomas Bendysh by Sir Heneage Finch, Earl of Winchilsea, which was due to the restoration of the English monarchy, affected relations with the Venetian *bailo* in Constantinople. By seeking to mediate between the rival powers, Venice and the Ottoman Empire, and by competing with the latter, Finch jeopardized the English diplomatic policy mentioned earlier and strained the relations of the English Crown with the Venetian *bailo* as well as with the Ottoman authorities. Thus, the already fragile neutrality was at risk of being broken at the first opportunity.

In the fifth chapter («Long rigmaroles of words») Gounaris explains the reasons that eventually led to de-escalation. English diplomatic policy, realistic as it was, became aware of the impasse of the Cretan War and its impending negative outcome for the Venetians; therefore, it sought to negotiate and mediate between

the two long-warring parties at the request of the *Serenissima*. On the other hand, of course, the vague promises made by the English monarch for immediate intervention on the Cretan front in support of the Venetians were unfounded and were merely an effort to impress or even to reassure the monarch's own fears of possible Dutch involvement, which in turn could bring about the involvement of other European forces, such as France. In any case, the end of the Second Anglo-Dutch War (1665–1667) combined with pressure from the Levant Company, which was interested in securing its interests in the Eastern Mediterranean basin, forced English diplomacy to remain neutral and conciliatory. This policy was maintained until the fall of Chandax (Candia) and the end of the Cretan War. After the war, England renewed its capitulations with the Ottoman Empire, as well as its intention to maintain good relations with Venice.

The sixth chapter («Religion and state interests»), which essentially summarizes the main argument developed in the previous chapters, emphasizes the interdependence between the religious element and state interests (diplomatic and economic). It is clarified at this point that England, mainly for religious, cultural, and ideological reasons, was unable to proceed to a direct and official partnership with the Ottoman Empire; at the same time, however, its state and commercial interests (namely those of the Levant Company) did not allow England to openly and actively align itself with the Venetian camp. In short, it seems that the economic reasons and conditions that prevailed in the European political scene after the religious wars and the overseas European expansion – practices in which the English were already directly engaged – imposed a more lucid and realistic approach on English diplomacy, free from religious zeal and ideological enthusiasm: from then on, it would not be possible to revive the old crusade of Western Christianity against the “infidels”. On the contrary, a new era of complex, changing and pragmatic diplomatic ventures begun to emerge for the dynastic states of Europe.

The work is accompanied by an extensive bibliography, a summary in Greek and a detailed index of names and thematic terms.

Undoubtedly, the book is a unique contribution and helps to broaden the European perspective on the Cretan War, whose significance for international relations was multifaceted. The primary diplomatic sources from the British state archives (official decrees, committee records, correspondence with the consular



This view of Candia was published by Nicolaes Visscher I (1618–1679). Visscher may have based the print on work by Jan Janssonius (1588–1664).

Source: Wikimedia Commons.

authorities, calendars, etc.), widely used by the author, shed light on the diplomatic processes among London, Venice and Constantinople during the Cretan War, in the context of the English stormy political scene. In addition, attempting to delve into the ideological background and stereotypes related to the religious scope of the conflict in the Eastern Mediterranean, which directly or indirectly influenced the policies of the parties involved, the author also examines printed sources that resonated with European public opinion, such as newspapers, novels and literary works in general, etc.

THEOFANIS STOLTIDIS



Icon of the naval Battle of Curzolari (Echinades in Greek) islands, by the Cretan painter Georgios Klontzas, last decades of the 16th century; one of the most famous depictions of the naval Battle of Lepanto in post-Byzantine art. Courtesy of the National Historical Museum, Athens (cat. n. 3578).

Venetian-Ottoman Wars

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